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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> M'Gregor's Trustees v. Kimbell [1911] ScotLR 950 (14 July 1911) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1911/48SLR0950.html Cite as: [1911] SLR 950, [1911] ScotLR 950 |
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A testator by a settlement disposing of his whole estate directed his trustees to pay the annual income thereof to his wife, and in the event of her entering into a second marriage to pay her one-third of the annual income. He further directed that the balance of income forfeited by his widow on re-marriage should fall into the capital of his estate until the period of division, which was the date of her death, should arrive. The settlement, which was signed by the testator's wife as well as by himself, contained a clause in which the wife accepted of the provisions in her favour in lieu of terce, jus relictæ, and every other claim competent to her through her husband's death. The testator died in 1881, and his widow thereafter received payment of her conventional provision. She re-married in 1894. In 1902 the direction to accumulate the balance of income set free by her re-marriage became inoperative under the Thellusson Act (39 and 40 Geo. III, cap. 98), and the balance thereafter fell into intestacy.
Held, in a special case, that the clause in the settlement whereby the wife accepted the provisions in her favour in lieu of her legal rights was to be regarded as having been intended solely for the protection of the settlement, and that the widow, in addition to her conventional provision, was entitled jure relictæ to one-half of the proportion of income falling into intestacy — Naismith v. Boyes, July 28, 1899, 1 F. (H.L.) 79, 36 S.L.R. 973, followed. Sim v. Sim, December 18, 1901, 4 F. 944, distinguished.
On 14th July 1911 a Special Case was presented to the Court by David Edward and another, trustees of the late James M'Gregor, 28 Hamilton Drive, Hillhead, Glasgow, first parties; Mrs Alice Jeffs or M'Gregor or Kimbell, widow of the said James M'Gregor, and now wife of William Alfred Kimbell, Herne Hill, London, second party; John M'Gregor, San Francisco, U.S.A., and others, the whole brothers or sisters or descendants of brothers and sisters of the said James M'Gregor, third parties; and William Jeffs, 34 Testerton Street, Kensington, London, and others, the whole brothers and sisters or descendants of brothers and sisters of
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the said Mrs Alice Jeffs or M'Gregor or Kimbell, fourth parties. The following narrative of the facts of the case is taken from the opinion of Lord Dundas—“The testator James M'Gregor died on 26th November 1881. He left no issue, but was survived by a widow, who married again on 24th November 1894 and is the second party to this case. Mr M'Gregor left a trust-disposition and settlement of his whole means and estate dated in 1876, by which, after sundry prior provisions, he directed his trustees (fourth) to invest the balance of his estate and pay the annual income thereof to his wife so long as she should remain his widow; and in the event of her entering into a second marriage the trustees were directed to pay her one-third of the annual income of his estate during all the years of her life. By the fifth purpose, in the event of the testator leaving issue and his said wife entering into a second marriage, the trustees were directed, after satisfying the said provision in her favour, to apply the balance of the income of his estate to the maintenance and education of his children; and in the event of his leaving no issue, the said balance of income was to fall into the capital of his estate until the period of division of his trust estate should arrive. By the sixth purpose of the settlement the truster directed that on the death of his said wife the trustees should convert into money the whole trust estate under their charge and pay and make over one-half thereof to his brothers and sisters german, equally among them, the lawful issue of predeceasers taking their parents' share; and the other half thereof to the brothers and sisters of his wife equally among them, the lawful issue of predeceasers taking their parents' share, all as by the said purpose provided. The settlement, which was signed by the truster's wife as well as by himself, also contained the following clause—‘And I, the said Alice Jeffs or M'Gregor’ (the wife) ‘do hereby accept of the provisions conceived in my favour by the foregoing settlement in lieu of terce, jus relictæ, and every other claim which might have been competent to me in consequence of the death of the said James M'Gregor.’ After the testator's death his widow did in fact accept and receive payment of her conventional provision under the settlement. In these circumstances various questions have arisen, for the determination of which this Special Case has been brought. We are asked to decide whether, looking to the provisions of the Thellusson Act (39 and 40 Geo. III, cap. 98), it was lawful for the trustees, after the expiry of twenty-one years from the truster's death (viz., 26th November 1902), to accumulate as capital of the estate the balance of the income arising in each year after payment to the widow of her restricted provision of one-third thereof [ not reported on this]; and if not, whether that portion of the income was distributable, and among whom.”
The following questions of law were, inter alia, submitted for the opinion and judgment of the Court—“2. Are the first parties entitled or bound to accumulate, as directed by the trustee, any part of the income of the estate after 26th November 1902? [ Answered in negative; not reported]. 3. Should the second question be answered in the negative, is the second party entitled, jure relictæ, to one-half of the surplus income after payment of her restricted annuity for each year since 26th November 1902, and so long as she survives?”
Argued for the second party—The widow was not barred from claiming jus relictæ out of what had fallen into intestacy. Her renunciation did not touch that part of the estate which by a casus improvisus had not been dealt with under the will. It had been conclusively settled by the House of Lords that the only object of a clause which barred the widow's legal rights was the protection of the settlement— Naismith v. Boyes, July 28, 1899, 1 F. (H.L.) 79, 36 S.L.R. 973. This affirmed a unanimous judgment of the First Division—May 27, 1898, 25 R. 899, 35 S.L.R. 702. The husband had only bought off the wife from making any claim against his estate which would disturb the provisions of his will. Naismith v. Boyes had been followed in the Court of Session in Moon's Trustees v. Moon, November 28, 1899, 2 F. 201, 37 S.L.R. 140, and in Mackay's Trustees v. Mackay, 1909 S.C. 139, 46 S.L.R. 147. The case of Sim v. Sim, July 1, 1902, 4 F. 944, was distinguishable. The wife's renunciation in that case was in an antenuptial contract of marriage, which became the law of the marriage and governed the rights of the parties. Here the renunciation was merely in reference to a particular deed. There was a marked distinction between a contractual provision and a provision by way of testamentary gift.
Argued for the third parties—The House of Lords did not intend to lay down an absolute general rule in Naismith v. Boyes ( sup. cit.). Every case of the kind depended on the intention of the testator, which was to be gathered from the settlement. It was always a question of circumstances — Lord Watson in Naismith v. Boyes, at 1 F. (H.L.) 82, Lord Davey at 86, and Lord M'Laren (in the Court of Session) at 25 R. 902. In this case there were the plainest indications that the testator intended his wife in the event of her re-marriage to get one-third of the income, and nothing more. In Naismith v. Boyes, on the contrary, there were no such indications in the settlement. It was true that Moon's Trustees v. Moon ( sup. cit.) was not distinguishable from the present case, but that decision should be reconsidered. It had there been assumed that Naismith v. Boyes laid down a general rule, and it was followed without any argument. Moreover, the latter case was so recent at the date of Moon's Trustees v. Moon that it had not yet been reported. In Mackay's Trustees v. Mackay ( sup. cit.) it was again assumed that Naismith v. Boyes applied. In Sim v. Sim ( sup. cit.), where the exclusion of legal rights was by marriage contract, Naismith v. Boyes
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was distinguished in respect that it related to a testamentary provision. In the present case also the exclusion was contractual because the wife was a party to her husband's settlement. Farquharson v. Kelly, March 20, 1900, 2 F. 863 (Lord President at 869), 37 S.L.R. 574, was also referred to. At advising—
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If the views which I have expressed are well founded, they afford material for answering the specific questions put to us in the case, to which I now turn.… [ His Lordship then dealt with the other questions on which the case is not reported.] … The answer to the third question should, in my opinion, upon the grounds I have endeavoured to explain, be in the affirmative.…
The testator died in 1881, and his widow remarried in 1894. On 26th November 1902 twenty-one years had elapsed since the death of the testator, and the direction to accumulate the two thirds of the income set free by the widow's second marriage became inoperative by virtue of the provisions of the Thellusson Act. The leading questions in the case are whether this two-thirds part of the income of the estate falls to be paid to the heirs ab intestato or to the legatees mentioned in the sixth purpose of the settlement, and, in the former event, whether the widow is entitled to one half jure relictæ notwithstanding that she was a party to the settlement which contains a clause by which she accepted of the provisions thereby conceived in her favour as in lieu of terce, jus relictæ, and every other claim which might have been competent to her in consequence of her husband's death.
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[ His Lordship then dealt with contentions of the parties with which this report is not concerned.]
The remaining question in the case is whether the widow is entitled, jure relictæ, to one-half of the income set free by her re-marriage. If so, the result is certainly at first sight surprising, because after 1902, when further accumulation became illegal, she would be entitled to two-thirds of the income of her husband's trust estate, although by the terms of the settlement she had accepted one-third as in full satisfaction of her legal claims as a widow.
If the question were open it would have demanded very serious consideration. In my opinion, however, it has been conclusively settled in favour of the widow by the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of Naismith v. Boyes ( 1 F. (H. L.) 79), which affirmed a unanimous decision of the First Division. I observe that in that case also the truster's widow was entitled to the whole income and annual proceeds of the trust estate so long as she remained unmarried, restricted to one-half in the event of her second marriage. There too, as here, a portion of the estate fell into intestacy through a circumstance which the testator had not foreseen, and against which he had not provided. In a carefully considered opinion delivered by Lord Watson in the House of Lords, that eminent Judge came to the conculsion that “the testator when he inserted a clause in his settlement barring the legal rights of the appellant and respondent, had no object in view except to protect the settlement by preventing the enforcement of these claims to the disturbance of his will, and to the detriment of the beneficiaries whom he had selected. When, accordingly, by the premature decease of his children of the second marriage, the residue provided to them by his settlement became intestate, I do not think it can be held that the testator contemplated or intended that the exclusion of the legal rights of his widow and surviving child should any longer remain operative.” That was also substantially the ground of judgment of the First Division, as expressed in the opinion of Lord M'Laren.
It was pointed out that there is this difference between that case and the present, that the widow here was a party to her husband's settlement, and that an element of contract or quasi-contract is accordingly present here which did not exist in the other case. I do not think that this circumstance creates any substantial distinction. When Mrs Boyes after her husband's death accepted her conventional provisions and took payment of them for four and a half years, in the full knowledge of all that was material to a valid election, she just as effectually barred herself from challenging the provisions of the will as the widow has done in the present case. Reference was made to the case of Sim ( 4 F. 944), but in that case the discharge was contained in an antenuptial contract of marriage, and to such a deed the rule laid down by Lord Watson was not necessarily applicable. The decision of the House of Lords in Naismith v. Boyes has been followed in two cases— Moon's Trustees, 2 F. 209, decided by the Second Division, and Mackay's Trustees, 1909 S.C. 139, decided by the First Division in circumstances which are admittedly quite indistinguishable from those which exist here. I am therefore of opinion that it is our duty to follow this consistent current of authority, and that we must sustain the widow's claim to one-half of the surplus income. and accordingly to answer the third question in the affirmative.…
The wife was a party to this settlement, and signed it, thus giving effect to a clause whereby she accepted the provision made by the will and renounced all legal rights, and she in fact received and accepted the provisions made by the settlement. [His Lordship then dealt with contentions with which this report is not concerned.]
It only remains to consider whether the widow can, in virtue of her jus relictæ, claim her share of the sums which year by year now fall into intestacy in consequence of the accumulations being stopped by the operation of the Thellusson Act, which brought them to an end in 1902. This matter is, I consider, settled by decision in the cases referred to in the debate, by which it has been held that a declaration in a settlement that its provisions are to be in full of legal rights is a clause to guard the settlement only, and does not affect those accepting in any question relating to what may prove to be intestate succession of the maker of the settlement. I content myself with expressing the opinion formed after consideration of the cases and the able arguments of counsel on both sides. I have had an opportunity of reading the opinions prepared by my brethren, in which the cases are fully — and very fully by Lord Dundas—considered, and I agree with all that their Lordships say in regard to the cases.
The result will be that the third question will fall to be answered in the affirmative.
The Court answered the third question of law in the affirmative.
Counsel for the First Parties— J. R. Dickson. Agents— Morton, Smart, Macdonald, & Prosser, W.S.
Counsel for the Second Party— Crabb Watt, K.C.— J. G. Jameson. Agents — Wishart & Sanderson, W.S.
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Counsel for the Third Parties— Blackburn, K.C.— Maconochie. Agents— Fraser, stodart, & Ballingall, W.S.
Counsel for the Fourth Parties— Wilson, K.C.— D. Anderson. Agents— Fraser & Davidson, W.S.