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Scottish Court of Session Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Gillespie v. Toondale Ltd [2005] ScotCS CSOH_133 (09 September 2005) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2005/CSOH_133.html Cite as: [2005] ScotCS CSOH_133, [2005] CSOH 133 |
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Gillespie v. Toondale Ltd [2005] ScotCS CSOH_133 (09 September 2005)
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2005] CSOH 133 |
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A533/05
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NOTE by LORD JOHNSTON in the cause THOMAS GRAHAM GILLESPIE Pursuer; against TOONDALE LIMITED Defenders:
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Pursuer: Richardson; Maclay Murray & Spens
Defenders: Clark; HBM Sayers
9 September 2005
[1] I heard a motion in the Vacation Court at the instance of the defenders to recall the inhibition that had been placed upon some of his properties by the pursuer in the context of this action. [2] The hearing was short, largely taken up by the pursuer seeking to demonstrate that there was a security risk justifying the retention of the inhibition, under reference to various company accounts. [3] The reason I did not entertain that submission was simply because in my opinion the pursuer has not demonstrated a sufficiently prima facie case to warrant the imposition of an inhibition with the deleterious consequences that can cause. Unless in my opinion that can be reasonably established, there is no justification for the charge. [4] My simple view in this case was despite requests to counsel for the pursuer, he was unable to produce any tangible evidence to support the assertion that any agreement existed which entitled the pursuer to succeed in this case. The defence is a complete denial. The contract is said to be oral and accordingly it follows that the existence of the inhibition depended upon assertions by counsel for the pursuer based on nothing other than apparent statements verbally given to him by his client. That is not acceptable. [5] In my opinion, against recent case law, this is a wholly inadequate basis to found the existence of inhibition in an action of this sort. It is, to my mind, oppressive and dispropriate. On that basis alone I accordingly pronounced the interlocutor now reclaimed against.
