Scottish Court of Session Decisions

Under these circumstances the Sheriff-Substitute found that Golder did not die as the result of an accident under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and therefore assoilzied the respondents.

The question of law put by the Sheriff-Substitute for our determination is whether the fact that as the result of the injury to his head, back, and sides, sustained by Golder in the course of his employment with the respondents, his general physical condition was so lowered that the nephritis from which he was then suffering was greatly accelerated in its operation, and that in consequence he died on 8th May, entitles the appellants to compensation.

It is to be observed that the Sheriff-Substitute does not state that the nephritis would certainly have proved fatal to Golder if the accident had not occurred, but only that it was likely to do so, though probably not for a few years. The case therefore is not the same as it would have been if Golder had been suffering from a disease which sooner or later was certain to prove fatal, and it is quite consistent with the statements in the case that, but for the accident, Golder might have lived to the ordinary term of human life and died from some cause other than nephritis. I am therefore of opinion that upon the statement in the case the efficient cause of Golder's death was the accident, and that consequently the respondents are liable to the appellants in compensation. It is, however, proper to add, that even if it had been stated in the case to be certain that Golder must, apart from the accident, have died sooner or later of the nephritis, it does not appear to me that this would have constituted an answer to the claim of the appellants. When, but for the accident, the person would not have died at the time at which, and in the way in which, he did die, the accident must, in my judgment, be held to have been the cause of his death in the sense of the Act.

For these reasons I am of opinion that the question put in the case should be answered in the affirmative.

Lord Adam and Lord M'Laren concurred.

Lord Kinnear—At first sight there seemed to be some difficulty in this case, but I have come to the same conclusion as your Lordships. The ground of defence was stated generally that the injury which was caused to this man by the accident was not the immediate cause of his death, but that the immediate cause of death was nephritis, a disease from which he was suffering. I am not sure that I know precisely what is meant by “the immediate cause of the death,” if that phrase is capable of exact definition, which I think is perhaps doubtful. But in the argument that was put in more detail I think it came to this—that the man was suffering from nephritis, which, though it did not threaten his life at the moment, was likely to be fatal sooner or later, and that, according to the Sheriff's statement of the case, the accident was not in itself fatal, but merely operated by lowering the man's system so as to enable the disease to act more quickly and fatally than it would otherwise have done, and therefore it is said that the true cause of the death was not the accident but the disease. Now, I must confess for myself that I do not know enough about the action and the reaction of the injury and the disease to be able to follow the pathological part of that argument, and as to the logical and metaphysical part of it I am not disposed in construing this statute to pay much regard to the subtlties which are so apt to perplex the idea of cause. I think, in construing the Act, which is expressed in ordinary language, we must go on plainer and simpler grounds. All that was requited of the appellant was to show that her husband was injured by an accident, in the first place, and in the second place, that death resulted from the injury. Now, as to the first of these points there is no question. The man was very seriously injured, and he was laid up and unable to work for a time, and although he had come back to work (or, at all events, to some work, for apparently the work he returned to was much lighter than that in which he was previously engaged), the result was that in fact he died on 8th May. Now, I do not see how it can be said that the injury which he suffered from the accident did not result in death. It had no other result, for the man did not recover. It is clear enough upon the Sheriff's statement that the death was not so remote a consequence as to have no direct connection with the accident at all. That is not suggested, and, on the contrary, in the form of words in which he puts the question for the consideration of this Court he says—“Does the fact that as a result of the injury to the head, back, and sides sustained by the said John Golder in the course of his employment with the respondents, his general physical condition was so lowered that the disease nephritis from which he was then suffering was greatly accelerated in its operation, and that in consequence he died.” Now, if he had died in consequence of the injuries described in that question, it seems to me that it is impossible to dispute that death was the result of these injuries. It is true enough, and it is obvious on the face of the statement that the injuries which proved fatal to this unfortunate man would probably not have proved fatal to a man in perfectly sound health, and there might be questions of liability in considering which that might be a perfectly relevant point, because, if liability were said to be the result of wilful wrong-doing, it might be quite relevant to inquire what an ordinarily prudent man would have contemplated as the probable consequence of his action. But in construing this Act we

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