Scottish Court of Session Decisions

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2012] CSOH 29

P144/11

OPINION OF LORD STEWART in the Petition of MK (AP) Petitioner; for Judicial Review of a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) notified on 20 December 2010 to refuse the Petitioner permission to appeal et separatim for Judicial Review of a decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department dated 18 January 2011 to remove the Petitioner to Afghanistan on 9 February 2011 ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­________________

Petitioner: Caskie, advocate; Drummond Miller LLP, solicitors

Respondent: McIlvride, advocate; Office of the Solicitor to the Advocate General

21 February 2012

[1] This is an immigration Judicial Review about a young man from Afghanistan. As presented his Petition raises two questions of general interest: (1) how are you meant to tell what guidance Country Guidance [CG] decisions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (now the Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber) actually give and; (2) how should the rules for review of Upper Tribunal decisions laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Eba be applied by the Court of Session in claimed "risk to life" cases like this one [Eba v Advocate General for Scotland 2011 SLT 768]? Having heard the submissions of Counsel and made avizandum I have formed the Opinion that I really only need to address the first question; and I have decided that the Petition should be refused and can properly be refused without going in to the second question. In making this decision I have applied "anxious scrutiny".

[2] The main decision which the Petitioner seeks to bring under review is a decision of a single Senior Immigration Judge of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) dated 20 December 2010 refusing the Petitioner permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against a determination of an Immigration Judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) dated 20 October 2010. The determination dated 20 October 2010 refused the Petitioner's appeal against an immigration decision of 13 September 2010. The end result was and is that the Petitioner is liable to be removed from the United Kingdom and to be returned to Afghanistan.

[3] The consequential decision which the Petitioner seeks to bring under review is the Removal Directions decision issued on 18 January 2011. There are no separate grounds put forward for reviewing the Removal Directions.

[4] I should mention that the hearing of this Petition has been delayed to await the outcome of the case of Eba in the Supreme Court. The proceedings were sisted for that purpose on 20 May 2011. The Eba decision was handed down by the Supreme Court on 22 June 2011. On 1 September 2011 a new First Hearing in the present proceedings was fixed for 6 January 2012. On 6 January 2012 I heard Counsel's submissions and made avizandum.

Background

[5] The Petitioner is a national of Afghanistan. He claims to have arrived illegally in the United Kingdom in January 2008. He made an asylum claim and said he was 15 years of age. On 16 July 2008 the United Kingdom Border Agency [UKBA] refused the Petitioner's claim for asylum and accepted his declared age. In accordance with the policy relating to unaccompanied asylum seeking children, the Petitioner was granted discretionary leave to remain until he reached the age of seventeen-and-a-half years. The Petitioner did not appeal the refusal of his asylum claim.

[6] On 20 November 2009 the Petitioner's application for extension of discretionary leave was received by UKBA. By Reasons for Refusal Letter dated 13 September 2010 the Petitioner's extension application was refused and a decision to remove the Petitioner to Afghanistan was intimated. The Petitioner appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) in terms of section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The appeal was heard by Immigration Judge MacDonald who issued his decision on 20 October 2010. The Home Office was not represented at the appeal hearing.

Decision of the Immigration Judge, First-tier Tribunal

[7] The Immigration Judge accepted that the Petitioner had left his home area in Laghman province, Afghanistan, because he was involved, not of his own choosing, in a blood feud. On the Petitioner's account the Petitioner's father had killed the Petitioner's uncle in a land dispute. The Petitioner had become the target for a revenge killing by his cousins. By implication the Immigration Judge accepted that if the Petitioner were returned to his home area in Laghman province he would be at risk of losing his life. (There was apparently no exploration of feud-settling conventions such as arranged marriage and assythment and why they were not applicable in this case.)

[8] The "crux of the case" as identified by the Immigration Judge was, and is: "whether or not the [Petitioner] can safely relocate in Afghanistan and whether it would be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect him to do so?" The Immigration Judge concluded that the Petitioner could safely relocate to Kabul and that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect him to do so. I am concerned in these proceedings only with the question of safe relocation.

[9] In the "Conclusions" section of his Determination, the Immigration Judge mentioned the Home Office Reasons for Refusal Letter dated 13 September 2010. He noted that the letter referred to the case of PM and Others (Kabul, Hizb-i-Islami) Afghanistan CG [2007] UKAIT 00089. He stated: "PM is a country guidance case and therefore binding on me." The guidance taken by the Immigration Judge from PM (Hizb-i-Islami) was: "In general returning failed asylum seekers, without more, are able to relocate in Kabul." No point is taken by Petitioner's Counsel about this. At paragraph 32 of his Determination, the Immigration Judge noted specifically the terms of paragraph 134 of PM (Hizb-i-Islami), which summarised the evidence of an expert witness, Dr Antonio Giustozzi, Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science. The expert evidence concerned the existence of community networks in Afghanistan that relay information about individuals from one part of the country to another. The evidence was accepted [PM (Hizb-i-Islami) at § 135].

[10] The Immigration Judge was apparently also referred to the UKBA Country of Origin Information Report [COIR] on Afghanistan dated 29 August 2008, section headed "Internal Flight and Relocation", paragraphs 30.05 and 30.06. Paragraph 30.06 consists of the following quotation [italics added]:

"It is not difficult to track people down in Afghanistan, although it might take time. Neighbours and landlords will check people's backgrounds, because everyone thinks in terms of security, and so they would want to check a newcomer's background in their home area. Further, messages are sent across the country via chains of communications based on personal contacts, and it would be natural to investigate where someone was from in order to see what role they could play in such a network. The postal service is unreliable and only delivers to the district centres, not to the villages, so that travellers are often used to deliver messages and goods to relatives and friends."

(The quotation actually comes from a paper by the same Dr Giustozzi - see below.) The Immigration Judge described paragraph 30.06 as "the high point of the [Petitioner's] case". He noted that the paragraph in question did not appear in the most recent Afghanistan COIR which, at that time, was Afghanistan COIR dated 8 April 2010. The Immigration Judge stated:

"In the absence of the Home Office it is not easy to see why the paragraph does not reappear in the most recent COI Report and it is difficult to know whether the position has changed either marginally or materially from what was written in August 2008 or whether the terms of this paragraph were not deemed important enough to repeat in the up-to-date COI."

Nonetheless it is clear - because he quoted the phrase "everyone thinks in terms of security" in his judgement - that the Immigration Judge did have regard to the quoted paragraph from the August 2008 Afghanistan COIR, paragraph 30.06; and that the Immigration Judge did proceed on the basis that if returned to Afghanistan the Petitioner would have to say that he came from Laghman province and that he had spent the last two and a half years in the United Kingdom.

[11] The Immigration Judge did not however treat this as requiring him to make a finding that the Petitioner's life, if he relocated to Kabul, would be at risk. The Judge reasoned as follows:

"... given the size of Kabul it seems to me that there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that [the Petitioner] 'will quickly become known to my cousins there' - as claimed by [the Petitioner] in his statement. While I cannot discount that as a possibility I do not think that the possibility amounts to a real risk that he would be discovered by his cousins living in Kabul. There is no suggestion that his cousins would know that he had returned to Afghanistan. On that basis [the Petitioner] would be safe in Kabul and his claim to fear persecution/ serious ill-harm [sic] would fail."

I personally might find the Immigration Judge's reasoning vulnerable: but it has not been criticised in the present proceedings [Petition, article 10]. As it stands, in the absence of any failure of the decision-making process, the Immigration Judge's conclusion is a finding in fact which is not amenable to appeal or to review.

[12] The point now taken, as explained in detail below, is that, it is said, there was "Country Guidance" embodying the text found in paragraph 30.06 of the August 2008 Afghanistan COIR; and that the Immigration Judge was, as a matter of law, bound to give effect to the "Country Guidance" in question with the effect of allowing the appeal unless there were good reason not to do so. Before addressing the merits of this argument I have to deal with the refusal of the Petitioner's applications for permission to appeal within the tribunal system.

Refusal of Permission to Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

[13] In terms of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 there is a so-called right of appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a point of law arising from a decision made by a First-tier Tribunal. The right may be exercised only with the permission of the First-tier Tribunal or of the Upper Tribunal.

[14] On 18 November 2010 Senior Immigration Judge Kate Eshun of the First-tier Tribunal refused the Petitioner's application for permission to appeal. She said that the Grounds of Appeal amounted to "no more than a disagreement with the findings made by the IJ" and that no arguable error of law was disclosed.

[15] The proposed Grounds of Appeal, which are lodged as a production in this process, state that the Immigration Judge's conclusions drawn from the background evidence are erroneous and that the Immigration Judge "placed insufficient weight" on the August 2008 COIR, specifically on the statement: "It is not difficult to track people down in Afghanistan, although it might take time." I agree that the criticism as stated does not amount to an "error of law" issue. Normally the question of the weight to be attached to a particular piece of information would be a matter for the fact-finder, in this case the Immigration Judge. This would be so in the asylum and immigration context unless the information had the special status of "Country Guidance".

[16] By Notice of Decision dated 20 December 2010 Senior Immigration Judge Davinder Gill of the Upper Tribunal refused permission to appeal, agreeing with Senior Immigration Judge Kate Eshun and adding: "The Immigration Judge made findings of fact he was entitled to make on the evidence, for the reasons he gave."

Country Guidance

[17] The Petition states that the same text as appears in paragraph 30.06 of the August 2008 Afghanistan COIR is embodied in a "Country Guidance" case and that the Immigration Judge made an error of law in failing to follow that guidance or in failing to give reasons, expressly stated, for not following it. It is submitted for the Petitioner that notwithstanding the failure of the Petitioner's representatives to draw attention to the "Country Guidance" the Immigration Judge and the Senior Immigration Judges ought to have applied it. Mr McIlvride for the Respondent does not contest that the Tribunal Judges at both levels were bound to take account of all relevant "Country Guidance" even though it was not drawn to their attention: he does say that the omission on the part of the Petitioner or his representatives to draw attention to the claimed "Country Guidance" would be a relevant factor in considering the second stage question whether, if an arguable error of law were to be identified, it would be proper to allow review applying the Eba rules.

[18] From 2000 the Immigration Appeal Tribunal [IAT] developed a practice of issuing "Country Guidance" determinations. The practice was followed from 2005 by the successor forum, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal [AIT], and is now, since 2010, followed by the AIT's replacement, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) [UTIAC]. "Country Guidance" determinations are identified by the letters "CG" in the citation. A case labelled "CG" is supposed to be treated, until superseded, as an authoritative finding on "the country guidance issue" identified in the determination.

[19] The legal effect of CG cases was considered by the Court of Appeal of England & Wales in R (Iran) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982. The Court approved the statement of Ousley J in NM (Lone women - Ashraf) Somalia CG [2005] UKIAT 00076. Brooke LJ giving the judgment of the Court said at paragraph 27:

"It will have been noticed that Ouseley J said that any failure to apply a CG decision unless there was good reason, explicitly stated, for not doing so would constitute an error of law in that a material consideration had been ignored or legally inadequate reasons for the decision had been give. This suggestion has now been repeated and adopted in para 18.4 of the AIT Practice Direction. We have no hesitation in endorsing this approach."

The same approach has been adopted in turn by the Inner House in Scotland [eg FH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] CSIH 84 at § 12].

[20] The matter is now dealt with by the Practice Directions for the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal (10 February 2010) §12:

"12 Starred and Country Guidance determinations

12.1 [...]

12.2 A reported determination of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT bearing the letters "CG" shall be treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the determination, based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determine the appeal. As a result, unless it has been expressly superseded or replaced by any later "CG" determination, or is inconsistent with other authority that is binding on the Tribunal, such a country guidance case is authoritative in any subsequent appeal, so far as that appeal:-

(a) relates to the country guidance issue in question; and

(b) depends upon the same or similar evidence.

12.3 A list of current CG cases will be maintained on the Tribunal's website. Any representative of a party to an appeal concerning a particular country will be expected to be conversant with the current "CG" determinations relating to that country.

12.4 Because of the principle that like cases should be treated in like manner, any failure to follow a clear, apparently applicable country guidance case or to show why it does not apply to the case in question is likely to be regarded as grounds for appeal on a point of law."

Since, I think, 2005 the nature of the guidance in CG cases and progressively the guidance itself, has been epitomised in an italicised headnote prepared or approved by the tribunal.

[21] A question raised by the Petitioner's submissions in the present case is whether CG headnotes are authoritative. The Court of Appeal considered the same issue in the case of PO (Nigeria) [2011] EWCA Civ 132 (22 February 2011). (Counsel did not cite this case to me: it is helpfully illustrative rather than determinative of the issue in the present proceedings.) Carnwath LJ, then Senior President of Tribunals, over whose signature the Practice Directions (10 February 2010) were issued, was a member of the Court. He explained:

"55. Finally I should comment briefly on the status of the "headnote", which as the Vice-President [of the Court of Appeal] has shown is inconsistent with the material parts of the determination. The headnote is not part of the determination as such. This is apparent from the fact that it precedes the formal "determination and reasons". As I understand it, the headnote is normally added by the tribunal's reporting committee when authorising the reporting of the decision, although it may in practice be drafted by one of the judges responsible for the decision. It is intended to provide a convenient shorthand summary of the effect of the decision, and is likely to be used as such in subsequent cases.

56. It is certainly useful to have a headnote of this kind. However, it is important that it should accurately reflect the relevant guidance as contained in the determination itself. The present case suggests that there may be a need to review the current practice. It may be that the problem would be reduced if, as I have already indicated, more care were taken to identify the "issue" to which the country guidance is intended to relate. It should then be possible for the panel judges themselves to conclude the determination with their own concise summary of the guidance on that issue. That might then provide the text which could be reproduced in the headnote, without the risk of the sense or emphasis being distorted in an attempted summary by the reporting committee.

57. In the circumstances I agree with the Vice-President that the appeal must be allowed. It is unfortunate that the finalisation of authoritative country guidance on this important issue will be further delayed. Since the present appellant has no direct interest in pursuing the remitted appeal in this case, it seems likely that further guidance will have to await the identification of another suitable appeal."

The position therefore seems to be that headnotes are not necessarily definitive, at least as regards CG cases decided before PO (Nigeria) (22 February 2011).

[22] The Petitioner in the present proceedings founds on what he submits is the guidance given in NM (Christian Converts) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00045 decided on 5 December 2008. NM (Christian Converts) is about the risk of return to Afghanistan for a Christian convert. The headnote in NM (Christian Converts) states:

"(1) An Afghan claimant who can demonstrate that he has genuinely converted to Christianity from Islam is likely to be able to show that he is at real risk of serious ill-treatment amounting to persecution or a breach of his Article 3 ECHR right on return to Afghanistan.

(2) This decision replaces AR (Christians - risk in Kabul) Afghanistan [2005] UKAIT 00035 only in so far as it deals with Muslims who have converted to Christianity."

[23] Mr Caskie for the Petitioner contends that the guidance in the case goes beyond what is in the headnote: he states that NM (Christian Converts) must be treated as authoritative for the proposition that individuals returning to Afghanistan who want to be anonymous or who have something to hide will sooner or later be tracked down. Mr Caskie founds on paragraph 58, which refers to RQ (Afghan National Army - Hizb-i-Islami - risk) CG [2008] UKAIT 00013, which cites the Afghanistan COIR dated April 2007, which in turn quotes an excerpt from Afghanistan Notes (2006) by Dr Antonio Giustozzi, published in the UNHCR Update on the Situation in Afghanistan and International Protection Considerations (June 2005), under the heading "Internal Flight and Relocation", as follows:

"It is not difficult to track people down in Afghanistan, although it might take time. Neighbours and landlords will check people's backgrounds, because everyone thinks in terms of security, and so they would want to check a newcomer's background in their home area. Further, messages are sent across the country via chains of communications based on personal contacts, and it would be natural to investigate where someone was from in order to see what role they could play in such a network. The postal service is unreliable and only delivers to the district centres, not to the villages, so that travellers are often used to deliver messages and goods to relatives and friends."

[24] Mr Caskie confirms that this is the same text as the text in paragraph 30.06 of the August 2008 Afghanistan COIR which was founded on by the Petitioner at the First-tier Tribunal.

[25] The Petitioner also relies on paragraph 70 of NM (Christian Converts), which includes the following:

"... Initially the [Secretary of State] would return [NM] to Kabul. We do not accept that in a city with a population of approximately five million, there is a real risk that the appellant would come into contact again with the two men who threatened him in the UK. However he would need to engage in the social networks that operate in Kabul in order to find employment and accommodation simply to be able to live. This would necessitate, as the Tribunal has found previously in PM (Hizb-i-Islami), investigations into his background and we think there must be a real risk that that would lead to enquiries in his home town and so back to his son and possibly to others who know him..."

[26] The AIT in NM (Christian Converts) at paragraph 58 noted that the tribunal in PM and Others (Kabul, Hizb-i-Islami) Afghanistan CG [2007] UKAIT 00089 had accepted much of Dr Giustozzi's opinion about the operation of community networks in Afghanistan. (Paragraphs 18, 23 and 30 are also relevant.)

[27] Mr Caskie refers particularly to PM (Hizb-i-Islami), paragraphs 30 and 122-124: in PM (Hizb-i-Islami) Counsel for the Secretary of State had described Dr Giustozzi as "knowledgeable, fair and objective"; and the AIT concluded that Dr Giustozzi was "an extremely helpful and reliable witness" who had "demonstrated his independence".

[28] The most recent UKBA Afghanistan COIR produced in the present proceedings, dated 8 April 2010, has nothing at all between the section on "Freedom of Movement" and the section on "Mines and Unexploded Ordnance" where the section on "Internal Flight and Relocation" used to be: but, says Mr Caskie, the "spider's web of information networks" is not positively excluded either.

[29] Mr McIlvride for the Respondent does not accept that NM (Christian Converts) constitutes "Country Guidance" on the issue of returnees being "tracked down" in Afghanistan. Mr McIlvride points out that the Practice Directions (10 February 2010) are quite specific: a CG determination is "an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the determination, based upon the evidence before the members of the [Upper] Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determine the appeal". He submits that guidance is distilled in the CG headnotes; and that the headnote in NM (Christian Converts) is an accurate distillation. He points to the section of the NM (Christian Converts) determination headed "Our Findings" at paragraph 59, the following sentence: "We are concerned solely with assessing the risk to an Afghan Christian living in Afghanistan who has converted from Islam, an apostate." He also draws my attention to the opening sentence of paragraph 66: "We do not think this is an issue as to whether or not an individual in these circumstances is reasonably likely to be discovered on return." If this is not the issue according to the determination itself, how can it be, to quote the Practice Directions (10 February 2010), "the country guidance issue identified in the determination"?

[30] The context of the two cited sentences diminishes the effect to an extent: but essentially I think Mr McIlvride is right. The determining issue in NM (Christian Converts) is about the risk of serious ill treatment amounting to persecution of Christian convert returnees who express their religious belief [§§ 71-73]. The guidance on this issue is appropriately encapsulated in the headnote. It follows that there was no error of law, no arguable error even, by the Immigration Judge in the present case in failing to apply or to distinguish the guidance given in NM (Christian Converts); neither was there a reviewable error on the part of the Senior Immigration Judge of the Upper Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) who refused leave to appeal.

[31] Mr McIlvride might have gone further. He might have said that NM (Christian Converts) is derivative, the source decisions for Mr Caskie's "tracking down" proposition being PM (Hizb-i-Islami) and RQ (Afghan National Army). Arguably this is another flaw in the submission for the Petitioner because the Practice Directions (10 February 2010) state that "Country Guidance" must be "based upon the evidence before the members of the Tribunal, the AIT or the IAT that determine the appeal." Though Dr Giustozzi gave evidence in NM (Christian Converts) he did not apparently adopt or give evidence about, and was not cross examined on, the text founded on by Mr Caskie. I note too that NM (Christian Converts) did not actually treat the source decisions as "Country Guidance" in relation to the proposition contended for by Mr Caskie.

Conclusion

[31] The 2007 Act allows an appeal to the Upper Tribunal on a "point of law". A "point of law" does not mean an "error of law": it means a "question of law". Perhaps Counsel for the Petitioner should have gone no further than asking me to decide, first, that there was and is a "question of law", namely whether the case of NM (Christian Converts) constitutes relevant "Country Guidance" for the Petitioner's situation; and, secondly, that in failing to identify, and to seise the Upper Tribunal of, that "question of law" the Senior Immigration Judges made an "error of law". Instead Counsel asked me to decide the merits of the "question of law" itself; and I have decided that NM (Christian Converts), properly understood, is not "Country Guidance" applicable to the Petitioner's case. Arguably this is usurping the function of the Upper Tribunal: but having made the decision both parties ask me to make, I shall let matters take their course. I should be surprised if the Upper Tribunal, on being presented with the same question, were to reach a different conclusion. That is perhaps as far as I can go [cf. KD (Nepal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2011 SC 560 §§ 6 and 7].

[32] Something more ought to be said about the issue raised by Mr Caskie. If I am right that there is no CG case law on the risk generally to returnees who wish to conceal something about themselves and on the key issue of internal relocation and if Mr Caskie correctly represents the position - which, after a word search of the Afghanistan COIRs since 2008, I think he does - that the key issue of internal relocation is no longer covered by the Afghanistan COIRs, then I would have to say that there is a gap in the information available for decision-makers [cf. Determination by Immigration Judge H J MacDonald dated 20 October 2010 at § 33].

[33] Another thing I would say is that, if CG cases are to add maximum value, identification of "the country guidance issue" must be done not just carefully but also systematically within the body of the determination. Otherwise CG cases risk falling short of the requisite standard of legal certainty. It seems to me that an arguable point about the scope of a CG case amounts, potentially, to an Eba-proof question of law for the reason that it is likely to involve "an important point of principle or practice". There is also the still - I think - unresolved question whether "risk to life" of the kind that can arise with Immigration Acts decisions constitutes "some other compelling reason" for allowing review.

[34] In this context, Mr Caskie makes a suggestion - which I have not evaluated but judge worthy of recording - that when Parliament restricted the category of tribunal decisions appealable to the Court of Session in terms of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 s. 13, Parliament did not have in view "life and death" decisions, as Mr Caskie calls them, for the reason that the proposed tribunal jurisdiction did not then extend to immigration matters. The Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the unified tribunal system, replacing the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, did not come into being until 15 February 2010 when the Transfer of Functions of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal Order SI 2010/21 took effect.

[35] Has the Supreme Court really confronted the issue of the scope for reviewing "life or death" decisions? Eba was about a claim for disability living allowance and the English case of Cart was about liability for child maintenance [R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal (SC(E)) [2011] 3 WLR 107]. The English immigration case selected for hearing along with Eba and Cart was MR (Pakistan). MR was a Pakistani visa-overstayer who applied for asylum on the basis of his claimed conversion, I think while over-staying, to Christianity. His application was rejected by UKBA and on appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. In refusing permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, Ouseley J said: "... crucial to the decision was the finding that the applicant was not a genuine convert to Christianity." The question of risk on return, "how a genuine convert would be treated", did not arise [R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal; R (MR (Pakistan)) (SC(E))
[2011] 3 WLR 107 at §§ 5, 59].

[36] However, for the reasons already given I find it unnecessary to address the issue whether application of the Eba rules would authorise review in the present case. On the basis that, as the matter has been presented to me, there was and is no reviewable error of law, I shall grant the Respondent's motion, sustain the Respondent's second Plea-in-Law and refuse the Petition.