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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Caton v. The Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Co., Ltd [1902] ScotLR 39_762 (11 July 1902) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1902/39SLR0762.html Cite as: [1902] ScotLR 39_762, [1902] SLR 39_762 |
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Page: 762↓
[Sheriff-Substitute at Haddington.
A workman who was employed as a cinder washer at a colliery, after
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having finished his day's work was going home along a private branch of railway in the occupation of the colliery company, and leading from the colliery to the main line of the North British Railway. At a point on the private branch line about 230 yards distant from the place where he worked he was killed by an engine belonging to his employers. Held ( diss. Lord Young) that the accident was not an accident “arising out of and in the course of his employment,” in the sense of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, sec. 1 (1), and that his representatives were not entitled to compensation under the Act.
Opinion per the Lord Justice-Clerk, that at the time of the accident the workman was not “on or in or about a mine” within the meaning of the Act.
Opinion per Lord Young contra.
This was an appeal in an arbitration under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897, before the Sheriff-Substitute of the Lothians and Peebles at Haddington ( Shirreff), between Mrs Elizabeth M'Nicol or Caton, widow of Joseph Caton, labourer there, claimant and respondent, and the Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Company, Limited, appellants.
The facts found proved were as follows:—“1. That the deceased Joseph Caton, labourer, Musselburgh, entered the employment of the appellants at Prestongrange Colliery on 24th December 1901, and with the exception of the Sunday following, worked continuously there until the date of his death on 31st December 1901. 2. That he was employed as a cinder washer at the end of the colliery boilers, about 100 yards distant from the main entrance gate of the colliery opening on the Musselburgh and Prestonpans road. 3. That on 31st December 1901, after the said Joseph Caton had finished his day's work, and while proceeding home along the private branch railway line, in the occupation of the appellants, and leading from their colliery and brickwork to the main line of the North British Railway Company, and when at a point on said private branch line about 230 yards distant from the place where he worked, he was knocked down and killed by an engine and five coal waggons belonging to the appellants. 4. That many of the men employed at the said colliery, particularly those residing at Drummore and Musselburgh, were in the habit of using the said private branch line both in going to and returning from the colliery, to which ingress and egress was had by a gate opening from the appellant's premises on to the public road leading to Musselburgh, and that this route through the appellants' premises to said public road was known as the back road. 5. That the deceased occasionally went home along the private branch line and through the gate on to the said public road, but generally he proceeded home by crossing eight lines of railway or tramway leading to the pit-head and the brickwork belonging to the appellants, and through the main entrance gate on the Musselburgh and Prestonpans public road, known as the front road.”
In these circumstances the Sheriff-Substitute found the appellants—the Summerlee and Mossend Iron and Steel Company, Limited—liable to pay compensation to the respondent, which he assessed at £150.
The following questions of law were stated for the opinion of the Court:—“(1) Whether the accident to deceased having admittedly happened after his day's work was done was one ‘arising out of and in the course of the employment’ within the meaning of said Act? (2) Whether the accident happened (within the meaning of said Act) ‘on or in or about a mine,’ the deceased having at the time of its occurrence reached a point on his way home 230 yards distant from the place of his employment?”
The Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (60 and 61 Vict. cap. 37) enacts, sec. 1 (1) as follows:—“If in any employment to which this Act applies personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment is caused to a workman, his employer shall, subject as aftermentioned, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with the First Schedule to this Act.”
Argued for the appellants—The workman had completed his day's work. The place where the accident happened was 230 yards away from the mine. The Sheriff-Substitute had proceeded on a misinterpretation of the case of Tod v. Caledonian Railway Company, June 29, 1899, 1 F. 1047, 36 S.L.R. 784. The questions had been settled by authority. First Question—Holness v. Mackay & Davis [1899], 2 Q.B. 319; Gibson v. Wilson, March 12, 1901, 3 F. 661, 38 S.L.R. 450. Second Question— Barclay, Curle, & Company, v. M'Kinnon, February 1, 1901, 3 F. 436, 38 S.L.R. 321; Brodie v. North British Railway Company, November 6, 1900, 3 F. 75, 38 S.L.R. 38; Caledonian Railway Company v. Bathgate, December 10, 1901, 39 S.L.R. 246; Turnbull v. Lambton Collieries, Limited, May 7, 1900, 16 T.L.R. 369.
Argued for the respondent—The Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 incorporates the definition of “mine” in the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887, under which the term “mine” includes any siding “adjacent to and belonging to the mine”— Monaghan v. United Collieries, Limited, November 27, 1900, 3 F. 149, 38 S.L.R. 92. The Act of 1897 was intended to cover all risks connected with the employment in question, and the risk continued so long as the employee remained upon the premises of his employer. The cases cited by the appellants supported the respondent's contention.
At advising—
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I am therefore of opinion that the decision of the Sheriff was wrong, and that the questions in the special case should be answered in the negative.
It is true that the deceased had laid down his tools, but before going out of the premises he met with this accident. He was on a private line of railroad by which the employees went to and returned from their work. When he was killed he was 230 yards from the spot where he had been working, but he was nevertheless within the premises where he had been working. If 230 yards is too much, would 20 yards be too much? What would you specify as the distance? I am not prepared to specify any distance. That is to say, it is a question in each case, was he in, on, or about the premises where he was employed. Here I am disposed to agree with the Sheriff that in the circumstances of this particular case the, deceased was in the course of his employment when he met with this accident, and therefore I am not disposed to interfere with what the Sheriff has done.
The Court answered the first question in the negative, and found it unnecessary to answer the second question.
Counsel for the Claimant and Respondent— Campbell, K.C.— Wilton. Agents— Gray & Handyside, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Appellants— Salvesen, K. C.— Hunter. Agents— W. & J. Burness, W.S.