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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Wise Property Care Ltd v. White Thomson Preservation Ltd & Ors [2008] ScotCS CSIH_44 (16 July 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2008/CSIH_44.html Cite as: [2008] ScotCS CSIH_44, [2008] CSIH 44 |
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EXTRA
DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lady Paton Lady Smith Lady Dorrian |
[2008] CSIH 44
A123/08 OPINION OF LADY PATON in RECLAIMING MOTION in the cause WISE PROPERTY CARE LIMITED Pursuers and Respondents; against WHITE THOMSON PRESERVATION LIMITED and OTHERS Defenders and Reclaimers _______ |
Pursuers and Respondents: Currie
Q.C., Delibegovic-Broome; Maclay Murray
& Spens
Defenders and Reclaimers: Martin
Q.C.,
16 July 2008
[1] On
"The Lord Ordinary having heard Counsel
on the unopposed motion of the pursuers, before calling no caveat having been lodged, ad interim interdicts the
defenders or any of them, whether acting by themselves, their Agents, employees
or anyone acting on their behalf or under their instruction from passing off as
those of the pursuers any service or business provided by the defenders and in
particular by trading or carrying on business under or using in their
brochures, business cards, stationery, promotional material and signage or in
any other manner in connection therewith (including but not limited to any use
on the internet) the names 'White', 'White Thomson', 'White Preservation',
'White Thomson Preservation' and 'White Thomson Preservation (Northern)' or any
other word or combination of words colourably similar thereto and likely to
cause confusion with the business of the pursuers trading as 'White
Preservation, a division of Wise Property Care Limited' and decerns."
[2] The defenders
enrolled a motion for recall. The Lord
Ordinary was provided with the Open Record dated March 2008, and certain
productions including affidavits. On
"The Lord Ordinary having heard Counsel
on the defenders' motion to recall the interdict ad interim granted
on 26 February 2008 refuses said motion;
varies the said interdict ad interim by adding at the end the
words 'provided that this order is not to interfere with any bona fide use by the third defender of
his own name as an individual'; finds
the first, second and third defenders liable to the pursuers in the expenses
occasioned by the Motion Roll Hearing on 4 March, 2008 and of today; remits the account thereof, when lodged, to
the Auditor of Court to tax."
The Lord Ordinary subsequently issued an opinion dated
[3] The defenders
reclaimed against the refusal to recall the interim interdict. The case came before the Inner House on 29
and
[5] In 1983 Mr
White and Mr Thomson decided to work independently of each other, and another
limited company was created. Mr White's
company traded as White Thomson Preservation (Northern) Ltd (company number
SC059360). Mr Thomson's company was
named White Thomson Preservation (Southern) Ltd. The latter company focused on the
[6] White Thomson
Preservation (Northern) Ltd offered property preservation services in the
[7] In 2002, the
three brothers decided to leave the company, and to set up their own property
preservation company, again offering investigation and treatment of dry rot and
similar problems. Their company was
called White Preservation Ltd (company number SC227355). That company traded in
[8] In 2004, Ewan
White left White Preservation Ltd. He
became a self-employed specialist in property preservation, carrying out work
for inter alios
[10] In January
2006, Gavin and Grant White sold the business and assets of White Preservation
Ltd to the pursuers, a large company of specialist property surveyors and
consultants trading throughout
[11] In 2007, Grant
White left the pursuers and found other employment.
[12] In late 2007,
Ewan White, who had been working as a self-employed specialist in the property
preservation market since 2004, decided to set up a property preservation
company which could, on one view, be seen as the successor to his father's
business namely the dissolved company White Thomson Preservation (Northern)
Ltd. On
[15] Ewan White was
offering property preservation services (i.e. the investigation and treatment
of dry rot, rising damp, woodworm and similar problems) in
"Due to the early history of [White
Preservation Ltd], customers often refer to [White Preservation, a division of
Wise Property Care Limited] not just as 'White Preservation' but still also as
'White Thomson Preservation' and as 'White Thomson'".
Thus the pursuers aver that, as a result of the past history
of the businesses, the name chosen by Ewan White had connotations and
associations with the business purchased by the pursuers.
[17] Ewan White had
selected a business address at 14 Viewfield Terrace,
" ... nearly all of our business came
via Solicitors and Chartered Surveyors.
The referrals would be as a result of personal relationships with the
Solicitors and Chartered Surveyors."
Nevertheless Ewan White's new company also advertised its
services to the public at large.
" ... the work of [Ewan White] in the
field of property preservation work in Fife & Kinross has already caused
customer confusion:
a.
On
or about
b.
On
or about 31 January 2008, [White Preservation, a division of Wise Property Care
Limited] received a call from another customer, Mr Wood, who wished to
instruct a survey of a property in Inverkeithing. He said he was advised by his solicitors,
Messrs Ross & Connel, to call 'Ewan White' of 'White Preservation' ..."
In addition, the pursuers instructed private investigators,
who provided a report including details of conversations with Ewan White and
his receptionist at White Thomson Preservation Ltd. In particular, one conversation between Ewan
White and a prospective client, David Nelson, which took place on
"Ewan White: Hello
David Nelson: Hi there is that White Preservation?
EW: White
Thoms ... yes, yes
DN: White
Preservation?
EW: Yes
White Thomson Preservation yes
DN: White
is that the same?
EW: Yes
DN: Same
company?
EW: Yes
DN: Right,
ok erm and is it 22 Viewfield Terrace you are at in
EW: Eh
no its 14 Viewfield Terrace
DN: 14
OK so is that the same company at 22 or?
EW: (hesitating)
No they have a mail drop there
DN: They
have a what sorry?
EW: I
have a mail drop at 22
DN: OK
alright so that is your company but its just a mail address?
EW: Exactly
DN: Right,
OK, erm right I was just wondering what sort of cost
there would be to come and see if
there is dry rot in a property."
On one view, the conversation could be seen as an attempt to
mislead the caller into thinking that White Preservation and White Thomson
Preservation Ltd were one and the same company.
Submissions
for the defenders and reclaimers
[21] Senior counsel submitted that the fundamental question was
whether the defenders' use of the title "White Thomson Preservation" had the
potential for passing off their business as that of the pursuers. The history of the companies was
important. The father's company, White
Thomson Preservation (Northern) Ltd, had always been separate from the three
brothers' company White Preservation Ltd.
The two companies had traded in open competition during 2002 to 2005. In January 2006, having purchased the business
and assets of White Preservation Ltd, the pursuers applied their own trading
logo to that part of their business, including the words "Wise" and "White
Preservation", with a large tick emerging from the capital W. By contrast, when Ewan White set up his
company in late 2007 as, in effect, a successor to his father's company, he
adopted a name which was almost identical to his father's former company, and
also the logo used by his father's company, namely a pillared doorway with the
words "Orig Est 1976". Thus there were
very different designs and get-ups, unlikely to mislead or to cause confusion
between the two companies. The reference
to 1976 was a clear indication that the business was not the pursuers'
business, and that it was not White Preservation Ltd (which had only come into
existence in 2002). Moreover White
Preservation Ltd had never used the name "Thomson". It was accepted that the word "White"
appeared in each business title, but the rest of the title was sufficiently
distinctive to make clear that there were two separate entities: cf Sir
Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine plc [2004] RPC 36.
[22] Against that background, the Lord Ordinary had failed properly
to identify the first prerequisite set out in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491,
at page 499, namely the nature of the goodwill which the pursuers were entitled
to protect. If the pursuers had no right
to the trading titles "White Thomson", "White Thomson Preservation", and "White
Thomson Preservation (Northern)", and no right to any goodwill attached to
those titles, then they were not entitled to try to prevent Ewan White and his
company from carrying on business in a way which tended to attract the goodwill
attached to those names or entities. The
assets and goodwill of White Thomson Preservation (Northern) Ltd belonged to Mr
White senior. Mr White senior was the
person who could seek to protect that company's goodwill. However he had not objected to his son Ewan
setting up his company in late 2007 in the way he had, adopting an almost
identical name and an identical logo to those of Mr White's former
company. It did not lie in the pursuers'
hands to prevent such a situation. At
best for the pursuers, the goodwill which they were entitled to protect was the
goodwill attached to the name "White Preservation", which had been in existence
since only 2002. Ewan White had never in
fact traded as White Preservation, nor had he attempted to do so. Thus the requisite element justifying an
apprehension of passing off did not exist.
[23] As for the second prerequisite set out in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd, namely a prima facie case of likelihood of confusion, the Lord Ordinary had
failed properly to weigh all the facts, including the different names (White
Thomson Preservation as opposed to White Preservation), the different get-ups,
the presentation of Ewan White's new company as the successor to his father's
company (which had openly competed with White Preservation Ltd), and the
specialities of the market in which the majority of the work was introduced to
the companies in question by professionals such as solicitors. The three examples of alleged confusion set
out in Article 13 of Condescendence did not provide an adequate basis for
alleged confusion. In particular, the
lady caller seeking to arrange a survey with "White 'something or someone'" had
demonstrated some confusion, but not to the disadvantage of the pursuers. In any event, that was only one incident. The affidavit of Hugh Short of Messrs Ross
& Connel, solicitors, 18 Viewfield Terrace,
[26] Chill Foods (
[27] For all the foregoing reasons, which counsel supported by
references to further authorities including Phones
4U Ltd v Phone4U.Co.UK.Internet Ltd [2007] RPC 5, Jacob LJ at paras. 9
to 10, 16 et seq; Dent v
Turpin (1861) 2 J & H 139; Parker-Knoll Limited v Knoll International
Limited [1962] R.P.C. 265, Lord Morris at page 279, Lord Hodson at page
284; and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co's Margarine Limited [1901] AC 217, at page 223, interim interdict was not justified. The interim interdict was also too wide. It had been made clear to the Lord Ordinary
that the defenders had no intention of using the titles "White Preservation" or
"White Preservation Ltd". To that extent
therefore the interim interdict granted was clearly unnecessary.
Submissions
for the pursuers and respondents
[30] So far as the second prerequisite (likelihood of confusion) was concerned, it was well established
that " ... it is not essential that the trader who sues should prove actual
instances of confusion having taken place, but, if such are proved, the court
will more readily grant interdict ...": Lord Hill Watson in Haig & Co Ltd v Forth Blending Co Ltd, 1954 SC 35, at page
37. The court had to assess whether
there was likely to be confusion, and to do so on an objective basis. When addressing this issue, the Lord Ordinary
took into account all the material before him, including the fact that the two
companies had similar names, similar addresses, similar services, and traded in
a similar geographical area. At
para.[187] he correctly adopted an objective approach, viewing matters from the
standpoint of customers. He rejected the
defenders' contention that the addition of the word "Thomson" made all the
difference, and concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion between the
names "White Preservation" and "White Thomson Preservation" (cf Chill Foods, where Lord Maxwell held
that there was a likelihood of confusion between non-identical names "Cool
Foods Limited" and "Chill Foods (Scotland) Limited"). The Lord Ordinary could not be said to have
erred in law in so doing, or to have assessed matters in an unreasonable or
irrational way The defenders had
further contended that there was a speciality of the market, namely that the
defenders' main introducers of work were professionals such as solicitors, who
appreciated the difference between the pursuers' division White Preservation
and Ewan White's new company White Thomson Preservation Ltd. However the new company also advertised
directly to members of the public, and as Mann J made clear in Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine
plc [2004] RPC 36, at paras.39 and 44 to 46, the fact that professionals
might know the difference between two companies did not mean that the public at
large would not be confused. Further,
there was in fact some evidence of confusion in the present case (albeit
limited, as in Chill Foods). The example of the lady caller seeking to
arrange a survey with "White 'something or someone'" was clear evidence of
confusion in that a member of the public thought that one business was the
other. Ewan White's telephone
conversation of 12 February 2008 provided not only evidence of confusion, but
material from which the Lord Ordinary could infer an intention to deceive or to
cause confusion, with the result that, as Lord Maxwell commented in Chill Foods at page 41, proof of
likelihood of passing off became easier.
The Lord Ordinary was entitled to regard the telephone conversation as
of significance. While there might be
disputes about facts requiring to be resolved at a proof, and while there might
be differing views about the proper construction to be placed on the telephone
conversation, it could not be said that no reasonable judge could have found
Ewan White's explanation for his responses implausible, or that no reasonable
judge could have drawn an inference of deliberate intention to deceive.
[31] As for the third element specified in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd, namely the likelihood of loss or
damage, senior counsel submitted that evidence of specific loss or damage suffered
by the pursuers was not required at the stage of interim interdict. The courts tended to proceed on the basis of
what was foreseeable as a result of confusion, and to take a broad and general
view of the sort of damage which could occur:
cf Lord President Rodger in William
Grant & Sons Limited v Glen Catrine Bonded Warehouse Limited, 2001 SC 901 at para.[79]; Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd, at paras.44 and 45. Diversion of trade was not the only type of
damage which could occur. The
disadvantages arising from confusion could take many forms, for example, damage
to reputation as a result of the newcomer's different standards of
workmanship. The Lord Ordinary's
assessment of the likelihood of loss or damage could not be criticised,
particularly bearing in mind the admissions made in Answer 18 of the Open
Record.
Interim interdict and
balance of convenience
[34] As is noted in
Burn-Murdoch, Interdict, at Ch IV (Interim Interdict) para. 143:
"Interim interdict ... is a matter of
discretion, exercised often in the light of merely ex parte statements ... Even when the question is not decided until
answers have been lodged, little more than a rough prima facie view of the facts is available, and the discretionary
element is prominent. The question is
thus on a footing entirely different from the ultimate claim of a successful
litigant to decree of perpetual interdict ... in an interim question only the prima facie aspect can be
considered. The question at this stage
is not so much the absolute relevancy of the case as the seeming cogency of the
need for interim interdict ..."
Further, at para. 152, it is stated that:
"In questions of interim interdict,
the relative inconvenience resulting to either party from its grant or refusal
is the dominating consideration ... ad
interim, it is assumed that either party may be ultimately successful, and
the balance [of convenience] is estimated on that assumption. This rule was more than once expounded by
Lord President Inglis: 'The object in
cases such as this is to regulate the interim possession in such a way as to do
least damage in the meantime to either party, and at the same time to provide
sufficiently for proper restitution being made for any damage suffered to the
party who shall be found in the right when the case is over.' (Tennant & Co v Thomson, 1870 8
S.L.R. 15)."
Circumstances in which the Inner House may interfere
with the decision of a Lord Ordinary
" ... Discretion. A discretion
will not be lightly interfered with. It
is not enough that the appellate court would have exercised the discretion
differently. The tests have been
variously described, depending to some extent on the area of law
concerned. The tests may be stated as
follows: (a) has there been a failure to
exercise the discretion at all (Orr
Pollock & Co (Printers) Ltd v Mulholland, 1983 S.L.T. 558), (b) has the
judge misdirected himself in law (Forsyth
v A.F. Stoddard & Co Ltd, 1985 S.L.T. 51), (c) has the judge
misunderstood, misused or failed to balance the evidence (Skiponian Ltd v Barratt Developments (Scotland) Ltd, 1983 S.L.T.
313, 314), (d) has the judge taken into account an irrelevant factor (Thomson v Glasgow Corporation, 1962 S.C.
(H.L.) 36, 66 per Lord Reid), (e) has the judge failed to take into account a
relevant factor (Thomson, above), (f)
is the decision unreasonable (Thomson, above),
(g) is the decision unjudicial (Thomson, above)."
Prima facie case of passing off
[36] "The principle
is this, that no man is entitled to carry on his business in such a
way or by such a name as to lead to
the belief that he is carrying on the business of another man or to lead to the
belief that the business which he is carrying on has any connection with the
business carried on by the other man ..."
(Romer LJ in Clock Ltd v
Clockhouse Hotel Ltd (1936) R.P.C. at page 275).
(1)
The
pursuers have a goodwill to protect.
(2)
There
is a misrepresentation by the defenders to the public (whether or not
intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that services
offered by the defenders are the services of the pursuers.
(3)
The
pursuers are suffering, or are likely to suffer, damage by reason of the
erroneous belief engendered by the defenders' misrepresentation:
cf Reckitt & Colman
Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491, Lord Oliver of Aylmerton at
page 499D-H. Taking each element in turn:
(1) A goodwill to protect
[38] In January 2006,
the pursuers purchased the assets and business of White Preservation Ltd. From early 2006 to late 2007, they ran that
business as a property preservation branch of their company in
"I had little difficulty in holding
that there was a prima facie case
that the pursuers had goodwill which they were entitled to protect."
(2) A
misrepresentation by the defenders to the public (whether or not intentional)
leading or likely to lead the public to believe that services offered by the
defenders are the services of the pursuers
[41] The information
and material placed before the Lord Ordinary included the following:
(i) Both the
pursuers and the defenders offer property preservation services,
including the investigation and
treatment of dry rot, rising damp, woodworm and similar problems.
(ii) Both the
pursuers and the defenders offer those services in approximately the
same geographical area,
(iii) The pursuers
have business premises at 22 Viewfield Terrace,
the defenders have business premises
at 14 Viewfield Terrace,
(iv) The pursuers
trade as "White Preservation, a division of Wise Property Care
Limited"; the defenders trade as "White Thomson
Preservation Ltd".
(v) In Article 10
of the Condescendence the pursuers offer to prove that:
"Due to the early history of [White
Preservation Ltd], customers often refer to [White Preservation, a division of
Wise Property Care Limited] not just as 'White Preservation' but still also as
'White Thomson Preservation' and as 'White Thomson'".
(vi) While many of
the introducers of business to the defenders are professionals,
in particular solicitors, the
defenders advertise to the general public and do business with members of the
public. In this connection, the defenders' Grounds of Appeal suggest that the
Lord Ordinary did not take into account the affidavits of Hugh Short and Julie
Craigie, referred to in para. [23] above, although no clear argument founded upon
a failure to take into account a relevant factor or factors was presented in
the Inner House. In my view, the Lord
Ordinary clearly took all the material before him into account, and weighed
that material in an objective manner. He
was entitled to form the view at para. [207] of his judgment that members of
the public were likely to be confused, even although certain professionals such
as solicitors Hugh Short and Julie Craigie had indicated in their affidavits
that they personally understood the difference between the companies. As Mann J pointed out in Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine plc [2004] RPC 36 at
paras. 39 and 44 to 46, the fact that professionals might know the difference
between two companies does not mean that the public at large would not be
confused.
(vii) The pursuers
offer to prove some instances of actual confusion between the
pursuers and defenders, as set out in
Article 13 of Condescendence, quoted in para. [19] above.
(viii) The pursuers
offer to prove the content of a telephone call dated 12 February
2008 between Ewan White and a
prospective client, David Nelson, all as set out in para. [19] above. When dealing with that telephone call, the
Lord Ordinary made the following observations in paras. [201], [210] and [211]
of his judgment:
" ... I was satisfied that the contents
of the telephone conversation with [Ewan White] provided a prima facie basis for an assertion that he was acting dishonestly
and was deliberately fomenting confusion, albeit he may have been led into it
[201] ... It will be seen that the contents of the telephone conversation were of
significance in my opinion [210] ... While it would not have been appropriate to
form a concluded view in the absence of evidence, the defenders' explanation
for what he said [viz. "he had simply been playing along" para.141] assuming it
was accurately recorded, appeared prima
facie implausible [211]."
In my view, the Lord Ordinary was entitled to draw the
inferences he did on the basis of the transcript, even although the pursuers
had not averred in terms a deliberate intention to mislead. Those inferences made Lord Maxwell's comment at
page 41 of Chill Foods particularly
apposite:
" ... while it is well-settled that
intention to cause confusion is not an essential element of a 'passing off'
case, the existence of such intention will make proof of likelihood of passing
off easier."
The pursuers are suffering, or are likely to suffer,
damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defenders'
misrepresentation
[44] The pursuers
aver in Article 18 of Condescendence:
"The pursuer is likely to suffer
substantial damage to its goodwill in [its White Preservation branch] by reason
of the defenders' activities. The
pursuer is also likely to suffer financial loss as existing customers of [White
Preservation] are likely to be confused and to engage in error the defenders'
services instead of those of [White Preservation]. In the event of a recommendation being made
by an existing customer of [White Preservation] in respect of the services
offered by [White Preservation], the recipient of the recommendation is likely
to be confused by the defenders' use of the names White, White Thomson, White
Preservation, White Thomson Preservation and White Thomson Preservation
(Northern) or any other word or words colourably similar thereto and is likely
to engage the services of the defenders instead of the [White Preservation]. The businesses operated by [White
Preservation] and the defenders overlap in that they both provide similar
services in
The defenders' response in Answer 18 is as follows:
"It is admitted that the pursuers are
likely to suffer a loss of goodwill and trade as a result of the activities of
the defenders but that is because he will compete with them and win business
from introducers. It is admitted that
the businesses overlap in the services they provide and in the area in
[45] I consider
that senior counsel for the pursuers was correct in his contention that all
that the pursuers require to demonstrate is a likelihood of damage. As Mann J observed in Sir Robert McAlpine Ltd v Alfred McAlpine plc [2004] RPC 36, at
para. 20:
"When it comes to considering damage,
the law is not so naïve as to confine the damage to directly provable losses of
sales, or 'direct sale for sale substitution'.
The law recognises that damage from wrongful association can be wider
than that. Thus in
'To induce the belief that my
business is a branch of another man's business may do that other man damage in
all kinds of ways. The quality of the
goods I sell; the kind of business I
do; the credit or otherwise which I
might enjoy. All those things may
immensely injure the other man, who is assumed wrongly to be associated with
me.'
In so saying, he was not limiting the
kinds of potential damage to those listed by him. Rather, he was indicating that the subtleties
of the effect of passing off extend into effects that are more subtle than
merely sales lost to a passing off competitor."
Strength of the prima facie case
Balance of convenience
(a)
Ewan
White's new company Thomson Preservation Ltd began trading in late 2007 and was
in effect a newcomer or interloper in the field in the sense described in Chill Foods (Scotland) Limited v Cool Foods
Limited, 1977 S.L.T. 38, at page 41 (cf Lord Macnaughton at page 223 of Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller &
Co's Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217), even although the company sought to
present itself as the successor to Mr White senior's former company. As is pointed out in Chill Foods, the established business is in general entitled to
protection against the interloper.
(b)
Ewan
White claimed to be well known in the property preservation business in
(c)
Ewan
White's new company, which had only just started trading, would be able to
re-brand albeit at some cost and inconvenience.
Such a re-branding exercise would not prevent Ewan White or his company
from trading (including, it should perhaps be added, undertaking to honour
guarantees given by his father's company).
(d)
If
the interim interdict were to be recalled, there would be difficulty
quantifying any loss suffered by the pursuers.
In all the circumstances of the case, with these factors
particularly in mind, the conclusion reached by the Lord Ordinary on balance of
convenience cannot in my view be criticised.
The precise terms of
the interim interdict
"The pursuers and respondents have no
right or title to the goodwill (if any) attached to "White Thomson
Preservation" and have no right to prevent the defenders from seeking to
utilise such goodwill."
EXTRA
DIVISION , INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lady Paton Lady Smith Lady Dorrian |
[2008] CSIH 44
A123/08 OPINION OF LADY SMITH in RECLAIMING MOTION in the cause WISE PROPERTY CARE LIMITED Pursuers and Respondents; against WHITE THOMSON PRESERVATION LIMITED and OTHERS Defenders and Reclaimers _______ |
Pursuers and Respondents: Currie
Q.C., Delibegovic-Broome; Maclay Murray
& Spens
Defenders and Reclaimers: Martin
Q.C.,
16 July 2008
[53] I agree that
the reclaiming motion cannot succeed.
Nevertheless, it is my view that the Lord Ordinary placed too much
weight on the telephone call of
EXTRA
DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION |
|
Lady Paton Lady Smith Lady Dorrian |
[2008] CSIH 44
A123/08 OPINION OF LADY DORRIAN in RECLAIMING MOTION in the cause WISE PROPERTY CARE LIMITED Pursuers and Respondents; against WHITE THOMSON PRESERVATION LIMITED and OTHERS Defenders and Reclaimers _______ |
Pursuers and Respondents: Currie
Q.C., Delibegovic-Broome; Maclay Murray
& Spens
Defenders and Reclaimers: Martin
Q.C.,
16 July 2008
[56] I entirely
agree with your Ladyship in the chair and have nothing useful to add.