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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Carlton Clubs Plc Foir Petition for Judicial Review [2004] ScotCS 30 (10 February 2004) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2004/30.html Cite as: [2004] ScotCS 30 |
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
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P1380/03
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OPINION OF LORD WHEATLEY in Petition of CARLTON CLUBS PLC Petitioner; for Judicial Review of a resolution by The Highland Council of 1st September 2003 to approve the grant of outline planning permission for a new bingo hall, associated facilities and car parking, at Inshes Retail and Leisure Park in Inverness
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Petitioner: Wilson; Dundas & Wilson, C.S.
Respondent: Mrs. Wolffe; Biggart Baillie
10 February 2004
[1] The petitioner is the heritable proprietor of a site at Beechwood Business Park, Inverness, for which outline planning permission for a bingo hall, associated facilities and car parking was granted on appeal by the Reporter appointed by the Scottish Ministers on 9 July 2003. This appeal had been taken by the petitioner following an initial refusal to grant planning permission by The Highland Council, which is the only respondent to appear in this Judicial Review. [2] One of the principal determining issues of the petitioner's appeal was concerned with the level of car parking provision necessary to support the proposed development. In particular, in considering the appeal, the Reporter was concerned with an examination of two different methods of calculating the provision of car parking to a development of the kind proposed by the petitioner. Historically, the respondent had applied a minimum parking requirement policy to such developments, which was based on an estimate of the numbers of car parking spaces that the developers thought they would need to support the development. Once that estimate was satisfactorily reached, the respondent would grant planning permission subject to the provision of a minimum number of car parking spaces in terms of the developer's estimate. This approach was therefore led by the perceived demand for car parking arising out of the development. [3] In March 2003, shortly before the Reporter appointed by the Scottish Ministers began the planning inquiry into the petitioner's application, the Scottish Executive published a document entitled Scottish Planning Policies Guidelines No.17 (hereafter "SPP17") on Transport and Planning Maximum Parking Standards. In terms of the introduction to SPPG17, the statements of the Scottish Executive policy contained therein, (which are also found in circulars published by the Scottish Executive), may be material considerations to be taken into account in the preparation of development plans and the existence of development control functions exercised by local authorities. [4] SPP17 was specifically intended to issue further guidance on maximum parking standards as initially provided by National Planning Policy Guidelines 17 (hereafter "NPPG17"). The fundamental principle behind SPP17 was a desire to see more sustainable modes of travel associated with developments. In general terms, these methods are designed to limit the use of private cars wishing to visit such developments. NPPG17 therefore provided detailed methods for working out the maximum car parking space appropriate to developments, including such as that proposed by the petitioner. [5] In SPP17 there is included (in Article 19) the Town and Country Planning (Notification of Applications) (Scotland) Amendment Direction 2003. It is this Direction which provides details of the application of the national maximum parking standards, by reference to the nature of the development and the amount of floor space. It is agreed in the present case that while the recommendation and proposals contained in the main body of SPP17 are guidelines which are designed to assist planning authorities in the preparation of their development plans and in the exercise of their functions of development control, the Direction itself has the force of law, and is an exercise of the power of the Scottish Ministers in terms of the relevant planning legislation. Accordingly, there are only two methods by which a planning authority can avoid applying the parking standards imposed by the Direction. The first is by making provision for alternative standards in terms of the local development plan, which requires to be approved by Scottish Ministers. The second method is by indicating that they are minded to grant an application in terms which are at variance with the Direction, where again the application must be submitted to the Scottish Ministers for their approval. [6] In the course of the decision letter of 9 July 2003, the Reporter appointed by the Scottish Ministers noted that the respondent had originally refused the petitioner's planning application for inter alia the following reason (page 2 para.5):"3. The applicants have failed to provide sufficient justification to demonstrate that the level of car parking proposed to be provided within the site is adequate to meet the requirements of patrons and staff and have, as a result, been unable to allay concerns that the proposed development will result in the unauthorised use of other car parks and adjacent residential streets, thereby exacerbating existing parking problems, all to the detriment of the local road network and to amenity."
"Development falling within the category set out in the table below, where the amount of car parking proposed is in excess of the maximum standard contained in the table, and for which a planning authority is minded to grant consent."
It would appear from the respondent's submissions that it is of the opinion that in applying the maximum car parking standards, as described in the Direction, they only have a responsibility to consider what is "proposed"; and if the proposal exceeds the maximum standard contained in the table, and they are minded otherwise to grant the consent, then and only then do they have to observe the consequences which apply where such an excess is contemplated. Those consequences are (apart from a strategic departure from the standards in the Development Plan which must be approved by Scottish Ministers) that a reference must be made to Scottish Ministers in respect of any minded to grant consent following a planning application such as the present. It therefore follows from the respondent's line of argument that, so long as the applicants confine themselves to a request for parking which is within the maximum car parking standards contemplated by the Direction, then it is entirely possible to grant permission for as many car parking spaces as is considered desirable, and in particular the respondent is wholly free to impose the minimum car parking requirements in line with its former policy.
[17] The respondent's position in this matter is clearly wrong. The whole purpose of SSP17 is to provide guidance and a direction in respect of maximum parking standards in orders to restrict car parking for new developments for the explicit purpose of promoting alternative and sustainable methods of transport. In this context, what an applicant seeks for in the course of his planning application is completely irrelevant to what the planning authority in the event decides should be provided in the way of car parking spaces. The application of maximum parking standards can only be relevant to whatever permission, is in fact granted and can have no relevance of any kind to what is contained in the application. To hold otherwise would simply allow any applicant to get round the guidelines and the Direction in the SSP17 by restricting the request for car parking spaces to below the maximum parking standards, in the confident expectation that the local authority will then be free to apply its own standards to the proposed developments in substitution for the national standards. Such a situation would be wholly untenable and to apply the respondent's reasoning would make a nonsense of the system of guidelines and directions. The only way in which SSP17 can be realistically or properly applied is to the nature and content of the planning permission which is granted. [18] Nor does it assist the respondent's case that the Reporter had regard to the availability of some measure of overspill parking in the petitioner's application. All that the Reporter was doing in taking note of the position was to indicate that the availability of additional on-street park could negate the spirit and intention of the maximum parking standards, and then to suggest that the local authority may require to take measures in order to avoid the consequences of that. In the present case, the respondent has specifically required as a condition of the grant of planning application that the applicants should allow unrestricted car parking throughout the remainder of the retail park car park which serves a number of other interests. In these circumstances, I find it difficult to understand how the respondent can argue that the car parking provision for the site which should be considered for the purposes of SSP17 and the Direction should be restricted to the small number of parking places adjacent to the bingo hall. It would seem to follow that had the additional unrestricted parking in the rest of the retail car park not been available, then planning permission would have been refused. In these circumstances, the attitude to the question of additional or overspill parking is merely an illustration of the unsoundness of the respondent's approach. It is quite plain that in ignoring the provisions of SSP17 the respondent acted beyond its proper powers. [19] That the failure to observe the provisions and Direction of SSP17 is a material consideration in terms of any planning application can not be a matter of doubt. It is clear from the examination of NPPG17 that all such matters amount to material considerations. I do not understand that it was seriously suggested by the respondent here that this is not the case. [20] Equally, I am satisfied that the failure to observe the provisions of SSP17 in the Teesmartin application must be regarded as a matter of material prejudice to the petitioner. The whole point of SSP17 is an attempt to constrain the uncontrolled and unrestricted availability of car parking spaces and thus discourage the use of cars as a method of transport to and from the bingo halls. It is implicit in this purpose that unless such constraints are in place then an inappropriate and excessive use of car travel will be made in respect of any particular development. SSP17 provides a clear indication that the Scottish Executive consider as a matter of national policy that this should not be so, and this in turn reflects the obvious fact that without such restraint, unrestricted access will be available to patrons of the Teesmartin bingo hall. It is clearly a matter of considerable significance, against that background, that one bingo hall should have unrestrained and unrestricted car parking access, while another nearby should be restricted to a particular number of car parking spaces within the national standards. In these circumstances, I have no difficulty in concluding that the petitioner is entitled to intimate their interest in the matter and to make their present claim. [21] In conclusion it is clear that the respondent has acted ultra vires in failing to apply the provisions and direction of SSP17 to its grant of planning permission in respect of the Teesmartin application. It also acted improperly in failing to take into account the decision of the Reporter, acting on behalf of the Scottish Ministers, in the petitioner's application. In view of this serious irregularity of procedure, I am also satisfied that the petitioner has suffered prejudice as a result of the material considerations arising out of the respondent's failure. In these circumstances I propose to sustain the pleas-in-law for the petitioner and to grant the prayer of the present petition.