BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Alam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ScotCS 162 (01 July 2004)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2004/162.html
Cite as: [2004] ScotCS 162

[New search] [Help]


Alam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ScotCS 162 (01 July 2004)

EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

Lord Kirkwood

Lady Cosgrove

Lord Eassie

 

 

 

 

 

P989/01

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD KIRKWOOD

in

PETITION and ANSWERS

by

MOHAMMED KHORSHEJUL ALAM

Petitioner and Reclaimer;

against

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent;

for

Judicial Review of a determination of a special Adjudicator dated 16 July 2001

_______

 

 

Act: Devlin; Drummond Miller, W.S. (Petitioner and Reclaimer)

Alt: Drummond; H.F. Macdiarmid (Respondent)

2 July 2004

[1]      This is a petition at the instance of Mohammed Khorshejul Alam seeking judicial review of the determination of an immigration adjudicator dated 16 July 2001 and reduction of that determination. On 13 May 2000 the petitioner had applied for asylum in the United Kingdom. On 29 December 2000 the respondent, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, refused the petitioner's application. On 16 July 2001 the adjudicator issued her determination refusing the petitioner's appeal against that decision. In August 2001 the petitioner presented this petition for judicial review. On 8 April 2003 the Lord Ordinary refused the petition and the petitioner has reclaimed against the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor.

[2]     
The petitioner was born in Chittagong, Bangladesh in 1995 and is married with two children. He lived in Bangladesh until 12 May 2000 when he flew from Dhaka to London, and on his arrival in London on 13 May he applied for asylum. His claim for asylum was based on the assertion that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Bangladesh because he had been harassed by supporters of the ruling Awami League Party owing to his position as an area organising secretary of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

[3]     
The petitioner avers that he was an active member and organising secretary of the BNP in the area of Chittagong Hill Tracks. He had joined the BNP in or about 1991 and had been appointed organising secretary for the said area in or about 1995. His duties as organising secretary were to organise meetings in support of the BNP, distribute leaflets, attend and speak at meetings and recruit new members to the party. After the Awami League Party was elected to government in or about 1996, it attempted to restrict opposition by means of threats and physical violence. On each occasion that the petitioner organised meetings to speak in opposition to the Awami League Party he was threatened with punishment by Dulal Chakma, his opposite number in that party. The petitioner had reported the threats to the police but they had failed to take any action. On about fifteen or twenty occasions between 1996 and August or September 1999 the petitioner had been threatened. Finally, in August or September 1999 Dulal Chakma had approached the petitioner and told him that if he held any further meetings or remained in his home area he would be killed. The petitioner was aware of other members of the BNP who had been killed after receiving similar death threats. He was afraid for his own safety and went into hiding. As a result of being unable to locate him, members of the Awami League Party made false accusations to the police against him, and on a number of occasions the police searched the petitioner's house in attempts to arrest him. The petitioner became afraid that it would be only a matter of time before he would be located by the police who would then advise the Awami League Party of his whereabouts and he would be killed. After about nine months in hiding, the petitioner was able to arrange to leave Bangladesh.

[4]     
The respondent refused the petitioner's application for asylum. He took the view that the petitioner had not established that he had a well-founded fear of persecution by the Awami League Party. He also noted that the petitioner had admitted (1) that a letter which he had produced in evidence claiming that the authorities had charged him with being in possession of illegal weapons was not genuine and (2) that he had an illegally obtained British passport in the name of Moshin Haider.

[5]     
The immigration adjudicator reviewed the petitioner's immigration history, the accounts which he had given in his initial asylum interview and in his evidence and the submissions which had been made on behalf of the petitioner and the respondent. The adjudicator also had regard to the Bangladesh Country Assessment of October 2000 by the Home Office Country Information and Policy Unit and a United States State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Bangladesh in 2000. The adjudicator found that the petitioner had failed to establish that he had a history of harassment or ill-treatment amounting to persecution for a Convention reason, that he had failed to establish that he was currently of interest to the Bangladesh authorities and that he had therefore failed to establish that there was a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would be persecuted for a Convention reason if he was returned to his own country. The adjudicator's reasons for reaching that conclusion are set out in paragraphs [42] to [47] of her determination which are in the following terms:

"[42] Against the background of the objective evidence I am able to accept the appellant's account as credible in so far as he says that the ruling party Awami League Party receives more favourable treatment from the police than the BNP, and the party in power always oppresses the opposition party.

[43]     
I accept as credible the answers given by the appellant to the Immigration Officer at the Asylum Interview on 13 May 2000 and in evidence namely that he has never been arrested or detained by the Bangladesh Authorities or police.

[44]     
The claim before me at its highest, showed that the appellant had a subjective fear of ill-treatment based on a number of uncertain events, namely if he were detained by the police, the Organising Secretary of the local Awami League was advised and choosing to act on the information, chose to gain access to him, having gained access the Awami League members chose to ill-treat him, and the police officers chose to turn a blind eye to any wrongdoing by the Awami League members.

[45]     
The appellant's evidence about the solicitor's letter is contradictory and confusing both in relation to its author, transmission to him and contents. At its highest the letter is self-serving and could not be given a higher status that (sic) the appellant's own evidence. I cannot accept the letter as evidence and therefore remove it from my consideration apart from the question of certification.

[46]     
The appellant's evidence about his activities and the beliefs of his party is scanty given the objective evidence contained in the Country reports and set out in paras 33 - 38 above. He failed to mention the halal or general strikes by the BNP. He failed to mention the December 1999 marches by opposition activists in the Chittagong and created instead the picture of a party losing supporters due to successful intimidation by the Awami League. I accept the respondent's submission that his lack of detail is not consistent with his assertion that he was an activist of interest to the Awami League and through them to the police.

[47]     
Taking into account the contents of the statement lodged, the oral evidence and the Asylum Interview Record I was not satisfied that the appellant was a credible witness. I accepted that he was a member of the BNP. Because the appellant demonstrated such a limited grasp of the political concepts of the party both in his oral evidence and at the Asylum Interview, I could not regard as credible his assertions that he had been an active Organising Secretary since 1995."

[6]      In paragraph [46] the reference to paragraphs 33 - 38 should be to paragraphs 36 - 41.

[7]     
The Lord Ordinary observed that the adjudicator had been in no real doubt that the petitioner's evidence about his active role in the party was not credible, and that the real issue was whether the adjudicator had been entitled to come to that conclusion for the reasons which she gave in her determination. The Lord Ordinary sets out the submissions which were made to him and states that he subjected the adjudicator's reasoning to rigorous scrutiny. However, he expressed the opinion that the adjudicator had been entitled to conclude that the petitioner had lacked the detailed knowledge that would be expected of any activist who would be of interest to an opponent intent on persecution, and that his evidence had not been consistent with his claim that he had been such an activist. The Lord Ordinary also noted that the adjudicator, in making her determination on the credibility of the petitioner's claim about his role in the BNP, had not sought to found on a number of matters which are set out in paragraph [16] of the Lord Ordinary's Opinion.

[8]     
Counsel for the petitioner had submitted to the Lord Ordinary that the adjudicator had failed to take account of all the relevant considerations. That submission was made with reference to the threats of punishment which had been spoken to by the petitioner in evidence before the adjudicator. The threats were referred to in Statement 5 of the petition, but Statement 7, which set out the grounds on which the petitioner sought reduction of the determination, did not include any reference to them. Counsel for the petitioner sought to make submissions to the Lord Ordinary about the alleged threats, but the Lord Ordinary took the view that it was not appropriate to consider and determine the issue of the threats which, he said, was not part of the case made by the petitioner in the petition. The Lord Ordinary refused the petition.

[9]     
The adjudicator did not accept as credible the petitioner's evidence that he had been the organising secretary for the BNP in the area of Chittagong Hill Tracks, and it was common ground that the issues for our determination were (1) whether the adjudicator had been entitled to reach that conclusion for the reasons which she gave, and (2) whether the Lord Ordinary had erred in deciding to refuse the petition.

[10]     
Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Lord Ordinary should have subjected the reasoning of the adjudicator to "anxious scrutiny" (R. v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith 1996 QB 517). While the Lord Ordinary had stated that he had subjected it to "rigorous scrutiny" it was submitted that he had, in fact, failed to do so. Counsel submitted that the adjudicator should have accepted as credible and reliable the petitioner's evidence that he was an organising secretary for the BNP. Regard must be had to the context in which his evidence was given, the personal circumstances of the petitioner and the relative importance or unimportance of the alleged omissions from his evidence. In finding that the petitioner was not a credible witness, the adjudicator had not sought to found on any discrepancies in his account of having been an organising secretary. There was no proof of background circumstances which contradicted his evidence that he had been an organising secretary for the BNP. In particular, there was no evidence before the adjudicator as to what the duties of an organising secretary of a political party in Bangladesh were and which contradicted the petitioner's evidence that he had been an organising secretary. The adjudicator had founded on the alleged lack of detail in his evidence, and matters which he had omitted to mention, in refusing to accept that he had been an active organising secretary since 1995. However, while she stated that he had not made mention of certain matters, such as the halal, general strikes by the BNP and the December 1999 marches by opposition activists in the Chittagong, she did not suggest that he had been asked questions about any of those matters. The petitioner had been criticised for having a limited grasp of the political concepts of the BNP, but the Country assessment had stated that there were few differences between the respective policies of the Awami League Party and the BNP. While the onus of proof was on the petitioner, it was a relatively light one and it was submitted that the Lord Ordinary had not subjected the reasoning of the adjudicator to anxious scrutiny. Further, in her determination the adjudicator had not dealt with the petitioner's evidence about the threats to which he had been subjected, and the Lord Ordinary had erred when he had refused to take into account the evidence of those threats. The petitioner had given evidence about the threats before the adjudicator, and the petition contained averments that the threats had been made. In the circumstances the reclaiming motion should be allowed.

[11]      In reply, counsel for the respondent invited us to refuse the reclaiming motion. It was submitted that the Lord Ordinary had not misdirected himself in law. He had not taken into account irrelevant facts or left out of account relevant considerations. The case for the petitioner was that he feared persecution because of his activities as an organising secretary for the BNP, but the adjudicator had been entitled to disbelieve his evidence on that critical matter. She had tested his evidence against the objective reports which were before her. The adjudicator had accepted that the petitioner had been a member of the BNP, but he had been put on notice that his assertion that he had been an organising secretary was under challenge. The question whether he had been subjected to threats did not really arise as he had said that he had been threatened because of his activities as an organising secretary for the BNP and the adjudicator had not accepted his evidence that he had been an organising secretary. The alleged threats and his activities as an organising secretary were clearly linked. In the circumstances the approach of the Lord Ordinary had been correct and the reclaiming motion should be refused.

Decision

[12]     
It was accepted by counsel for both parties that the adjudicator's finding that the petitioner was not a credible witness was based on the relatively narrow ground that she did not believe his evidence that he had been an active organising secretary for the BNP since 1995, and that the principal issue for our determination in this reclaiming motion was whether the adjudicator had been entitled, for the reasons which she had given, to reject the petitioner's evidence to that effect. The Lord Ordinary held that the adjudicator had been entitled to make the findings she did on the strength of the material on which she had relied. However, as the Lord Ordinary rightly observed, the issue in this case was not one of making a determination of credibility based on inconsistencies between earlier and later statements by the petitioner.

[13]     
The adjudicator accepted that the petitioner had been a member of the BNP and that the party in power in Bangladesh always oppresses the opposition party. However, she stated that the petitioner's evidence about his activities and the beliefs of his party was scanty given the objective evidence contained in the Country reports. She specified, in paragraph [46], matters which he had failed to mention. She then accepted the respondent's submission that the petitioner's lack of detail was not consistent with his assertion that he had been an activist of interest to the Awami League, which was the party in power in Bangladesh. It is, however, to be noted that there is no indication that the evidence given by the petitioner about the nature of his activities as an organising secretary was inconsistent with the activities which would normally be expected in the case of an organising secretary of a political party in Bangladesh. While the adjudicator referred to matters which the petitioner had failed to mention, and stated that he had a limited grasp of the political concepts of his party, the extent to which the questions which were put to him were calculated to elicit these matters is far from clear. In particular, there is no indication in the adjudicator's summary of the evidence before her that the petitioner was asked any questions which might reasonably have produced answers mentioning the limited number of political events or matters to which the adjudicator referred in paragraph [46] of her decision. In the absence of such questions and answers demonstrating ignorance of political events, we do not consider it legitimate to draw a crucial adverse inference merely from a failure to volunteer a mention of events such as a general strike or protest marches which might be thought by someone in the petitioner's position as so within public knowledge as not to warrant reference in the absence of specific questioning.

[14]     
Further, with regard to the adjudicator's refusal to accept the petitioner's evidence that he had been an activist of interest to the Awami League Party, and through them to the police, the petitioner had given evidence of threats which had been made to him, including a threat to kill him. It was accepted by counsel for both parties that the adjudicator had not dealt specifically with the evidence of the alleged threats. She did not say that she rejected the petitioner's evidence about the threats nor, if it could be implied that she had rejected that evidence, did she give reasons for rejecting it. Counsel for the petitioner had attempted to make submissions to the Lord Ordinary about the threats but the Lord Ordinary refused to allow him to do so on the ground that, although the petition contained averments that threats had been made, Statement 7, which set out the grounds on which the petitioner sought reduction of the determination, did not include any reference to them. Shortly before the first hearing an attempt had been made to amend the petition by adding averments about the threats, but another Lord Ordinary had refused to allow the minute of amendment to be received. In our opinion, however, the factual issue as to whether or not threats had been made to the petitioner could have had a considerable bearing on the credibility and reliability of his assertion that he had been an active organising secretary since, if the threats had been made, they could be attributed to his activities in that post. Indeed, counsel for the respondent conceded that the question whether the petitioner had been an organising secretary and the issue of the making of alleged threats were interlinked. If it was accepted that threats had been made against him by supporters of the ruling party, that would lend considerable weight to the petitioner's evidence that it was his activities as an organising secretary for the opposition party which had attracted the unwelcome attentions of the Awami League Party.

[15]     
In the particular circumstances of this case we are satisfied that the Lord Ordinary was not justified in refusing to hear submissions about the alleged threats. In R v. Home Secretary, ex parte Robinson 1998 QB 929 Lord Woolf M.R., delivering the Opinion of the Court, made the following observations (at page 945):

"It follows from what we have said that it is the duty of the appellate authorities to apply their knowledge of Convention jurisprudence to the facts as established by them when they determine whether it would be a breach of the Convention to refuse an asylum-seeker leave to enter as a refugee, and that they are not limited in their consideration of the facts by the arguments actually advanced by the asylum-seeker or his representative."

[16]      While the Lord Ordinary was, of course, obliged to focus primarily on the stated grounds for the judicial review, we consider that he took too strict a view of the petitioner's pleadings, having regard to the fact that the alleged threats had been spoken to by the petitioner in evidence and were referred to in the petition. In the circumstances we are satisfied that the adjudicator and the Lord Ordinary both failed properly to take into account a relevant consideration, namely, whether threats had been made to the petitioner by the Awami League Party.

[17]     
On the whole matter we are satisfied that the reasons given by the adjudicator for disbelieving the petitioner's evidence that he had been an active organising secretary for the BNP were inadequate, and that the Lord Ordinary should have heard submissions in relation to the threats which the petitioner alleged had been made against him in Bangladesh. We will allow the reclaiming motion, recall the interlocutor of the Lord Ordinary dated 8 April 2003, reduce the determination of the adjudicator dated 16 July 2001 and remit the case to a different adjudicator for a re-hearing of the petitioner's appeal against the respondent's decision of 29 December 2000 refusing his application for asylum.


BAILII:
Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2004/162.html