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Scottish Court of Session Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Hyaltech Ltd, Re Judicial Review [2007] ScotCS CSOH_84 (15 May 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2007/CSOH_84.html
Cite as: [2007] ScotCS CSOH_84, [2007] CSOH 84

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Opinion of Lord Macphail

In the petition of

 

Hyaltech Limited, Petitioners

for

Judicial Review of a decision of the Medicine and Health Products Regulatory Agency

 

 

 

15 May 2007 Summary

 

This application for judicial review concerns a decision of the Medical and Health Products Regulatory Agency ("MHRA"). Hyaltech Limited ("the company") manufactures a product called VisThesia, which they consider to be a medical device. The MHRA, however, determined that it was a medicinal product and required the company to stop selling and supplying it. A Review Panel appointed by the MHRA concurred that VisThesia was a medicinal product.

 

Lord Macphail decided that the reasons given by the Review Panel were sufficient for their purpose and that the MHRA had not made any error of law in their interpretation of the relevant regulations. The petition was therefore refused.

 

Hyaltech Limited manufacture in Scotland a product named "VisThesia" which is designed to facilitate intraocular surgery to remove a cataract and implant a prosthetic lens. The product includes a solution called "VisThesia Topical".

 

The sale and distribution of medical products and medical devices for human use are governed in the United Kingdom by regulations which implement European Community Directives. Manufacturers must obtain the grant of a marketing authorisation from the UK Licensing Authority, the Secretary of State for Health, who acts through the MHRA.

 

The company considered that VisThesia Topical was a medical device. The MHRA, however, provisionally determined that it was a medicinal product. A Review Panel appointed by the MHRA in accordance with the relevant regulations considered representations from the company and from the MHRA and advised the MHRA that it was a medicinal product. The MHRA then made a final determination that it was a medicinal product and they required the company to stop selling and supplying it. The company applied to the Court of Session for judicial review of that determination, and the MHRA conceded that the determination should be reduced because it had not been supported by proper reasons. Thereafter the MHRA, without obtaining further advice from the Review Panel, issued a second final determination to the same effect as the first, but on this occasion they gave reasons.

 

The company then applied to the Court of Session for judicial review of the second final determination. They maintained that if they were to be prohibited from selling and supplying VisThesia from the UK, they would only be able to sell and supply it in other member States of the European Union in which VisThesia has been classified by the national licensing authorities as a medical device. They argued, first, that the Review Panel had failed to provide the MHRA with proper and adequate reasons for their advice. Secondly, they argued that in reaching their second final determination the MHRA had made errors of law, had taken into account irrelevant considerations and had failed to take account of relevant considerations.

 

Summary of Lord Macphail's Opinion in relation to the MHRA's decision:

 

                    Lord Macphail held, first, that although the reasons given by the Review Panel had been briefly expressed, they had been sufficient for the purposes of the MHRA, and the company had been able to understand them.

 

                    Secondly, his Lordship held that the MHRA had not made any error of law in the interpretation of the relevant regulations. He found that they had misunderstood passages in the US patent for the product now called VisThesia, and a sentence in a letter from a medical expert. He concluded, however, that the company had failed to demonstrate that the MHRA had erred in any other respect, and that these errors had not vitiated their determination. Lord Macphail therefore refused the petition.

 

 

 

NOTE

This summary is provided to assist in understanding the Court's decision. It does not form part of the reasons for that decision. The full report of the Court is the only authoritative document.

 

The full opinion will be available on the Scottish Courts website from 12.00 noon today at this location:

 

Media Contact Elizabeth Cutting

Public Information Officer

Parliament House

Edinburgh

0131 240 6854

07917 068173

[email protected]

 


OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

 

[2007] CSOH 84

 

P818/06

 

 

OPINION OF LORD MACPHAIL

 

in the Petition of

 

HYALTECH LTD

 

Petitioners;

 

for

 

Judicial Review of a Final Determination of the Secretary of State for Health as the UK Licensing Authority established by section 6 of the Medicines Act 1968, acting by The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency

 

Respondents:

 

 

ญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญญ________________

 

 

 

Petitioners: Cormack, Solicitor Advocate; McGrigors

Respondent: Brodie; Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate General

 

15 May 2007

Introduction

[1] The petitioners manufacture in Scotland a product named "VisThesia" which is designed to facilitate intraocular surgery for the removal of a cataract and the implantation of a prosthetic lens. The product includes a solution called "VisThesia Topical" which is intended to be applied to the surface of the eye. It contains a viscoelastic product, sodium hyaluronate, and an anaesthetic agent, lidocaine hydrochloride ("lidocaine").

[2] The sale and distribution of medicinal products and medical devices for human use are governed in the United Kingdom by regulations which implement European Community Directives. Manufacturers require to obtain the grant of a marketing authorisation from the European Commission or the UK Licensing Authority. The UK Licensing Authority is the Secretary of State for Health who acts through an executive agency of the Department of Health known as The Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency ("the MHRA"). Where a question arises as to whether a particular product should be classified as a medicinal product or a medicinal device, the MHRA may serve on the manufacturer a "provisional determination notice" informing him that they are minded to determine that the product is "a relevant medicinal product". The manufacturer may make oral representations to a Review Panel at a hearing at which the MHRA may also make oral representations. The Review Panel then give advice to the MHRA who, having considered the advice, determine whether or not the product is a relevant medicinal product.

[3] In the present case the MHRA served on the petitioners a provisional determination notice informing them that they were minded to determine that VisThesia Topical was a relevant medicinal product. The petitioners contended that it was a medical device. The matter proceeded to a Review Panel who, after hearing oral representations from the petitioners and the MHRA, advised the MHRA that VisThesia Topical was not a medical device but a relevant medicinal product. The MHRA thereafter served on the petitioners a notice ("the first final determination") that they had determined on behalf of the licensing authority that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product and that it required the petitioners to cease the sale and supply of VisThesia with immediate effect. They did not state any reasons for their determination. The petitioners applied to this Court for judicial review of that determination. It was conceded that the determination should be reduced. Thereafter the MHRA issued a further notice ("the second final determination") which advised the petitioners that they had made a determination and requirement in the same terms as the first. Unlike the first, the second final determination was accompanied by a statement of reasons.

[4] The petitioners now apply for judicial review of the second final determination. The respondent is the Secretary of State for Health acting by the MHRA. Shortly stated, the petitioners rely on two grounds. The first is that the Review Panel failed to provide the MHRA with proper and adequate reasons for their advice. The second is that alternatively and in any event the second final determination should be reduced because it is ultra vires in respect that the MHRA made material errors of law, took irrelevant matters into account and failed to take relevant matters into account. The petitioners accordingly seek, first, declarator that the respondent made the decision to make the second final determination without having proper advice from the Review Panel, in an unfair manner and in a manner which was contrary to the petitioners' legitimate expectations. They also seek declarator that the second final determination is ultra vires, reduction of that determination, and suspension of the notice given in the notice of final determination.

[5] A common theme in both grounds is the interpretation of the expression "medical device" in the relevant Regulations. It is there defined as including devices which, among other things, incorporate as an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product and "which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device." The principal issue between the parties in relation to interpretation is whether the lidocaine, the anaesthetic agent in the solution, is liable to act upon the body "with action ancillary to" that of the VisThesia Topical. If it is liable so to act, as the petitioners maintain, VisThesia Topical should be classified as a medical device,. If it is not so liable, as the MHRA maintain, VisThesia should be classified as a relevant medicinal product. The practical significance of the matter for the petitioners is that they claim that if they are to be prohibited from selling and supplying VisThesia from the UK, they will only be able to do so in other Member States of the European Union in which VisThesia has been classified by the national licensing authorities as a medical device.

 

The regulatory framework

[6] The marketing of medicinal products and the marketing of medical devices are regulated by two separate regimes, each derived from a Community Directive. That for medicinal products is regulated by the Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisations etc) Regulations 1994 (SI 1994, No. 3144), as amended ("the 1994 Regulations") which implements inter alia Directive 2001/83/EC ("the Medicinal Products Directive"), and that for medical devices by the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (SI 2002, No. 618) ("the 2002 Regulations") which implements inter alia Directive 93/42/EEC ("the Medical Devices Directive").

[7] "Medicinal product" and "medical device" are defined as follows. "Medicinal product" is defined by article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC, as amended, as:

"Any substance or combination of substances presented as having properties for treating or preventing disease in human beings;

Any substance or combination of substances which may be used in or administered to human beings either with a view to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions by exerting a pharmacological, immunological or metabolic action, or to making a medical diagnosis."

It should be noted for the sake of completeness that from 31 October 2005 that definition replaced an earlier definition in the following terms, to which reference is made in the provisional determination notice (No. 6/5 of process):

"Any substance or combination of substances presented for treating or preventing disease in human beings.

Any substance or combination of substances which may be administered to human beings with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions in human beings is likewise considered a medicinal product."

[8] "Medical device" is defined in the following way in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations:

"'medical device' means an instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article, whether used alone or in combination, together with any software necessary for its proper application, which -

(a) is intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of -

(i) diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,

(ii) diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap;

(iii) investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process, or

(iv) control of conception; and

(b) does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, even if it is assisted in its function by such means,

and includes devices intended to administer a medicinal product or which incorporate as an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device."

[9] That definition in regulation 2(1) is derived from the following provisions of articles 1.2(a) and 1.4 of the Medical Devices Directive:

"2. For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions shall apply:

(a) 'medical device' means any instrument, apparatus, appliance, material or other article, whether used alone or in combination, including the software necessary for its proper application intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of:

- diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,

- diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap,

- investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process,

- control of conception,

and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its function by such means;

[. . . ]

4. Where a device incorporates, as an integral part, a substance which, if used separately, may be considered to be a medicinal product within the meaning of Article 1 of Directive 65/65/EC and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device, that device must be assessed and authorized in accordance with this Directive."

[10] Regulation 2(1) also provides a definition of "intended purpose" which, so far as material, states:

"'intended purpose' means -

(a) in relation to an active implantable medical device [not relevant]

[. . . ]

(b) in relation to any other medical device, the use to which the device is intended according to the data supplied by the manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional materials."

[11] I now refer to the relevant provisions of the 1994 Regulations. Regulation 3(1) provides that no relevant medicinal product is to be placed on the market or distributed by way of wholesale dealing unless a marketing authorisation in respect of the product has been granted in accordance with the relevant Community provisions by the licensing authority or the European Commission, and is for the time being in force in accordance with those provisions. "The licensing authority" is the Secretary of State for Health (Medicines Act 1968, sections 1, 6, as amended). As already explained, the Secretary of State acts through the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency ("the MHRA"), an executive agency of the Department of Health.

[12] A question may arise as to whether a particular article submitted to the MHRA for a marketing authorisation should be classified as a "medicinal product". In particular, there may be a question whether it should be classified as a "medicinal product" or as a "medical device". Such articles are known as "borderline products". A procedure for determining whether a borderline product is a medicinal product is provided by regulation 3A. Shortly stated, the procedure is that the MHRA serve on the manufacturer a "provisional determination notice" informing him that they are minded to determine that the product is "a relevant medicinal product". The manufacturer may make oral representations to a Review Panel at a hearing at which the MHRA may also make oral representations. The Review Panel then give advice to the MHRA who, having considered the advice, determine whether or not the product is a relevant medicinal product.

[13] The following are the provisions of regulation 3A which are material in the present case.

"(1) Where the licensing authority are of the opinion that a product without a marketing authorization [. . . ] is a relevant medicinal product, they may, by a notice in writing (referred to in this regulation as a 'provisional determination notice') served on any person who has placed or who in the opinion of the authority may place the product on the market -

(a) inform him that they are minded to determine that the product is a relevant medicinal product (referred to in this regulation as 'the provisional determination') and of the reasons why they are so minded; and

(b) advise him that if he disagrees with the provisional determination, he may request that the licensing authority review their provisional determination, provided that within four weeks of the date on which the provisional determination notice was served on him (referred to in this regulation as 'the date of the provisional determination') he makes that request, and

[. . . ]

(ii) within four weeks of the date of the provisional determination, he informs the licensing authority in writing that he wishes to make oral representations to a review panel, appointed by the licensing authority, explaining why he considers that the product is not a relevant medicinal product.

(2) Where the licensing authority have been informed, pursuant to paragraph (1)(b)(ii), that a person wishes to make oral representations to a review panel, they shall, after consultation with that person, set a date for the oral hearing (at which the licensing authority may also make oral representations to the panel) and [. . . ] that date shall be the date fixed for the oral hearing.

[. . . ]

(5) If a person on whom a provisional determination notice was served -

[. . . ]

(b) has made oral representations to a review panel at an oral hearing arranged pursuant to paragraph (2), [. . . ] the licensing authority shall, after further consideration of the matter and in particular after having considered the advice of the review panel arising out of -

(i) the oral representations made and any other evidence submitted to the panel at the hearing by that person;

(ii) any oral representations made and any other evidence submitted to the panel at the hearing by the licensing authority, and

(iii) any other evidence considered by the review panel,

determine whether or not the product is a relevant medicinal product,

and shall inform that person in writing of their determination and their reasons for it, and if the licensing authority make a determination which is contrary to the advice of the review panel, they shall also give their reasons for disagreeing with the advice of the review panel.

(6) In respect of any product which the licensing authority determine, in accordance with paragraph [. . . ] (5), to be a relevant medicinal product, the licensing authority may, by a notice in writing served on any person who has placed or who in the opinion of the licensing authority may place the product on the market, require that he shall -

(a) stop marketing the product from a date specified in the notice; or

(b) not place the product on the market,

unless or until a marketing authorization [. . . ] is granted in respect of that product."

[14] In addition to the material provisions of the various Regulations it is necessary to notice the terms of a guidance document produced by the European Commission relating to the application of, among other Directives, the Medical Devices Directive. This document (No. 6/2 of process) is headed, "MEDICAL DEVICES: Guidance document", is identified as "MEDDEV 2. 1/3 rev 2 July 2001", and is referred to hereafter as "MEDDEV". The Foreword is in these terms:

"The present Guidelines are part of a set of Guidelines relating to questions of application of EC-Directives on medical devices. They are legally not binding. The Guidelines have been carefully drafted through a process of intensive consultation of the various interested parties (Competent Authorities, Commission services, industries and other interested parties in both the medical devices and the medicinal products sectors) during which intermediate drafts were circulated and comments were taken up in the document. Therefore this document reflects positions taken in particular by the aforementioned interested parties.

Due to the participation of the aforementioned interested parties and of experts from Competent Authorities, it is anticipated that these guidelines will be followed within the Member States and, therefore, ensure uniform application of relevant Directive provisions."

[15] MEDDEV is in four sections. The first, Section A, is headed, "Demarcation between medical devices directives and medicinal products directives". The introductory paragraph notes that in the Medical Devices Directive several provisions to establish the demarcation between both regimes have been laid down. It continues:

"It was recognised that the subject needs to be further explained and illustrated by practical guidance and examples. The present document has no legal force. It has nevertheless been elaborated by an expert group including experts from Member States' competent authorities for both medical devices and medicinal products, the European Commission, as well as industry trade associations. It is therefore intended that the document will provide useful guidance which should assist common positions to be taken throughout the European Union."

Section A goes on to state general principles, give examples of medical devices and medicinal products, and discuss medical devices incorporating a medicinal substance with ancillary action. I shall refer to the contents of MEDDEV in more detail later in this Opinion.

[16] It should also be noted that article 9 of the Medical Devices Directive provides a system of classification of medical devices according to risk, and that before a device in the higher classes is entitled to bear the CE mark an independent certification organisation (a "Notified Body") must certify that it meets certain specified requirements. It is common ground between the parties that a Notified Body in the Netherlands named KEMA accepted that Ophthaleaze, subsequently renamed VisThesia, fell within the Medical Devices Directive and that KEMA certified that it met these requirements. The petitioners aver that they have been able to sell VisThesia throughout the European Union with the CE marking and the identification number of KEMA as the relevant Notified Body. It is also accepted by both parties, however, that the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Optident Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] UKHL 32, [2001] 3 CMLR 1 is that it is not the law that if a CE mark is obtained in one Member State it must be respected in another Member State unless it can be set aside: the application of the CE mark in one Member State does not exclude the competence of the authorities or courts of another Member State (Lord Slynn of Hadley at paragraph 29).

 

Procedure

[17] In the present case, the procedure laid down by regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations was initially followed. The MHRA served on the petitioners a provisional determination notice dated 17 May 2004 (No. 6/5 of process) informing the petitioners that they were minded to determine that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product and stating the reasons why they were so minded. The petitioners, through their solicitors, informed the MHRA that they wished to make oral representations to a review panel. A hearing took place before the review panel ("the Review Panel") on 25 November 2004 at which both the petitioners and the MHRA were represented. The Review Panel heard parties' oral representations. They also had before them written submissions from the petitioners' solicitors (Nos. 6/16, 6/18 and 6/21 of process) and a skeleton argument from counsel for the MHRA (No. 6/19 of process). In a document dated 16 and 21 December 2004 the Review Panel advised that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product and gave reasons for its advice (No.  6/4 of process). The MHRA determined, or purported to determine, that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product, and so informed the petitioners in a letter dated 21 December 2004 in which they also required the petitioners to cease the sale and supply of VisThesia with immediate effect (No.  6/6 of process). They did not, however, state any reasons for their determination. That letter is referred to above as "the first final determination".

[18] The petitioners then applied to this Court for judicial review of the first final determination, the respondent being the Secretary of State for Health. In that petition ("the first petition", No. 6/7 of process) the petitioners' first plea-in-law was in these terms:

"(1) The respondent's decision to make the final determination being unsupported by proper reasons in terms of regulation 3A(5) of the 1994 Regulations, decree of declarator and reduction should be pronounced."

The petition was disposed of on 14 July 2005 by the Court's pronouncing an interlocutor (No. 6/8 of process) interponing authority to a joint minute (No. 6/9 of process), sustaining the petitioners' first plea-in-law and reducing the first final determination.

[19] Thereafter the MHRA appear to have taken no action in the matter until 31 March 2006, when they sent the petitioners a letter ("the second final determination", No. 6/3 of process) which referred to the same advice from the Review Panel, informed the petitioners that the MHRA had determined that VisThesia was a relevant medicinal product, and required them to cease the sale and supply of it with immediate effect. In this letter the MHRA gave their reasons for their determination.

[20] In the present petition the respondent is the Secretary of State for Health acting by the MHRA. The petitioners seek the following orders in relation to the second final determination:

"3.1 Declarator that the respondent made the decision to make the final determination without having proper advice from the Review Panel in terms of the 1994 Regulations, in an unfair manner and in a manner which was contrary to the petitioners' legitimate expectations;

3.2 Declarator that the final determination is ultra vires;

3.3 Reduction of the final determination;

3.4 Suspension of the purported notice under regulation 3A(6) of the 1994 Regulations given in the notice of final determination requiring that the petitioners cease the sale and supply of the topical components in the products VisThesia and VisThesia Light with immediate effect and interim suspension;

3.5 A finding of expenses against the respondent."

At the first hearing the solicitor advocate for the petitioners explained that interim suspension was not sought because an undertaking had been given.

[21] The petition makes it clear that the petitioners rely on two grounds for review of the second final determination. The first relates to the advice of the Review Panel, and the second is that the second final determination is ultra vires in respect that the MHRA made material errors of law, took irrelevant matters into account and failed to take relevant matters into account.

[22] Before considering the grounds for review I shall describe the product VisThesia, outline the initial dispute between the petitioners and the MHRA, and summarise the procedure before the Review Panel. I shall then consider, first, the advice of the Review Panel, and secondly, the terms of the second final determination, in the light of the grounds for review.

 

VisThesia

[23] The following description of VisThesia is derived from the petitioners' averments which are admitted by the respondent.

[24] VisThesia and VisThesia Light (hereafter collectively referred to as "VisThesia"), are products designed to facilitate intraocular surgery to remove cataracts and implant a prosthetic lens. Such surgery involves the eyelids being held open by a metal surgical instrument known as a speculum. An incision is then made in the cornea, the diseased lens is removed and replaced by the prosthetic lens, and the wound is closed by suturing. The eyelids are held open by the speculum for the duration of the procedure, which is typically about 20 minutes.

[25] VisThesia is in the form of a kit or pack assembled by the petitioners at their factory in Edinburgh. VisThesia is principally made up of two viscoelastic solutions: first, a solution contained in two ampoules for topical application to the eye ("VisThesia Topical"); and, second, a solution designed for intracameral administration ("VisThesia Intracameral"). The pack includes a sterile cannula, or syringe, to facilitate the injection of VisThesia Intracameral. VisThesia Topical is a sterile clear viscous solution of 0.3% sodium hyaluronate and 2% lidocaine hydrochloride. The latter ("lidocaine") is a local anaesthetic. VisThesia Intracameral is a sterile clear viscoelastic solution which consists of 1.5% sodium hyaluronate and 1% lidocaine.

[26] The information for use ("IFU") leaflets lodged in court (No. 6/17 of process, appendix 3), which have been included in packs of VisThesia, differ in certain respects, as will appear, but they have the following in common, which may suffice to indicate very broadly how the product is used. They agree in describing VisThesia as "Viscoelastic substances to facilitate intraocular surgery". They instruct that the contents of one ampoule of VisThesia Topical should be applied to the surface of the eye before surgery. They advise that each ampoule of VisThesia Topical and each syringe of VisThesia Intracameral includes lidocaine which is free to diffuse from the viscous solution. They explain that VisThesia Topical hydrates and lubricates the surface of the eye. VisThesia Intracameral is infused through the cannula into the anterior chamber during surgical intervention to remove cataract and implant a prosthetic lens. The intracameral viscoelastic creates and maintains a deep chamber and the space in which to work inside the eye, thus minimising the risk of mechanical damage to any of the ocular structures involved.

 

The initial dispute

[27] The MHRA in their provisional determination dated 17 May 2004 (No. 6/5 of process) accepted that the VisThesia Intracameral and the cannula in each pack were medical devices. They considered, however, that VisThesia Topical was a medicinal product. Their reasoning may be paraphrased as follows. Lidocaine is a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product (this is not disputed). In the opinion of the MHRA the lidocaine in VisThesia Topical is not "liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to" that of the VisThesia Topical. Because the definition of "medical device" in regulation 2(1)(a) of the 2002 Regulations includes a device "which incorporate[s] as an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device", it does not include a device incorporating such a substance whose action is more than "ancillary". Accordingly VisThesia Topical is not a device, but a medicinal product. It is a substance or combination of substances "which may be administered to human beings with a view to [. . . ] modifying physical function" and accordingly satisfies the definition of "medicinal product" in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC. The MHRA said in their provisional determination:

"Whilst the product has two separate functions, lubrication and anaesthesia, these are two separate and independent actions. As anaesthesia is essential prior to surgery the Agency does not agree that the action of the lidocaine is ancillary."

 

The Review Panel

[28] The petitioners then set in motion the procedure under regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations by informing the MHRA that they wished to make oral representations to a Review Panel and explain why they considered that the product was not a relevant medicinal product. An oral hearing was arranged for 25 November 2004. The MHRA decided to be represented and to make oral representations to the Panel. Both the petitioners and the MHRA submitted to the Panel beforehand a substantial amount of material including written representations, authorities and other documents. The written submissions by the petitioners' solicitors are Nos. 6/16, 6/18 and 6/21 of process, and the skeleton argument of counsel for the MHRA is No. 6/19 of process.

[29] The petition gives a detailed account of the written submissions and the arguments advanced at the hearing before the Review Panel. The petitioners submitted that the MHRA had relied on irrelevant information and that the focus should be on the manufacturers' current claims as to a product's principal intended purpose [sic]. They said that the principal intended purpose of VisThesia Topical was hydration, lubrication, protection and keeping the eye clear, and that that was supported by current scientific data and literature and by the evidence of skilled witnesses. Both parties made submissions as to the meaning of "ancillary", the petitioners arguing that it meant only "subordinate" while the MHRA submitted that it meant either "insignificant" or "not separate and independent". The petitioners also maintained that there was an onus on the MHRA to demonstrate that the product was not a medical device. In addition, there was some discussion of a US patent filed by Dr Julius Nielsen, who gave evidence.

[30] The Review Panel thereafter issued a document (No. 6/4 of process) which was signed by the chairman and the secretary on 16 and 21 December 2004 respectively. The following are its material terms:

"Hyaltech Ltd.

Visthesia & Visthesia Light

FINDINGS

The Panel considered the oral and written representations of the MHRA (Borderline Section) and Hyaltech Ltd. In light of the fact that there was no dispute in relation to whether Visthesia and Visthesia Light bore any medicinal claims, the Panel did not consider whether the first limb of the definition of 'medicinal product' ('Any substance or combination of substances presented for treating or preventing disease in human beings or animals') as per Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC was satisfied. The Panel, therefore, only had to consider whether the second limb of the definition of 'medicinal product' ('Any substance or combination of substances which may be administered to human beings or animals with a view to making a medical diagnosis or to restoring, correcting or modifying physiological function in human beings or in animals is likewise considered a medicinal product') was satisfied. The Panel found that Visthesia and Visthesia Light fell within the second limb of the definition of a medicinal product.

 

ADVICE

The Panel advised that Visthesia and Visthesia Light are relevant medicinal products and subject to the provisions of The Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisations Etc.) Regulations 1994 (S.I. 1994/3144) as amended by The Medicines for Human Use (Marketing Authorisations Etc.) (Amendment) Regulations 2000 (S.I. 2000/292).

 

REASONS FOR ADVICE

The products Visthesia and Visthesia Light are presented as kits comprising an intracameral, a viscoelastic cannula and two topical ampoules containing sodium hyaluronate (3mg/ml) and lidocaine hydrochloride (20mg/ml). The topical ampoules are the components under review.

The definition of medical device in Regulation 2(1) of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 includes devices incorporating a medicinal product 'which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device'. By definition, therefore, a product cannot be classified as a device if the medicinal component is more than merely ancillary.

It is well documented that lidocaine is an established medicinal substance with a local anaesthetic action i.e. its effects will modify physiological functions in human beings. Anaesthesia is an essential part of surgery and lidocaine is commonly used by surgeons at the start of a cataract operation. Lidocaine has no effect on the action of the hyaluronate, whereas the hyaluronate has a synergistic effect on the lidocaine.

After having considered all the information available, including the witness statements and evidence, the patent, the claims of the manufacturer (both original and current), other literature and the presentations made by both parties, the Panel held that the anaesthetic element in the products Visthesia and Visthesia Light is not an ancillary medicinal product, but has a separate and substantial action of its own. The lidocaine is not liable to act on the body with action ancillary to that of the device itself. Accordingly, neither Visthesia nor Visthesia Light can be considered as a medical device for the purposes of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002.

The Panel, therefore, considered that Visthesia and Visthesia Light fall within the second limb of the definition of a medicinal product as stated in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EEC."

 

First ground for review: the advice of the Review Panel

[31] The petitioners' first plea-in-law is in these terms:

"1. The respondent having made the decision to make said final determination without having proper advice from the Review Panel et separatim in an unfair manner et separatim in a manner which was contrary to the petitioner's legitimate expectations, decree of declarator and reduction should be pronounced as craved."

[32] The advice of the Review Panel was of importance because the MHRA considered it before making their second final determination, as they were bound to do by regulation 3A(5)(b) of the 1994 Regulations. The petitioners complain that the Review Panel failed to give proper and adequate reasons for its advice. They aver that the giving of advice by the Review Panel is critical to the fair achievement of the proper purpose of the process, which is independent scrutiny of the position provisionally taken by the MHRA in light of evidence and submissions from the MHRA and from the person on whom the provisional determination notice has been served. It is, say the petitioners, a necessary implication from the terms of regulation 3A that the Review Panel's advice will contain proper and adequate reasons for their recommendation and that they will consider the issues raised before them in such a manner as to allow such reasons to be given. They point to the "Guidance on requesting a review of a Provisional Determination issued by the Borderline Section of the Medicines Control Agency [the predecessor of the MHRA]" (No. 6/24 of process) which states at paragraph 6.1, "The Panel's advice will be put in writing giving full reasons [. . . ]" The petitioners say that they had a legitimate expectation that that guidance would be complied with.

[33] The petitioners go on to aver that the advice leaves the informed reader in real and substantial doubt as to what the reasons for it were and what were the material considerations taken into account in reaching it. In particular, the advice does not explain why the Review Panel rejected the petitioners' arguments as to the interpretation and application of the Medical Devices Directive, the 2002 Regulations and MEDDEV. They did not give any reasons for the definition of "ancillary medical product" which they chose to adopt. They did not explain why they had taken into account claims by the manufacturer which had been superseded. They did not deal with the issue of onus, or indicate what they had taken from the evidence. They made only two findings on matters of dispute: that anaesthesia is an essential part of surgery; and that hyaluronate has a synergistic effect on the lidocaine, a finding which was contrary to the evidence.

[34] In his oral submissions at the first hearing of the petition, the solicitor advocate for the petitioners took me through many of the materials that had been before the Review Panel. He pointed out that the respondent had admitted in answer 20 on page 30 of the record that the Review Panel must provide the licensing authority with reasons for its advice. He argued that unreasoned advice was not liable to be of assistance to the licensing authority. The chairman of the Panel had to be legally qualified (No. 6/24 of process, paragraph 2.2) and it was his duty to ensure full consideration and a fair hearing, and to have regard to legal precedent and to the evidence and submissions. The licensing authority could not satisfy itself that these duties had been implemented in the absence of a statement of full reasons. When the licensing authority disagreed with the Review Panel it had a duty to give reasons (regulation 3A(5)), and it could not do so if the advice itself was not adequately reasoned. The purpose of the requirement for advice was to affect the decision-making process, and a failure to give adequate advice invalidated the ultimate decision. Reference was made to Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police v Lothian and Borders Police Board [2005] CSOH 32, 2005 SLT 315 and Somerville v Scottish Ministers [2006] CSIH 52, 2007 SLT 96.

[35] The respondent's position on averment was that the advice and reasons satisfied the requirements of regulation 3A. They were not binding on the licensing authority. The issue before the Review Panel had come to be whether the lidocaine was "liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device." The Panel had correctly approached it as a question of fact to be determined on the available evidence. It was not necessary for the Panel to rehearse the parties' submissions as to construction. The Panel had construed "ancillary" correctly. The manufacturers' intended purpose was not determinative of the issue. Their superseded and current claims were both relevant. The question of onus did not arise.

[36] At the first hearing of the petition counsel for the respondent submitted that in any given case the need to give reasons and the reasons which would be adequate were determined by the context and circumstances of the case. The reasons must enable a reader informed as to the issues to understand in broad terms why the matter had been decided as it had been. Any inadequacy of reasoning should have led to genuine and material prejudice on the part of the aggrieved party. Counsel cited J & A Kirkpatrick v Lord Advocate 1967 SC 165 at 174-176; Paterson v Secretary of State for Scotland 1971 SC 1 at 5, 9-10; London & Clydeside Properties Ltd v Aberdeen District Council 1983 SC 145 at 151-153; South Bucks District Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33, [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraphs 35, 36; and Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police, supra. Any deficiencies at the Review Panel stage might be cured by the final decision by the MHRA. The Panel were only required to provide advice. The question was, What did fairness require? The petitioners and the MHRA were a most informed audience. The decision-maker was not the Panel, but the MHRA. The petitioners had not been prejudiced by the advice of the Panel. As a result of the successful petition for judicial review of the first final determination, the MHRA had been required to reconsider the whole issue and consider all the evidence and submissions before reaching the second final determination. In any event the Panel had identified the question at issue, had adopted a correct construction of "ancillary", had identified the nature and properties of lidocaine, and had had sufficient evidence before them to entitle them to make their findings as to the importance of anaesthesia and as to the role of the lidocaine being more than ancillary.

[37] In my opinion, in order to assess the adequacy of the reasons provided by the Review Panel for its advice, it is necessary to answer the question whether their statement of their reasons caused any prejudice to the petitioners. In order to address that question it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the function of the Review Panel. That appears from regulation 3A of the 1994 Regulations and the practice of the Review Panel. The duty of the Review Panel is not to make a decision which has binding force, but to tender advice to the MHRA after considering written or oral representations made by a person on whom a provisional determination notice has been served and by the MHRA themselves, should they wish to make representations. That advice having been tendered, the MHRA, after further consideration of the matter, and in particular after having considered the advice of the Review Panel arising out of those representations and any other evidence considered by the Review Panel, determine whether or not the product is a relevant medicinal product (regulation 3A(2), (5)). While there is no statutory requirement that the Review Panel should give reasons, or that their advice should be copied to the party aggrieved by the MHRA's provisional determination, in practice reasons are given, a copy of the advice is sent to the aggrieved party with the final determination, and both the advice and the final determination are published.

[38] This is an unusual procedure. Although the Panel are described as "The Independent Review Panel" in the Guidance (No. 6/24 of process) and in the document containing their advice (No. 6/4 of process), the word "Independent" appears to have no statutory warrant. It is not perhaps a wholly appropriate description of a panel appointed by the very body whose representations it may have to weigh against those of a person aggrieved by that body's decision, and to whom the panel must report with advice as to whether that body's views are right or wrong. Counsel were not aware of any similar process elsewhere in the field of administrative law. The closest analogue that was suggested is that of a reporter in planning procedure whose report is not determinative but advisory. The analogue is only very approximate, because in planning procedure the Minister to whom the report is addressed is not acquainted with all the details of the live issues and with the evidence and submissions at the planning inquiry, and for that reason, among others, it is necessary for the reporter to compile a report which must contain appropriate findings in fact together with sufficient material to enable the Minister to reach a fully informed decision. In the procedure under regulation 3A in the present case, however, the decision-makers, the MHRA, not only had already investigated the subject and made a provisional determination but also were already fully informed as to the issues raised, the evidence led and the submissions made before the Review Panel, because the MHRA themselves had been in attendance as active, contending parties at the hearing.

[39] In that situation, what did procedural fairness require in the way of reasons from the Review Panel? It is not difficult to understand that the petitioners might have been disappointed by the brevity of the reasons given. Nor is it difficult to imagine that the petitioners might have appreciated a more elaborate document which included an acknowledgement of the importance of the case to them and the industriousness of their legal advisers in their conduct of it. But these are not the issues. The question is whether the Review Panel's reasons for their advice were such that they led to a result which was unfair to the petitioners.

[40] With some hesitation I have reached the view that that cannot be affirmed. The Review Panel's document begins by correctly identifying the question they had to consider: whether VisThesia satisfied the second limb of the earlier definition of "medicinal product" in Article 1 of Directive 2001/83/EC. They also stated, correctly, that the topical ampoules were the components under review. They next turned to the definition of "medical device" in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations and accurately directed themselves that a product could not be classified as a device if the medical component was more than merely ancillary.

[41] They then had to arrive at a definition of "ancillary", find the material facts relative to the ampoules under review, and apply the definition to these facts. They expressed the view that a medicinal product incorporated in a device was not ancillary if it had "a separate and substantial action of its own". They found in fact that lidocaine was an established medicinal substance with a local anaesthetic action. Echoing the definition of "medicinal product", they observed that its effects would modify physiological functions in human beings. They also found that anaesthesia was an essential part of surgery and that lidocaine was commonly used by surgeons at the start of a cataract operation. They took into account "all the information available, including the witness statements and evidence, the patent, the claims of the manufacturer (both original and current), other literature and the presentations made by both parties." Having done all that, they concluded that the anaesthetic element in the products was not an ancillary medical product, but had a separate and substantial action of its own: it was not liable to act on the body with action ancillary to that of the device itself. Accordingly VisThesia was not a medical device but fell within the second limb of the definition of a medicinal product.

[42] In my opinion, although that advice was briefly expressed, it was all the advice that the MHRA needed. In addition, the petitioners were able to understand it, albeit they did not agree with it. Both the MHRA and the petitioners knew what materials had been before the Panel and what submissions had been made to them. If I may anticipate conclusions which I shall express more fully later in this Opinion, it also appears to me that the advice was advice which the Panel was entitled to give. As I shall explain later, I consider that the definition of "ancillary" cannot be faulted. The findings about anaesthesia were supported by material in the statements of three of the witnesses, Mr Singh, Mr Mackintosh and Dr Nielsen. In particular, the finding that anaesthesia is an essential part of cataract surgery cannot be gainsaid. The finding that lidocaine has no effect on the action of the action of the hyaluronate was not controversial. The question whether the hyaluronate had a synergistic effect on the lidocaine was a matter of dispute, but the finding that it had such an effect was supported by material before the Panel which they were entitled to accept. Dr Nielsen said (No. 6/16 of process, appendix, paragraph 22) that the "use of a viscous meniscus on top of the eye may establish a compartment from where the anaesthetic is gradually released to where it is needed and as long as it is needed. This provides for overall less use of anaesthetic with less anaesthetic side effects put on the cornea." The Panel were entitled, in my view, to look at the patent and at both the original and the current claims of the manufacturer. There was no question of onus of proof. It must have been clear to the petitioners that the Panel had rejected their submissions on that matter and on the meaning of "ancillary", as well as their submissions that the manufacturer's earlier claims and the evidence about the patent were irrelevant. It was unnecessary for the Panel to set out their reasons for the rejection of those submissions because the informed readers of the advice, the petitioners and the MHRA, had heard the arguments for and against them at the hearing.

[43] While the Review Panel have not set out their advice and the reasons for it with the degree of elaboration that might be expected of a professional judge, that is not, in my view, what is required of them. Some indication of what is required may be gleaned from the speech of Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood in South Bucks D C at paragraphs 35 and 36, where his Lordship is attempting "some broad summary of the authorities governing the proper approach to a reasons challenge in the planning context." It must be the case that the standards required of reasons in that context cannot be higher than those required in the present context. His Lordship said at paragraph 36:

"36 The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the 'principal important controversial issues', disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inferences will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in the dispute, not to every material consideration. [. . . ] Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision."

[44] I shall now assume that, contrary to my opinion, the advice of the Panel was not adequately reasoned, and I shall consider whether the petitioners have genuinely been substantially prejudiced thereby. The short answer is that the petitioners do not make sufficient averments on that matter. They say, first, that the MHRA should have arranged for the matter to be reheard by a differently constituted Review Panel, and that in proceeding without having adequately reasoned advice the MHRA has caused the UK Licensing Authority to act ultra vires. In any event, by so proceeding, "the MHRA has caused the process to be conducted in a manner which is unfair to the petitioner, contrary to its own Guidance and in violation of the petitioner's legitimate expectation that such Guidance would be complied with. The outcome of the process under regulation 3A could have been different had the Review Panel considered the issues and provided advice in an appropriate way." In argument, the petitioners' solicitor advocate submitted that a failure to give adequate advice in terms of reasons invalidated the ultimate decision made, and reference was made to Somerville v Scottish Ministers and to Chief Constable, Lothian and Borders Police. In reliance on Lord Reed's dicta at paragraph 64 of his opinion in the latter case relative to a statutory duty to give reasons, it was argued that this was a situation in which adequate reasons had to be provided at the required time, and in which a failure in compliance could not subsequently be "cured"; and that where the purpose of the duty to give reasons was to influence the decision-making process, it might be that that duty could not be fulfilled after a failure in compliance had occurred, since the failure might so taint the legitimacy of the decision-making process that the decision should be re-taken.

[45] These averments and submissions appear to assume that the MHRA reached their second final determination simply by adopting the advice of the Review Panel, and that they thus neglected the statutory duty imposed upon them by regulation 3A(5)(b) to undertake further consideration of the matter. The petitioners do not, however, make any explicit averment to that effect. On the contrary, it seems clear from the terms of the second final determination that the MHRA examined the whole matter afresh and reached their determination on the basis of much more elaborate reasoning than that contained in the Review Panel's advice. It is not remarkable that they should have done so, because their first final determination had been reduced on the ground that it had been "unsupported by proper reasons". In any event the reasons provided in support of the second final determination, which I shall examine later, are so comprehensive and articulate that it is not possible to affirm that any assumed inadequacy in the Review Panel's reasoning tainted the legitimacy of the decision-making process. It is obvious that the MHRA were not content merely to rely on the reasons provided by the Review Panel, but pursued their own reasoning in order to arrive at the second final determination. As Lord Reed observes at paragraph 42 of his opinion,

"the consequences of a failure to comply with a statutory duty to give reasons depend, like those of other failures to comply with procedural requirements imposed by statute, upon the terms of the relevant provision and upon the context."

In the present case it is accepted that the Review Panel had an obligation, albeit not a statutory duty, to give reasons. On the assumption that they failed to do so, the consequences were not, in my view, prejudicial to the petitioners. The MHRA were fully aware of the petitioners' evidence and arguments, and took them into account in reaching their own view as to what their second final determination should be. Viewed in that context, the presumed inadequacy of the Panel's reasons cannot be said to have vitiated the determination. To say that the outcome could have been different if the Panel had acted otherwise must be no more than speculation.

[46] I do not consider that the concept of legitimate expectation is of assistance to the petitioners. They aver that they had a legitimate expectation that the Review Panel would give "full reasons", as stated in paragraph 6.1 of the Guidance (No. 6/24 of process). What will be sufficient reasons is, however, a matter of circumstance (Somerville, paragraph 152). Further, the petitioners would have to show that they had relied on that representation in the Guidance to their detriment (Shetland Islands Council, Petitioner  [2007] CSOH 05 at paragraphs 156, 157). I have already expressed the view that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate any prejudice or detriment by reason of the assumed inadequacy of the Panel's reasons.

[47] I shall accordingly repel the petitioners' first plea-in-law.

 

Second ground for review: the second final determination

[48] The petitioners' second plea-in-law states:

"2. The respondent having acted ultra vires in deciding to make said final determination, decree of declarator and reduction should be pronounced as craved."

The petitioners, having stated on averment their criticisms of the reasoning of the Review Panel go on to say, "Alternatively, in any event," if the second final determination does not fall to be reduced on that basis, "it should be reduced as it was based upon material errors of law going to the root of the questions for determination and is accordingly ultra vires." It is said, first, that the MHRA made material errors of law. Secondly, they took into account irrelevant considerations. Thirdly, they failed to take account of relevant and material considerations which ought to have been taken into account. I shall consider each of these criticisms in turn.

 

The definition of "medical device"

[49] The first matter on which the petitioners found as a material error of law on the part of the MHRA is their interpretation of the definition of "medical device" in the 2002 Regulations. It will be convenient to repeat the material terms of the definitions of "medical device" and "intended purpose" in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations and to highlight the words and phrases discussed in argument:

"'medical device' means an [. . . ] article [. . . ] which -

(a) is intended by the manufacturer to be used for human beings for the purpose of -

(i) diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease,

(ii) diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or handicap;

(iii) investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process, or

(iv) control of conception; and

(b) does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, even if it is assisted in its function by such means,

and includes devices intended to administer a medicinal product or which incorporate as an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product and which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device."

Regulation 2(1) also provides the following definition of "intended purpose", read short:

"'intended purpose' means -

[. . . ]

(b) in relation to any other medical device [that is, one other than 'an active implantable medical device] the use to which the device is intended according to the data supplied by the manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional materials."

[50] It will also be useful to quote from MEDDEV, the guidance document produced by the European Commission (No. 6/2 of process) which has already been mentioned above. In the discussion of general principles in Section A, the document observes (on page 2) that as a general rule a relevant product is regulated either by the Medical Devices Directive ("MDD") or by the Medicinal Products Directive ("MPD"). It then advises (on page 3):

"In order to decide which regime applies, the following criteria should be examined:

Step 1 The intended purpose of the product taking into account the way the product is presented (this is likely to establish if either the MDD or the MPD apply, rather than distinguish between the two regimes),

Step 2 The method by which the principal intended action is achieved.

The latter criterion, based on the 'principal intended action' is crucial in the definition of a medical device. Typically the medical device function is fulfilled by physical means (including mechanical action, physical barrier, replacement of or support to organs or body functions, . . .). The action of a medicinal product is generally achieved by pharmacological, immunological means or by metabolism.

The principal intended action of a product may be deduced from:

-                     the manufacturer's labelling and claims,

-                     scientific data regarding mechanism of action.

Although the manufacturer's claims are important, it is not possible to place the product in one or other category in contradiction with current scientific data. Manufactures may be required to justify scientifically their rationale for classification of borderline products."

[51] Section A.5 deals with "Medical devices incorporating a medicinal substance with ancillary action", and states:

"It follows from the definition of a medical device that devices may incorporate substances as an integral part which, if used separately, may be considered to be a medicinal product. This is specifically addressed in article 1(4) MDD which makes it clear that such products are devices, provided that the action of the medicinal substance is ancillary to that of the device, as reflected in the product claim and as supported by the scientific data provided by the manufacturer of the devices."

The underlining is in the original.

[52] In the second final determination the MHRA interpreted regulation 2(1) in this way:

"In making this determination it is necessary to consider the meaning of 'intended purpose', 'principal intended action' and 'ancillary'. The definition in Directive 93/42/EC ('the Directive') and the Medical Devices Regulations [the 2002 Regulations] is supplemented by Guidance issued by the European Commission: the Medical Devices Guidance Document, or MEDDEV. The Guidance is authoritative but not legally binding. The MHRA accepts the relevance of these matters, although it notes that they are not exhaustive of the material which may be considered; nor are they set out in either the Directive or the Medical Devices Regulations.

Under the Directive:

Intended purpose relates to the question of whether the product has, overall one of the four purposes set out in categories I to IV [(i) to (iv)] above. This is determined by having regard to the data supplied by the manufacturer in the labelling, instructions for use and promotional materials. Insofar as the Guidance makes reference to manufacturers' claims, where the product remains unchanged, this is not limited to current claims. The issue of manufacturer's intent is determinative only at the initial stage of deciding whether a product has, overall, one of the four purposes which would suffice to make it a device (e.g. the purpose of investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological process).

The principal intended action of the product is to be determined objectively. Although the Guidance (p3) states that the principal intended action may be deduced from manufacturer's claims and scientific data, it notes that it is not possible to categorise a produce in contradiction with current scientific data and that manufacturers may be required to justify scientifically their classification rationale. The question of whether or not such action is achieved by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means can only be addressed by scientific evidence.

Taking into account the examples given in the Guidance, MHRA is of the view that:

Ancillary action, in relation to the principal intended action, is an action which is insignificant or of little importance; or an action which is subsidiary or auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended action.

Because the definition of medical device includes devices incorporating a medicinal product 'which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device' it does not include devices incorporating medicinal products whose action is more than 'ancillary'. Such devices do not come within the scope of the Medical Devices Regulations and are to be regulated as medicines. The question of whether a medicinal component of a device has an ancillary action is to be determined according to whether it is 'liable' to have ancillary action, not whether it is intended by the manufacturer to have an ancillary action. If an action is more than ancillary, this does not necessarily mean that it must be a principal intended action.

The Guidance states that the issue of whether the action of a medicinal component is ancillary is to be decided in the light of 'the product claim' and 'the scientific data provided by the manufacturer of the devices' (para A.5). It is important to note that manufacturers' claims cannot prevail over scientific data (para A.2)."

[53] On averment the petitioners claim that the MHRA erred in taking the view that the question whether a medicinal component of a device has an ancillary action was to be determined according to whether it was liable to have an ancillary action, not according to whether it was intended by the manufacturer to have an ancillary action. That question, say the petitioners, should be determined by the manufacturer's principal intended purpose [sic], viewed objectively from the product claims of the manufacturer, provided that that is not inconsistent with the scientific data. The MHRA had failed to ask themselves the right question, which was whether VisThesia Topical achieved its principal intended purpose by the action of the device or by the action of the medicinal substance. Further, the correct meaning of "ancillary" in this context was "subordinate". The MHRA's interpretation was not consistent with the Guidance provided by MEDDEV.

[54] In argument the petitioners' solicitor advocate noted that it was agreed that the intended purpose of VisThesia Topical fell within the terms of regulation 2(1)(a)(iii), "investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process". The reference to "principal intended action" in regulation 2(1)(b) indicated that a product classed as a device could have more than one intended action. The words from "and includes" to the end were there for the avoidance of doubt, to make it clear that a device which incorporated an integral medicinal substance fell within the definition of "medical device" provided it met the test of "principal intended action", and these words should not have to meet a more stringent test than the preceding general words. "Ancillary" should be interpreted as meaning "subordinate", which was one of the primary meanings assigned to it by The Oxford English Dictionary. The equivalent word in the French text of the Directive was "accessoire". The MHRA had erred by leaving the intention of the manufacturer out of account. That was inconsistent with the MEDDEV Guidance. A medical device might not achieve its principal intended action by pharmacological means or one of the other means excluded by regulation 2(1)(b), but it might be assisted in its function by such means. The test was whether the principal intended action was achieved by the device means or the pharmacological means; and that test was to be applied with reference to the manufacturer's labelling and claims and the scientific data regarding mechanism of action, in accordance with the MEDDEV Guidance. It was necessary to undertake a comparative analysis between two different actions in the context of the overall intended purpose of the product. An outcome might be that the two actions were of equal significance, but the assessment was still one of relative significance. The MEDDEV Guidance should be consistently applied, in conformity with the fundamental principle of consistency in administrative decision-making: R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Urmaz  [1996] COD 479. The MHRA's errors in interpretation had led them not to address the matter in the proper way by ascertaining the principal intended action having regard to the product claims and the scientific data.

[55] The respondent's approach to the issue of construction in her pleadings was as follows. In determining whether a product was a "medical device" it was necessary to consider, first, its "intended purpose" and whether it was for any of the purposes in regulation 2(1)(a). Its intended purpose was to be determined, as required by regulation 2(1)(a), by reference to "the data supplied by the manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional materials." The intended purpose was to be identified subjectively, by reference to the manufacturer's intentions as to purpose. Secondly, it was necessary to consider regulation 2(1)(b) and determine the "principal intended action" of the product in or on the human body and whether that was achieved by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means. That was to be assessed objectively, having regard to the manufacturer's representations and to scientific data as to how the device did in fact act on the human body. The manufacturer's claims could not prevail over the scientific evidence. The question whether a substance was "liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device" necessitated a determination of what the action of the device was and how the substance was liable to act upon the body. No provision was made here for the intention of the manufacturer: the latter was a question of fact to be determined by scientific evidence, and the manufacturer's intention could have no relevance. "Ancillary" in this context meant "insignificant" or "of little importance" or an action which was "subsidiary" or "auxiliary" to the principal intended action. That approach conformed with MEDDEV.

[56] The submissions of the respondent's counsel elaborated on these averments. It was necessary, first, to consider what was the intended purpose of the product, on the basis of the manufacturer's materials, in order to see whether it was one of the four purposes listed in regulation 2(1)(a). It was then necessary to identify the principal intended action of the product by considering the scientific question, capable of objective determination, of how it acted in or on the human body, and also what the manufacturer intended its principal action to be. If the product achieved its principal intended action by pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, it would not be a medical device; but if its principal intended action was assisted by such means, it might still qualify as a medical device. If it was intended to administer a medicinal product or if it incorporated as an integral part a substance which, if used separately, would be a medicinal product, it was necessary to consider whether that product or substance "was liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device." Here, there was no role for the intention of the manufacturer: one was looking simply at how the product or substance was liable, that is, apt, to act on the human body.

[57] Counsel referred to various dictionary and judicial definitions of "ancillary" and "accessoire" including those in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Sarsfield v Dixons Group plc [1998] STC 938 at paragraph 16, Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions European Court of Justice, 23 March 2004, at paragraph 26, and Skalka v Sozialversicherunganstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft European Court of Justice, 29 April 2004, at paragraph 10. These definitions pointed to a spectrum of meanings. An ancillary effect could be one which was insignificant or of little importance, or materially inferior in importance, in particular as compared to other components of the product. Or it could be one which was not separate and independent but which had a causal link to another more important effect, serving as a means to an end. Or "ancillary" could mean "lesser". In the context of the Directive and the Guidance, it connoted "being of relatively less importance". What was ancillary then came to be a matter of judgment. Reference was made to R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23 at 29A-E.

[58] Thus, said counsel, where the action of the medicinal product was more than of relatively little importance, or more than insignificant or minor, with or without a causal connection, as compared to the physical or mechanical action, in the context of the overall function of the article in relation to the purpose in regulation 2(1)(a), the article would not be a medical device. Determining whether the medicinal product was ancillary in that sense was a matter of fact, involving a judgment properly exercised on consideration of the relevant evidence. That had consequences for any challenge made to a finding as to what was "ancillary": Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14; R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p South Yorkshire Transport Ltd, supra, at 32F-33A.

[59] In my opinion it is clear that in order to make their determination it was necessary for the MHRA to interpret the definition of "medical device" in regulation 2(1) of the 2002 Regulations and, in particular, to reach a view as to the meanings of the expressions "intended purpose", "principal intended action" and "ancillary".

[60] As to "intended purpose", the intended purpose of the product under consideration is defined by regulation 2(1) as "the use to which the device is intended according to the data supplied by the manufacturer on the labelling, the instructions for use and/or the promotional materials." The question here, accordingly, is whether those data indicate that the product is to be used for one of the four purposes listed from (i) to (iv) in part (a) of the definition of "medical device". It is common ground that VisThesia Topical is intended to be used for a purpose falling within (iii): "investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or a physiological process". This means of arriving at the intended purpose of the product is consistent with the MEDDEV Guidelines in section A.2, already quoted, which advises that in order to decide whether the MDD or the MPD regime applies, two criteria should be examined, the first of which is "The intended purpose of the product taking into account the way the product is presented." At this stage, accordingly, a subjective test is to be applied: the product's "intended purpose" is to be identified only by reference to the manufacturer's intentions as these may be discerned from the way he presents it and the data he supplies. Here, therefore, the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive of the issue of what is the intended purpose of the product. As will shortly appear, I am of opinion that it is only at this stage of the construction of the definition of "medical device" that the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive. I therefore consider that the MHRA's interpretation of "intended purpose" was correct: they said,

"The issue of manufacturer's intent is determinative only at the initial stage of deciding whether a product has, overall, one of the four purposes which would suffice to make it a device."

I shall deal later with their observation that in so far as the Guidance makes reference to manufacturers' claims, "where the product remains unchanged, this is not limited to current claims."

[61] The MHRA next had to consider what is meant by the "principal intended action" of the product in or on the human body. The second criterion provided by the MEDDEV Guidance is "the method by which the principal intended action is achieved." It may be convenient to repeat what the Guidance then goes on to say:

"The latter criterion, based on the 'principal intended action' is crucial in the definition of a medical device. Typically the medical device function is fulfilled by physical means (including mechanical action, physical barrier, replacement of or support to organs or body functions, . . .). The action of a medicinal product is generally achieved by pharmacological, immunological means or by metabolism.

The principal intended action of a product may be deduced from:

-                     the manufacturer's labelling and claims,

-                     scientific data regarding mechanism of action.

Although the manufacturer's claims are important, it is not possible to place the product in one or other category in contradiction with current scientific data. Manufactures may be required to justify scientifically their rationale for classification of borderline products."

[62] In my opinion that passage from the Guidance makes it very clear that the manufacturer's claims are not determinative of the identification of the principal intended action of the product. It is obvious that his labelling and claims must be considered and must be regarded as important. But if they contradict current scientific data, it is the data which determine the issue. That must be so, because otherwise the manufacturer would be the arbiter of the category into which his product was to be placed, even if his categorisation flew in the face of the scientific data. The scientific data must be conclusive, because one of the objectives of the regime provided by the Directives is the protection of public health. The Medical Devices Directive  states, among other things:

"Whereas medical devices should provide patients, users and third parties with a high level of protection and attain the performance levels attributed to them by the manufacturer; whereas, therefore, the maintenance or improvement of the level of protection attained in the Member States is one of the essential objectives of this Directive; [. . . ]"

Similarly, Recital 2 to the Medicinal Products Directive states:

"The essential aim of any rules governing the production, distribution and use of medicinal products must be to safeguard public health."

Accordingly the manufacturer's claims are not simply to be accepted, but are to be tested, and cannot prevail against scientific data. I am therefore of opinion that the MHRA's understanding of the expression "principal intended action" in the paragraph of the determination beginning "The principal intended action" is entirely correct.

[63] Next, the MHRA had to consider the words "which is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device." The MEDDEV Guidance in section A.5, already quoted, refers to article 1.4 of the Medical Devices Directive which, according to the Guidance, "makes it clear" that articles which incorporate as an integral part substances which, if used separately, may be considered to be a medicinal product "are devices, provided that the action of the medicinal substance is ancillary to that of the device, as reflected in the product claim and as supported by the scientific data provided by the manufacturer of the devices." With all respect to the authors of the Guidance, I must observe that I find that a rather curious statement. The words "as reflected in the product claim and as supported by the scientific data provided by the manufacturer of the devices" do not appear, and are nowhere implied, in article 1.4. Nor can any similar words be said to appear or to be implied in the 2002 Regulations. Further, they seem to mean that the question whether the action of the medicinal substance is ancillary to that of the device is to be determined only by reference to the claims made and the scientific data provided by the manufacturer. That, however, would be inconsistent with the stance of the Guidance in relation to the determination of the principal intended action of the product under consideration, where it is made clear that the manufacturer's claims cannot determine into which category the product is to be placed. It does not seem possible to accept that at the stage of deciding whether a substance is liable to act upon the body with action ancillary to that of the device the MHRA should be obliged to defer to the manufacturer's claims and to scientific data selected and presented by him. That would be an irrational way of arriving at a conclusion on the matter. How a substance is liable to act upon the body must be a question of fact, to be determined by such scientific evidence as the MHRA may reasonably decide to accept after appropriate critical scrutiny. It is important to notice that the MEDDEV document describes itself, correctly, as "legally not binding" and having "no legal force". The MHRA at page 2 of their determination describe it as "authoritative but not legally binding", which to a lawyer may appear to be an oxymoron. The true position may be that the Guidance carries weight in so far as it deals with matters within the expertise of its authors, but nothing in its contents is binding on a tribunal or a court of law. However valuable and persuasive it may be in relation to medical matters, it would surely be incorrect for a court or tribunal to follow the Guidance where it bore to supplement the terms of a Directive by adding words which did not there appear and could not be implied, especially where it thereby seemed to recommend an irrational means of deciding an issue of importance.

[64] It follows that in my opinion the MHRA were correct in saying in their determination that the question whether a medicinal component of a device has an ancillary action "is to be determined according to whether it is 'liable' to have an ancillary action, not whether it is intended by the manufacturer to have an ancillary action." Their approach to the MEDDEV Guidelines was, in my opinion, sound: they noted what was said in paragraph A.5, but added, correctly, "It is important to note that manufacturers' claims cannot prevail over scientific data (para A.2)."

[65] The next issue is the MHRA's interpretation of the word "ancillary" in its context in regulation 2(1). The MHRA said in their determination:

"Taking into account the examples given in the Guidance, MHRA is of the view that:

Ancillary action, in relation to the principal intended action, is an action which is insignificant or of little importance; or an action which is subsidiary or auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended action."

The petitioners argued that ancillary meant "subordinate", while the respondent argued that it meant "insignificant" or "of little importance", or an action which was "subsidiary" or "auxiliary" to the principal intended action.

[66] The word "ancillary" is not defined in the Directive or in the Regulations. It is clear from the definitions cited in argument that it encompasses a range of meanings. It may suffice to refer to The Oxford English Dictionary. It provides three meanings of the adjective "ancillary". Ignoring the "rare and affected" second meaning, these are: "1.  Subservient, subordinate, ministering (to). 3.  Designating activities and services that provide essential support to the functioning of a central service or industry; also, of staff employed in these supporting roles. Now used esp. of non-medical staff and services in hospitals." Those meanings appear to fall into two groups. In the first, "ancillary" means subordinate, or of inferior importance. Thus in Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions European Court of Justice, 23 March 2004, at paragraph 26, the Court referred to "activities on such a small scale as to be regarded as purely marginal and ancillary." Here, all that is meant by "ancillary" is that that which is ancillary is of lesser importance than the object with which it is said to be related. In the second group, "ancillary" means that that which is ancillary is linked to the other object because it is of use to it (or is subservient to it) or provides it with something (or ministers to it) or furthers its purposes by providing it with essential support. Here, the ancillary matter is auxiliary to the other object: there is a causal link between the existence of the ancillary matter and the purpose of, or the effect produced by, the other object. Thus, in Sarsfield v Dixons Group plc [1998] STC 938 at paragraph 18 a warehouse was said to be used for a purpose ancillary to the purposes of retail shops because its use served no other purpose than furthering the purposes of those retail shops. And in Skalka v Sozialversicherunganstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft European Court of Justice, 29 April 2004, at paragraph 10, a compensatory supplement to a retirement pension which could only be paid to a person receiving a pension under the statutory pension insurance scheme was "a benefit ancillary to that pension": it furthered the beneficial purpose of the latter pension.

[67] In R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex p South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23 at 29C-D Lord Mustill said:

"The courts have repeatedly warned against the dangers of taking an inherently imprecise word, and by redefining it thrusting on it a spurious degree of precision."

In the present case, suffice it to say that in my opinion the MHRA directed themselves correctly as to the meanings of "ancillary". They took account of both groups of meanings when they said that "ancillary" action, in relation to the principal intended action, "is an action which is insignificant or of little importance [the first group]; or an action which is subsidiary or auxiliary, or which supplements or provides support, to the principal intended action [the second group]." If the analysis of the meanings of "ancillary" which has been attempted above is correct, the MHRA's interpretation of it cannot be held to be an error in law.

[68] The MHRA went on to apply these meanings of "ancillary" to the facts before them. They noted, correctly, that the product would fall outside the definition of "medical device" if the action of the anaesthetic component was more than ancillary. They continued:

"It is therefore for the Agency to determine whether the action of the lidocaine in the topical component is ancillary to the purpose of the topical component as a whole. Whether or not such action is ancillary is a question of fact."

That appears to me to be unassailable. They went on to express the following view:

"In the present case, MHRA is of the view that the lidocaine component is liable to have an effect on the body which is more than ancillary because:

1) The evidence suggests that the anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical is of greater, or at least equal, importance relative to the wetting function served by the sodium hyaluronate.

2) Even if that is not the case, it is the Agency's view that the anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical is at least a significant, independent function of the product and cannot properly be regarded as ancillary."

Accordingly, the product did not satisfy either group of definitions of "ancillary". First, its anaesthetic action was not insignificant or of little importance: thus, it did not satisfy the first group. Secondly, it was not auxiliary to the wetting function of the solution because the anaesthetic function was independent of the wetting function and did not serve to make the wetting function more effective: thus, it did not satisfy the second group.

[69] Whether in reaching these conclusions the MHRA took into account irrelevant considerations or left out of account relevant considerations are separate issues for consideration later. Here, I find that they did not misdirect themselves in law in their interpretation of the definition of "medical device" in the 2002 Regulations.

 

Relevant material

[70] The petitioners' next point under the heading of "material errors of law" is that the MHRA did not accept their submissions with regard to the material which was relevant. The petitioners had submitted that on a proper construction of the legislation and the Guidance it was only the current claims of the manufacturer which were relevant, as a matter of law, to "the ascertainment of principal intended purpose [sic]". The petitioners aver that, contrary to that submission, the MHRA had regard to and founded upon a US patent, the petitioners' Information for Use (IFU) leaflet dated April 2002, a document referred to as "the CIBA Vision press release" and the changes to the IFU leaflet.

[71] I note that the petitioners in their pleadings (in statement 23(a) at the top of page 35 of the record) and in their submissions used the expression "principal intended purpose" to which I have drawn attention above. That expression appears in the MEDDEV Guidance, paragraph A.2, together with the expressions "principal purpose" (paragraph A.2) and "primary intended purpose" (paragraph A.4). None of those expressions, however, is employed in the Directive or in the Regulations, and I regret that I have found them confusing and unhelpful. Accordingly I entertain a doubt as to whether the petitioners' submissions relative to "principal intended purpose" are soundly focused. I shall, however, examine their proposition on the assumption that they contend that only the manufacturer's current claims are relevant, as a matter of law, to the ascertainment of the "intended purpose" and the "principal intended action" of the product under consideration. I have already expressed the view that it is only at the stage of the ascertainment of its "intended purpose" that the manufacturer's intentions are conclusive; and that in the ascertainment of its "principal intended action" the manufacturer's claims are to be considered but cannot prevail over the scientific data. I would add that the manufacturer's claims and the scientific data cannot be, in my view, the only materials the licensing authority is entitled to consider. The MEDDEV Guidance cannot reasonably be interpreted as exhaustive and as fettering the discretion of the licensing authority to examine any material which may be relevant to their determination of a matter concerning the vitally important object of the protection of public health.

[72] I now consider each of the matters referred to by the petitioners.

[73] United States Patent No. US 6,627,620 B1 ("the US patent", No. 6/17 of process, appendix 8), dated 30 September 2003, relates to a "composition set and kit for use in intraocular surgery". The inventor is Dr Per Julius Neilsen. The abstract is in these terms:

"A new composition set and a kit for use by intraocular operations, preferably cataract operations. The composition set comprises a first and a second viscoelastic agent, e.g. [read 'i.e.'] sodium hyaluronate, containing an anaesthetic, e.g. [read 'i.e.'] lidocaine hydrochloride. Hereby a simplified operation and anaesthesia is achieved while at the same time the risk of complications and discomfort on the patient are reduced."

The petitioners aver that they "materially developed" VisThesia "specifically as a device from an original concept of Dr Per Julius Nielsen" (statement 7). In a statement provided to the Review Panel (No. 6/16 of process) Dr Nielsen said, "VisThesia is effectively my invention." There is no indication that there has been any material change to the product since the publication of the US patent.

[74] In their final determination the MHRA noted, correctly, that the US patent was "focused mainly on claims for its anaesthetic properties." They quoted various passages from the patent and concluded, "This indicates that anaesthesia is either the principal intended action or one of two principal intended actions."

[75] The petitioners submitted that the patent was irrelevant because it was neither evidence of the claims of the manufacturer nor scientific data. I have already considered and rejected that submission. While the MEDDEV Guidance refers to the manufacturer's claims and to scientific data, the Guidance cannot properly be invoked to prevent a licensing authority from considering any other evidence which is likely to be of assistance. It seems clear that the licensing authority are entitled to consider that the contents of the patent of the product under consideration are likely to be of significance: they can scarcely be ignored on the ground that they are irrelevant. The fact that the inventor was not the agent of the petitioners is immaterial.

[76] The petitioners further submitted that in any event the MHRA had unreasonably misconstrued the patent. The passages quoted in their determination referred not to VisThesia Topical but to VisThesia Intracameral. This criticism appears to be sound. The passage in the determination which deals with the US patent must accordingly be left out of account.

[77] The next matter which the petitioners say the MHRA should not have considered is the Information for Use (IFU) leaflet dated April 2002 (No.6/17 of process, appendix 3). The petitioners contend that it was only their current claims for the product which were relevant, as a matter of law, to the ascertainment of "principal intended purpose". I shall again assume that what is meant is "principal intended action". I have already indicated my view that the MHRA were entitled to consider materials other than the manufacturer's claims and scientific data.

[78] The IFU leaflet dated April 2002 may fairly be said to give as much prominence to the anaesthetic function of VisThesia Topical as it does to its hydrating and lubricating function. Later, however, the leaflet was significantly amended, although the product remained the same. The April 2002 leaflet contained the following words, which did not appear in a later leaflet dated July 2003:

"The anaesthetic ingredient of both VisThesia topical and VisThesia intracameral is lidocaine which stabilises the neuronal membrane and prevents the initiation and conduction of nerve impulses thereby effecting local anaesthetic action."

The April 2002 IFU leaflet also contained the following passage. The words omitted from the July 2003 leaflet are printed in italics:

"VisThesia topical hydrates and lubricates the surface of the eye in preparation for intraocular surgery, with analgesia.

Application 5 minutes before intraocular surgery enables hydration of the surface tissue and diffusion of the analgesic through the viscous solution to be absorbed directly into the cornea.

A second application immediately before surgery supplements the initial application to provide hydration, lubrication and analgesia of the cornea for the early stages of the surgical procedure.

The viscous solution brings the anaesthetic into intimate contact with the corneal epithelium through which it is absorbed. Anaesthesia occurs rapidly usually within 5 minutes. The duration of effect is normally 20 to 30 minutes."

The July 2003 leaflet contains the following words, which do not appear in the April 2002 leaflet:

"[Application before intraocular surgery] ensures that the cornea stays clear and hydrated throughout the surgery and is not compromised. The lubricating properties ensure that a clean small incision can be made with minimal damage.

A second, supplementary, application is used only if needed.

Lidocaine is incorporated in the topical viscoelastic as an ancillary anaesthetic agent. It should be included in the ophthalmic surgeon's routine anaesthetic regimen."

[79] The deletion of the references to analgesia and anaesthesia, and the assertion that the lidocaine was only an ancillary anaesthetic agent are, prima facie at least, rather strange, because the product had not been altered in any respect. The MHRA commented in their determination, under the heading "Manufacturer's information":

"There was [in the April 2002 leaflet] no suggestion in the dosage regime that additional anaesthesia from another product would be needed during the procedure, implying that the manufacturer's intention was that the product provided all of the anaesthesia necessary during surgery."

Under the heading "Changes to the Information for Use leaflet" they said:

"During our investigation, the Information for Use leaflet was significantly amended in 07/2003 in order to place less emphasis on the role of the anaesthetic claims relating to lidocaine. However, the product formulation has not altered in any way and the action of the lidocaine in the topical ampoules remains to provide anaesthesia for cataract surgery. The change in the manufacturer's claim does not reflect any change in the scientific evidence of the anaesthetic effect of lidocaine at the concentration contained in the product or as to how the product is used."

[80] The petitioners submitted that the original IFU was ambiguous, but it did not indicate that the later IFU was false. The original IFU did not clearly assert that the product provided all of the anaesthesia necessary during surgery, and in particular it did not assert that it supplied all the topical anaesthesia which might be regarded as necessary. To claim otherwise had no evidential basis and in any event was unreasonable. The respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the contents of the earlier leaflet and the changes made were relevant to both "intended purpose" and "principal intended action". I agree with the submission for the respondent. Since the emphasis on the product's anaesthetic function in the IFU had changed but the product itself had not changed, the MHRA were entitled to consider the statements in the original IFU. It appears to me that the MHRA were entitled to read the original IFU as they did, to make the comments they did, and to take these comments into account when reaching their determination.

[81] As to the fact that changes were made to the IFU leaflet, the petitioners said that the MHRA had failed to address the critical question whether the later IFU was inconsistent with the actual mode of action as demonstrated by the scientific data. The petitioners argued that at best for the MHRA, the changes in the IFU simply raised a question about the current claims, but the MHRA had failed to go on to deal with that matter. I do not consider that that is a fair reading of the MHRA's comments. It seems to me to be obvious that the MHRA called in question the accuracy of the later version of the leaflet and took the view that the leaflet had been altered to play down the role of the lidocaine. They expressly stated that the amendment had been made in order to place less emphasis on the role of the anaesthetic claims relating to lidocaine, and that the change in the claim did not reflect any change in the scientific evidence about the lidocaine. In my opinion they were well entitled to express those views.

[82] The petitioners similarly argued that the MHRA had not been entitled to have regard to and found upon a press release which was referred to as "the CIBA Vision press release". This document is dated 9 May 2002 and is within No. 6/17 of process. Like the original IFU leaflet, it emphasises both the anaesthetic function and the wetting function of the product, and does not suggest that the former is ancillary to the latter. It includes the following statements:

"CIBA Vision will begin offering an entirely new produce for cataract surgery called VisThesia - a combination [of] viscoelastic and aesthetic to be used for the new procedure of 'viscoanesthesia'. By combining viscoelastic and anaesthesia, VisThesia may help surgeons shorten the time needed for cataract surgery and help increase patient comfort.

VisThesia is packaged with both topical and intracameral components with separate percentages of sodium hyaluronate and lidocaine hydrochloride. Surgeons have the advantage of no longer needing to choose between a topical or an intracameral anaesthetic. In addition, they can save time by eliminating separate injections of viscoelastic and anaesthetic. Procedures previously requiring two injections now require only one.

Patients also benefit from these same advantages. VisThesia is designed to help patients by reducing time in surgery and by avoiding separate injections of anaesthetic and viscoelastic."

[83] In their determination the MHRA quoted from the first paragraph. The petitioners said that what was stated in the press release applied both to VisThesia Intracameral and to VisThesia Topical. The material point, however, is that the press release refers to both components, states that each contains lidocaine, and lays stress on the claim that the product is a combination of viscoelastic and anaesthetic: there is no indication that the anaesthetic plays an ancillary role in either component. Those representations, like those in the original IFU leaflet, were matters which in my view the MHRA were entitled to take into account when determining the "intended purpose" and "principal intended action" of the product.


Onus

[84] The final matter raised by the petitioners under the heading of "material errors of law" is that there was an onus on the MHRA "to demonstrate that a CE marked product like VisThesia assessed under the Medical Devices Directive is not a medical device and that doubt, if any, should be resolved in favour of the petitioner[s]." The petitioners complain that in their determination the MHRA apparently did not accept their submissions with regard to onus. No authority was cited in support of these submissions, and I am unable to see how any question of onus could have arisen. Reference was made at the first hearing to the views of the French, German and Dutch licensing authorities on the categorisation of VisThesia. The MHRA say in their pleadings that these views were a relevant consideration for them in arriving at a final determination, but they were not binding upon the MHRA as the competent authority within the United Kingdom.

[85] I have already noted above that Optident Ltd v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] UKHL 32, [2001] 3 CMLR 1, makes it clear that it is not the law that if a CE mark is obtained in one Member State it must be respected in another Member State unless it can be set aside. It was said in argument that the MHRA had not referred in its determination to the views of these other authorities. There was no exploration before me, however, of the materials these authorities had considered, or of the reasoning which led them to their various views, in order to demonstrate the extent to which their views might have carried weight. Accordingly I do not consider further the alleged lack of consideration of the views of the other authorities.

 


Irrelevant considerations

[86] The petitioners aver in statement 24 of the petition that in any event the decision of the MHRA is ultra vires because the MHRA have taken into account irrelevant considerations. I have already dealt above with the matters raised in statement 24: the first IFU leaflet and the changes to it, the CIBA Vision press release and the US patent.

 

Relevant considerations

[87] The petitioners go on to aver in statement 25 that in any event the decision of the MHRA is ultra vires because the MHRA failed to take account of relevant and material considerations which they ought to have taken into account. First, it is said that the MHRA apparently failed to take into account the MEDDEV Guidance and "the unchallenged position of the petitioner[s] that the current information for use leaflet and the marketing material is consistent with classification as a device." I have already stated my views on the Guidance and on the extent to which the manufacturer's claims are determinative.

[88] It is said, next, that the MHRA excluded relevant material from consideration by deciding that other publications submitted by the petitioners on the role of hyaluronate related to dry eye syndrome, not cataract surgery, and were not relevant. There is a sentence to that effect at the foot of page 4 of the determination. It is possible that the MHRA took too strict a view in so far as the publications were intended to demonstrate the value of sodium hyaluronate, but that is immaterial as the MHRA accepted that sodium hyaluronate had the properties claimed for it (No. 6/17 of process, appendix D, page 22). Counsel for the respondent confirmed at the first hearing that the importance of the hydrating and lubricating action of sodium hyaluronate was not in dispute.

[89] The petitioners also say that the MHRA did not deal correctly with expert evidence on the subject of the precise function of the topical sodium hyaluronate. That, say the petitioners, was a topic on which the expert witnesses disagreed, and the determination "without explanation" preferred the evidence of Dr Singh and left out of account the evidence of Dr Nielsen. In the determination the matter is dealt with in this way:

"The experts disagreed over the function of the topical sodium hyaluronate. Mr Singh noted that it had an important role as a wetting agent, but was not needed for lubrication because the eye does not blink during surgery. Mr Mackintosh described its function both in terms of wetting and lubrication. Whether or not sodium hyaluronate is a more novel or interesting compound than lidocaine, as suggested by Mr Mackintosh, is not relevant to this determination. The legal test is whether the action is ancillary. Mr Mackintosh does not suggest that the topical anaesthetic in VisThesia is unimportant.

Expert evidence shows that the product is intended to facilitate surgery in two ways, by providing anaesthesia and acting as a wetting agent. Both experts agree that wetting and anaesthesia are essential for surgery. The fact that two substances with two different objectives are used in combination does not, of itself, reduce either objective to an ancillary role."

[90] I am unable to see that any dispute between experts as to the precise function of the topical sodium hyaluronate is of material importance. As I have indicated above, the MHRA accepted that sodium hyaluronate had the properties claimed for it. The two experts were agreed that it was a wetting agent. The issue was, not the nature of its precise function, but whether the action of the lidocaine was ancillary to it.

[91] The petitioners' next complaint is that in their determination the MHRA failed to take into account the evidence of Dr Nielsen and Mr Mackintosh with regard to the limited role of the topical anaesthetic. The petitioners' averments relative to these witnesses in statement 19(d) run as follows. Dr Nielsen explained to the Review Panel that in his view the role of topical anaesthesia at the beginning of surgery was limited to dealing with a minor chance of pain on the surgical incision being made. Mr Mackintosh said that the main role of the lidocaine in the VisThesia Topical was to make the injection of the VisThesia Intracameral into the eye more comfortable. There was uncontradicted evidence from both experts that surgical practice in relation to the anaesthetic in VisThesia varied from surgeon to surgeon with many surgeons using additional anaesthesia including anaesthesia used topically and by injection. That was consistent with the advice in the later IFU leaflet that the lidocaine in VisThesia should be included in the ophthalmic surgeon's routine anaesthetic regimen. In statement 25 the petitioners add that in the final determination the MHRA quoted a sentence from Mr Mackintosh's report and had misunderstood his evidence. On a proper construction of his evidence he was there referring to using VisThesia Topical during the operation for the reasons he had described relating to the function of the sodium hyaluronate.

[92] What the MHRA said was this:

"From the expert evidence, it can be deduced that:

Topical anaesthetic is routinely used in cataract surgery in the UK. Both Mr Singh and Mr Mackintosh agree that it is necessary for usual surgical practice. It is not in dispute that VisThesia provides topical anaesthesia. Some surgeons also provide anaesthesia by injection; some do not. There is therefore no dispute that topical anaesthesia plays an essential role.

Even where anaesthesia is given by injection subsequent to topical anaesthesia, topical anaesthesia clearly plays an important role in anaesthetizing the eye. The opinion of Mr Mackintosh indicates that an injection would not normally be given without prior local anaesthesia. Although Mr Mackintosh states that he would add additional topical anaesthetic, he notes that VisThesia can fulfil that function:

'A fault in the descriptive use of this product in Hyaltech's literature is that it emphasises using it preoperatively, but does not stress that it should be used during the operation . . .'"

[93] The first statement attributed to Dr Nielsen in the petitioners' averments is not, in my opinion, helpful to the petitioners. Even if the topical anaesthesia was not necessary throughout the procedure, it is plain from the statement that it was necessary at the beginning. It is also clear from Dr Nielsen's written statement appended to 6/16 of process that anaesthesia is part of the procedure, and there is no suggestion there that the lidocaine in VisThesia Topical plays a part which is "ancillary" to the action of the product in either of the senses discussed above. In particular, he says at paragraph 22 of his statement that "use of a viscous meniscus on top of the eye [i.e. the sodium hyaluronate] may establish a compartment from where the anaesthetic is gradually released to where it is needed and as long as it is needed."

[94] As to the petitioners' other averments, the MHRA expressly accepted that surgical practice in relation to the anaesthetic in VisThesia varied from surgeon to surgeon, with some surgeons providing additional anaesthesia. That, however, does not alter the fact that, as the MHRA found, topical anaesthesia plays an essential role.

[95] Mr Mackintosh was concerned to rebut a view expressed by Mr Singh, a consultant ophthalmic surgeon who had supplied a report to the MHRA dated 3 September 2003 Mr Singh had there observed that the sodium hyaluronate in the VisThesia only acted as a carrier for the lidocaine and had no action on its own account. In a letter to the petitioners' agents dated 25 August 2004 (No. 6/16 of process, appendix) Mr Mackintosh disagreed with that view and said that the sodium hyaluronate applied to the cornea before and during surgery helped to improve corneal clarity, and that the interesting, novel component of the ampoules was the sodium hyaluronate and not the anaesthetic. Mr Mackintosh went on to say that the majority of surgeons in the United Kingdom would not carry out cataract surgery purely using topical local anaesthetic, but would generally use a local anaesthetic block carried out by injections to achieve anaesthesia. It is clear that the MHRA understood and accepted that. Mr Mackintosh also said that he had supplemented the use of VisThesia with some pure topical anaesthesia; and the MHRA also noted that. The next sentence in his letter is the one quoted in the determination. I am satisfied that the MHRA misunderstood it. It seems clear that what Mr Mackintosh meant was that the product should be used during the operation because of the utility of the sodium hyaluronate in improving corneal clarity. That error, however, does not in my opinion vitiate the determination. The MHRA correctly drew from what Mr Mackintosh had to say that he did not suggest that the lidocaine in VisThesia Topical was unimportant. They were entitled, accordingly, to infer from his evidence that the action of the lidocaine was not ancillary to that of the VisThesia Topical.

[96] It should be added that after the date of Mr Mackintosh's letter, Mr Singh submitted a further report dated 5 October 2004 (No. 6/17 of process, appendix 7) in which he took account of the submissions and productions which the petitioners had presented for the hearing before the Review Panel. He there accepted that the viscoelastic had a wetting property and that wetting of the cornea was an essential part of the procedure. He continued:

"I accept all the properties of Viscoelastic as claimed by the company. My contention is that the addition of lidocaine is done with the sole purpose of its local anaesthetic effect hence it is a medicine.

Two substances in combination where each on its own has a different primary action cannot be portrayed as one having a primary action and the other a secondary role. In this case the primary action of Viscoelastic is wetting and of lidocaine is as a topical anaesthetic.

[. . . ]

Viscoelastic is primarily a wetting agent and lidocaine is primarily a local anaesthetic agent. The combination of these two does not reduce either of them to an ancillary role."

Mr Singh went on to say that Dr Nielsen did not claim that lidocaine had any role in the wetting of the cornea and maintaining its clarity during cataract surgery. He pointed to an article by Dr Nielsen in the May 2003 issue of Eurotimes in which he had said, "VisThesia provides a good introduction to topical anaesthesia and brings comfort to both patient and surgeon." Dr Nielsen detailed in the article 160 cataract operations performed using only VisThesia as a local anaesthetic agent.

[97] I consider that there was, accordingly, sufficient material before the MHRA to entitle them to express the following views, which I have noted above and repeat for convenience:

"The experts [Mr Singh and Mr Mackintosh] disagreed over the function of the topical sodium hyaluronate. Mr Singh noted that it had an important role as a wetting agent, but was not needed for lubrication because the eyelid does not blink during surgery. Mr Mackintosh described its function both in terms of wetting and lubrication. Whether or not sodium hyaluronate is a more novel or interesting compound than lidocaine, as suggested by Mr Mackintosh, is not relevant to this determination. The legal test is whether the action is ancillary. Mr Mackintosh does not suggest that the topical anaesthetic in VisThesia is unimportant.

Expert evidence shows that the product is intended to facilitate surgery in two ways, by providing anaesthesia and acting as a wetting agent. Both experts agree that wetting and anaesthesia are essential for surgery. The fact that two substances with two different objectives are used in combination does not, of itself, reduce either objective to an ancillary role."

 

Decision wholly unreasonable

[98] Finally, the petitioners aver that esto the MHRA took into account the relevant matters which the petitioners say they failed to take into account, their decision was wholly unreasonable. They aver that no reasonable licensing authority properly directed in law, following the terms of the Guidance and having regard to the relevant material and only to such material would have reached a conclusion other than that VisThesia and in particular VisThesia Topical is correctly classified as a medical device incorporating an ancillary medicinal substance and that the existing CE marketing as a device could not be said to be wrong. They point out that the MHRA had already classified VisThesia Intracameral as a device incorporating an ancillary medicinal substance.

[99] It was not demonstrated at the first hearing that the classification of VisThesia Intracameral had any bearing on the classification of VisThesia Topical. I believe I have considered in this Opinion all the other matters mentioned. I have expressed the view that the MHRA misunderstood the passages they quoted from the US patent and the sentence they quoted from Mr Mackintosh's letter. Those appear to me to be minor errors which do not vitiate their determination. I shall accordingly repel the petitioners' second plea-in-law. Their third plea-in-law, seeking suspension of the notice of final determination, was founded only on the argument that the final determination was invalid. Their fourth plea-in-law was a general plea to the relevancy of the respondent's answers.

 

Result

[100] Although the respondent has stated a general plea to relevancy, her counsel moved me to sustain only her second plea-in-law, which states, "The final determination demonstrating no error of law, the petition should be refused." I shall sustain the second plea-in-law for the respondent, repel the pleas-in-law for the petitioners, and refuse the petition.

 


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