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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Davidson's Trustees v. Ogilvie [1909] ScotLR 248 (21 January 1909)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1909/47SLR0248.html
Cite as: [1909] ScotLR 248, [1909] SLR 248

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 248

Court of Session Inner House Second Division.

Friday, January 21, 1909.

47 SLR 248

Davidson's Trustees

v.

Ogilvie.

Subject_1Succession
Subject_2Liferent and Fee
Subject_3Free Annual Income
Subject_4Literary Works — Royalties and Profits from Sale of Books.
Facts:

A testator directed his trustees to hold the residue of his estate for the liferent use of his niece, and to pay to her the “free annual income” thereof. He was the author of a number of books, some published during his life and some after his death. In both cases books were published on each of the following terms of remuneration—(1) a single payment, (2) a royalty on sales, and (3) a share of profits.

Held that royalties and profits derived from the sale of books published before the testator's death fell to the liferentrix as “free annual income,” but that all sums received by the trustees in respect of works published after the testator's death fell to be treated as part of the capital of the estate.

Headnote:

Robert Russell Simpson and another, testamentary trustees of the late Rev. Andrew Bruce Davidson, LL.D., first parties, and Mrs Davidson or Ogilvy, Dr Davidson's niece and the liferentrix of the residue of his estate, second party, presented a Special Case dealing with the proceeds derived from his literary works.

The testator died on 26th January 1902, leaving a trust-disposition whereby he disponed and conveyed his whole estate

Page: 249

to trustees, and directed them, inter alia, to hold the residue and to give to his “niece Mrs Helen Bruce Davidson or Ogilvie … the liferent use and enjoyment thereof, and to pay to her the free annual income of the estate at two terms in the year by equal instalments during all the days of her life … with full power to my trustees to sell and dispose of all or any part or portion of the trust estate and effects.”

The testator was the author of a number of published works on the Hebrew language and theology, and among his repositories on his death were found the manuscripts of certain further theological works. Some of the books and articles published were paid for by a single payment. For others a royalty only was received, the publishers taking the whole risk, and for others again Doctor Davidson received a large proportion of the profits, he taking the risk of publication. After the testator's death his trustees arranged for the publication of five manuscripts found in his repositories. In one case the trustees received a sum down in respect of a fixed number of sales with a royalty on additional sales. In two cases they received a royalty only. In a fourth case the publication was a joint-undertaking with the publishers, the trustees receiving two-thirds of profits and bearing two-thirds of loss, while in the fifth case £200 was received for an absolute sale of an unfinished manuscript.

The questions of law were—“(1) Do royalties derived from sales subsequent to the testator's death of works published by him fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income? (2) Do profits derived from sales subsequent to the testator's death of works published by him fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income? (3) Does a sum paid to the trustees as the price of the testator's work on publication of the work by the trustees fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income? (4) Do royalties derived from the sale of the testator's works published by the trustees fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income? (5) Do profits derived from the sale of the testator's works published by the trustees fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income? (6) Does a sum paid to the trustees on publication by them of a book by the testator to cover a fixed number of copies sold fall to be treated ( a) as capital or ( b) as income?” [Questions (3) and (6) were not argued, these payments admittedly falling to capital.]

Argued for the first parties—Royalties and profits derived from the sale of the testator's works, whether published during his life or after his death, fell to be treated as capital. They were not income, because they were not derived from a capital subject, itself left untouched. They were simply a form of price for the copyright, paid by instalments, and no value would remain when the copyright expired. They should therefore be regarded as capital, as had been an annuity— Crawley v. Crawley, 1835, 7 Simon 427—and a share of profits in a partnership— Freer's Trustees v. Freer, January 28, 1897, 24 R. 437, 34 S.L.R. 323; Dykes' Trustees v. Dykes, November 20, 1903, 6 F. 133, 41 S.L.R. 84. Casualty cases were different, for there a capital subject existed and was left intact — Gibson v. Caddall's Trustees, July 11, 1895, 22 R. 889, 32 S.L.R. 668; Ross' Trustees v. Nicol, November 22, 1902, 5 F. 146, 40 S.L.R. 112; M'Dougal's Factor v. Watson, 1909 S.C. 215, 46 S.L.R. 172. In any event royalties and profits from works published after the testator's death were clearly capital on the analogy of mineral royalties, which were treated as income only when the mines had been opened during the testator's lifetime, and as capital if opened after his death — Campbell v. Wardlaw, &c., July 6, 1883, 10 R. (H.L.) 65, 20 S.L.R. 748; Ranken's Trustees v. Ranken, 1908 S.C. 3, 45 S.L.R. 10; Naismith's Trustees v. Naismith, 1909 S.C. 1380, 46 S.L.R. 844.

Argued for the second party—Royalties and profits of this nature were to be regarded as income. (1) In the case of books published before the testator's death it was presumed that where the testator was enjoying an annual return from a subject during his life, he intended that the liferenter should enjoy the same return — Campbell v. Wardlaw, &c., and Ranken's Trustees v. Ranken, cit. supra; Ferguson v. Ferguson's Trustees, February 23, 1877, 4 R. 532, 14 S.L.R. 377; Strain's Trustees v. Strain, July 19, 1893, 20 R. 1025, 30 S.L.R. 906; Mein's Trustees v. Mein, June 21, 1901, 3 F. 994, 38 S.L.R. 715; Dick's Trustees v. Robertson, June 28, 1901, 3 F. 1021, 38 S.L.R. 744; M'Laren on Wills and Succession, i, 616. (2) As regards books published by the trustees, the analogy of mines opened after a testator's death was inapplicable. In mines the actual subject wasted; here the subject, the book, continued to exist, although it might be valueless on the expiry of the copyright. The payments were rent for the use of the subject, not price in instalments. The trustees might have let the MSS. lie and produce nothing, or they might have sold them for a capital sum, but when they did not do so, but used them as a profit-bearing asset, the profits should go to the liferenter.

Judgment:

Lord Justice-Clerk—It appears to me that a very marked distinction must be drawn in this case between the proceeds of manuscripts and books with which the testator himself had dealt before his death and those dealt with by the trustees after his death. I think the testator's intention is manifest. Of the books which he himself published he took the income for himself, and when he left the liferent of his estate to anybody, I think he must be held to have intended that that from which he was deriving income should be a source of income to the liferenter, whoever he might be. Therefore I have no doubt whatever that any questions relating to works which the testator had published before his death must be answered by holding that the proceeds from those works formed part of the income of the estate.

Page: 250

But I think it is a totally different case when you come to those works which were dealt with after the death of the testator. Whatever he left after his death and had not dealt with during his lifetime — whether complete manuscripts or incomplete manuscripts—were necessarily of the nature of estate left behind by him, which it was the duty of the trustees to realise to the best of their ability. They might do that in various ways. To a certain extent they were in the hands of publishers as to how it could be accomplished, because everybody who has had anything to do with the publishing of books knows perfectly well that different terms may be given by publishers as regards different books. Even in the case of a book that might turn out well publishers may not be willing to take the risk of paying a price for it. Accordingly sometimes an arrangement is made for royalties, and sometimes an arrangement is made for a sum down and for royalties. It was the duty of these trustees to do their best for the realisation of the works. I assume that they have done their best. Their conduct has not been impugned in any way. Everybody is agreed that nothing has been done that ought not to have been done. I am clearly of opinion that the works which passed into the hands of the trustees as part of the testator's estate, and which he had not dealt with except by leaving it to them, form part of the capital of the estate. I would move your Lordships that we should answer the questions accordingly.

Lord Ardwall—I agree with what your Lordship has said. This is a novel and interesting case. It appears that at his death Dr Davidson left, as might have been expected, a number of literary works. With regard to some of these he had already disposed of the copyright by having come to an arrangement under which in some cases he had got a sum down and in other cases he was to be entitled to royalties or profits from the sale of the books as time went on. In some cases he was remunerated partly in one way and partly in the other. With regard to the literary works published before the testator's death he had been during his lifetime in receipt of the proceeds, so far as they consisted of royalties or profits, by way of income—income available for himself, to spend year by year as he pleased.

In these circumstances he directs his trustees to give his niece the liferent use and enjoyment of the residue of his estate, and to pay to her the free annual income at two terms in the year. I cannot doubt that as a matter of intention we must hold that the free annual income of the estate means the free annual income of the estate as it existed at his death, of which those profits or royalties formed a part. It seems that there is no case exactly on all fours with the present, but I think we derive assistance from and find a very valuable analogy in the cases which have been decided regarding minerals, and in which a distinction has been taken between minerals the proceeds of which formed income before the testator's death, and minerals which had not begun to be worked at the death of the testator. These decisions must be held to proceed on the principle of intention; and likewise in this case I hold we must have regard to the intention of the testator in deciding the question as to the proceeds of royalties on works published by himself before his death. Accordingly, with regard to such royalties and profits I hold that they still form income, and should be paid to the liferentrix.

But with regard to the other works which have been published by the trustees since his death, I think these are in a totally different position. It was the trustees' duty, as has been pointed out by your Lordship, to dispose of the manuscripts carrying with them copyright to the best advantage after the testator's death. At the testator's death they represented part of the capital of the estate. I do not think it can be held that these unpublished manuscripts and the copyright which they bore with them were anything else than capital. Now, what was the trustees' duty with regard to that capital? I find that under the trust deed the trustees have power to sell or dispose of all or any part or portion of the trust estate and effects. I think these literary remains form part and portion of the truster's estate and effects; and the question which the trustees had to decide was how they could best be disposed of. In this matter the trustees were to a certain extent tied by the usages of the publishing trade. Under these usages books are sometimes disposed of in return for a sum paid down, and sometimes, instead of taking payment all at once, by taking payment of the price in instalments in the shape of royalties. The trustees were practically tied up to taking one course or another. But whatever course they did take, whether they were paid by a sum down or by instalments, or partly by a sum paid down and partly by instalments, the proceeds were a surrogatum for the assets left by the testator at the time of his death in the form of literary property. I think that they must be treated, accordingly, as capital and as nothing else—the proceeds being invested as they accrue, and the interest of that capital so invested being paid to the liferentrix. To hold anything else would have this result, that the trustees would have it in their power to alter the respective interests of the liferentrix and the fiars in what was truly part of the capital of the estate at the time of the death of the testator. I think that is a conclusion which we cannot accept. Although this is a novel case I have really no hesitation in deciding it in the way your Lordship has suggested, and the questions will fall to be answered accordingly.

Lord Dundas—I am of the same opinion and have nothing to add.

Lord Low was absent.

Page: 251

The Court answered the first alternative of the first and second questions of law in the negative, and the second alternative of the said first and second questions in the affirmative, the first alternative of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth questions of law in the affirmative, and the second alternative of the said third, fourth, fifth, and sixth questions in the negative.

Counsel:

Counsel for the First Parties— Graham Stewart, K.C.— R. C. Henderson. Agents— R. R. Simpson & Lawson, W.S.

Counsel for the Second Party— Constable, K.C.— Cowan. Agent— R. C. Gray, S.S.C.

1909


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