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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Davidson v Assessor To The Central Scotland Valuation Joint Board [2011] ScotCS CSIH_15 (26 November 2010) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2011/2011CSIH15.html Cite as: [2011] ScotCS CSIH_15, 2011 GWD 8-205, [2011] RVR 132, [2011] CSIH 15 |
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FIRST DIVISION, INNER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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Lord PresidentLord OsborneLord Hodge
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[2011] CSIH 15XA186/09
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LORD HODGE
in Appeal by
GEORGE DAVIDSON
Appellant;
against
ASSESSOR TO THE CENTRAL SCOTLAND VALUATION JOINT BOARD
Respondent:
_______
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Alt: Wallace; Wright Johnston & Mackenzie LLP
26 November 2010
Introduction
[1] Mr
Davidson has appealed under section 82(4) of the Local Government Finance Act
1992 against a decision of the Central Scotland Valuation Appeal Committee
("the committee") dated 29 October 2009, by which it refused his appeal against
the entry of his house at 93 Glentye Drive, Tullibody at band F in the Council
Tax List ("the list").
The relevant statutory provisions
[2] The 1992 Act
provides that the amount of council tax payable in respect of a dwelling is to
be calculated by reference to the valuation band in which the dwelling is
entered in the list. See sections 72-74. Section 84 requires the Assessor to
compile on 1 April 1993, and thereafter to maintain, a valuation list showing
each dwelling in the relevant area and the valuation band applicable to it.
Section 86(2) provides that the valuation for this purpose shall be carried out
on by reference to 1 April 1991 and on such assumptions and in accordance
with such principles as may be prescribed.
[3] The Council Tax
(Valuation of Dwellings) (Scotland) Regulations 1992 (SI
1992/1329) (as amended) provide:
"2(1) For the purposes of valuations under section 86(2) of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 and valuations carried out in connection with proposals for the alteration of a valuation list, the value of any dwelling shall be taken to be the amount which the dwelling might reasonably have been expected to realise if it had been sold in the open market by a willing seller on 1st April 1991, having applied the assumptions mentioned in paragraph (2) below ..."
The assumptions in paragraph (2) include that the sale was with vacant possession, that the dwelling was sold free from any heritable security and that it was in a reasonable state of repair.
The background to this appeal
[4] The appellant's dwelling was built in 2008
as part of a development of detached villas in Muirside, Tullibody. The
assessor listed it in valuation band F, namely within the range of values
exceeding £80,000 but not exceeding £106,000.
[5] Several of the owners of dwellings in an
earlier phase of the Muirside development, in which houses had been completed
from about 2001 onwards, had appealed against the listing of their properties.
In November 2004 the committee heard seven appeals from residents in the
Muirside area. Those appeals included appeals by three owners of dwellings of
the same house type as the appellant's. But the owners of that house type did
not appear to support their appeals and the committee heard only appeals by
owners of other types of house within the development which had a larger floor
space. Nonetheless, it appears that in the course of those appeals a
representative of the assessor gave evidence on his methodology, which included
how he had calculated the valuations of the various dwellings in the
development for the purpose of banding.
The hearing before the committee
[6] The appellant
argued that the committee in considering the 2004 appeal had not considered
properly his type of property. It had been incorrect to include his house type
in valuation band F along with the larger dwellings. He sought to compare his
dwelling with houses of comparable or larger size in developments in the south
of Tullibody, namely Wood Avens, the Laurels and the Cedars. Thereafter,
comparing the average price per square foot of properties in Rose Street,
Muirside in 2003 with the price per square foot of his comparators on around
1991, he sought to show that there resulted a price reduction factor which,
when applied to his type of property, brought its value significantly below the
lower threshold of valuation band F. He conducted a similar exercise in
relation to the sale of villas in Muirside in 2008-2009 compared with sales of his
comparators in 1991-1993.
[7] In support of his
valuation the assessor's witness cited as comparators three dwellings of the
same house type on the Muirside estate. He explained that indicative
valuations for that house type had been before the committee in 2004.
[8] In his closing
submission the assessor's representative argued that the appellant's house type
had been before the committee in the 2004 appeal. He referred to the
committee's conclusion in 2004 that the assessor had used a correct method of
reaching an indicative valuation and expressed the view that it was important
that the committee's decisions were consistent. He referred to the valuation
of other properties in the Muirside development, including the properties in Rose Street which had been decided in the
2004 appeal. He argued that the committee had to be consistent in its
decisions so that similar properties appeared in the same valuation band.
The decision of the committee
[9] The committee
refused the appeal and set out its reasons as follows:
"1. The committee had previously dealt in 2004 with appeals against banding for council tax purposes of properties in Rose Street, Tullibody identical to and close to the subjects of appeal.
2. At that hearing, the committee had considered evidence of identical houses to the appeal subjects and had decided that the method of reaching an indicative value which had been used by the assessor was correct and that the sales evidence used by the assessor which had been obtained from open-market sales was sufficient to justify the banding.
3. No evidence was led by the tax payer which would have justified any alteration to the banding or considering (sic) that the method used in 2004 of reaching an indicative value was incorrect."
The Appellant's challenge and the Respondent's answer
[10] Mr Davidson advanced
his appeal on five grounds. First, he submitted that the assessor had erred in
law in taking as a starting point house prices in 2004 and seeking to calculate
by reference to local data what the prices of those properties would have been
in 1991. In so doing the assessor had relied on housing price indices, contrary
to his statement in his own literature. Secondly, he submitted that the
committee had erred by treating itself as bound by its previous decision of 11 November 2004, contrary to the decision of
this Division in Assessor for the Highland & Western Isles Valuation
Joint Board v Fraser 2001 SC 473. Thirdly, he submitted that, as a
result, the committee had not considered his appeal on its merits and so had
erred in law. Fourthly, he submitted that the committee had not reasonably
considered the evidence which he had provided of sales of houses elsewhere in
Tullibody at about April 1991. He also suggested that the committee had not
been quorate but withdrew that suggestion when this court explained the
relevant legislation.
[11] Mr Wallace for the
respondent submitted that it was common ground that Assessor for the
Highland & Western Isles Valuation Joint Board v Fraser required
the committee to look at each appeal on its merits and not to treat itself as
bound by a previous decision. He argued that the committee had given adequate
reasons and that one could infer from paragraph 3 of its reasons that it had
taken account of Mr Davidson's submissions. He emphasised that the
evidence which had been before the committee in 2004 was available to it when it
heard the appeal in 2009 and that the assessor had presented that evidence in
summary form. He referred to Stefan v General Medical Council [1999] 1 WLR 1293 and Piglowska v Piglowski [1999] 1 WLR 1360, Lord
Hoffmann at p.1372. The committee's decision was within the range of
reasonable responses to the evidence which it had heard.
Conclusions
[12] We are satisfied
that the committee has erred in law in its failure to give clear and sufficient
grounds for its decision. It appears from the record of its decision that the
committee has relied on the 2004 decision and has not properly addressed the
issues which Mr Davidson raised in his appeal. This impression is strengthened
when one has regard to the evidence led by, and the submission on behalf of, the
assessor.
[13] Full allowance must
be made for the exigencies of the committee's work, as Lord Hoffmann urged in Piglowska.
But, in the light of the approach that the assessor invited it to take, we do
not infer from paragraph 3 of its decision, which has a formulaic flavour, that
the committee had, as Mr Wallace submitted, adequately addressed the
appellant's submissions. Those submissions required the committee to address
whether dwellings in developments in the southern part of Tullibody were properly
comparable to those in the Muirside estate.
[14] Having reached this
conclusion, we make no comment on the other arguments which Mr Davidson
advanced against the committee's decision. It will be for the committee to
decide, among other things, whether the comparators on which he relied are
distinguishable because they are of houses in other parts of Tullibody, whether
they can be used in a comparison with houses in the Muirside development to
obtain an accurate differential of house prices between 1991 and 2001-2003, and
whether the assessor's method of valuation is satisfactory in the light of Mr
Davidson's criticisms.
[15] At the end of the
hearing we allowed the appeal and remitted to the committee for
reconsideration, intimating that we would in due course give our reasons in
writing. This Opinion expresses those reasons.