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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Pyntek v Secretary Of State For The Home Department [1999] ScotCS 293 (9 December 1999) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/1999/293.html Cite as: [1999] ScotCS 293

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The appellant is a citizen of Uganda and his date of birth is 25 March 1963. He is not a British citizen and although a commonwealth citizen he did not have a right of abode in the United Kingdom before the Immigration Act 1971 came into force. On 26 August 1992 the appellant applied for United Kingdom entry clearance. A letter dated 2 December 1991 from the School of Management at Stirling University was attached to his application. On 13 September 1992 the appellant entered the United Kingdom with leave obtained as a result of the said application. His leave to remain in the United Kingdom was originally for one year. He had a right to apply for an extension of that leave and on 24 November 1993 he presented himself at the Home Office Public Inquiry Office at Croydon and was given an extension of his leave. This extension ran until 31 December 1994. In terms of Rule 109 of the then Immigration Rules (H.C. 251) no such extension will be granted if there is any reason to believe that the student does not intend to leave at the end of his studies. On 15 June 1994 the appellant applied for asylum, which is equivalent to an application for extended leave to remain in the United Kingdom. This application for asylum was made in terms of Rule 180A. The terms of that Rule are as follows:

Rule 180B of the said Rules provides:

The requirements for Refugee Status are found in the 1957 U.N. Convention in relation to the Status of Refugees. Article 1A(2) defines the status of a refugee as follows:

By Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967 the reference to events occurring before 1 January 1951 was removed so that the original qualification about time no longer applies. Regulation 180D of the Immigration Rules regulates the refusal of Refugee Status. An application which does not meet the criteria of Rule 180B will be refused.

By letter dated 12 April 1996 the Secretary of State informed the appellant that his application for Refugee Status had been refused because he considered that the application did not meet the necessary criteria. The Secretary of State thereafter sent the appellant a formal notice dated 15 April 1996 refusing to vary the leave to abide in the United Kingdom. Section 8(2) of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 provides that a person who has limited leave under the 1971 Act to remain in the United Kingdom may appeal to a Special Adjudicator against any refusal to vary, and after receipt of the said notice of refusal the appellant appealed to the Special Adjudicator under this section. The question for the special adjudicator to consider would be: is the appellant a refugee as defined by the legislation?

The appeal to the Special Adjudicator was held at Glasgow on 2 July 1996 and by Determination dated 17 July 1996 the Special Adjudicator, Mrs. R. Swanney, dismissed the appellant's appeal.

Section 8(6) of the 1993 Act applies Schedule 2 of the Act which makes supplementary provisions about appeals. Paragraph 4(2)(c) of Part 2A of the Schedule applied the provisions in the 1971 Act, about appeals to the Immigration Appeals Tribunal, to refusals by an adjudicator to vary leave to reside. Section 21(1) of the 1971 Act then defines the right to appeal to the Immigration Appeals Tribunal. It should be noted that the appeal is not specifically limited to questions of law. The appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Immigration Appeals Tribunal on 5 August 1996 and the Tribunal granted leave to appeal. By Determination of the Tribunal dated 20 December 1996 the appeal was refused. It is this refusal which is now appealed to us under section 9 of the 1993 Act.

It should be noted that the present appeal, which is being heard in October 1999, relates to a Determination in December 1996 and thus seems to be exorbitantly delayed. However the appellant claims that the delay was caused by a misconception on the part of the Scottish Legal Aid Board, which had originally applied the criteria for judicial review to the case. The said Board, having eventually been persuaded of the correct criteria for the determination of appeals such as this, granted legal aid to the appellant.

The arguments presented by the parties to the appeal are fairly narrowly based but must be assessed in the context of the factual history of the case. Since much of this history is vouched by documents, to that extent, it is beyond issue.

The claim that the appellant is entitled to Refugee Status has in fact been considered on three earlier occasions, namely, by the Secretary of State, by the Special Adjudicator and by the Immigration Appeals Tribunal. Each such consideration has led to a refusal of the status desired.

In his initial application for U.K. entry clearance the appellant had to give certain information. When asked in the appropriate form how long he intended to stay in the United Kingdom he answered one year. When he applied for Refugee Status the reasons given were said to relate to fear of persecution and victimisation in Uganda (such persecution being for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion). Before the Secretary of State decides an application for Refugee Status the applicant has to sign a self-completion questionnaire (S.C.Q.) and is also interviewed. In the case of the appellant the interviewing officer had commented that he had answered all the questions put to him willingly and in a forthright manner. When the Secretary of State had to consider if it was appropriate to accord the appellant Refugee Status the initial entry application would be before him. Later the Secretary of State by his decision letter dated 12 April 1996 intimated (at paragraph 4) that he had noted several points which seriously damaged the veracity and credibility of the appellant. Thus the Secretary of State comments on the fact that the appellant had claimed to have been employed by the Ugandan Government from 1987 to 1992 and had, as part of a Government funded project, studied for a year at Stirling University. The appellant had, at interview, claimed that his University funding had been stopped because of his tribe's association with the Ugandan Peoples' Army (U.P.A.). He had claimed that he was sympathetic to this movement and had passed on information to them while working in the civil service. However, the Secretary of State noticed that the appellant had not made an earlier reference to that matter in his original S.C.Q. The appellant referred to the fact that his aunt claims to have been removed from an important position in a Government Ministry because of tribal connections. The appellant had claimed that before her dismissal his aunt had used her position to secure him Government funding. The Secretary of State could not accept that the aunt would have held such an important Government position over a period if the discrimination asserted by the appellant had in fact existed. The appellant had claimed that he had on one occasion been beaten up by soldiers after his tribal identity had been revealed, but the Secretary of State notes that he made no reference to this in his S.C.Q. The Secretary of State notes that the appellant claimed to be a member of the Ugandan Peoples' Congress (U.P.C.) and that he was sympathetic to the Ugandan Peoples' Army. However, the Secretary of State comments that he seemed to know little about the relationship between these organisations. The Secretary of State also notes that the appellant alleged that his employers had reneged on a verbal promise to fund a second year of study, but when the appellant had visited the Croydon Office to obtain his first extension of leave he had produced a letter allegedly from the Ugandan authorities confirming his sponsorship for a second year of study at Dundee University.

The Secretary of State's comments in his refusal letter, the record of the initial interview, and the S.C.Q. were all before the Special Adjudicator when she determined the appellant's case.

The Special Adjudicator held an adjudication hearing at Glasgow on 2 July 1996. She kept a record of the proceedings as she was obliged to do. This record was produced to us. At the Adjudicator's hearing the appellant was represented by Mr. Seils from the Scottish Refugee Council. We were told that the appellant was represented by a charity representative because he could not afford a lawyer. The Secretary of State was represented by a Home Office Presenting Officer. The appellant himself gave evidence. The Special Adjudicator had certain correspondence available to her and a U.S. State Department Report dated March 1996 in respect of Uganda.

In her Determination and reasons the Special Adjudicator sets out her views on the appellant's appeal at some length. She dismisses the appeal and her reasons for doing so are largely to be found in the passages which she sets out in her Determination as follows:

In the grounds of appeal lodged in respect of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (and in particular grounds 1 and 2) it was claimed by the appellant that the Special Adjudicator failed to give a clear account of her views on credibility and furthermore that she did not state clearly what elements of the appellant's account she considered to be credible. She was prepared to accept that some of what the appellant had said might be true. In ground of appeal 3 it is claimed that if the Tribunal answered the decision sufficiently clearly to meet the requirements set out in the authorities it is submitted that the conclusions reached were perverse. There follow certain arguments the appellant relies upon in support of that general claim. In ground of appeal 4 it is alleged that the Adjudicator appears to require that the appellant himself undergoes a more serious form of maltreatment before he is eligible for protection under the Convention. Its is said that it is wrong in law to focus that matter thus because the Convention itself is concerned to prospective mistreatment in the future. Ground of appeal 5 is that the appellant has provided a sufficiency of evidence, apparently accepted by the Special Adjudicator, to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely that the members of his family and others of similar ethnicity have been, or are likely to be persecuted. We have only summarised the grounds of appeal but it is useful to see what was presented by the appellant to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. At page 10 of its Determination the Tribunal set out:

The Tribunal then quote the Special Adjudicator's findings and these we have already set out. Thereafter the Tribunal's Determination proceeds:

In addressing us on the present appeal counsel for the appellant argued that the Special Adjudicator had focused on the past experiences of the appellant whereas the main question should be the risk he runs in the future. If we upheld the appeal we were asked to remit the appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal to hear evidence de novo. It was submitted that the Special Adjudicator and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal failed to identify and focus on the kernel of the appeal. The risk run by the appellant did not derive from his personal activities but rather from the risk of future persecution because he belongs to a particular family. The Special Adjudicator had not taken account of the evidence on that critical matter. For the Special Adjudicator to dismiss the appeal and make a finding that the appellant had no solid basis for fearing persecution the Special Adjudicator would require a specific finding that the appellant had no grounds for fearing that he would be persecuted simply because of his family connection. The Special Adjudicator had not done this. Instead she had assumed that the appellant is only at risk if he shares the politics of his family. The Tribunal too have failed to focus on the critical facts and thus erred in law. The Tribunal have power to hear extra evidence and should have exercised that power to clarify whether the Special Adjudicator's view of the evidence could be justified. The Tribunal appear to have misunderstood the nature of their jurisdiction and merely sought to test the Special Adjudicator's finding on the basis of her application of the law. The appellant's counsel reviewed the legislation relating to the relevant appeal procedures and gave a history of the various appeals. It was said that the appellant's vulnerability to persecution derived from his belonging to a family targeted for such persecution. This follows from the decision of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. Savchenkov (1996) Imm AR 28 where it was held that a group characterised by innate or unchangeable characteristics can be "a particular social group" in relation to Refugee Status. Thus a family is a "particular social group". It was explained that it was only when his University place was put in jeopardy by difficulty over funding that the University counsellor advised the appellant to apply for Refugee Status. It was accepted that in the letter dated 15 June 1994 from the Refugee Legal Centre to the Home Office the appellant's apprehension of persecution was related to ethnic origins and perceived political opinions. However, in his self-completion questionnaire dated 6 July 1994 he mentions therein (after he has mentioned that he comes from an area that is opposed to the Government of Uganda) one of his own reasons for seeking protection in the United Kingdom is that he is related and tribally linked to a group of people whom the Government of Uganda consider to be enemies. At the top of the document he also says that he is seeking asylum because of fear of persecution linked to his ethnic origin and political affiliation. This document, however, he claims was written with the assistance of the Refugee Legal Centre. During a subsequent interview he maintained that if he returned to Uganda he would be arrested at the airport or worse. Some trouble would certainly ensue. Counsel for the appellant indicated that he could not evade the fact that at the hearing before the Special Adjudicator his representative Mr. Seils had not focused on the true issue which was that the appellant would be persecuted in Uganda because of his family association.

We were referred to Mecheti v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department 1996 S.C.L.R. 998. That was a case where the Special Adjudicator had found the witness to be an unreliable witness but had failed to state reasons for doing so. Lord McLean stated that the reasons for disbelieving a witness should be stated adequately and clearly. The standard of proof required from an applicant for Refugee Status is less than a balance of probability. What is required is that proof should show a reasonable degree of likelihood that persecution will follow. We were referred to Sivakumaran (1980) Imm. A.R. 147. Moreover, the doctrine of anxious scrutiny should apply to an immigration matter where a risk of serious personal damage to the applicant for Refugee Status is in issue (Bulut v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1996) Imm. A.R. 210). In the present case there is no clear finding that the appellant did not fear persecution because of his connection with his family. In relation to the appeal before the Tribunal they should have distinguished the parts of the evidence that the Special Adjudicator was entitled to find credible. Moreover the Tribunal concluded by indicating that they could not find the Special Adjudicator's finding to be perverse. That is the wrong test. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal has a far wider power to interfere than would arise under the test of perversity.

Finally we were asked to pay regard to the case of Hanif v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1999) SCLR 48. This was an authority for the view that where the Special Adjudicator has made a material mistake in understanding the evidence then the Immigration Appeal Tribunal should not merely act as a court of review, as in a judicial review, but rather should itself hear evidence de novo.

In summary counsel for the appellant argued that the Special Adjudicator had had evidence before her from which she should have seen that the appellant's fear was based on a risk emerging from his family connection which of course she should have regarded as a social problem. The Adjudicator had identified the facts but failed to focus on the proper question of law. She had failed to make findings in fact relevant to the proper questions in law. The appellant had lacked legal aid so that before the Special Adjudicator his case may not have been focused to best effect. When the Tribunal observed a new point of law being effectively focused for the first time they should have allowed evidence to be led de novo which would have identified what was properly the real issue.

Mrs. Stacey, Q.C. for the Secretary of State urged us to reject the appeal. She did not dispute that an appeal requires special consideration if life and liberty are at stake. It has to be noticed that the appellant's claim to Refugee Status had been considered three times and on each occasion the credibility of his claim had been rejected.

The appellant was originally allowed to enter this country to study for a year. From the earliest application to vary the original leave the Secretary of State has been dissatisfied with the information given to him by the appellant about his funding. The letter which the appellant showed to the office at Croydon to secure an extension of his leave to remain in the United Kingdom was withdrawn and has never again been produced by the appellant. That letter purported to be a written agreement from the appellant's employers to fund his studies for a second year, but the appellant now claims that the funding agreement was verbal. The Secretary of State does not dispute that the appellant's cousin is in exile in London, that his aunt Mrs. Opio was a high-ranking official in Uganda nor that the appellant's brother was abused in Uganda and later died. When the appellant appeared before the Special Adjudicator he was free to lead such evidence as could support his case. The Secretary of State and the Special Adjudicator usually have some initial comprehension of the state of affairs in particular countries from which applications for Refugee Status come. In fact Special Adjudicator's are employed in Refugee Status cases so that they can build up specialist experience. If conditions in a particular country are notorious it is common for an appellant to be supported by relevant organisations such a Amnesty International. In correspondence between Dundee University and himself, the Ugandan Commissioner Mr. Kabagambe Kiliisa, the appellant's claim that the Ugandan Government had agreed to fund him for a second year was not supported. The appellant's counsel claims that the focus of the application for Refugee Status is the appellant's family connection but the appellant himself originally attributed his alleged fear of persecution to ethnic background and political opinion. Counsel for the respondent did not dispute that a family would fall into the category of "social group" for the purposes of the Convention. In any event some of the appellant's complaints (such as abuse at work) relate to discrimination rather than to persecution. The appellant has only claimed to be persecuted since finding himself in difficulty with funding. He claims that he will be persecuted because of his family but his aunt, Mrs. Opio, remained in a high-ranking post with the present Government for years. In his evidence the appellant claimed that he had passed sensitive information onto the opposition but he never raised this in his original interview. The case of Mecheti requires to be considered with caution because the essential complaint against the Special Adjudicator was not merely a failure to state findings in fact clearly but that she had erred in a point of law.

Horvath v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (1999) Imm. A.R. 121 was a case before the Immigration Appeal Tribunal where it was held that if the Tribunal were not impressed by a Special Adjudicator's finding on credibility they can decide not to be bound by it, albeit they do not hear evidence of the facts de novo. The case also highlights the distinction between discrimination and persecution. It confirms that the Tribunal can alter a finding in fact if it considers it to be wrong, but it need not find that the finding is perverse. The case of Hanif decided that if the Tribunal is faced with a situation where there is a plain fact-finding error in the Special Adjudicator's Determination it has power to rehear a case. The right to rehear a case should however be exercised sparingly. Hanif followed upon the case of R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal et parte Zaman and Zaman 1982 Imm. A.R. 61. That case was an application for judicial review where it was held that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal had wider powers than a review court hearing a judicial review. However, Hanif dealt with an obvious mistake made by the Special Adjudicator not merely a disputed view on the applicant's credibility.

In our view the Special Adjudicator must arrive at a clear view on credibility. However, what is required is that the Special Adjudicator's position should be unambiguous and based on reasons which an appeal court can test. If, for example, a Special Adjudicator concludes that an appellant is not telling the truth about certain important matters the degree of such unreliability could be such as to render it perfectly correct and reasonable for the Special Adjudicator to conclude that she cannot place any trust in the witness in respect of critical matters. The overriding consideration is well expressed by Lord President Emslie in Wordie Property Company Limited v. Secretary of State for Scotland 1984 S.L.T. 345 where he states:

Of course if a Special Adjudicator were to doubt an appellant's credibility for reasons which are questionable (or for no stated reasons at all) then that would be another matter. It must be noted that the deficiencies in the Special Adjudicator's reasons which were found in Mecheti were particularly flagrant. As Lord McLean states in his Opinion at pages 1001-1002, firstly the Special Adjudicator had accepted that the broad lines of the petitioner's case had remained consistent throughout. Secondly the Adjudicator had failed to indicate whether or not he accepted that the petitioner was a member of the F.I.S. (a particular political party). This was a significant matter because the respondents themselves did not contest that if the petitioner was a member of that party he could claim Refugee Status because in U.N.H.C.R. guidelines membership of the F.I.S. was referred to as a justification for asylum. However, the Special Adjudicator had completely omitted to deal with that point. Finally the Special Adjudicator had indicated that he had "a multitude of reasons" for finding that the petitioner as a witness was unworthy of belief but he had not stated what these reasons were. Moreover the last three paragraphs of his decision contained material which was irrelevant to it. Thus the Special Adjudicator's Determination in Mecheti contained omissions which cast an obvious and serious doubt on the validity of his decision.

When the Determination of the Special Adjudicator in the present case is examined closely a different picture emerges. In her Determination she states, very fairly, that some of what the appellant had stated "may well be true" but she then asserts that she does not believe he has been entirely credible "or that he has been persecuted or that he has a fear of persecution". Thus the Special Adjudicator disbelieves the appellant on matters which represent the kernel of his application for Refugee Status. It should be noted that the Special Adjudicator's comment that some of what the appellant says may well be true is inserted to explain why the Special Adjudicator is not unduly influenced by the comment of the original interviewer that the appellant was "forthright throughout his interview". The Special Adjudicator proceeds to explain why she did not accept that the appellant had a real fear of persecution. She points out that he only claimed political asylum after his funding had been refused. She points out circumstances which indicate that the appellant was not candid when he obtained the first extension of his leave to remain. Indeed his evidence directly contradicted what he had represented when applying for that extension. The Special Adjudicator points out that the appellant's position has changed since he completed his original questionnaire. This is explained by the appellant's contention that he did not understand his position until after receiving advice from the Scottish Refugee Council. However, she did not accept this explanation from a person as intelligent and articulate as she had found the appellant to be. She found it difficult to accept that the appellant and his aunt had been employed for so long by the Government and then become exposed to harassment and persecution. She has concluded that the uncle and cousin who have left Uganda and are in exile are in such exile because of their political views but she does not consider that such views are held in any depth by the appellant. His claim to political allegiance seems merely to be that his family always supported the U.P.A. The suggestion that he has passed on information to the U.P.A. was not included in his original self-completion questionnaire. The Adjudicator also observes that the Ugandan Government originally gave the appellant the opportunity to come to Scotland to study. She states that she is in absolutely no doubt that "his fear of being killed and to have suffered persecution" is simply not true. She refers not only to the past but (at page 8) to the fact that she is not satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be persecuted if he returned to Uganda.

It is plain from the Determination of the Special Adjudicator in what respects she did not consider the appellant to be credible. She did not believe his evidence that he had a genuine reason to fear persecution. She pointed to the fact he and his aunt had held Government jobs for a substantial stretch of time, that the Government had apparently sponsored his original application to study in Scotland, and that he had originally come to this country not to escape from Uganda but to study for the period of one year. She has pointed to inconsistencies in his evidence. The counsel for the respondent accepts that certain members of the appellant's family have had difficulty with the Government. However, an overall view of the evidence suggests that most, if not all of these difficulties, are likely to be associated with involvement in serious political activity. The incident the appellant spoke to involving his deceased brother and his sisters occurred in 1991. Thus these incidents occurred some time ago. Since these incidents the appellant has been employed by the Government and has been sponsored for study. The main complaint of the appellant is that there was no earlier focus on the danger to members of his family as such rather than because of his tribal or political affiliations. However, the Special Adjudicator can hardly be blamed for highlighting tribal and political affiliations because it is clear from the evidence of the appellant and his submissions of his adviser Mr. Seils that the tribal and political affiliations were the dominant source of risk. At the time when the appellant appeared before the Special Adjudicator it appeared that his aunt Mrs. Opio had last been heard of in Kampala. It also appears from the papers that she had organised opposition to the Government and had been a supporter of the U.P.A. The evidence certainly also shows that the appellant's uncle and his cousin Charles were prominently political. The appellant says that his aunt was dismissed for no reason but the Special Adjudicator finds it hard to believe that she would have held such a prominent position for so long without her background being known. Thus the Special Adjudicator concludes that she is not convinced that the particular circumstances of the members of the appellant's family who are purportedly threatened are due to other than political activity. Even if it were to be accepted that the appellant and his advisers did not focus on the alleged danger to himself arising solely from family connection the Special Adjudicator has essentially dealt with the situation. The appellant has to show that there are solid grounds for believing that he will be persecuted if he returns to Uganda. The only evidence of such a risk comes from himself and the Special Adjudicator does not believe that his fears are genuine. Apart from his own evidence there is nothing to suggest that if he were to return to Uganda he personally would be persecuted. The Special Adjudicator has seen and heard the appellant and from that enjoys a considerable advantage. In the absolute sense she may or may not be right in her assessment of the appellant's credibility but it cannot be said that her views are unreasonable or misconceived. All other things being equal she is in the best position to hold an opinion as to the appellant's credibility. In testing the validity of the Special Adjudicator's Determination it is not that she has failed to identify certain facts as proved that governs the issue but rather what she specifically finds not to have been proved.

With regard to the appeal to the Tribunal Mr. Bryce for the appellant is correct to contend that the Tribunal are not restricted to disagreeing with the Special Adjudicator's Determination on the limited ground that it was perverse. They could properly uphold an appeal if they considered that there were grounds for holding that the original determination by the Special Adjudicator may have been wrong. However, the case of Hanif should not be construed as giving the Tribunal a free hand to hear an appeal again without reasons for doing so. In Hanif no oral evidence had been led before the Special Adjudicator. The appeal had been decided on documentary material and the Special Adjudicator had made a mistake. This mistake had an important bearing on the assessment of the appellant's credibility. There was a clear question of law in the appeal to the Court of Session. That was said to be:

In the present case there has been no equivalent error. Moreover in Hanif fresh evidence was available. In addition the court was ready to cite with approval (at page 55) a quotation from the judgment of Hirst L.J. in Borissov v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (1996) Imm. A.R. 524. At page 535 Hirst L.J. said:

In the ground of appeal before the Tribunal the appellant makes a general point that the Special Adjudicator has not made her view of the facts sufficiently clear. However, ground of appeal 3 as we have already stated is on an esto basis and is to the effect that if the decision of the Special Adjudicator is sufficiently clear then it is submitted that the conclusions reached are perverse. The phraseology of the grounds of appeal may be a little obscure. However, as we have said, ground of appeal 3 before the Tribunal appears to suggest that if the test of clarity is passed by the Special Adjudicator's Determination then all her conclusions in fact are perverse. In respect of ground of appeal 4 the question of perversity can scarcely arise because this seems to be based on an alleged error in law. Ground of appeal 5 on the other hand relates to the facts of the case. However, it should be noted that the fifth ground of appeal is little more than an elaboration of ground of appeal 3(v). The Tribunal have obviously read the appellant's case as being that on the facts the Special Adjudicator's rulings are perverse. At page 10 of their Determination the Tribunal show specifically that that is their view. The conclusions set out by the Tribunal in the last paragraph of page 15 of their Determination could have been more effectively expressed but they amount to rejection of the appellant's claim that the material in grounds 1 to 3 are perverse. They then obviously take care not to leave grounds 4 and 5 formally undecided so for "record purposes" they specifically except grounds 4 and 5 from any charge of perversity. In effect it was the appellant who introduced the standard of perversity into the appeal and the Tribunal are stating that the allegation of perversity must be answered in the negative. If there was room for confusion, and there was any possibility that the Tribunal had applied the wrong standard to their decision, then we would have been reluctant to see the appellant fail because of what possibly is an ambiguous expression of the grounds of appeal. However, the reality seems to be that the Tribunal refused the appeal, not only because they did not find the Special Adjudicator's conclusions to be perverse, but also because they did not find them to be wrong or of dubious validity. Indeed the Tribunal point out that having correctly directed herself to the standard of proof the Special Adjudicator has fully dealt with the question of the appellant's credibility. They illustrate this by quoting fully from the Special Adjudicator's determination. This is done with apparent approval of it. Moreover the court high-light certain features of the situation which support the Special Adjudicator's conclusions. In the whole circumstances we fail to see how it can be said that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal or the Special Adjudicator have erred in law. The Special Adjudicator found against the appellant on the matter of his credibility and she sets out acceptable reasons for that finding. She concludes that she cannot believe the appellant when he says that the incidents and circumstances he has spoken to have given him grounds for a reasonable fear that he personally is at risk of persecution if he returns to Uganda. She therefore decided that she required to dismiss the appellant's appeal. The Tribunal could find no fault with the manner in which she arrived at her Determination. Since we have not found that either the Special Adjudicator nor the Immigration Appeal Tribunal have erred in any respect in law, the appeal must be refused.