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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Barbour v. M'Douall [1914] ScotLR 720 (19 June 1914) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1914/51SLR0720.html Cite as: [1914] SLR 720, [1914] ScotLR 720 |
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Page: 720↓
[Sheriff Court at Stranraer.
Lease—Outgoing—Compensation—Unreasonable Disturbance—Reasonable Opportunity of Valuing Stock—Expense Directly Due to Quitting Holding—Forced Sale—Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908 (8 Edw. VII, cap. 64), sec. 10.
In a claim at the instance of outgoing tenants at the termination of a lease for compensation for drainage improvements the arbiter found that the improvements had been executed by the claimants with tiles supplied by the landlord in accordance with the “custom on the estate,” and that no additional rent or interest had been charged against the claimants in respect of such drainage. The tenants having claimed compensation for the improvements under section 3 of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908, and averred an agreement to dispense with written notice of intention to execute the improvements, held that in respect that the actings of the parties were covered by the custom of the estate a written notice of intention to execute the improvements in terms of the statute was necessary to certiorate the landlord that the tenants intended to claim under the statute, and that no agreement to dispense with such a notice could in the circumstances be inferred.
The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908, sec. 10, enacts—“ Compensation for Unreasonable Disturbance.—Where ( a) the landlord of a holding, without good and sufficient cause, and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management, terminates the tenancy by notice to quit, … the tenant upon quitting the holding shall … be entitled to compensation for the loss or expense directly attributable to his quitting the holding which the tenant may unavoidably incur upon or in connection with the sale or removal of his household goods: … Provided that no compensation under this section shall be payable ( a) unless the tenant has given to the landlord a reasonable opportunity of making a valuation of such
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goods … ( b) unless the tenant has, within two months after he has received notice to quit … given to the landlord notice in writing of his intention to claim compensation under this section.” In a claim under the above section by an outgoing tenant for compensation, held (1) that “reasonable opportunity” was a question of circumstances, the section not imposing any duty on the tenants to give intimation to the landlord of such opportunity, and (2) that “loss or expense directly attributable to … quitting the holding which the tenant may unavoidably incur” covered loss assessed by arbiter as due to breakup prices at a forced sale.
The Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908 (8 Edw. VII, cap. 64) enacts—Section 3—“(1) Compensation under this Act shall not be payable in respect of any improvement comprised in Part II of the First Schedule hereto, unless the tenant of the holding has, not more than three nor less than two months before beginning to execute the improvement, given to the landlord notice in writing of his intention so to do, … and upon such notice being given, the landlord and tenant may agree on the terms as to compensation or otherwise on which the improvement is to be executed.… (4) The landlord and the tenant may by the lease or otherwise agree to dispense with any notice under this section, and any such agreement may provide for anything for which an agreement after notice under this section may provide, and in such case shall be of the same validity and effect as such last-mentioned agreement.” Part II of the First Schedule refers to “Drainage.”
Section 10 is quoted supra in rubric.
On 10th December 1913 John Miller Hannah, the arbiter in a reference under the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908 (8 Edw. VII, cap. 64), between Andrew Kenneth M'Douall of Logan, Kirkmaiden (the landlord), and John Barbour and Robert Barbour, formerly tenants of the holding of Balgowan, on the estate of Logan (the tenants), stated a Case for the opinion of the Sheriff-Substitute at Stranraer ( Watson) with reference to certain claims for compensation by the tenants under the said Act on the determination of their tenancy.
The Case stated—“The deceased Robert Barbour (father of the claimants) entered into the occupancy of the farm of Balgowan at Whitsunday 1887 on a nineteen years' lease, but no formal lease was ever executed. From the date of his death, about three years later, the farm was carried on by his testamentary trustees until Martinmas 1900, when the claimants were accepted as tenants, and continued as such until Whitsunday 1906. From that date the farm was held by them by tacit relocation until Whitsunday 1913, at which date their tenancy was brought to an end by notice to quit given by the respondent on 29th April 1912.
The claim included a claim in respect of improvements made by the tenants by drainage. It was admitted that the claimants did not on any of the occasions on which such improvements were executed give notice in writing to the landlord in compliance with the requirements of section 3 (subsection 1) of the Act. It was, however, admitted or proved to the arbiter's satisfaction that on each of these occasions when drainage improvements were executed, the claimants had interviews with the former factor Mr D. A. M'Clew, at which the nature of the work proposed was brought fully under his notice. Orders for the tiles necessary for carrying out the work, to the Tirally Brick and Tile Works, were given by the said factor to the claimants, and the tiles so supplied were charged against and paid for by the estate. No additional rent or interest was charged against the claimants in respect of such drainage; the cartage and laying of the drains were done by the claimants at their own expense, and that this was and is the custom on the estate. It was further admitted that at none of these meetings was the subject of compensation mentioned, or the question of written notice specifically raised.
It was proved that the tenancy of the said John Barbour and Robert Barbour of said holding was terminated by notice to quit given by the landlord without good and sufficient cause, and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management. Notice of intention to claim for loss under section 10 was given by the claimants to respondent's factor on 24th May 1912, and the claimants did not dispose of any of their effects until 13th February 1913, on which date the main part of their dairy stock was sold at the farm by public auction, the remainder of the stock, together with the implements and utensils of husbandry, being sold by public auction at the farm on 17th May 1913. These two sales were duly advertised by posters displayed in the district and also by advertisements in the various local newspapers for some considerable time before the sales actually took place. It was admitted by the factor that he saw the advertisements but that he took no steps to have a valuation made. The claimants gave the following written notice on 26th April 1913 to the respondent—‘Balgowan, Ardwell, Stranraer, 26th April 1913. To Andrew Kenneth M'Douall, Esq., of Logan, per Henry Michie, Esq., Logan Estate Office, Ardwell, Stranraer. Dear Sir,—In terms of section 10 of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908 we hereby give you notice that you can now have an opportunity of inspecting the goods, implements, and stock on the farm of Balgowan.—Yours faithfully, Robert Barbour; John Barbour.’
It was proved that the sale of the dairy stock was a good sale so far as public displenishing sales go, and that at least fair values were obtained for the various animals so far as such sales go. It was, however, proved to the arbiter's satisfaction that during the tenancy the claimants had built up by selection and breeding a good milking herd, the value of which as a herd to the tenants was greater than the cumulo value of the component units sold at a displenishing public sale to individual purchasers.
“It was further found proved that the implements
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and dairy utensils were sold at break-up prices, and did not realise anything approaching their value. It was also proved that the tenants did not receive at the public sale the full values of the horses and brood mares sold.” On 5th November 1913 the arbiter issued proposed findings in which he, inter alia, proposed to find—“(1) That on the claim for drainage improvements, from the facts and circumstances proved as above, there existed by implication such an agreement to dispense with formal written notice as is contemplated in and provided for by sub-section 4 of section 3 of the said Act. I therefore proposed to award compensation to the claimants in respect of drainage improvements executed by them, and in assessing the amount of the compensation, to have taken into account the benefit derived by the tenant from the landlord's expenditure on tiles, in accordance with the provisions of section 1 (2) of said Act. (2) That a reasonable opportunity was given by the tenants to the landlord of making a valuation of the whole goods, implements, produce, and stock in respect of which a claim is made under section 10 of the Act. (3) That the claimants sustained loss or expense directly attributable to their quitting the holding, unavoidably incurred by them in connection with the sale of their stock, implements, and dairy utensils; that from the evidence led and my own knowledge I assess the loss sustained on these sales as follows:—Dairy stock, £100; horses and brood mares, £30; implements, £65.”
The questions of law were—“1. On the facts found by me to be admitted or proved, am I entitled to hold that there was an agreement to dispense with written notice to execute drainage in terms of section 3 (4) of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908, and to award compensation in respect of such improvements? 2. In respect of the terms of the notice, dated 26th April 1913, given by the claimants to the respondent, are the claimants barred from founding on any other alleged previous circumstances to supersede a similar notice prior to the sale of 13th February? 3. On the facts found by me to be admitted or proved, am I entitled to find that a reasonable opportunity was given to the landlord by the tenants of making a valuation prior to the sale of 13th February 1913, in terms of section 10, proviso ( a)? 4. On the facts found by me to be admitted or proved, am I entitled to find that the sums proposed to be awarded as loss in connection with the sales of dairy stock and implements are loss or expense unavoidably incurred by the tenants upon or in connection with said sales, and directly attributable to their quitting the holding?”
On 4th February 1914 the Sheriff-Substitute answered the first and second questions of law in the negative and the third and fourth in the affirmative.
The claimants appealed, and argued—(1) It was clear from the circumstances of the case that the landlord and tenant had agreed to dispense with notice under section 3 of the Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1908 (8 Edw. VII, cap. 64). It was not necessary that such an agreement should be in writing— Ogilvy v. Elliot, November 3, 1904, 7 F. 1115, per Lord Ordinary (Kincairney) at p. 1124, 42 S.L.R. 41. Under sections 2 and 4 writing was specifically required, but not under the present section. It was competent, therefore, to prove dispensation with notice prout de jure. In any event, if writing were necessary, it need not be formal, but only such as was necessary to found a good contract of lease or loan, and that in the present case was satisfied by the written orders for tiles which the landlord supplied— Hope v. Derwent Rolling Mills Company, Limited, June 27, 1905, 7 F. 837, 42 S.L.R. 794; Sellar v. Aiton, January 26, 1875, 2 R. 381, 12 S.L.R. 272. (2 and 3) The claimants were not barred by their letter of 26th April 1913 from proving that prior to 13th February 1913 a reasonable opportunity had been given to the landlord of making a valuation of the stock. Reasonable opportunity was a question of fact, and did not require any written notice. (4) The Sheriff was right in upholding the arbiter's award for loss incurred in removing under section 10. Compensation was properly due for depreciation due to a forced sale.
Argued for the respondent—(1) There was an express finding by the arbiter that all that was done in respect of drainage was done in accordance with the custom of the estate. Where there was such a custom there was no room for an inference such as the claimants asked in the present case, that compensation had in fact been claimed. Written notice was necessary in such cases, and its object was to certiorate the landlord that his tenants intended to proceed under the Act. Where there was no such custom as existed here it might be that without a written notice compensation might be found due, but that was not the case here. (2 and 3) The letter of 26th April 1913 showed that the tenants had not previously to February 1913 given the landlord a “reasonable opportunity” of valuing, and they were therefore barred from maintaining that they had. Further, it was the tenant who under the Act was bound to make the first move in giving such an opportunity— Brown v. Mitchell, 1910 S.C. 369, per L.P. Dunedin at p. 384, 47 S.L.R. 216. (4) The arbiter was not entitled to award compensation for mere speculative loss, as he had done in the present case.
The first of those relates to a claim for compensation for certain drainage improvements executed as described in the case; and the
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It is quite plain, therefore, from the facts found in the case that there was no compliance with the requirements of section 3, subsection 1, of the Act. In that sub-section it is provided:—[ His Lordship quoted the sub-section].
The notice required in this sub-section was admittedly not given; but it was argued on behalf of the appellants that although this was so, yet looking to the provision in subsection 4 it might be inferred in certain cases, of which it is contended that this is one, that there was an agreement to dispense with any notice under this section, including notice of an intention to execute an improvement of the class comprised in Part II of the First Schedule of the Act. We had an argument on the question whether an agreement to dispense with notice could be inferred from facts and circumstances, or whether it was necessary that, as the notice is to be given in writing, so such an agreement should be proved by writing also. It is not necessary to pronounce an opinion upon that point in the present case. It may be that in a future case such facts and circumstances may be presented that the Court would consider itself entitled to draw the inference that there was an agreement to dispense with notice.
The ground of judgment in the present case is that on no view of the facts and circumstances can it be said that the appellants here, as tenants of the farm, did bring themselves within the provisions of the Agricultural Holdings Act with regard to compensation for improvements by way of drainage. Upon that point the argument stated by Mr Johnston appeared to me to be quite conclusive. Speaking for myself, I may say that I do not think that our attention at the outset was sufficiently directed to the important finding at the top of page 5 of the case, from which it appears quite plainly that all that was done by the tenants and by the landlord upon the occasion when the drainage improvement was executed was done entirely in conformity with the custom on the estate. The cartage and laying of the drains was done by the claimants at their own expense, and the tiles, for which the order was given from the estate office by the factor to the claimants, were charged against and paid for by the estate. The arrangement to which appeal is made, and from which the Court is asked to draw the inference that there was an agreement between the landlord and tenants to dispense with the statutory notice was an arrangement which was made without any reference at all to the Act of Parliament. If it were the case, as was contended by the appellants, that the object of requiring such notice to be given is merely in order that the landlord may have knowledge of what is being done, then it might be possible to lay a foundation for the argument on behalf of the appellants. But this is not the purpose of the statutory notice; on the contrary, its purpose is to certiorate the landlord that what is being done is being done on statutory conditions. And when one bears in mind the facts which have been found by the arbiter in this case, I think it is impossible to hold as to this work, which was done upon the footing of the estate custom, that there are any facts which can be regarded as inferring an agreement on the part of the landlord that no notice should be given to him, as required by the statute. I think the Court would be slow in any case in construing any agreement which has no reference to notice at all as equivalent to a dispensation with notice under the provisions of the Act of Parliament. Accordingly upon that matter I think the arbiter was mistaken in the view which he took, and that upon this point the judgment of the Sheriff-Substitute should be affirmed.
With regard to the other matters which were brought up by way of appeal on the part of the landlord, I am of opinion that the Sheriff-Substitute has also taken a sound view. The first of these matters arises on the second question which is put, namely—“In respect of the terms of the notice, dated 26th April 1913, given by the claimants to the respondent, are the claimants barred from founding on any other alleged previous circumstances to supersede a similar notice prior to the sale of 13th February ” That arises under the provisions of section 10 of the Act. That section provides:—“Where the landlord of a holding, without good and sufficient cause, and for reasons inconsistent with good estate management, terminates the tenancy by notice to quit,” then “the tenant upon quitting the holding shall, in addition to the compensation (if any) to which he may be entitled in respect of improvements, and notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, be entitled to compensation for the loss or expense directly attributable to his quitting the holding which the tenant may unavoidably incur upon or in connection with the sale or removal of his household goods or his implements of husbandry, produce, or farm stock, on or used in connection with the holding.” As a proviso to that the Act of Parliament says—“Provided that no compensation under this section shall be payable ( a) unless the tenant has given to the landlord a reasonable opportunity of making a valuation of such goods, implements, produce, and stock as aforesaid.”
The argument was, that inasmuch as there was a sale of part of the tenants' stock on 13th February 1913, and as the tenants through their agents, as we were informed, wrote on 26th April 1913 a letter stating that “in terms of section 10 of the Act we hereby give you notice that you can now have an opportunity of inspecting the goods, implements, and stock on the farm of Balgowan,”
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The third query raises the question of the construction to be put upon sub-section ( a). The Court is asked—“On the facts found by me to be admitted or proved, am I entitled to And that a reasonable opportunity was given to the landlord by the tenants of making a valuation prior to the sale of 13th February 1913, in terms of section 10, proviso ( a)?” No question, of course, could arise with regard to the second sale, which was on the 17th May 1913, because that was after the letter of 26th April, and therefore the question arises only in regard to the first sale on 13th February 1913.
It appears to me that under sub-section ( a) there is no duty on the part of the tenant to do anything. There is no provision that he is to give intimation. What is said is that he is to give the landlord “reasonable opportunity,” and what “reasonable opportunity” is must, of course, depend on the circumstances of each case. But to say that the landlord in the present case had not reasonable opportunity is, I think, hopeless on the facts of the case; because the necessary notice under sub-section ( b) was given by the claimants so far back as 24th May 1912, and the first of the sales was not until 13th February 1913. The notice given on 24th May was in terms of proviso ( b) of section 10 of the Act. Therefore the landlord had due notice that the tenants intended to claim compensation under the the section so far back as 24th May 1912. If after his making a request thereafter for a reasonable opportunity to make a valuation of the goods on the premises the tenants had obstructed him and prevented him from getting what under sub-section ( a) he was entitled to get, then there would have been ground for complaint. So also if the tenant had hurried on a sale so that the landlord had no reasonable opportunity of making a valuation. On the facts in the present case I think the landlord had no ground of complaint.
That leaves only the last question, which is—“On the facts found by me to be admitted or proved, am I entitled to find that the sum proposed to be awarded as loss in connection with the sales of dairy stock and implements are loss and expense unavoidably incurred by the tenants upon or in connection with said sales, and directly attributable to their quitting the holding.” Upon that matter the proposed finding of the arbiter was—“That the claimants sustained loss and expense directly attributable to their quitting the holding, unavoidably incurred by them in connection with the sale of their stock, implements, and dairy utensils; that from the evidence led, and my own knowledge, I assess the loss sustained on these sales as follows”—and then he assesses the amount at £195. That does not seem to be an excessive sum in view of the fact that the amount realised from the two displenishing sales was something like £3400 prima facie.
The ground upon which the arbiter proceeded was apparently that—as disclosed in the statement of facts—“the sale of the dairy stock was a good sale so far as public displenishing sales go, and that at least fair values were obtained for the various animals so far as such sales go. It was, however, proved to the arbiter's satisfaction that during the tenancy the claimants had built up by selection and breeding a good milking herd, the value of which as a herd to the tenants was greater than the cumulo value of the component units sold at a displenishing public sale to individual purchasers. It was further found proved that the implements and dairy utensils were sold at break-up prices, and did not realise anything approaching their value. It was also proved that the tenants did not receive at the public sale the full value of the horses and brood mares sold.”
Now I am of the opinion that the judgment upon that point of the Sheriff-Substitute should be affirmed, and the plainest and most obvious ground is that we have no materials in the case for coming to any other conclusion. Even supposing the argument which was submitted to us on the construction of section 10—upon the meaning to be attached to the words “loss and expense”—were sound, I do not know how we could possibly give effect to it, or turn it into pounds, shillings, and pence in the present case. I do not for my part see that there are any grounds stated in the case for holding that the arbiter acted ultra vires in coming to the conclusion that he did. This being the case, it is probably not the proper occasion for going into a discussion of what exactly is the meaning of “loss and expense.” When the arbiter has found that the loss or expense is directly attributable to the tenants quitting the holding, and is unavoidably incurred by them in connection with the sale of their stock, I am unable to see that he has done anything that he was not warranted in doing under the Act.
Prima facie the term “expense” would appear to me more applicable to the case of the removal of stock, and to refer to the cost attending the removal. In a case of this kind what the tenant would be entitled to would be not merely the expense of the sale but the loss through deterioration of the stock upon a sale, and the elements which are mentioned by the arbiter are certainly relevant to be taken into consideration. I think that in the absence of a special averment of facts which would show that injustice had been done to the landlord, I should say that the arbiter as a rule would take the facts as he found them, and if there had been a sale he would deal with the matter on the footing of a sale,
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The
The Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute.
Counsel for the Appellants— Constable, K.C.— Keith. Agents— Simpson & Marwick, W.S.
Counsel for the Respondents— Johnston, K.C.— C. H. Brown. Agents— E. A. & F. Hunter & Company, W.S.