EXTRA DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord Osborne
Lord Johnston
Sir David Edward, Q.C.
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[2007] CSIH 51
XA80/05
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD OSBORNE
in
APPEAL
A M
Appellant;
against
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent:
_______
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Act: Forrest; Drummond & Miller
Alt: Lindsay; The Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate
General
20 June 2007
The background
circumstances
[1] The
appellant, having arrived illegally in the United Kingdom on 6 December
2001,
claimed asylum on 19 December 2001.
He contended that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in Burundi for the reason of membership of a
particular social group. He also claimed
that he had a right to remain in the United Kingdom under Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. His application was considered
by the respondent, but refused, for the reasons given in a letter dated 14
February 2002,
to which we refer for its terms. The
appellant was thereafter served with a notice of a decision to issue removal
directions to an illegal entrant, dated 18 February 2002 stating that directions had been
given for his removal to Burundi.
There followed an appeal brought under the terms of the Immigration and
Asylum Act 1999. The appeal was heard
twice by different adjudicators, after which it was twice remitted for hearing de novo.
Thereafter, following the coming into force of the Asylum and
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, the appellant's case came
before an immigration judge on 13 April 2005.
On 29 April 2005, the appellant's appeal was
dismissed for the reasons set forth in the determination of the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal annexed to the Appeal.
Following upon that, the appellant made an application to the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal for leave to appeal to this court, which was itself
refused on 4 July 2005.
The reasons given for that refusal were as follows:
"The appellant spoke of attacks upon
his home by Tutsi soldiers in 1994, 1998 and 2001. The current situation between Tutsi and Hutu
was considered in the determination. The
appellant feared that he would be at risk because of his brother's activities
with the Interahamwe. The Immigration
Judge at paragraph 23 of his determination did not find the account of the
search for the brother to be credible.
The Hutu constitute the majority of the population of Burundi.
A transitional Government was installed in November 2001 and has been
working closely with the United Nations.
The reasoning of the Immigration Judge was adequate. The appellant has himself no personal political
profile and his brother now lives abroad in any event. Four years have elapsed from the events
described. The determination does not
disclose any error of law in its approach to the issue of return or at all."
[2] Following
upon that determination the appellant made an application for leave to appeal
to this court under section 103B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act
2002 in which grounds of appeal against the decision of the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal, dated 4 July 2005, were stated. Those grounds are in the following terms:
"3.1 The
reasoning of the Immigration Judge ('the judge') was not adequate (see line 9
of the decision of the Tribunal). The
judge correctly identifies whether the incident in 2001 took place as the first
part of the important question (see last sentence in paragraph 22 of the
decision by the judge dated 29 April 2005).
He concludes (see final sentence in paragraph 23 of his decision) that
it did not because the authorities would have known where to find the
appellant's brother (see earlier in paragraph 23). This was not a finding that was open to him
because there was no evidence that the authorities knew where his brother
was. The reasoning of the judge was
therefore based on speculation. It is
accordingly flawed. In so far as the
Tribunal state that his reasoning was adequate its decision is similarly
flawed.
3.2 The
reasoning of the Immigration Judge ('the judge') was not adequate (see line 9
of the decision of the Tribunal). The
judge correctly identifies the effect of the incident in 2001 will have on the
risk on return as the second part of the important question (see last sentence
in paragraph 22 of the decision by the judge dated 29 April
2005). If the incident in November 2001 did take
place the judge was not entitled to draw the conclusion that there was no
credible reason to believe that the authorities would know or care about his
return (see third sentence in the judge's decision). Such a line of reasoning would be justified
only if (a) the incident was not itself important; and (b) the improvement in the country situation
to which the judge refers in the second last sentence in paragraph 24 was
sufficiently marked as to render the effect of the incident in November 2001
irrelevant. There was no evidence that
the incident was anything other than serious while the judge basis his
conclusion that the country has improved on minimal evidence. His decision is therefore flawed. In so far as the Tribunal state that his
reasoning was adequate its decision is similarly flawed.
3.3 The
determination of the Immigration Judge disclosed an error of law (see line 12
of the Tribunal's decision). In finding
that it would not be unduly harsh for the appellant to avoid his home
area. It is assumed he has meant that it
was open to the appellant to seek the option of internal flight relocation in Burundi.
If so, he has erred by failing to properly consider the appropriate test
and relevant issues, such as whether the appellant would be able to work in
another part of Burundi, what effect this would have on his
home/family life, what protection, if any, he would have, and what other
consequences would result from such an important move. (AE and
FE v S.S.H.D. (2003
INLR 475)."
[3] By an
interlocutor, dated 4 May 2006, this court, on the unopposed motion of the
appellant, no answers having been lodged, granted the application for leave to
appeal to this court and held the application as the appeal in the case. At the outset of the hearing of the appeal
before us, on 29 May 2007, counsel for the appellant sought
leave to amend ground of appeal 3.2 by the insertion after the date "29
April 2005",
occurring in line 5 of that ground the words "but fails to apply the correct
standard of proof." While this motion
was originally opposed, the basis of opposition to it was resolved and the
amendment was allowed.
Submissions of the
appellant
[4] At the outset
of his submissions, counsel for the appellant indicated that he sought to have
the court remit the case to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, after
allowance of the appeal. There ought
then to be a reconsideration of specific parts of the evidence which had been
misconstrued by the Immigration Judge.
The powers of the court, in this regard, were now defined in section
103(B)(4) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It was a matter of agreement that the
original appeal against the decision of the respondent, dated 14
February 2002,
had been brought under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, in the first
instance. The appeal continued to be
regulated by that Act but, by virtue of transitional provisions, the disposal
of the case by the court fell to be dealt with under section 103B of the 2002
Act.
[5] Thereafter
counsel described the elaborate history of the case, which we have already
summarised. The present appeal was
focused upon the decision of the Immigration Judge, dated 29
April 2005. It was submitted that that decision involved
certain errors of law.
[6] Dealing first
with ground of appeal 3.1, counsel drew attention to paragraph 22 of the
decision under consideration. In the
last sentence of that paragraph the Immigration Judge stated that the important
question was whether the incident of 2001 took place, and its relationship to
the risk on return. The reference to the
incident of 2001 was, of course, a reference to the incident described in the
Immigration Judge's account of the appellant's evidence, narrated in
paragraph 11(f) of his decision.
The appellant had claimed that on 20 November
2001, Tutsi
soldiers came to the house of the appellant's family again. Five soldiers came to the house asking for
the appellant's brother Youssouf. The
family was badly beaten by the soldiers.
They said that they believed that his brother was associated with the
Interahamwe. By way of answering the
important question which he had proposed in paragraph 22 of his decision, the
Immigration Judge stated in paragraph 23:
"It became clear in the course of
evidence that the appellant's brother was a substantial business man. He was getting large shipments of garments
from Thailand, which he was selling from their
father's shop. His brother was also able
to travel abroad. In these circumstances
it must always have been obvious to the authorities where to find his
brother. I do not believe his evidence
as to the incident in which they are alleged to have been looking for his
brother."
Counsel submitted that the conclusion reached by the
Immigration Judge in paragraph 23 was not based on evidence. Rather it amounted to no more than
speculation and was therefore flawed. To
the extent that the conclusion of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal stated
that that reasoning was adequate, its decision was similarly flawed. In connection with this submission, counsel
drew our attention to Wani v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2005
S.L.T. 875, particularly at page 884.
In particular, the inference to be found in the second last sentence of
paragraph 23 could not be drawn on the basis of the earlier parts of that
paragraph. Thus the Immigration Judge
was not entitled to disbelieve the evidence of the appellant on that basis.
[7] Counsel
turned next to support ground of appeal 3.2. This ground was focused upon the reasoning of
the Immigration Judge in paragraph 24 of his decision, which, it was
submitted, was bad. The context of paragraph 24
included what was narrated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the decision. In paragraph 4 it was stated:
"The basis of the claim to asylum, as
summarised for the appellant in submissions, was as follows:
'The appellant has a well-founded
fear of persecution from the security forces and affiliated armed groups is
returned to Burundi, by reason of his social group as the brother of a Hutu
militia member suspected of involvement in the Interahamwe.'"
In paragraph 5 it was narrated that it had been specifically
conceded on behalf of the appellant that he was not seeking asylum by reason of
his Hutu ethnicity alone, or his perceived political opinion. Against that background it was accurate to
say, as the Immigration Judge did in paragraph 24, that "in any event, the
appellant has not claimed to have been personally targeted." In connection with this submission the
standard of proof was crucial. It was
contended that that standard amounted to "a reasonable degree of
likelihood". There was, however, no mention
of that standard of proof in the decision, particularly in paragraph 23 or
24. Paragraph 24 was couched upon
the basis that the incident of November 2001 did in fact take place. However, the Immigration Judge was not
entitled to draw the conclusion that he sought to draw in paragraph 24. In connection with this submission
paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision, which dealt with country
information, derived from the United States Department of State document dated 28 February
2005 and the
document compiled by the County Information Policy Unit. Paragraphs 14 and 15 were inconsistent
with the document from the United States Department of State. At this point in the submissions counsel for
the respondent produced the report compiled by the Country Information Policy
Unit, of 2004. After consideration of
this document counsel for the appellant accepted that paragraphs 14 and 15
of the decision appeared to be consistent with that document. Nevertheless, he argued that that did not
undermine this ground of appeal. The
Immigration Judge had reached a conclusion based on a misunderstanding of the
evidence, which gave rise to an issue of law.
In any event, the Country Information Policy Unit report was unclear
regarding the present risk which the appellant might face in Burundi.
In all the circumstances the finding made in paragraph 24 was
perverse.
[8] Counsel then
proceeded to support ground of appeal 3.3 which was focused upon the
contents of paragraph 25 of the decision in which it was stated:
"If the appellant fears being asked
about his brother, avoiding his home area in order not to run into anyone who
might possibly pose such questions would not be unduly harsh."
If the grounds of appeal 3.1 and 3.2 were to fail, 3.3
would be immaterial. However, if the
appellant succeeded on grounds 3.1 and 3.2 paragraph 25 of the
decision should be reconsidered. The
fact of the matter was that there was no material available to the Immigration
Judge to entitle him to make the finding contained in paragraph 25.
Submissions of the
respondent
[9] Counsel for the respondent moved the
court to refuse the appeal and affirm the decision of the Asylum and
Immigration Tribunal. At the outset,
however, he indicated that two concessions were to be made on behalf of the respondent. First, the contention made in ground of
appeal 3.1 was accepted. In
particular, it was accepted that, in paragraph 23 of his decision, the
Immigration Judge had stated a non
sequitur. There was no basis for the
conclusion stated in the sentence: "In
these circumstances it must always have been obvious to the authorities where
to find his brother." Thus the basis for
the Immigration Judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence concerning the
incident of 20 November 2001 disappeared.
[10] Secondly,
ground of appeal 3.3 was also accepted.
There was no adequate reasoning concerning the conclusion that internal
relocation would not be unduly harsh.
[11] However,
despite these concessions, if the appellant were to succeed, he had to succeed
in relation to ground of appeal 3.2, as amended. That ground was intimately connected with
what was said by the Immigration Judge in paragraph 24 of his
decision. In this connection, the
respondent adhered to the position taken up in his Answers, relating to that
ground. There was nothing that was open
to criticism in paragraph 24 of the decision. The conclusion reached that there would be no
real risk to the appellant if he were to be returned to Burundi was not in any way perverse.
[12] The amendment
to this ground of appeal had raised the issue of whether the Immigration Judge
had adopted the correct standard of proof.
In relation to that, it was submitted that he had not erred in any way. In paragraph 24, he spoke of there being
no "real risk" on return. Those words
indicated an application of the test of a reasonable degree of likelihood of
risk, the accepted standard of proof. In
this connection counsel relied upon R.
(Bagdanavicius) v Secretary of State
for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 668, particularly at page 676 in
paragraph 22 of the judgment of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. It was evident from paragraph 7 of the
decision of the Immigration Judge that he had been fully aware of the
appropriate standard of proof. Counsel
also relied upon Nalliah Karanakaran
v Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2000] INLR 122, in which reference was made to the earlier
case of R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sivakumaran [1988] AC 958. The test as regards standard of proof was
clear. It has been applied by the
Immigration Judge. There was no merit in
the argument related to the standard of proof.
[13] It appeared to
be contended that the Immigration Judge's conclusion in paragraph 24 was
perverse and that there was no proper basis for the statement that the
situation in Burundi had much improved since the
appellant left that country. In this
connection reliance was placed upon the report of the Country Information
Policy Unit, which had been before the Immigration Judge. Counsel referred particularly to
paragraphs 4.52, 6.1, 6.76 and 6.79 of that report. The relevant contents of the report were
closely reflected in the terms of paragraph 15 of the decision of the
Immigration Judge, where it was said that the security situation had
dramatically improved. That material
was, in turn, reflected in paragraph 24 of the decision. Thus it could not be said that, in reaching
the conclusion that he did in that latter paragraph, the Immigration Judge had
proceeded on no evidence. In all these
circumstances it was submitted that there was no merit in ground of
appeal 3.2. If that ground of
appeal were to be refused, the appeal itself must fail. If that ground were sustained, in the light
of the concession made in relation to ground of appeal 3.3, it would be
necessary for the case to be remitted to the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal. That disposal was competent
within the powers of the court defined in section 103B(iv) of the
2004 Act. There would require to be
a substantive hearing upon reconsideration, such as had previously
occurred.
The decision
[14] In view of the concessions made by counsel
for the respondent in relation to grounds of appeal 3.1 and 3.3, the
issues for the court that continue to be live are, of course, only those
arising out of ground 3.2, as amended.
As regards the issue raised concerning the Immigration Judge's alleged
failure to apply the appropriate standard of proof, we have no hesitation in
rejecting the appellant's submissions. Having
regard to the authorities cited by counsel for the respondent, we are satisfied
that that standard is to be seen as a reasonable degree of likelihood of
risk. At several points in the course of
his decision, particularly paragraph 7 and paragraph 24, the Immigration
Judge uses the expression "real risk".
We are satisfied that in doing so, he was applying the appropriate
standard of proof.
[15] As regards the
other matters raised in ground 3.2, it is necessary to focus attention on
paragraph 24 of the decision. In
the first sentence in the paragraph the Immigration Judge has said that, in any
event, the appellant had not claimed to have been personally targeted. That is undoubtedly true as appears from what
was said in paragraph 4 of the decision.
The well-founded fear of persecution was said to arise by reason of the
appellant's social group as the brother of a Hutu militia member suspected of
involvement in the Interahamwe. As
regards the second sentence of paragraph 24, we consider that what is
there said is largely beside the point.
As regards the remaining parts of the paragraph, having regard to the
findings in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision, which were based upon
the Country Information Policy Unit report, we consider that the Immigration
Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that he did. It is perhaps disappointing that his
conclusions are stated with such telegraphic brevity, but, essentially his
meaning is clear and the basis for his conclusion plainly appears to be
evidence before him upon which he was entitled to rely. We should mention that counsel for the
appellant conceded in the discussion before us that there was no positive
evidence of a continuation of persecution of the Hutu militia members, or the
Interahamwe movement. In that situation,
we consider that the Immigration Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion
that he did in paragraph 24. In
that situation, this appeal must fail.