The decision by the Immigration Judge

Decision

is always relevant in such cases to consider whether moving elsewhere in the home country (otherwise "internal relocation") is available as an alternative to a grant of asylum. It was because the Immigration Judge considered that were the applicant to relocate to Khartoum he would not be at risk of persecution or abuse of his human rights that he refused the applicant's appeal. As we understood Mr Forrest's submissions, the second related to what was the appropriate test for determining whether an internal relocation alternative was reasonable and the first submission related to what factors should be had regard to when applying this test. There does not appear to us to have been any error on the part of the Immigration Judge either in identifying the correct test or applying it. As Mr Forrest explained, the correct test gets a recent and authoritative expression in the opinions delivered in the House of Lords in Januzi v Home Secretary [2006] AC 426. At paragraph 21 of his opinion in Januzi (supra at 449H) Lord Bingham of Cornhill says this:

"The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so."

At paragraph 47 of his opinion (supra at 457G) Lord Hope of Craighead puts it this way:

"The question where the issue of internal location is raised can, then, be defined quite simply ... it is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect a claimant who is being persecuted for a Convention reason in one part of his country to move to a less hostile part before seeking refugee status abroad. The words 'unduly harsh' set the standard that must be met for this to be regarded as unreasonable. If the claimant can live a relatively normal life there judged by the standards that prevail in his country of nationality generally, and if he can reach the less hostile part without undue hardship or undue difficulty, it will not be unreasonable to expect him to move there."

It appears to us that the Immigration Judge appreciated that that was the test. At paragraph 8 of his determination the Immigration Judge puts it this way:

"Internal relocation is possible where it would not be unduly harsh to send an asylum seeker back to a safe haven in the country of nationality".

By way of explanation as to what should be taken into account in determining whether it would be unduly harsh to expect a claimant to relocate in another part of his home country, Mr Forrest drew our attention to paragraph 5 of the opinion of Lord Bingham in AH and others (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 3 WLR 832 at 836A. There, Lord Bingham says this:

"In para 21 of my opinion in Januzi I summarised the correct approach to the problem of internal relocation in terms with which all my noble and learned friends agreed:

'The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so ... The decision-maker must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum the particular case falls ... All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant facts'.

Although specifically directed to a secondary issue in the case, these observations are plainly of general application. It is not easy to see how the rule could be more simply or clearly expressed. It is, or should be, evident that the inquiry must be directed to the situation of the particular applicant, whose age, gender, experience, health, skills and family ties may all be very relevant. There is no warrant for excluding, or giving priority to, consideration of the applicant's way of life in the place of persecution. There is no warrant for excluding, or giving priority to, consideration of conditions generally prevailing in the home country. I do not underestimate the difficulty of making decisions in some cases. But the difficulty lies in applying the test, not in expressing it. The humanitarian object of the Refugee Convention is to secure a reasonable measure of protection for those with a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country or some part of it; it is not to procure a general levelling-up of living standards around the world, desirable though of course that is."

Thus, in determining whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to relocate to part of his home country other than that in which he experienced persecution, regard must be had to all the circumstances, both general circumstances and circumstances particular to the claimant. It appears to us that this is exactly what the Immigration Judge has done in the present case. He does not shrink from recognising that the conditions in the camps for displaced persons in and about Khartoum are grim or that the current regime in the Sudan has assisted those who are responsible for persecution of persons such as the applicant. However, having had regard to the country guidance cases and the other material listed in paragraph 4 of his determination which relates to general conditions in Sudan, in paragraph 27 he has had regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant before concluding that to return the applicant to Khartoum would not place the United Kingdom in breach of its obligations under either of the two International Conventions which had been relied upon. It was not in any way irrational for the Immigration Judge to reject the applicant's evidence of how he came to flee Darfur and yet to accept such evidence as he provided about his personal circumstances, much of which was self-evident given the applicant's age, appearance and presence in the United Kingdom.