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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Bell v. Bell [1897] ScotLR 34_634 (13 May 1897) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1897/34SLR0634.html Cite as: [1897] SLR 34_634, [1897] ScotLR 34_634 |
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Page: 634↓
[Sheriff of the Lothians.
Where, in an appeal from the Sheriff, the appellant, though printing the note of appeal, record, and interlocutors, had omitted to print the proof, in compliance with the A.S. 10th March 1870, sec. 3, and where he admitted that the omission was not due to inadvertence, held that the appeal was incompetent.
This was an appeal from a judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute of the Lothians (Hamilton), pronounced after a proof, dismissing an action of accounting and payment brought by Harold Fraser Bell against John Munro Bell.
The appeal was lodged with the Sheriff-Clerk on 22nd March 1897, and the process was transmitted to and received by the Clerk of Court on 24th March.
The appellant duly printed the appeal, record, and interlocutors, but did not print the proof.
In the Single Bills the respondent objected to the competency of the appeal, on the ground that the appellant, having failed to comply with the provisions of the A.S. 10th March 1870, sec. 3, must be held to have abandoned it.
The appellant explained at the bar that an action had been raised in the Court of Session covering the whole subject-matter of which the Sheriff Court action touched a part. He had accordingly intended when the appeal came up to move the Court to remit it ob contingentiam to the Lord Ordinary before whom the Court of Session action depended. He had therefore not printed the proof, but he had since been advised that such a motion would be incompetent, and he now proposed to proceed with the appeal m ordinary course.
The A.S. 10th March 1870, sec. 3, alters the course of proceeding prescribed by sec. 71 of the Court of Session Act 1868 to the following extent and effect:—“(2) The appellant shall during vacation, within fourteen days after the process has been received by the Clerk of Court, deposit with the said clerk a print of the note of appeal, record, interlocutors, and proof, if any, unless, within eight days after the process has been received by the clerk, he shall have obtained from the Lord Ordinary officiating on the bills an interlocutor dispensing
Page: 635↓
with printing in whole or in part, and the appellant shall, upon the box-day or sederunt-day next following the deposit of such print with the clerk, box copies of the same to the Court; and if the appellant shall fail within the said period of fourteen days to deposit with the Clerk of Court as aforesaid a print of the papers required … or to box or furnish the same as aforesaid on the box-day or sederunt-day next thereafter, he shall be held to have abandoned his appeal, and shall not be entitled to insist therein except upon being reponed as hereinafter provided.” Argued for the respondent—The appellant had urged no good reason for dispensing with the regulation of the Act of Sederunt. On the contrary, his explanation plainly showed that his failure to print the proof was deliberate and not due to inadvertence. That was sufficient to distinguish the case from Boyd, Gilmour, & Company v. Glasgow and South-Western Railway Company, November 16, 1888, 16 R. 104, where the decision proceeded on the ground that the omission was unintentional, and where Lord Rutherfurd Clark and Lord Lee both dissented from the principles laid down by Lord Young, upon which the appellant relied.
Argued for the appellant— Boyd, Gilmour, & Company, ut sup., showed that the Court had an absolute discretion in the matter, and Lord Young's opinion was all in favour of a liberal construction of Acts of Sederunt. The objection taken to the appeal was purely technical, and no one would be prejudiced if the appeal were proceeded with. The provision of the Act of Sederunt was ex facie an alteration of a statutory provision (authorised by section 106 of the Court of Session Act), and should not be interpreted as strictly as if it were a section of the statute itself. It was to be observed that section 71 prescribed totally different rules as to printing from the Act of Sederunt.
Lord President—Even if we were to assign no greater rigidity to the Act of Sederunt than was contended for by Mr Cooper, I still think that his request must be refused.
The Act of Sederunt at least lays down what is the rule of practice, and the decision which has been cited is not an exception to the following of the rule, but merely shows that where the spirit of the rule would not be carried out by a literal compliance with it owing to exceptional circumstances it will not be misapplied.
But the case cited was a case of inadvertence, and the appellant here is constrained to admit that he did advert to this point, but he had at that time a theory, which on better consideration he is obliged to abandon, that the Court might be successfully moved not to hear the appeal in ordinary course but to send it to a Lord Ordinary. He accordingly adverted to the duty of printing, and takes his chance of not complying with it. He is now proposing to follow out the appeal in ordinary course, and he is asking us to absolve him from the consequences, not of an accidental omission, but of a deliberate and calculated contravention of the rule applicable to appeals.
The Court pronounced the following interlocutor:—
“The Lords having heard counsel on the competency of the appeal, Sustain the objections thereto, dismiss the appeal, and find the defender and respondent entitled to £5, 5s. of modified expenses,” &c.
Counsel for the Appellant— Cooper. Agent— R. Ainslie Brown, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Respondent— R. Macaulay Smith. Agents— Lister, Shand, & Lindsay, S.S.C.