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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Bradley v. Menley & James, Ltd [1913] ScotLR 765 (29 May 1913) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1913/50SLR0765.html Cite as: [1913] ScotLR 765, [1913] SLR 765 |
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Page: 765↓
(Single Bills.)
An action of slander was raised to which defences were lodged. The defender thereafter offered to the pursuer £5 in settlement of his claim. The pursuer refused this offer. Three issues were allowed, and on each the jury found for the pursuer, and assessed the damage at sixpence on each issue. The defenders, in moving the Court to apply the verdict asked for expenses, including those before the tender.
Held that the defenders were not entitled to expenses before the date of tender.
Page: 766↓
Orlando Charnock Bradley, Principal of the Royal (Dick) Veterinary College, Edinburgh, pursuer, raised an action of damages for slander against Menley & James, Ltd., defenders, London, concluding for £500 damages. After having lodged defences the defenders tendered to the pursuer the sum of £5 in full of his claim. The pursuer refused this tender. Three issues were allowed, and, on 26th March 1913, the case was tried before the Lord President and a jury. The jury found for the pursuer on each of the issues and assessed the damages at 6d. on each.
On 29th May 1913 the defenders, in Single Bills, moved the Court to apply the verdict and to find them entitled to expenses, including those incurred before the date of the tender.
The motion was heard by Five Judges, who had assembled to hear Justiciary appeals.
Now the jury really affirmed all those propositions except the last. They held that the defenders had published, that the publications were of and concerning the pursuer, that they did contain a slur upon his professional conduct, but that the pursuer had no real damage done to him by them, and accordingly they assessed the damage at sixpence on each of the three issues. That they did following the view of the facts I had suggested to them in my charge.
Now it is the fact that a tender was put in at some period immediately after the lodging of the defences, and the tender being for a larger sum than the one shilling and sixpence recovered, the defenders would be entitled to expenses after the date of the tender, in accordance with the well-known rule. But then, in asking us to apply the verdict the defenders move also for the expenses prior to the tender, and they do so upon the ground that the action, as they say, never ought to have been raised.
Now the pursuer does not move for these expenses, and he does not move for them for this very good reason, that he comes within the words of the 40th section of the Court of Session (Scotland) Act 1868 (31 and 32 Vict. cap. 100), which provides that “where the pursuer in any action of damages in the Court of Session recovers by the verdict of a jury less than £5, he shall not be entitled to recover or obtain from the defender any expenses in respect of such verdict, unless the judge before whom such verdict is obtained shall certify on the interlocutor sheet that the action was brought to try a right besides the mere right to recover damages; or that the injury in respect of which the action was brought was malicious; or, in the case of actions for defamation or for libel, that the action was brought for the vindication of character and was in his opinion fit to be tried in the Court of Session.” Well, no such certificate was asked from me, and accordingly the pursuer is not in a position to ask for expenses. I may say at once, in order that counsel may not think I am putting any slur upon them, that I should never have granted a certificate in this case if I had been asked to do so, because I am clearly of opinion that this action should never have been raised, and that it was persisted in after it should have been given up. I think that the offers of amende in the letters of the defenders were very proper offers and ought to have been accepted. But then the defenders ask that they should have expenses up to the tender. I think if we granted that we should be, so to speak, going against the verdict of the jury. After all, the jury has affirmed, as I say, certain propositions which put the defenders, not only technically, but in one sense really in the wrong. No doubt the publications did not cause any damage to the pursuer, and the pursuer ought not to have gone on with the action; but still the verdict of the jury shows that in one sense the pursuer was right in raising the action.
Accordingly I think that the motion of the defenders, so far as it asks expenses prior to the date of the tender, should be refused, that we should apply the verdict, and in accordance with ordinary practice where there has been a tender, find the defenders entitled to all expenses since the date of the tender.
In the case where the verdict is given for a very small sum, it is, in the first place, for the judge who tried the case to consider, as your Lordship did in this case, the question whether he would give a certificate that the action was properly raised for the vindication of character. I have heard from your Lordship that you would not have given such a certificate.
Further, there is the case where nominal
Page: 767↓
Now I must concur with your Lordship in thinking that the fact that the verdict of the jury was for the pursuer, and that fulfilling their duty they had to assess damages even although they assessed them at so small a sum, implies that the action was an action which might be raised and for which the pursuer could bring facts entitling him to a verdict in his favour.
In these circumstances I cannot see that there is any ground for holding that the defenders are entitled to get expenses up to date when by their practical act of putting in a tender of a certain sum of money they placed the pursuer in a position of considering whether he would go on with the action and try to get more or would accept what was offered. If he had accepted the tender he would certainly have been entitled to expenses up to its date. I entirely agree with what your Lordship has said.
The Court applied the verdict, and in respect thereof decerned against the defenders for the sum of one shilling and sixpence, being the cumulo amount of the damages assessed by the jury, found neither party entitled to expenses up to the date of the tender, and found the defenders entitled to expenses subsequent thereto.
Counsel for the Pursuer— Watt, K.C.—J.R. Christie. Agent— Robert Anderson, S.S.C.
Counsel for the Defenders— Constable, K.C.—Hon. W. Watson. Agents— Finlay &Wilson, W.S.