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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> City of Glasgow Friendly Society v. Bruce [1915] ScotLR 199 (10 December 1915) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1915/53SLR0199.html Cite as: [1915] SLR 199, [1915] ScotLR 199 |
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Page: 199↓
[Sheriff Court at Glasgow.
The pursuer in an action of maills and duties is not bound to apply to the Court for leave to proceed under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 in respect that the action is merely declaratory of his right and does not enter him into possession of the subjects.
The Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 (4 and 5 Geo. V, cap. 78) enacts—Section 1 (1)—“From and after the passing of this Act no person shall ( b) levy any distress, take, resume, or enter into possession of any property, exercise any right of re-entry, foreclose, realise any security … forfeit any deposit … for the purpose of enforcing the payment or recovery of any sum of money to which this sub-section applies, or in default of the payment or recovery of any such sum of money, except after such application to such court and such notice as may be provided for by rules or directions under this Act.”
James Reid M'Gavin Smith, British Linen Bank, Glasgow, and others, trustees for the City of Glasgow Friendly Society, pursuers, brought an action in the Sheriff Court at Glasgow against John Wilson Bruce, accountant, Glasgow, defender and appellant, in which they concluded for declarator that the pursuers as heritable creditors in a bond over property in Glasgow belonging to the defender had right to the rents, maills, and duties of the property, or so much as might be necessary to pay the principal sum and interest.
The Sheriff-Substitute ( Fyfe) granted decree in terms of the prayer and added to his interlocutor an order in the following terms:—“Meanwhile assigns as a diet for hearing parties upon the question whether the pursuers are precluded from enforcing the decree now granted by the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914, Tuesday, 9th November next at 2 p.m.”
The defender appealed to the Court of Session, and argued—The action was irrelevant in respect that the pursuers had not applied for leave to proceed under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 (4 and 5 Geo. V, cap. 78), sec. 1 (1) ( b). The pursuers had entered into possession to the extent that they had put the defender out of possession by interpelling the tenants from paying rents. The Act forbade not merely entering into possession but all its incidents—Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 (32 and 33 Vict. c. 116), sec. 119; Heritable Securities (Scotland) Act 1894 (57 and 58 Vict. cap. 44), sec. 3.
Argued for the pursuers—The pursuers were doing none of the things forbidden in
Page: 200↓
section 1 (1) ( b) of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 ( cit. sup.) They were not seeking to enter into possession, and though they had got a decree they could not make it operative without a decree of the Court authorising them to take further steps. This required an application under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 for leave to proceed. Defender's argument, if well founded, would interfere even with arrestment on the dependance.
Two points were argued before us. The first was whether there had been a sufficient demand for payment to justify the pursuer in raising an action at all. [ His Lordship gave his reasons for holding that sufficient notice had been given.]
The other question turns upon the interpretation of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act 1914 and the relative Act of Sederunt. It was argued that before this action of maills and duties was raised at all there should have been an application to the Court, on the ground that this was really a step in the process of entering into possession, or of enforcing payment or recovering money in terms of section 1 (1) ( b) of the statute. In my opinion that argument is not well founded. I think an action of maills and duties is not a step in process in any proper sense of the word, but the decree in such an action is really, as Lord President Inglis described it in the case of Robertson's Trustees v. Gardner, 16 R. 705, 26 S.L.R. 547, only available as giving the heritable creditors a title to enter into possession of the estate.
It is a mere declarator of right which enables the holder of the decree to take further steps to get himself put into possession, but it in no sense enters the holder of it into possession. Further proceedings require to be taken before that result is brought about. I think the view upon which the Sheriff-Substitute proceeded is correct, namely, that a creditor having obtained a decree of maills and duties must then, under the powers given to the Court to stay execution, make an application to have it considered and determined by the proper Court whether such a decree should be put into operation. As Lord Guthrie pointed out in the course of the discussion, if it were necessary that before an action of maills and duties was brought an application under the statute for leave to bring it had to be made and disposed of, the result might be that the circumstances might be entirely changed between the date of the disposal of the application and the date of the final decree. The findings of the Sheriff-Substitute seem to me sufficient for the disposal of the whole case, and I think we should find in terms of his interlocutor and dismiss the appeal.
Page: 201↓
The Court dismissed the appeal, found in fact and in law as in the interlocutor of the Sheriff-Substitute, of new found, declared, and decerned as craved in the initial writ.
Counsel for the Pursuers and Respondents— Sandeman, K.C.— Lippe. Agents— Simpson & Marwick, W.S.
Counsel for the Defender and Appellant— M'Lennan, K.C.— Walker. Agent— S. F. Sutherland, S.S.C.