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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Campbell v. United Collieries, Ltd [1911] ScotLR 140 (25 November 1911)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1911/49SLR0140.html
Cite as: [1911] SLR 140, [1911] ScotLR 140

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 140

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

[Sheriff Court at Airdrie.

Saturday, November 25. 1911.

49 SLR 140

Campbell

v.

United Collieries, Limited.

Subject_1Reparation
Subject_2Sheriff
Subject_3Process
Subject_4Master and Servant — Action Laid Alternatively at Common Law and under the Employers' Liability Act 1880 (43 and 44 Vict. cap. 42) — Relevancy where No Distinction between Grounds of Claim.

Reparation — Master and Servant — Contributory Negligence — Disclosure by Pursuer of Contributory Negligence.
Facts:

A father raised in the Sheriff Court an action at common law, or alternatively under the Employers' Liability Act, against a colliery company for damages for the death of his son killed in their employment owing to his stepping upon a revolving wheel in the mine. The pursuer averred that the defenders had failed in their duty

Page: 141

in respect that they ought to have fenced the wheel.

Held that the averment was a good averment of liability both at common law and under the Employers' Liability Act, and that the ground of action being the same there was no need for discrimination between the two.

M'Grath v. The Glasgow Coal Company, Limited, 1909 S.C. 1250, 46 S.L.R. 890, distinguished.

A pursuer in an action against the employers of his deceased son, laid alternatively at common law or under the Employers' Liability Act, averred that his son in going to his work required to pass a certain wheel in the defenders' colliery; that the employers ought to have fenced the wheel, but had not done so; that shortly before reaching the wheel the lamp of his son was extinguished; that the son continued to advance, and inadvertently stepped upon the wheel, which was revolving, and sustained injuries from which he died.

Held ( dissenting Lord Johnston) that pursuer's averments did not so clearly disclose contributory negligence as to disentitle him to go to proof.

Headnote:

James Campbell, miner, Uddingston, pursuer, raised an action in the Sheriff Court at Airdrie against the United Collieries, Limited, coalmasters, Bredisholm Colliery, by Uddingston, defenders, in respect of the death of his son John Campbell, miner, sometime in the defenders' employment. The claim or demand of the pursuer was “(1) for damages at common law laid at £500, in respect of the decease of the said John Campbell, aged fifteen years, who was a drawer in the employment of the defenders, and earning 25s. per week or thereby, in consequence of injuries sustained by him on 22nd February 1911 through the fault of the defenders, while working in the employment of the defenders in the Lower Drumgray seam of No. 3 Pit, Bredisholm Colliery, Nackerty, Uddingston, said accident having been caused by the said John Campbell being caught in the haulage wheel now used in said Lower Drumgray seam in said colliery through said wheel not being properly fenced, owing to fault or negligence on the part of the defenders or of those for whom they are responsible; or alternatively (2) for payment of £195 as reparation under the Employers' Liability Act 1880 in respect that said lack of fencing constituted a defect in the ways, works, machinery and plant of the defenders.”

The pursuer averred, inter alia—“(Cond. 2) On said 22nd February the said John Campbell was employed by the defenders in their No. 3 Pit, Bredisholm Colliery. A stoppage of the haulage had been caused by a fall from the roof, and the said John Campbell, along with other drawers employed by the defenders, was waiting in the pit until the haulage should be restarted. About 9·15 p.m. the haulage was restarted, and the said John Campbell went forward towards the face to see if hutches were ready for him. (Cond. 3) In going to the face the said John Campbell required to pass a fixed wheel which formed part of the machinery in use in the colliery. Said wheel was a horizontal wheel of about 42 inches diameter. It was fixed on a pivot on the level of the pavement and acted as a pulley round which travelled an endless rope which worked the haulage in the pit. (Cond. 4) Shortly before reaching the said wheel the lamp carried by the said John Campbell was extinguished, and the said John Campbell, who continued to advance towards the face, inadvertently stepped upon the said wheel, which was revolving, and sustained very severe injuries from the results of which he died the following day in the Royal Infirmary, Glasgow. (Cond. 5) The death of the said John Campbell was due to the fault of the defenders in failing to take precautions for the safety of their employees and to provide safe and suitable plant. In particular, the defenders were in fault in not providing sufficient fencing round the said wheel, whereby persons employed in the pit might be prevented from being caught in the wheel while the same was in motion. The wheel was so placed that it revolved below the level of the rails which carried the hutches and was in such a position that only one half of it was covered by the boards on which the rails were laid. The remaining half of the wheel which extended towards the side of the roadway was not covered with boards or otherwise protected. Two boards were fitted to uprights so as to act as a fence parallel to the line of rails, but no cross fencing was fitted up so as to close the passage formed by the space between the uprights and the wall within which the exposed portion of the wheel revolved, with the result that there was nothing to prevent persons who were passing along the said roadway close to said wall from stepping upon said wheel while the same was in motion. The defenders have, since the said 22nd February 1911, completely covered over the said wheel with boards and the same is now in a condition of safety. Had the said wheel been so covered over or had any cross fencing been fitted up so as to close the passage between the uprights and the said wall within which the exposed half of the wheel revolved at 22nd February, or had other sufficient fencing been provided, the said accident would not have happened and the said John Campbell would not have lost his life.”

The pursuer pleaded—“(1) The death of the said John Campbell having been occasioned by fault on the part of the defenders, the pursuer as father of the said John Campbell is entitled to reparation as concluded for. (2) In the circumstances condescended upon the sums alternatively claimed as damages are reasonable, and

Page: 142

decree should be pronounced as concluded for with expenses.”

On 31st October the Sheriff-Substitute ( Glegg) dismissed the action as irrelevant.

Note—“The only averment directed to instructing liability for fault on defenders' part is condescendence 5. The pursuer there in effect avers that defenders should have fenced a certain wheel, and that it was not fenced. This is a good averment of a defect in plant, but is insufficient in regard to fault, inasmuch as it does not disclose whose fault it is that pursuer seeks to hold this limited company responsible for. The pursuer avoids a good many difficulties by taking no notice of obvious facts, and he is of course not bound to raise difficulties if he can avoid them, but he cannot withhold explanations which known circumstances require. As regards his common law case it may be asked how did this company become liable for an act of negligence of its servants, and as regards the Employers' Liability case, who was the negligent servant? Information should have been given on both heads, but instead of doing so, and distinguishing between the two grounds of claim, he simply makes the bald averment mentioned. The case seems to fall within the rule laid down in M'Grath v. Glasgow Coal Company, 1909 S.C. 1250, and I accordingly dismiss it.”

The pursuer appealed, and argued—(1) The foundation of the pursuer's case at common law and under the Employers' Liability Act depended upon the same facts, namely. a defect in the ways, works, In M'Grath v. Glasgow Coal Company, Limited, 1909 S.C. 1250, 46 S.L.R. 890, the whole averments were so confused that the defenders were not given fair notice of what the pursuer's case was. The obligation to fence was set out in the Coal Mines Regulation Act 1887 (50 and 51 Vict. cap. 58), sec. 49, rule 31. (2) Cond. 4 was not an admission of contributory negligence.

Argued for the defenders and respondents—The case was relevant. A pursuer who sued alternatively was bound to discriminate between his claim at common law and that under the Employers' Liability Act— M'Grath ( cit. sup.) The pursuer had not done so either in his condescendence or even in his pleas. To make the case relevant at common law the pursuer would have required to aver that the defenders had not used reasonable care to appoint a competent manager, or had not supplied him with adequate materials and resources— Black v. Fife Coal Company, Limited, 1909 S.C. 152, 46 S.L.R. 191; Wilson v. Merry & Cuninghame, May 29, 1868, 6 Macph. (H.L.) 84, 5 S.L.R. 568—and, to make it relevant under the Act, that the person entrusted with the duty of inspection had been negligent—Employers' Liability Act 1880 (43 and 44 Vict. cap. 42), sec. 2, sub-sec. 1. (2) The pursuer's own averments in cond. 4 disclosed contributory negligence.

Judgment:

Lord President—I am of opinion that an issue must be allowed here, because I think that the pursuer has stated a perfectly relevant case. The learned Sheriff-Substitute has refused a proof, because he thought he was within the rule of M'Grath v. Glasgow Coal Company ( supra), which was a case where the action was dismissed really because the whole statement was so confused and unprecise that it was impossible for the defender to know what cause he was going to meet. I am not saying a word against that judgment. I think it was perfectly right. But when I turn to the present case I do not find any want of precision. The case made is an extremely simple one. It is that there was a failure of duty in the Collieries Company in leaving certain parts of a revolving wheel unguarded, and that the result of that failure in duty was that the deceased man met his death by coming in contact with the unguarded part of the wheel.

Now it is also said that there is no proper specification in the sense of discrimination between the case so far as laid upon common law and so far as laid upon the Employers' Liability Act. In some cases where the ground of action depends upon the Employers' Liability Act I can easily imagine that it would he necessary to give ample notice of this kind. I do not think that the matter ever arises upon the point of relevancy, in the strict sense of the word, because, as has often been pointed out, the Employers' Liability Act does not really give a new ground of action; it leaves the grounds of action as it finds them, but takes away certain defences which were competent before the Act was passed. But still, in the other sense in which the word “irrelevancy” is used, viz., insufficient specification and want of fair notice, I can imagine cases in which it might be said that the notice was not sufficient; but here it does not seem to me that any notice is necessary to distinguish between the case so far as laid upon common law and so far as laid upon the Employers' Liability Act, because the blunt averment that works and ways were in a defective condition is a good averment of liability both at common law and under the statute. The only difference between the two positions is that a defence which is a good defence to the one action is not a good defence to the other. At common law it is a good defence to say of a portion of the works in which an accident has occurred, that it is not a portion of the works which the employer himself undertook to supervise, that the employer had remitted such supervision to a qualified person, and had not in any way interfered with or stopped that person in the procuring of such materials as were necessary for the performance of the work entrusted to his supervision. But under the Employers' Liability Act that is not a sufficient defence in itself; the defender has got to show that the works and ways were in an efficient condition.

Well, here I think there is a relevant case, but I understand that one of your Lordships has a difficulty upon the argument that the pursuer's own statement discloses a case of contributory negligence. Now as to the possibility of such a position, I do

Page: 143

not doubt that if a pursuer in his account of the accident tells such a story that he shows that according to his view the proximate cause of the accident was his own negligence—I do not doubt that in such circumstances the case cannot go on. But when I look at the averments here I cannot say that I think they disclose such a situation. I think the pursuer's averments quite clearly disclose this, that there may be proved against him a case of contributory negligence. But they do not seem to me to be tantamount to saying that he was guilty of contributory negligence. Accordingly I think the interlocutor must be recalled and an issue granted.

Lord Johnston—As the case is presented upon the Sheriff-Substitute's interlocutor, I entirely agree with all that your Lordship has said, and I agree that the pursuer has made a sufficiently relevant statement of fault on the part of the defenders. But I confess that my own impression is that at the same time condescendence 4 so clearly discloses, upon the statement of the pursuer himself, that he was guilty of contributory negligence, which was the proximate cause of the accident, that I think he ought to be non-suited on his own record, in respect that it would be improper to allow the case to go to proof upon an averment of fault where there is an admission of contributory negligence, which is an absolutely complete answer to that averment of fault. I cannot conceive that a miner who merely states that his lamp was extinguished, and that he continued to advance in face of a known danger, does anything else but disclose upon the record the unqualified admission that his own negligence or rashness was the proximate cause of his death.

Lord Mackenzie—I agree with your Lordships that the pursuer here avers a relevant case at common law and under the Employers' Liability Act.

As to the point that his averments disclose a case of contributory negligence, one is very reluctant to deal with that until the facts have been fully ascertained, for the reason that only then can the complexion of the case be known. All I say is that I do not think that condescendence 4 necessarily means that the pursuer was guilty of contributory negligence.

Lord Kinnear was absent.

The Court recalled the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute dated 31st October 1911, and remitted to him to proceed.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Pursuer and Appellant— Moncrieff. Agents— Simpson & Marwick, W.S.

Counsel for the Defenders and Respondents— Macmillan. Agents— R. & R. Denholm & Kerr, Solicitors.

1911


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