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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Central Motor Engineering Co. and Others v. Gibbs and Another [1917] ScotLR 384 (20 March 1917)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1917/54SLR0384.html
Cite as: [1917] SLR 384, [1917] ScotLR 384

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SCOTTISH_SLR_Court_of_Session

Page: 384

Court of Session Inner House First Division.

Tuesday, March 20. 1917.

54 SLR 384

Central Motor Engineering Company and Others

v.

Gibbs and Another.

Subject_1Process
Subject_2Petition
Subject_3Bankruptcy
Subject_4Sequestration — Nobile Officium — Petition for Declarator that Sequestration ab initio Null and Void — Competency.
Facts:

A firm and its partners having been sequestrated presented a petition founding on informalities in the citation to the sequestration proceedings and in the affidavit of the petitioning creditor, in which they craved declarator that the whole sequestration proceedings were null and void ab initio. Held that the petition was incompetent, as in effect it proceeded by application to the nobile officium to crave a remedy which might be sought by common law action of reduction.

Headnote:

The Central Motor Engineering Company, Glasgow and Edinburgh, and Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alistair Houston Boswall Preston, the only partners thereof, as such partners and as individuals,

Page: 385

petitoners, brought a petition against Sylvia Mary Gibbs and others, of whom Mrs Euphemia Constance Gibbs and her husband Antony Edmund Gibbs as her administrator-in-law and as tutor and guardian of the said Sylvia Mary Gibbs, his daughter, respondents, lodged answers. The petition craved the Court to find and declare that the warrant of confirmation and whole sequestration proceedings by which the petitioners had been sequestrated were void and of no effect ab initio, and to repone and restore the petitioners in integrum.

The petition as amended set forth—“The estates of the petitioners were on 14th January 1915 sequestrated on petition at the instance of creditors by the Sheriff of Lanarkshire at Glasgow.

That William Brodie Galbraith, chartered accountant, 87 St Vincent Street, Glasgow, was appointed the trustee on the sequestrated estates of the petitioners conform to Act and warrant of confirmation in his favour by the said Sheriff of Lanarkshire dated 27th January 1915.

That in August 1914, on the outbreak of the present war, both of the present petitioners joined the Army, and at the date of the presentation of the said petition for sequestration the present petitioners Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alistair Houston Boswall Preston were furth of Scotland on active service.

That the said petition for sequestration was presented without the consent of the present petitioners

A copy of the petition for sequestration and the warrant thereon were left at the place of business of the present petitioners in the hands of a servant under section 26 of the Act [ i.e., Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 (3 and 4 Geo. V, cap. 20)], but the present petitioners were not cited edictally as section 25 prescribes. These petitioners accordingly were not cited to appear in the manner prescribed in the last-mentioned section. Moreover, the presentation of the said petition for sequestration was not brought to the notice of these petitioners owing to their absence from Scotland on active service as above narrated until after said award of sequestration had been made, and they believe and aver that had said petition come to their knowledge prior to said award of sequestration said award would not have been made. Further, the claim produced by the creditors on whose petition the sequestration was awarded was not deponed to in terms of section 24 of the statute. These creditors (the Anglo-American Oil Company, Limited) are a company incorporated under the Companies Acts. Their principal office is in London, and they have branch offices at various places in England and Scotland. Their said claim was deponed to by a Mr Joseph Patterson, who is described in his affidavit as an ‘accountant and principal officer’ of said company. The present petitioners believe and aver, however, that the said Joseph Patterson is simply in the service of the said company as an accountant and book-keener in their branch office in Glasgow under the local manager there, and is not ‘the secretary, manager, cashier, clerk, or other principal officer’ of the said company within the meaning of said section 24 of the Act.

In these circumstances the present petitioners are desirous of having it declared that the said proceedings and the pretended award of sequestration following thereon are and were ab initio void and of no effect, and they submit to the Court the following facts to show that it would be greatly to the interest both of the present petitioners and of their creditors that the said sequestration should be held as reduced ab initio.

Mrs Alice Mary Houston Boswall Preston, the mother of the said Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alistair Houston Boswall Preston, by her will made certain provisions in their favour whereby the liferent of certain trust funds of considerable value was conferred upon them under the proviso that at the date of her death her said sons should be living and no act or event should have been done or have happened by reason whereof the liferent or any part thereof if held upon trust for them absolutely would be vested in or charged in favour of or be payable to any other person or persons or any corporation. The said will provided that in the event of the doing or happening of any such act or event the income to the said Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alistair Houston Boswall Preston was to cease, and in such event the said Mrs Alice Mary Houston Boswall Preston appointed that the capital and income comprised in said trust funds should be held upon trust for her granddaughter, Sylvia Mary Gibbs, daughter of Antony Edmund Gibbs of Winsor Manor, Bilbury, in the county of Gloucester, and residing there, should she survive her and attain the age of twenty-one years, then from and after her attaining that age or the death of the testatrix, whichever of such events should be the later, the capital and income of the trust fund should be held upon trust for her absolutely, but if she should die under the age of twenty-one years then the said trust fund should be held upon trust for her daughter Mrs Euphemia Constance Gibbs, wife of the said Antony Edmund Gibbs, and residing with him at Winsor Manor aforesaid absolutely. The said Mrs Alice Mary Houston Boswall Preston died on 9th July 1916. The capital value of the said trust funds was at that date £40,435 or thereby. If the petitioners were bankrupt at that date their rights under the said will ceased and determined. If the said sequestration proceedings be held void ab initio they will be entitled to the provisions in their favour made by the said will.

By deed of appointment dated 4th December 1913 the said Mrs Alice Mary Houston Boswall Preston, mother of the said Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alistair Houston Boswall Preston, exercised in favour of her said sons a power of appointment conferred on her by her marriage settlement dated 5th May 1883 over funds therein mentioned (being part of the said trust funds) to the extent of a sum of £20,000, with compound interest at the rate

Page: 386

of five per cent. per annum, from 4th December 1913 until the date of her death.

By mortgage dated 10th February 1914 the said appointees assigned their reversionary interest under the said marriage settlement to the Equitable Life Assurance Society in security of a loan of £12,000 made by that society to them. By assignment dated 25th June 1915 the Equitable Life Assurance Society, in consideration of the sum of £13,476, 19s. 10d., sold the said reversionary interest in the appointed sum of £20,000 and compound interest to the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society.

By letter, dated 18th June 1915, the said William Brodie Galbraith as trustee foresaid consented to the sale mentioned in the last paragraph, and by letter of undertaking or memorandum of agreement, dated 25th June 1915, the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society undertook, in consideration of the said trustee's consent thereto, provided the said Mrs Alice Mary Houston Boswall Preston, the tenant for life of the property, should die on or before 25th June 1918, which as above stated she did, to pay to the said trustee one-half of the net profit which the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society might realise from the property so purchased, all on the terms and conditions set forth in the said letter of undertaking or memorandum. Litigation is proceeding in the Chancery Court, London, in connection with the said sum of £20,000 dealt with by the said deed of appointment, and litigation is also proceeding in the Court of Session at the instance of the said trustee against the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society in connection with the reversionary interest in the said sum of £20,000. It is in the interest of the creditors of the petitioners that both these litigations should be brought to an end, as they will be if the prayer of the present petition be granted.

Further, the father of the petitioners, who is a claimant to a large extent in the sequestration, is agreeable to discharge his claims against the petitioners' estate in the event of the sequestration proceedings being held as reduced. The claims of the petitioners' father in the sequestration amount to more than £3000 out of total claims amounting to £6028, 17s. 4d.

The present petitioners have been advised that the said Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 contains no provision to enable the Court to find and declare an award of sequestration to be void and of no effect ab initio, and that the present petition is the only competent process by which the result may otherwise be obtained.

In these circumstances the petitioners make this application to the Court to grant in exercise of its nobile officium the prayer of the petition.

The creditors of the present petitioners to the extent of £5901, 2s. 10d. out of a total amount of £6028, 17s. 4d. concur in asking your Lordships to grant the prayer of the present petition.”

Argued for the petitioners—There had been no proper service of the petition for sequestration, for the partners of the firm had been sequestrated as individuals, but they had not been cited edictally as required by the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 (3 and 4 Geo. V, cap. 20), sec. 25. Further, the claim of the creditor petitioning for sequestration was not properly vouched, as it had not been deponed to by one of their principal officers, but by their accountant and bookkeeper in a branch office—section 24; Anderson v. Monteith, 1847, 9 D. 1432; Campbell v. Myles, 1853, 15 D. 685; Dow & Company v. Union Bank, 1875, 2 R. 459, 12 S.L.R. 339. Accordingly sequestration should not have been awarded. The only remedy which would exclude prejudice to the petitioners was declarator that the sequestration was null and void ab initio Recal of the sequestration even if competent was useless, for it proceeded on the hypothesis that the sequestration had been valid, and that was sufficient to cause forfeiture of the petitioners' rights. Reduction of the sequestration did not appear to be competent— Gibson v. Munro, 1894, 21 R. 840, 31 S.L.R. 706; Whitlie v. Gibb & Son, 1898, 25 R. 412, 35 S.L.R. 355. Accordingly as there was no other remedy the petitioners were entitled to proceed by petition to the nobile officium. The petition was competent, and the circumstances were analogous to those in Anderson, 1866, 4 Macph. 577; Macleish's Trustees, 1896, 24 R. 151, 34 S.L.R. 93; A B, 1842, 5 D. 74; and Ballantyne, 1900, 2 F. 1077, 37 S.L.R. 798, where the Court had exercised the nobile officium to provide a remedy where there was no other competent.

Argued for the respondents—The petition was incompetent, for the Court would not exercise its nobile officium if another remedy was competent—Mackay's Practice, vol. i, p. 214. Here reduction of the sequestration was competent— Gibson's case ( cit.), per Lord Young at 21 R. p. 848; Whitlie's case ( cit.), per Lord Low (Ordinary) at 25 R. p. 419; Goudy, Bankruptcy, pp. 140 and 147. Further, a summary petition was incompetent if another remedy was available— Carter-Campbell v. Lamont-Campbell, 1894, 21 R. 614, 22 R. 260, 32 S.L.R. 203. Further, litigations were in progress in connection with the £20,000, and the nobile officium had never been exercised in the course of a litigation, to stay it. In any event the provisions of sections 24 and 26 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 had been complied with.

At the close of the debate counsel for the petitioners offered to amend the prayer by inserting after the words in integrum the words “subject to any right acquired under the sequestration by the said Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society.”

Judgment:

Lord Mackenzie—The estates of the petitioners, the Central Motor Engineering Company, and Gordon Houston Boswall Preston and Alastair Houston Boswall Preston, the only partners of the company, as such partners and as individuals, were on 14th January 1915 sequestrated on a petition at the instance of creditors by the Sheriff of Lanarkshire at Glasgow. This petition is now presented—as appears on the face of it—for recal of the sequestration proceedings, but when we turn to the prayer of the petition we find that the title is not borne

Page: 387

out by the prayer, because the Court is there asked to find and declare that “the whole sequestration proceedings are and were void ab initio, and to repone and restore the petitioners thereagainst in integrum.” The ground upon which it is sought that the Court should grant this prayer in the exercise of the nobile officium is that there were informalities in two particulars in the proceedings leading up to the award of sequestration.

The first of these informalities is that there was not due compliance with section 24 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act of 1913, inasmuch as the person who took the oath as to the debt of the petitioning company was not “the secretary, manager, cashier, clerk, or other principal officer,” but a person occupying the position of bookkeeper and accountant. The other ground of objection is, that whereas the estates not only of the Central Motor Engineering Company but also of the two individual petitioners, both as partners and as individuals, were sequestrated, the proper procedure was not adopted as regards the citation prescribed by section 25 in the case of the sequestration of an individual; and that it is not sufficient that the procedure in regard to citation prescribed by section 26—which is provided in regard to the case of a company—was complied with.

It is unnecessary to say anything about the grounds upon which the petition proceeds. There is no doubt that these two individuals set out what seems to be a serious interest to them to get quit of the consequences of the sequestration, because they are beneficiaries under their mother's settlement which contains a clause of forfeiture. In that settlement a liferent is given to them under the proviso that at the date of their mother's death “no act or event should have been done or have happened by reason whereof the liferent, or any part thereof in trust for them absolutely, will be vested in any other person or persons or any corporation. In that event it is provided by the settlement that their interest is to go over to the persons who appear here as respondents to resist the prayer of the petition being granted.

The petitioners do not rely upon any of the sections of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act of 1913. There could not be an appeal to the provisions of section 30, because the procedure prescribed must be taken within forty days. And the necessary conditions have not been complied with as regards section 31, which, moreover, applies only to a recal by a petition to the Lord Ordinary.

I should be slow to set limits to what can be done by this Court in the exercise of its nobile officium. I will only say that no case has been cited which is a warrant for our doing what is here asked. It is an unprecedented application. And although Mr Sandeman was successful in citing cases where the Court had in the exercise of its nobile officium declared sequestration proceedings to be at an end, he was unable to produce any authority for a petition in the terms we have before us being granted.

It is sufficient for the disposal of this petition to hold that what is in effect asked is that we should in the exercise of our nobile officium pronounce a decree of reduction. I am unable to hold that sufficient grounds have been stated to induce this Court to accede to that demand. If the petitioners think that they can successfully maintain the grounds stated in the present petition as entitling them to set aside the award of sequestration, it is open to them to take the appropriate steps by bringing an action of reduction. I pronounce no opinion as to what view may be taken of the action of reduction when it is brought. The grounds upon which it is laid would be examined. I will only say that the door seems to me by no means shut by the two cases of Gibson, 1894, 21 R. 841, 30 S.L.R. 706, and Whitlie, 1898, 25 R. 412, 35 S.L.R. 355, that were cited, because in these two cases the view taken was that the facts set out did not warrant the remedy which was sought. For these reasons I am of opinion that the present petition should be refused.

Lord Skerrington—I agree with your Lordship. I do not think that it is legitimate to ask the Court to exercise its nobile officium unless it is made clear that there is no other remedy open to the petitioners. An excellent illustration of a case in which the nobile officium is properly exercised in bankruptcy law is where in the peculiar circumstances justice requires that a certain sequestration should be declared at an end. Now apart from the nobile officium I know of no legal remedy that could be obtained in such cases. But in the present case there are two remedies which to my mind are prima facie competent, and which would probably serve the purpose of the petitioners. I do not say that they are competent, but it is the duty of the petitioners to try these remedies before asking an extraordinary remedy from us. I refer in the first place to an action of reduction, and in the second place to a petition under section 31 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act of 1913 presented at the instance of nine-tenths of the creditors in number and value. We are told that an overwhelming majority in value of the creditors concurred in this petition, but we are not told that there is the necessary majority in number, and, what is more important, we are not told that the statutory majority are willing to sist themselves as petitioners to prosecute this petition as an application for recal under section 31. In these circumstances it seems to me that the petition must be refused as premature or incompetent in the particular circumstances in which it has been presented. On the merits of the application I express no opinion.

Lord Cullen—I agree that the petition should be refused. The Bankruptcy Act of 1913, like its predecessor of 1856, makes provisions for bringing a sequestration to an end by recal. The petitioners here, however, do not seek to utilise these provisions. What they aim at is something different. They ask what is practically a decree of reduction of the sequestration proceedings declaring these proceedings void ab initio,

Page: 388

There is no precedent for such an application, and I do not think that we should entertain the present one. If the petitioners are not content with the statutory recal but desire decree of reduction, and conceive that there are competent grounds for such a decree, I think that they should proceed to seek it under the ordinary forms of process.

The Court refused the petition.

Counsel:

Counsel for the Petitioners— Sandeman, K.C.— Maclaren. Agents— Simpson & Marwick, W.S.

Counsel for the Respondents— Macphail, K.C.— Henderson. Agents— Tods, Murray, & Jamieson, W.S.

Counsel for the Trustee in the Sequestration— E. O. Inglis. Agents— Webster, Will, & Company, W.S.

Counsel for the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society— Gentles. Agents— Thomson, Dickson, & Shaw, W.S.

1917


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