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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Bankes v. Anderson and Others [1899] ScotLR 36_936 (20 July 1899) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1899/36SLR0936.html Cite as: [1899] SLR 36_936, [1899] ScotLR 36_936 |
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Entail — Disentail — Entail Amendment Act 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 61), sec. 5, sub-sec. (2) — Averments as to Health of Heir in Possession — Process — Proof or Remit to Medical Man.
In a petition for authority to disentail an entailed estate, the three next heirs, who declined to give their consents to the disentail, and whose expectancies accordingly fell to be valued under the Entail Amendment Act of 1875, consented to the usual remits, suggested the name of the man of skill, and represented by their local agent accompanied him on his survey of the estate. They subsequently lodged objections to
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his report, maintaining that he had undervalued the property, specifying the particulars in which he had been mistaken, and moved for a proof. The Lord Ordinary (
Pearson ) having remitted of new to the man of skill to consider the objections put forward by the next heirs, the Court adhered, holding that, whatever might have been the case had the respondents originally demanded a proof, they were not in the circumstances entitled to depart from the mode of inquiry to which they had consented.Opinion (per Lord President) that the respondent in a petition to disentail, where the interests at stake are of a momentous nature, is entitled to a proof with regard to the value of the entailed estate if he comes forward at once and demands it, and that he should not be compelled to accept the opinion of a man of skill.
The respondents in a petition to disentail, presented by the heir in possession, made certain averments with regard to the petitioner's health as affecting the value of her interest in the estate. These averments were all founded upon present symptoms, and did not involve the previous history of the petitioner.
Held ( aff. judgment of Lord Pearson, and distinguishing the case of Macdonalds v. Macdonald, March 12, 1880, 7 R. (H.L.) 41) that while these averments were relevant, the proper mode of inquiring into their correctness was by means of a remit to a medical man to make an examination of the petitioner.
On 5th July 1898 Mrs Maria Ann Liot Bankes, heiress of entail in possession of Letterewe and Gruinard, presented a petition for authority to disentail these estates. The petitioner was born in 1839, and the deed of entail under which she held her estates was dated 31st March and 25th April 1883, and recorded in the Register of Tailzies on 18th June of the same year. The three next heirs entitled to succeed to the entailed estates were Mrs Ada Jane Bankes or Anderson and her two sons, all of whom were of full age and subject to no legal incapacity.
The petitioner averred—“The said Mrs Ada Jane Bankes or Anderson, Allan Meyrick Anderson, and Robert Holme Anderson have not as yet consented to this application, but the petitioner is prepared to pay the values of their expectancies or interests, as the same may be determined by your Lordships, in terms of the foresaid statutes in the event of their not consenting, or in the event of their consenting to this application she will produce in the course of the proceedings to follow hereon a deed or deeds of consent duly executed by them.”
The Entail Amendment (Scotland) Act 1875 (38 and 39 Vict. c. 61), sec. 5, sub-sec. (2) (to which the petitioner referred), enacts—“In the event of any of the foresaid heirs, except the nearest heir for the time, … declining or refusing to give … his consent, the Court may dispense with such consent in terms of the provisions following (that is to say), ( a) when any of the foresaid heirs entitled to succeed except the nearest heir for the time declines or refuses to give … his consent, the Court shall, on a motion to that effect by the petitioner in the application, and on a statement by him of the declinature or refusal … of such heir or heirs aforesaid, … ascertain the value in money of the expectancy or interest in the entailed estate with reference to such application of such heir or heirs declining or refusing to give consent as aforesaid.”
The Entail (Scotland) Act 1882 (45 and 46 Vict. c. 53), sec. 13, enacts that the provisions of sec. 5 of the Entail Amendment Act 1875 shall apply to the nearest heir as well as to other heirs.
On 4th October 1898 Lord Pearson, as Lord Ordinary officiating on the Bills, remitted to the Hon. J. W. Moncreiff, W.S., to inquire into the regularity of the procedure, to Mr J. J. Davidson to inspect the estates, and to report what in his opinion was their net value, and to Mr George M. Low, actuary, to value the interests or expectancies of the three next heirs of entail in the said lands. The three next heirs appeared by their agent at the proceedings in the Bill Chamber, and it was upon their suggestion that Mr Davidson was substituted as the man of skill for the reporter originally nominated by the Lord Ordinary.
On 17th January 1899 Mr Davidson presented his report, in which he stated that the estates extended to 69,627 acres, of which 51,450 acres were under deer forest; that the property was mainly and essentially a sporting one; that in his judgment the present sub-division of the property for sporting purposes was probably as judicious an arrangement from the letting point of view as could be adopted; that the sporting rental of the property might be taken at £2500 per annum, the crofting and farm rents amounting to £726 besides; and that in his opinion the present value of the property was £65,000.
It appeared that on his visit to and perambulation of the estate Mr Davidson was accompanied by the local agent of the three next heirs.
On 9th May 1899 Mr Low presented his report, in which he valued the expectancies of the three next heirs at a total sum of £17,288, or alternatively, and upon the footing that their interests should be valued as prospective rights of liferent merely, at a total sum of £12,115,
The petitioner lodged objections to Mr Low's report, based chiefly upon the ground that in estimating the probable duration of life of the petitioner and the next heir of entail he had followed the rule of the Carlisle Tables, which apply to
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male lives only, whereas the probability of life of females of the same age is higher. The three next heirs lodged objections to Mr Davidson's report, and relying upon a report furnished by a neighbouring factor maintained that the value of the estates was £87,584.
The respondents subsequently lodged amended objections to both reports, in which, with reference to Mr Davidson's report they averred and offered to prove that the present arrangement of the property was a bad one from a letting point of view, specifying in detail the disadvantages attendant upon it, and with reference to Mr Low's report they made the following averment:—“The heiress in possession is in a precarious state of health, suffering from extreme physical debility, more or less bronchial trouble, and great stomachic derangement, combined with nervous symptoms of an anxious kind, which seriously affect her expectation of life, and the respondents maintain that these facts are proper subjects of preliminary inquiry, and that the result must be taken into account in the reporter's calculations.”
On 29th June 1899 the Lord Ordinary (
Pearson ) pronounced an interlocutor by which he (first) remitted of new to Mr Davidson to consider the objections to his report; (second) remitted of new to Mr Low to report with regard to the objections to his report, and (third) remitted to Dr Byrom Bramwell “to examine the petitioner, and to inquire into the facts and circumstances averred in the amended objections for the respondents, touching the petitioner's state of health, and to report whether and to what extent (if any) her expectation of life is thereby affected.’Opinion.—“This is a petition to disentail, in which the three next heirs have refused their consent. In such a case the statutes enjoin the Court to ascertain the value in money of the expectancy or interest of such heirs in the entailed estate with reference to the application.
Remits were made to a valuator and an actuary according to the ordinary practice.
The valuator has reported the value of the estate to be £65,000, and the net rental £2715, 1s. 5d. The respondents object to this valuation as being considerably under the true value; and they have lodged in process a valuation obtained on their own instructions, which brings out a value of over £87,500, and a net rental of £3808. The estate is mainly a sporting one, consisting largely of deer forest ground. The main objection of the respondents is that hitherto the most has not been made of the estate, and that in order to draw the full annual value of it, it ought to be redivided and let according to a different scheme. The respondents asked to be allowed a general proof on the subject of the value of the estate.
It seems to me that no reason has been shown for departing from the ordinary practice in this case. Indeed, it appears to me to be a strong case for following it, because the objections are based largely on matters of mere opinion, and raise questions as to what the rental would have been if the estate had been differently divided and differently managed. I do not say that the considerations urged by the respondents are irrelevant. But in my judgment the proper way to deal with them is not to allow a proof at large, but to remit them to the reporter for his consideration.
I was unwilling however to make the report of the respondents' valuator the subject of the remit, it being virtually a precognition; and I have allowed the respondents to formulate their averments in amended objections now lodged. I propose to remit of new to Mr Davidson to consider these objections and any answers thereto which the petitioner may lodge, and to report. It remains to be seen whether this will result in an alteration of Mr Davidson's figures. If it does, there will require to be a new remit to the actuary.
The report of the actuary is also objected to, and by both parties.
1. The actuary assumed, as he was bound to do in the absence of objection, that the petitioner's life was an average one. The respondents now object to this assumption, and make averments as to her state of health, alleging that her expectation of life is seriously affected. The averments are, in my opinion, sufficient to warrant inquiry into the matter. The respondents stated their preference for an inquiry by way of proof on this head also. But the petitioner, through her counsel, expressed her willingness (if the averments are considered to be relevant) to submit to be examined by a medical man selected by the Court; and I am clearly of opinion that this is the proper course in the circumstances of this case. It is easy to figure cases in which this course might not be appropriate, as where the averments relate to matters of old date. Here all the averments touching the petitioner's health are founded on present symptoms, and (I should suppose) admit of being tested by examination in the ordinary way, in the light of such information regarding the history of the case and the surrounding circumstances, as the medical man may think material. If he should find any difficulty in obtaining the necessary information, it is open to him to present an interim report to that effect.
The petitioner, on the other hand, objects to the actuary's report, on the ground that he has underestimated her expectancy of life, and that of her sister, the heir-presumptive, and has thus overestimated the value of the expectancies of the two postponed heirs, who are males. This is said to have resulted from the actuary having calculated the expectations of life upon tables which are applicable to male lives only, it being averred that the probabilities of life of females of the ages of the petitioner and her sister are materially higher. I see no objection to asking for an explanation from the actuary on this head, and I shall do so by way of a supplementary remit,”
The respondents reclaimed, and moved
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for a proof both as to the value of the property and as to the health of the petitioner. Argued—1. With regard to the value, no doubt a remit was the usual mode of ascertaining the facts, but here the circumstances were complicated and peculiar, and the determination of questions involving serious pecuniary interests should not be left to the opinion of one man of skill. Mr Davidson had already given his decision, and to refer the objections to him for reconsideration would be idle. It was doubtful whether a remit was competent when one of the parties objected to it,— Quin v. Gardner & Sons, Limited, June 22, 1888, 15 R. 776. 2. With regard to the petitioner's health, the respondents had a right to inquiry. The most appropriate form for that inquiry to take was a proof, and proof had been allowed in Macdonalds v. Macdonald, March 19, 1879, 6 R. 869, rev. March 15, 1880, 7 R. (H.L.) 41. [Counsel for the respondents intimated that, although he had refrained from putting them into print, he was in a position to make averments as to the petitioner's health which would necessitate the facts of her past life being inquired into]. De Virt v. Wilson, Dec. 19, 1877, 5 R. 328, also referred to. Argued for the petitioner—The Lord Ordinary had taken the proper course on both matters. 1. With regard to value, a remit to a reporter was not only the usual but the appropriate method of arriving at what at the very best was necessarily matter of opinion— Pringle v. Pringle, June 12, 1891, 18 R. 895. But, in any event, if the respondents desired a proof, they were too late now in asking for it. They had consented to the original remits, and could not now propose to supersede that mode of inquiry. 2. With regard to the petitioner's health, the averments here were of a nature easily distinguishable from those in the case of Macdonald, ut sup. There certain historical facts in Captain Macdonald's life were averred which were eminently suitable for proof in the ordinary way. Here, the averments, one and all, dealt with symptoms presented by the petitioner at the present time, and therefore most readily tested by medical examination, to which the petitioner was quite willing to submit.
With reference to the other question raised, namely, as to the health of the petitioner, it is alleged in the objections lodged by the respondents to the report of the actuary Mr Low, that the petitioner is in a state of health which prejudicially affects her expectancy of life, and that her life is not to be taken, as it has been taken by Mr Low, as an average life. The question again is as to the mode of procedure to be adopted. The Lord Ordinary has remitted to a medical man to examine the petitioner, but the respondents say that, the question being one of fact, they are as a matter of right entitled to have a proof as in any ordinary case. Now, I do not doubt facts and circumstances may be averred in a particular case which might make it the judicious course to allow a proof, but I am clearly of opinion that the Court is not bound in all cases to ascertain the facts by a proof, but that the usual course is for the Court to ascertain the facts in the way it thinks most judicious. That being so, the question is, whether the averments made by the respondents are such as to require a proof, or whether the facts can be sufficiently ascertained by the medical examination of the petitioner, and I have come to be of opinion that the facts averred here, the averments all being, as the Lord Ordinary says, “founded on present symptoms,” can be sufficiently ascertained by the examination of the petitioner by a medical man. On this point also, therefore, I think the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor is right.
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If the expectant heir, however, should wish for any reason that the facts should be ascertained in a more formal manner, I should expect him to appear and state to the Lord Ordinary that in his view this was too important a case to be dealt with by a remit, and that he desired a proof on the question of value or some other question. But if he contents himself with suggesting a name for the Lord Ordinary's consideration, and then complains of the report because it is not altogether what he expects, I am not prepared to say that as a matter of right he is to be indulged with a proof.
In the present case it appears to me that on the matter of valuation the valuator has gone very carefully into the point before him, and I have no doubt that he will consider fairly the objections which the respondents propose to take. He would be a very unsuitable man for his duties if he were not prepared to consider points sent to him for reconsideration. On this question of value, accordingly, I am of opinion with Lord Adam that no sufficient grounds have been shown for reopening the question. I do not say, however, that if it appeared from the report of the valuator that there were questions of fact demanding investigation with which he was unable to deal except upon evidence, we should not order a proof, for I think that might be justified on the same grounds on which the House of Lords directed an inquiry into the facts in the case of Macdonald.
As regards the health of the petitioner, that is a very material element, because it affects the expectancy of all the heirs of entail if the expectation of life of the heir in possession is less than that proper to her age. The Lord Ordinary has said here of the averments touching the petitioner's health that they are all founded on present symptoms. That appears to me correctly to characterise these averments, and there being nothing in those averments to lead us to think that an inquiry into the petitioner's past life is necessary, I agree with the Lord Ordinary that an inquiry by a medical man is the proper method.
As regards the objections to Mr Low's report, I think the Lord Ordinary's ground of judgment perfectly sound. If this were such a case as occurred in Macdonald, where special facts in the history of the expectant heir's life were averred, which affected the value of his interest, I should have thought that was a case for allowing proof, but no such averments are made here.
As regards the question of the state of this lady's health, I think there is a very clear ground of judgment. The Court is not by the words of the statute tied to any one mode of ascertaining the value of the life of the heir, and of course the health of the heir only affects her probable longevity. But, on the other hand, in the case of the expectation of life of anyone, the broad fact of age is that with which you start and also probably end, for unless there are exceptional circumstances further inquiry is at an end. But then it has been held, first, that where the ordinary presumption is said to be varied by the actual and present state of health of the person in question, that is naturally to be ascertained by medical examination of that person, but that, secondly, and on the other hand, where the problem is complicated by antecedent historical facts which bear on the
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When I turn from that case to the present, it seems to me that all the elements which were held in Macdonald's case to lead to a proof are absent, for I think that the Lord Ordinary has rightly characterised the respondents' averments. Therefore upon that ground I am of opinion with your Lordships that the Lord Ordinary is right, and that there is no sufficient averment for inquiry by way of proof. And I part from this by saying that Mr Johnston's very clear exposition of his argument postulated, what he hinted was his case, that there were facts in the history of the heir's life which should be investigated. But averments of such facts are entirely absent.
As regards the question of value, it seems to me that it is in a different position. Here again the Court is not tied to any one form of inquiry. I suppose your Lordships would agree that if the respondents came forward with a definite view of the value, the Lord Ordinary might order a proof. On the other hand, he might not, and he might rest content with the opinion of an expert. But I am bound to say that I should greatly regret if it were inferred from the decision in this case that a momentous question of value, even when it depended merely upon an estimate of value, was to be concluded against an objecting respondent by the opinion of one individual. I see nothing in the statute to warrant that. The Court is to “ascertain,” but to ascertain by means appropriate to the interests involved; and I for my part should have great hesitation in refusing the request of any party who promptly came forward and asked for a proof. But then your Lordships consider that in the present case the respondents have so conducted themselves and managed their procedure that the other course has been definitely embarked upon. That is a question of inference from the circumstances; your Lordships have had much greater experience than I in such matters; and upon that ground, and that alone, I concur.
The Court adhered.
Counsel for the Petitioner— Guthrie, Q.C.— Chree. Agents— A. P. Purves & Aitken, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondents— H. Johnston, Q.C.— C. K. Mackenzie. Agent— A. S. Douglas, W.S.