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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Allseas UK Ltd v Greenpeace Ltd [2001] ScotCS 88 (11 April 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2001/88.html Cite as: [2001] ScotCS 88

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[1] The pursuers are currently in a contractual relationship with BP Exploration Operations Co. Ltd. in terms of which they have to provide pipeline installation and other associated work as part of a project called Magnus Enhanced Oil Recovery. The purpose of the project is to pipe natural gas from the Foinaven and Schiehallion Fields in the North Atlantic, west of Shetland, to the Sullum Voe Terminal. Some of the gas will be processed at Sullum Voe, and some will be piped on to the Magnus Field east of Shetland in order to assist with the extraction of oil deposits there. In order to provide the pipework services and the other subsidiary works, the pursuers will require to operate two of their own vessels, and nine further vessels, which they have hired for the purpose. The vessels are named in Part (ii) of the First Conclusion of the Summons. The contract is expected to run from April to December 2001, during which period all of these vessels are liable to be in the area of the Foinaven and Schiehallion Fields in the North Atlantic, the coastal waters around the Sullum Voe Terminal, and the Magnus Field. One of the principal operations to be carried out by the pursuers is the positioning of the pipework itself, which requires the vessel involved to travel at an extremely slow speed in a particularly straight line.

[2] The defenders are also a company incorporated under the Companies Acts, and have a place of business in London. There is no issue on jurisdiction, apart from a relatively minor matter concerning the terms of the interdict concluded for in Part (i) of the First Conclusion of the Summons. The defenders are a well-known campaign group, who inter alia engage in active forms of protest on environmental issues. The pursuers are apprehensive that their participation in the Magnus Project will attract disruptive action by the defenders, and they accordingly seek interdict and interim interdict preventing them from doing that.

[3] The pursuers concede that the defenders have as yet committed no delict against them. They base their case for interdict on the stated aims and objectives of the defenders, coupled with their exploits in recent times in pursuit of those aims and objectives. In particular, the defenders have vigorously and publicly campaigned against the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources in the North Atlantic and in the North Sea. A particular target of their protest is the Foinaven Field, where the pursuers are to be concerned in the installation of pipework. There is no doubt that the defenders have frequently and regularly staged active protests against many of the operations carried out by companies engaged in the extraction gas and oil in the areas to the east and west of Shetland. They have also mounted such protests at inshore locations and on land. There is equally no doubt that these protests have attracted a considerable degree of public attention.

[4] A number of instances illustrating the character of the defenders' campaigns are described in the summons. There is no need to repeat the detail of these averments, as they did not appear to be disputed by the defenders. It is sufficient for present purposes to note that in July and August 1997, members of Greenpeace carried out a number of direct and indeed dramatic actions in the North Atlantic, west of Shetland, which were calculated to disrupt and prevent the operation of companies involved in preliminary work connected with the extraction of petroleum in the area. As a result, various interdicts were pronounced in the Court of Session against the defenders at the instance of Britoil Plc. In 1998 the defenders again engaged in disruptive activity against the vessel involved in survey work relating to the recovery of gas and oil in the area covered by the present averments. Among other activities, the defenders' members entered the water and swam in front of the survey vessel. The disruption which followed was said to have caused the company considerable expense. In March 2000, two members of the defenders boarded a ship owned by Enterprise Oil Plc moored in the Cromarty Firth and prevented it from sailing. Again the company concerned obtained interdicts against the defenders in this Court. Later in the same month, five members of the defenders boarded an oil rig in the Cromarty Firth and prevented it from being prepared to fulfil a contract with another company connected with the extraction of natural resources in the area. Two further companies subsequently obtained interdicts against the defenders in respect of this matter. On 1 April 2001 a number of persons acting in the defenders' name boarded another drilling rig in the Cromarty Firth and refused to leave. As a consequence, the rig was unable to proceed to commence drilling operations, and considerable expense was incurred. On the same date the two companies principally involved in the operation of the rig obtained interim interdict against the defenders in this Court. Thereafter, on 5 and 6 April 2001 further orders of interdict were granted against the defenders, as described in the summons.

[5] Counsel for the pursuers submitted that although no activities of the kind described in the summons had been directed at the pursuers, the circumstances clearly indicated that the pursuers were reasonably and justifiably apprehensive that the defenders might take similar action against their proposed operations. This apprehension was reinforced by the defenders' refusal to give an undertaking that they would not disrupt the pursuers' activities. The inventory of productions lodged with the summons contains a letter from the pursuers' solicitors to the defenders' solicitors dated 10 April 2001, requesting such an undertaking, and a reply of even date from the defenders' solicitors declining to give such an undertaking, suggesting that it would be unnecessary. Further, counsel for the pursuers argued that the balance of convenience clearly favoured the pursuers. The work which the pursuers were about to embark upon was extremely expensive and highly dangerous, and the slow and delicate nature of the pipe laying operation would be particularly susceptible to disruption.

[6] In reply, the defenders' counsel submitted that there was no prima facie justification for granting the interdict sought by the pursuers. There was particularly so when the pursuers accepted that no wrong had yet been committed. The appropriate test in these circumstances was whether there could fairly be said to be reasonable apprehension on the part of the pursuers that the defenders would commit the actions described in the conclusions of the summons. In the present case, he maintained, there was no suggestion that the defenders would specifically do anything against any named vessel owned or hired by the pursuers. There was no evidence that they had taken any concrete step to achieve the results described in the conclusions of the summons. It was fully accepted that the defenders were opposed to the further exploitation of natural resources in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. However, there is in the present case no link demonstrating that anything said or done by the defenders suggests that they were about to do anything against the present pursuers. Counsel for the defenders further argued that the total number of the defenders' activities as described in the averments was relatively small, having regard to the large number of operations undertaken by those engaged in oil and gas exploration in the area. The pursuers could not therefore be reasonably apprehensive that they would be subject to any interference by the defenders. Further, counsel stated that the defenders' vessel, MV Greenpeace, was currently moored in Blyth Bay in Northumberland, and was scheduled to take part in a toxic waste protest in the Baltic; the defenders therefore had no present plans to visit the areas where the pursuers would be working. Accordingly the pursuers could not establish a prima facie case that the defenders threatened them with actual harm. A mere assertion to this effect so was insufficient.

[7] I concluded on the basis of these submissions that in principle the orders for interim interdict should be granted. I consider that the correct test where no delict or injury has yet been committed, is to consider whether the pursuers are in reasonable apprehension that a serious delict or injury will be, or is liable to be, committed against them by the defenders (Burn-Murdoch: Interdict in the Law of Scotland p.131). If that is correct, then I am of the view in the present case that the pursuers have plainly satisfied that test. It is clear from the unchallenged statements by the pursuers' counsel, and the extracts produced from the defenders' website as productions, that in recent times the defenders have made a series of clear and unequivocal statements to the effect that they are opposed in principle to the further exploitation of natural gas and oil deposits in the North Atlantic and the North Sea. At the same time they have regularly undertaken a series of direct and highly effective operations of various kinds against a number of other companies involved in that activity. The defenders' activities have caused considerable expense to these companies. There can be no doubt therefore that the defenders have, in the recent past, been prepared to engage in a number and variety of direct actions designed to frustrate and prevent the operation of the kind that the pursuers are about to engage in. It should be said that the defenders did not appear to deny any of this.

[8] Accordingly, the present pursuers are about to embark upon operations of the sort and in the area where the defenders have been effectively active in the very recent past. What the pursuers intend to do appears to be particularly susceptible to disruption by the kind of activities which the defenders have adopted. The connection between the defenders' stated aims, and their conduct is particularly striking. In this context they are perhaps victims of their own success. In these circumstances, it appears to me that the pursuers are wholly justified in apprehending that the defenders will, or are liable, to inflict damage or injury upon them. The current stage of the defenders' intentions to sail their vessel elsewhere may well be correct; however, that does not do anything to dispel the apprehension that the pursuers say they will experience in the discharge of their obligations during the period of the contract. In this context, it is I think relevant to consider the refusal of the defenders to provide an undertaking that they would not interfere with the pursuers' operations, for whatever reason. There were no competing submissions on the question of balance of convenience. Accordingly in all the circumstances I felt it appropriate to grant the orders sought.

[9] Counsel for the defenders maintained that if interdict was to be pronounced, there were a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the terminology of the interdicts presently sought. In the first place he submitted that the word "encouragement" occurring in the second line of the first conclusion, was too general and vague. I disagreed; I had no difficulty in understanding precisely what the word meant in the context of the present case and of the conclusions, and I saw no reason to alter or delete the term. The second complaint by the defenders was that the interdict as phrased was too wide, and not confined to operations in the water carried out by the pursuers. My reading of the interdict conclusion is that precisely is all that it seeks to cover, and on that understanding I see no reason to qualify the terms of the conclusions. Counsel for the defender also argued that the interdict contained no time limit. However, counsel for the pursuers pointed to the averments in Condescendence 2 and 3, which indicated that the contract was expected to take between April and December 2001. I concluded therefore that the interdict would be self-limiting. Fourthly, counsel for the defenders suggested that a more specific definition of the operation and use of the vessels would be appropriate, and this was agreed. Finally, defenders' counsel maintained that the terms of the conclusions of the summons suggested that interdict was sought to cover areas outwith the jurisdiction of the Court. I agree that this was a possible reading of the terms of the interdict and accordingly qualified the interlocutor to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

[10] After I had announced my conclusions, counsel for the pursuers asked for the expenses of the hearing. The defenders opposed this, on the basis that some qualification of the orders sought had been achieved. However, I felt that the pursuers had achieved substantial success and I took into account the refusal by the defenders to give an undertaking not to behave unlawfully in respect of the pursuers' proposed operations. Accordingly I granted the pursuers the costs of the hearing.