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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Niven v. Burgh of Ayr [1899] ScotLR 36_294 (18 January 1899)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1899/36SLR0294.html
Cite as: [1899] ScotLR 36_294, [1899] SLR 36_294

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 294

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Wednesday, January 18. 1899.

( Lord Stormonth Darling, Ordinary.

36 SLR 294

Niven

v.

Burgh of Ayr.

Subject_1Discharge
Subject_2Probative Writ Declaring Loan Paid without Express Words of Discharge.

Facts:

An action was raised by a creditor in a debenture bond against the debtor for payment of an instalment of the loan. The debtor founded upon an ex facie probative document, endorsed on the debenture, in these terms—“I, A B, in consideration of the sum of £100 now paid to me by C D [the debtor], being the balance of the contents of this debenture, and all interest due thereon, and I bind myself and my heirs, executors, and successors to warrant this discharge at all hands, and I have delivered up this mortgage to C D.—In witness whereof,” &c. The debenture had, as matter of fact, been delivered up to C D.

Held (rev. judgment of Lord Stormonth Darling) that this document, being tantamount to a discharge, must be reduced before the pursuer could obtain decree in her action.

Headnote:

This was an action raised by Miss Agnes Niven, Ayr, against the Provost, Magistrates, and Council of Ayr, concluding for payment of £100, being part of the sum contained in a debenture for £100 granted by the defenders in favour of the pursuer and her sisters on 1st April 1890.

The defenders averred that the amount of the debenture had been repaid by them in instalments to Matthew M'Kissock, who acted on behalf of the pursuer, and with whom the pursuer admitted that the debenture and interest warrants had been lodged. The defenders also produced and founded on five receipts endorsed on the debenture, and dated respectively, 18th March 1892, 19th September 1892, 13th April 1893, 11th November 1893, and 15th May 1895.

Page: 295

These receipts, with the exception of the third, all bore to be signed by Miss Niven, and to be duly tested. The third was signed by M. M'Kissock “for and on behalf of, and as authorised by the said Agnes Niven.”

The last was in the following terms—“ I, Agnes Niven, in consideration of the sum of £100 sterling now paid to me by the Provost, Magistrates, and Council of Ayr, being the balance of the contents of this debenture, and all interest due thereon, and I bind myself and my heirs, executors, and successors to warrant this discharge at all hands, and I have delivered up this mortgage to the said Provost, Magistrates, and Council.—In witness whereof, &c.

“A. Niven.”

The debenture had as a matter of fact been delivered up to the Magistrates.

With reference to these receipts, the pursuer averred that in the first two and the last two the pursuer's signiture, as well as those of the witnesses, was a forgery, and with reference to the third she averred that no authority was ever given by her to M'Kissock to uplift any part of the principal of the debenture. “No part of the principal sums contained in the said debentures has ever been paid by the defenders to the pursuer or her sisters, or to anyone authorised by them, or any of them, to receive payment thereof on her or their behalf. M'Kissock had no authority to hand the debentures to the defenders, and the pursuer was not aware until he absconded that that had been done. The said sum of £100 alleged to have been paid to M'Kissock on 13th April 1893 is the sum sued for in this action. It is due and resting-owing to the pursuer under said debenture for £400. All claims for payment of the remainder of the sums contained in the said debentures are reserved. The defenders are called upon to lodge them in process.”

The defenders pleaded, inter alia,—“3. The pursuer having granted to the defenders on 15th May 1895 a valid discharge for the £400 contained in the debenture of 1st May 1890, is bound to reduce said discharge before suing for payment of any part of the said £400.”

On 30th November 1898 the Lord Ordinary ( Stormonth Darling) repelled the third plea-in-law for the defenders, and allowed the parties a proof of their averments.

Opinion.—“The only question to be decided at this stage is that raised by the defenders' third plea-in-law, viz., Whether the pursuer is bound to reduce the so-called discharge of 15th May 1895, before suing for payment of any part of the sum of £400 contained in the debenture, No. 274. I repel that plea, because the writing in question is not a discharge. It has no discharging words. I shall therefore allow a proof.”

The defender reclaimed, and argued—The Lord Ordinary was wrong. The document of 15th May 1895 was to all intents and purposes a discharge, and therefore must be reduced before the pursuer could proceed with her action. The defenders were entitled to have the whole matter disposed of at once, and not piecemeal as the pursuer seemed to threaten.

Argued for the pursuer—If the document of 15th May were truly a valid discharge, it must be reduced. But it was no such thing. It was not a conclusive and valid discharge; it contained no formal discharging words; at the most it was a piece of evidence; and therefore reduction was unnecessary—Shand's Practice, p. 640. The question at stake here was purely one of practice.

Judgment:

Lord President—I am unable to agree with the Lord Ordinary in the view which he takes of this document, which, in order to adopt a neutral term, I shall describe as the document printed last in the appendix.

The pursuer sues under these circumstances. She is not possessed of the document which gives rise to her claim. It is possessed by her debtor, and her debtor produces not only the bond but along with it the document printed last in the appendix. Now, that document is a probative writ under the hand of the pursuer, and while it does not contain express words of discharge, it is at all events a declaration under her hand that this lady has received all the money which is due to her under the bond, and that she has handed over the bond to her former debtor. Now, the document being probative, it seems to me to contain a complete acquittance of the liability under the bond. The Lord Ordinary says quite justly that it does not contain words of discharge, but at the same time it has the legal effect of a discharge, if a creditor acknowledges by a probative writing that she has received all that is due to her, and that the possession of the bond by the debtor is through her act in consequence of her having so received payment. It appears to me that such a document if not properly called a discharge has all the force and effect of a discharge, and accordingly that this action cannot proceed without this document being got out of the way. As Mr Guthrie has intimated that he proposes to bring a reduction, I think that the proper course will be to remit to the Lord Ordinary to sist procedure to allow of an action of that kind being brought.

Lord Adam concurred.

Lord M'Laren—I should have thought that as soon as it appeared that the defence was in part rested upon a probative deed bearing to be an extinction of the obligation on which the action was founded, the pursuer would at once put herself in a right position by repeating a summons of reduction. That would be a very simple and inexpensive proceeding, because it does not involve opening up the record, but merely serving the summons and lodging it in process. I think that is a necessary and proper step, even in the most advanced view of simplicity, for without a summons it is impossible that a decree can be given in favour of the pursuer upon that particular

Page: 296

question. However, as your Lordships are content to leave this point open to consideration, I am willing that the case should go back to the Outer House.

Lord Kinnear—I am entirely of the same opinion. I think a probative writ by which a creditor under her hand acknowledges to have received payment of her whole debt, and in respect thereof to have delivered her document of debt to her debtor, is in law a discharge. It may be described, as your Lordship has observed, by some other term. But that it is a discharge in law, and may be properly called a discharge, I cannot say that I entertain any doubt. But whether it is properly called a discharge or not, it clearly presents an obstacle to the pursuer's demand, and until that obstacle is swept away she cannot possibly recover payment of her money, for as long as this document stands that would mean that she is entitled to have her debt paid twice over.

The Court recalled the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary, and “ in respect the pursuer states her intention to bring a reduction of the deed dated 15th May 1895,” remitted to the Lord Ordinary to sist process in order that this might be done.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Pursuer— Guthrie, Q.C. — Cook. Agents— Kinmont & Maxwell, W.S.

Counsel for the Defenders— Balfour, Q.C — Hunter. Agent— James Ayton, S.S.C.

1899


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