[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Mejury v Renfrewshire Council [2000] ScotCS 296 (28 November 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2000/296.html Cite as: [2000] ScotCS 296

[New search] [Help]

[1] The defenders and appellants are Renfrewshire Council. On 7 May 1998, their Licensing Sub-Committee decided inter alia to refuse an application by the pursuer and respondent, Alistair Mejury, for renewal of his taxi driver's licence. The pursuer appealed against that decision, by means of an action raised in the Sheriff Court at Paisley. By interlocutor dated 15 January 1999, the sheriff reversed the defenders' decision of 7 May 1998, granted the application for renewal, and ordained the defenders' clerk to issue the licence to the pursuer. The defenders appeal against that interlocutor. We should mention that on 7 May 1998, the Sub-Committee suspended the pursuer's existing licence, as well as refusing his application for renewal; and the sheriff reversed that suspension along with the refusal of renewal. The question of suspension is, however, effectively academic, and no separate issue arises in that respect.

[2] The reasons for the refusal of renewal are set out in a letter from the appellants Head of Legal Services dated 21 May 1998. The application was refused in terms of paragraph 5(3)(a)(ii) of Schedule 1 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982, whereby it is provided that a licensing authority shall refuse an application to grant or renew a licence, if, in their opinion, the applicant is not "a fit and proper person" to be the holder of the licence. An objection to the application for renewal had been intimated by the Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police, in a report which was spoken to at the meeting on 7 May 1998. That report is not before us, and seems not to have been before the sheriff; but the only matter raised in it appears to have been the fact that Mr. Mejury was convicted at Paisley Sheriff Court on 16 December 1997 of contraventions of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, section 67 and the Company Directors (Disqualification) Act 1986, section 11. The Sub-Committee were aware of the terms of the charges upon which Mr. Mejury was convicted, and of the fact that he was sentenced to 240 hours of community service and disqualified from being a company director for a period of five years.

[3] The relevant charges were charges 2 and 3 in a complaint, and it is convenient to set out their terms:

The conviction on charge 3 was upon the second of two alternatives. It is to be observed that the date of the offence under charge 2 falls within the period covered by charge 3, and it appears to be common ground that both matters are to be seen as elements in a single course of conduct. On behalf of Mr. Mejury, it was submitted to the Sub-Committee that there had been no intention on his part to deceive anyone, and that he considered that he had authority from the directors of the Banana Bus Company to obtain the money in question - "He did not steal it or act dishonestly". In relation to charge 3 it was submitted that this was a very "technical" offence. Apart from these submissions, and their knowledge of the sentences imposed, the Committee appear to have had no further knowledge of what was involved in these charges, beyond their bare terms.

[4] After dealing with a matter which the Sub-Committee held not to have been made out, the letter of 21 May continues as follows:

It is this passage which sets out the sole basis upon which the Sub-Committee concluded that Mr. Mejury was no longer a fit and proper person to hold a taxi driver's licence.

[5] Before the sheriff reference was made to a number of authorities, including Ranachan v. Renfrew District Council 1991 S.L.T. 625 and McDowall v. Cunninghame District Council 1987 S.C. 217, which were also referred to before this court. The correct legal approach, in appeals against decisions such as this, is not in dispute, and was acknowledged by the sheriff who observed that it was not for the sheriff, on appeal, to replace the authority's view with his own. "Equally, as Ranachan made clear, it was for the authority to determine what might be said to be in the interests of the public in its own area in deciding what weight to attach to any conviction or other factor, and again not for the sheriff to reconsider the issue of weight and possibly replace the authority's view with his own." It was not submitted to the sheriff that he could properly consider what weight should be attached to Mr. Mejury's conviction on these charges. The submission turned upon the terms of the statement of reasons. It was the taxi driver's responsibility with regard to "the safety and well-being of passengers" which the Sub-Committee were not satisfied that Mr. Mejury could fulfil, "in light of said convictions" - which were seen as indicating "weakness of character" or "a large element of dishonesty". It was submitted that the Sub-Committee had "made an irrelevant connection" in this respect and had consequently both erred in law and exercised their discretion unreasonably.

[6] The sheriff says that he is with the solicitor for Mr. Mejury "in his submission that a conviction on two charges involving deception and dishonesty cannot be said to be relevant to passenger safety or well-being". He goes on to acknowledge that conviction on such charges might be relevant in relation to having a taxi operator's licence; and in relation to taxi driver's licences, raises the possibility of a Sub-Committee considering that applicants for such a licence, dealing constantly with the public, would more inspire confidence if they were persons without a significant criminal conviction or persons of apparent honesty. But he contrasts that situation with this Sub-Committee's conclusion that the pursuer, by virtue of these offences, could not discharge his responsibility in regard to the safety and well-being of passengers. He says that in his view that is an irrelevant and flawed connection.

[7] If the expression "safety and well-being" is taken to mean "physical safety and well-being" or the like, the submission that Mr. Mejury's conviction on these charges is irrelevant to such safety and well-being is easy to understand. While the sheriff does not actually refer to "physical" safety and well-being, he expresses the view that the word "well-being" is no more than a repetition or amplification of the idea of passenger safety. And reading what he says as a whole, it appears that he was proceeding upon the basis that the reference to safety was a reference to physical safety.

[8] In their submissions to this court, counsel for both parties proceeded upon the basis that this was indeed the sheriff's understanding and approach. The essential issue between the parties is whether the sheriff's understanding of what the Committee were saying is right. Certain other matters were also discussed, but it is convenient to deal with this central issue first.

[9] On behalf of the appellants, it was acknowledged that the statement of reasons was not expressed as well as it might have been. In particular, the expression "safety and well-being" was not perhaps ideal. But one must read it in context. It was clear that the Committee were not thinking of physical safety or well-being. In referring to a taxi driver's responsibility with regard to the safety and well-being of passengers, they clearly had in mind aspects of safety and well-being to which the conviction on these charges was, in their minds, relevant. Passengers were plainly entitled to be kept safe not merely from physical danger or violence, but from being over-charged or deceived in relation to payment of their fares, and from having items of property taken or not returned. The reference to "safety and well-being" could in context be read as covering interests of that kind, in relation to which the honesty of the taxi driver would be an important consideration.

[10] On behalf of Mr. Mejury, the submission was that the expression "safety and well-being" could not bear this meaning. The normal meaning of the expression related to physical safety and well-being, and the sheriff was right to give the expression that normal interpretation. The Sub-Committee could easily have referred to the passengers' interest in having an honest taxi driver, and the driver's corresponding responsibility for behaving honestly. But that was not what they had said. Safety and well-being were considerations of a quite different kind, and the sheriff was right to have seen them as unrelated to risks of deception or dishonesty, to which conviction on these charges might be relevant.

[11] In our opinion, the words are not well-chosen. It may be that devoid of context, they would most naturally be taken as referring to physical aspects of safety or well-being. And in many contexts it might be clear that that was the scope of their meaning. But reading this statement of reasons as a whole, we cannot accept that the Sub-Committee were introducing, for no evident reason, the proposition that a taxi driver has a responsibility with regard to physical safety and well-being, and then saying that they were not satisfied that Mr. Mejury could fulfil that responsibility in the light of his conviction upon charges which (as is obvious) have nothing to do with such matters. The wider meaning contended for by the appellants is in our opinion an understandable one, and we are satisfied that it is to be preferred, as a fair reading of what the Sub-Committee were saying. In our opinion the sheriff was in error in proceeding upon the basis that the Sub-Committee were referring to physical safety and well-being, and then making a quite irrational connection with conviction on these charges. We acknowledge, as was submitted on behalf of Mr. Mejury, that it is for those producing a statement of reasons to express it in a way that can be understood, by the recipient and indeed by the public. But as he acknowledged, such statements are not to be subjected to an over-critical analysis, and we are satisfied that despite its deficiencies, this crucial sentence is clear enough.

[12] That is not an end of the matter. Even if the Sub-Committee were considering the passenger's interest in having a driver whose honesty could be relied upon, counsel for Mr. Mejury submitted that conviction upon these charges did not provide a sufficient basis for regarding him as not, in this respect, a fit and proper holder of a licence. It was submitted that these charges did not, in themselves, carry a necessary or inevitable imputation that the acts in question had been committed dishonestly. This had been acknowledged by the Sub-Committee, who recognised that "weakness of character" was an alternative explanation. And in any event, even if Mr. Mejury had been dishonest in that respect at that time, there was no pattern of dishonest behaviour, and it could not be said, on the basis of his conviction on these charges, that he was, in a more general way, a dishonest man or likely to act dishonestly again. That being so, no reasonable Sub-Committee could conclude that he was unable to fulfil his responsibilities, in terms of honesty, or that he was not a fit and proper person to hold a taxi driver's licence.

[13] Counsel for the appellants again acknowledged that the charges did not inevitably entail deliberate dishonesty, accepting that the offences could be committed, for example, with a reckless disregard for the relevant provisions of the statutes in question. But the conduct remained a relevant consideration in considering whether Mr. Mejury was acceptably reliable and dependable, having regard to the passengers' interest in honest dealing, in relation to such matters as fares and property. This was a matter which required to be weighed, and weighing was a matter for the Sub-Committee.

[14] In our opinion, that submission, on behalf of the appellants, is well-founded. The Sub-Committee has fairly acknowledged that there is a range of possibilities, from weakness of character to a large element of dishonesty. We are satisfied that the matter was one for them to weigh, and that their conclusion was one which they were entitled to reach. We allow the appeal and restore the Sub-Committee's decision.