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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> McCann v Messrs Waddell and Macintosh, Solicitors & Ors [2014] ScotCS CSOH_15A (30 January 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2014/2014CSOH15A.html Cite as: [2014] ScotCS CSOH_15A |
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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A102/10
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OPINION OF LORD BRODIE
in the cause
ROBERT JAMES McCANN Pursuer;
against
(FIRST) MESSRS WADDELL & MacINTOSH SOLICITORS and (SECOND) JOHN M MASON and (THIRD) ROGNVALD MASON Defenders:
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Defenders: McBrearty QC Irvine; Dundas & Wilson
30 January 2014
Introduction
A
claim for damages for professional negligence
[1] This
is an action for damages at the instance of a builder and property developer
against the firm of solicitors who were engaged to conclude missives on his
behalf for the sale of subjects extending to 3.9 hectares at Sillyhole,
Dalmellington, Ayrshire, title number AYR 71936 ("Sillyhole") to EASSDA
Limited ("EASSDA") between August 2004 and September 2006.
[2] In short,
it is the pursuer's case that as a result of the responsible solicitor's
negligence the pursuer became bound to a contract of sale which was conditional
on him obtaining planning consent for residential development on the subjects
within a period of twelve months from the date of the missives, with an option
to the purchasers to withdraw from the bargain in the event that consent was
not obtained in that period, but with no equivalent option to the pursuer as
seller to withdraw in the same circumstances. As a result, when planning
consent was not obtained within the stipulated period and EASSDA did not
withdraw, the pursuer remained bound to the contract and, for that reason, lost
the opportunity to accept the offer of another prospective purchaser at a much
enhanced price.
[3] The
contract was initially concluded in terms of missives dated 27 August
2004, 1 October 2004, 29 October 2004, 9 November 2004,
11 November 2004, 20 January 2005, 31 January 2005, 10 February
2005, 18 February 2005 and 4 March 2005. The agreed purchase price
was £650,000 with a date of entry fourteen days after the grant of outline
Planning Consent in terms of clause 4 of the missives.
Clause 4 was of critical importance. It appeared in the purchasers' offer of 27 August 2004. It was in the following terms:
"4. It is an essential condition of this Offer that the Sellers shall obtain within a period of twelve months of the date hereof outline Planning Consent for a housing development on the subjects which Planning Consent shall not be subject to onerous conditions. If the said Planning Consent is not granted within the said time period or is granted subject to conditions which the Purchasers consider to be onerous acting reasonably, then the Purchasers shall be entitled, but not bound, to resile from the missives to follow hereon without any liability arising by one party to the other."
[4] The
pursuer avers that prior to concluding missives for the sale of the subjects to
EASSDA he had received no advice from the defenders regarding the meaning and
effect of clause 4. The pursuer further avers:
"In particular, the pursuer received no advice from the firm on whether he could rescind the missives or on the circumstances in which EASSDA could rescind the missives. The pursuer was unaware that the meaning and effect of clause 4 was that that he was unable to rescind the missives after the expiry of the twelve month period if outline Planning Consent for residential development had not been obtained. It is commonplace for missives to include rights of rescission for both purchaser and vendor in the event that anticipated planning permissions are not obtained. Such provisions secure an equality of arms between the purchaser and vendor. No solicitor of ordinary skill and competence exercising reasonable care would have failed to advise the pursuer: (i) of the meaning and effect of clause 4 of the missives; (ii) that clause 4 only gave EASSDA a right to rescind the missives; (iii) that the effect of clause 4 of the missives was that he would remain bound by them until EASSDA rescinded them as he had no right to rescind the missives and there was no long stop date beyond which the missives would fall; (iv) that clause 4 should be amended to give him a right to rescind the missives if outline Planning Consent was not obtained within the twelve month period; and (v) not to conclude missives unless clause 4 was amended in the forgoing manner. The pursuer received no such advice from the firm. If the pursuer had received such advice from the firm he would not have concluded missives unless clause 4 was amended to give him a right to rescind the missives if outline Planning Consent was not obtained within the twelve month period. As such provisions are commonplace in missives of this nature the pursuer has no reason to believe that such an amendment to clause 4 would not have been accepted by EASSDA."
[5] The
pursuer concludes for damages in the sum of £2,000,000. He instructs his
loss by the following averments:
"The pursuer had difficulty in obtaining outline Planning Consent and such consent was not obtained by 31 December 2006. Accordingly, the amended missives fell and the original missives continued unaltered. On or about July 2007 the pursuer received an unsolicited unconditional oral offer from Mr Raymond Clyde on behalf of Croftmore Developments to purchase the subjects for £2,500,000. In particular, this offer was not conditional upon the obtaining of outline Planning Consent for residential development on the subjects. Croftmore Developments were confident that outline Planning Consent for residential development on the subjects would be granted by the planning authority and therefore were prepared to make an unconditional offer to purchase the subjects. Croftmore Developments had placed £2,759,055 on deposit with their solicitors. Messrs Macdonald Henderson in Glasgow, and wished to purchase the subjects without delay. Mr Clyde had the required authority to make such an offer on behalf of Croftmore Developments. If the missives had provided the pursuer with a corresponding right to rescind the missives after the expiry of said twelve month period he would have rescinded the missives and concluded new missives for the sale of the subjects to Croftmore Developments for a purchase price of £2,500,000. The pursuer re-marketed the subjects for sale. The pursuer concluded missives for the sale of the subjects to JCR Developments Limited by letters dated 15 July 2009. The date of entry was 15 July 2009 and the purchase price was £500.000."
The defence to the
action
[6] The
enrolled solicitor who negotiated the missives on behalf of the pursuer was Mr James
Gibson.
[7] The
position of the defenders is that notwithstanding that the pursuer was the
proprietor of Sillyhole and that it was he for whom they were acting in respect
of the sale, at all times the firm took their instructions from the pursuer's
father, Robert McCann Senior, and that Mr Gibson provided full and
appropriate advice to Mr McCann Senior before receiving his instructions
to conclude missives on terms which included clause 4. In particular the
defenders aver:
"A solicitor of ordinary skill and competence exercising reasonable care would have concluded missives on behalf of a seller which included clause 4, provided that the seller had been alerted to the effect of clause 4 and had nevertheless instructed the solicitor to proceed with the transaction. Further explained and averred that the initial offer from EASSDA was faxed to the firm on 27 August 2004. On that day, the firm's Mr Gibson telephoned Mr McCann Senior (who was instructing him in relation to the transaction) in order to advise him in relation to the offer and take instructions thereon. He advised Mr McCann Senior that clause 4 of the missives gave the purchaser the right to resile from the missives in the event of planning permission not being obtained, but that the seller did not have the same right. He advised that it was normal for both parties to have the right to resile and that the clause should be deleted and replaced with an appropriate alternative, in terms of which the same right to resile would be granted to the seller., Mr McCann Senior indicated that he did not wish to amend clause 4 in that way. He was anxious to settle the transaction and considered that the suggested revisal might discourage EASSDA from proceeding. Moreover, he advised Mr Gibson that a planning application had already been submitted and that he was confident that planning permission would be granted within the necessary timescale, so that he was not concerned that the right to resile lay only with the purchaser. Accordingly, having received Mr Gibson's advice, Mr McCann Senior nevertheless instructed Mr Gibson not to revise clause 4. On 29 September 2004, Mr Gibson and Mr McCann Senior discussed the matter further by telephone. Mr Gibson reminded Mr McCann Senior that only the purchaser would have a right to resile and that it would be necessary to obtain planning permission within the nine month time limit then set out in the missives. Again, Mr McCann approved clause 4 without revisal. On 3 March 2005, prior to the conclusion of the missives, Mr Gibson again reminded Mr McCann Senior of the fact that the seller had no right to resile. Mr McCann Senior indicated that he was happy that there was more than enough time to obtain the planning permission within the necessary period (which, by then, had been increased to twelve months) and instructed Mr Gibson to conclude the missives without revisal of clause 4."
[8] The
defenders do not accept that the pursuer received an offer from Croftmore Developments,
as he claims that he did.
[9] A line of
defence which appears in Answer 6 of the Record to the effect that on a proper
construction of clause 4 the pursuer was entitled to call on EASSDA either
to implement the contract or resile within a reasonable time after the deadline
for the obtaining of planning consent had passed, was expressly departed from
and is accordingly not further discussed.
A factual dispute
[10] As
will be apparent, the success or otherwise of this claim turns on matters of disputed
fact. Later in this opinion, adopting the analysis suggested by counsel for
the pursuer, I set out seven discrete factual issues which require to be
determined in order to resolve the dispute between the parties but, very
broadly, these issues can be compressed into two questions: first, have the
defenders established that Mr Gibson gave the appropriate advice at the
appropriate time to the appropriate person? and, second, has the pursuer
established that he did indeed receive an offer to purchase Sillyhole in
July 2007 at a price of £2.5 million? Witnesses gave conflicting
accounts in relation to the first of these questions. The evidence in relation
to the second of these questions was all to one effect: that such an offer was
indeed made, but the witnesses speaking to that were all vigorously challenged
as to their veracity. This is therefore a case which is dependent upon an
assessment of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses as to fact, and
what is to be made of their evidence. These are matters which I shall have to
address in some detail but, first, having identified who the witnesses were, I
shall set out what I held to be established by the essentially undisputed
evidence, in order to provide a context for a discussion of what was more
controversial.
The proof
[11] The
action was raised early in 2010. It came to an eight-day diet of proof
commencing on 15 May 2012. At that diet the pursuer was represented by Mr Sandison
QC, and the defenders by Mr McBrearty. The pursuer was led in evidence,
as were his father, Robert McCann Senior; Professor Robert Rennie, Professor of
Conveyancing in the University of Glasgow; Stuart Jackson, a house
builder and director of EASSDA; Raymond Clyde, a builder and property
investor; and Mrs Michelle McCann or Edens, the sister of the pursuer. A
continued diet of proof was fixed for 15 January 2013 but when the case
called on that day I was advised that the pursuer was not in a position to
proceed and Mr Sandison moved for discharge of the diet and a continuation
to another diet. Against opposition on behalf of the defenders, I granted that
motion on conditions. The case called again for proof at a continued diet on
5 November 2013. The pursuer was represented by Mr Bowen QC.
Mr McBrearty QC, as by then he was, appeared with Ms Irvine for the
defenders. The evidence of Kevin Bell, MRICS, chartered surveyor, was led
as the final witness on behalf of the pursuer. James Gibson, solicitor;
Donald Reid, solicitor; Mrs Jess Nisbet, an estate agent who
carried on business as The Homeseller Agency; and Gordon King FRICS,
chartered surveyor, were led on behalf of the defenders. The parties agreed by
joint minute that the affidavit of David Flint, a solicitor and partner in
Balfour + Manson LLP, be taken as the equivalent of his oral evidence. Following
submissions, the proof was concluded on 14 November 2013.
Uncontroversial
matters of fact
Background
[12] The
background to the case was what was described by witnesses as a "buoyant" or "booming"
market for the sale of land for residential development in East Ayrshire in the
years immediately preceding the economic crash of 2008. The market was
rising and, to judge by the evidence of the pursuer and other witnesses, quite
substantial sums of money were to be made by trading in land with potential for
house building; according to one of the witnesses, "land was going for crazy
money". Active in that market were speculators and developers from Northern
Ireland where by then prices were higher than in Scotland. Among the Northern
Irish business people who came to Scotland and settled there in that period
with a view to working as dealers in land and builders, were members of the
McCann family: two brothers, a sister and a father. On the evidence, the
McCanns were a close family who cooperated one with the other in forwarding
their various business interests. While that much was clear, parties were at
issue on what precisely was the role played by Mr McCann Senior.
The witnesses to fact
[13] The
pursuer is Robert James McCann. He was born in Northern Ireland in 1975
and therefore was 37 years of age when he gave evidence at the proof. He
first came to Scotland in 2001. He is the son of Robert McCann
Senior. He is one of five siblings, two boys and three girls. All his
brothers and sisters now live in Scotland. The eldest of the children is Mrs Michelle
Elizabeth McCann or Edens. The pursuer's elder brother is
Stephen John McCann. At the time the pursuer moved to Scotland he
had been working with his brother Stephen as a roofer. The brothers came
to Scotland to build a development of forty nine houses at Barony Road,
Auchinleck, on behalf of a Northern Ireland company, Crossgreen Properties
Limited. The pursuer was appointed as secretary (on 30 May 2003) of
Regent Builders Limited, an English registered company which had been
incorporated in 2002 as a vehicle for the building of houses for
Crossgreen (a Northern Ireland registered Regent Builders Limited would appear
to have been incorporated later in 2002, again with the pursuer as
secretary). Stephen McCann was the director of Regent Builders. The
registered office of the English registered Regent Builders was at the address
of John Beaumont, an accountant who acted for Stephen McCann and
other members of the McCann family (including Mr McCann Senior, as it
would appear from the pursuer's evidence, but not so according to Mr McCann
Senior). Through working on the Auchinleck site, the pursuer and Stephen McCann
became involved in land acquisition in Scotland. The pursuer explained that he
set up a company, XL Contracts Limited. Details from the Register of
Companies give an incorporation date of 22 March 2006 for XL Contracts
and the date of the pursuer becoming a director as 18 May 2006 but the
pursuer's evidence that it was set up in 2004 may mean that XL Contracts
was initially used as a business name. In late 2003 to early 2004
the pursuer, together with Clarence Coulter, a Northern Irish businessman,
bought the shareholding of DMH Leisure Limited, the company which owned
Brunston Castle Golf Club. This was the pursuer's first experience of
instructing Mr Gibson of the defenders. The mechanism of acquisition of
the golf club involved the incorporation of Quartzite Circle Limited to act as
the holding company of DMH Leisure. Initially the pursuer was secretary
and director of Quartzite Circle.
[14] Robert McCann
Senior was 66 years of age when he gave evidence at the proof. He had
been in business as a building contractor in Northern Ireland. He had
undertaken a housing development on a 23-acre site at Ballygally, County
Antrim, funded by Abbey National PLC. The development had not been a financial
success due to a down-turn in the housing market and this had resulted in litigation
with his funders which was finally determined against Mr McCann by a
judgment of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland dated 13 June 1997.
Robert McCann Senior described himself as being retired since
about 1995 or 1996 when, he explained, he had suffered two heart
attacks. In giving evidence-in-chief he indicated that he had had no involvement
in site purchase prior to 1995/6 and, more specifically, had no experience
of the Scottish system of land purchase. That evidence has to be given context.
During his evidence the pursuer said of his father that "he had been working
with the price of land all his days; that is where I got my knowledge from". The
pursuer also described his father as being "good at looking at sites" and
indicated that "he was not active until he came [to Scotland] in 2003",
implying that after 2003 Mr McCann Senior was active in that respect.
In evidence-in-chief the pursuer readily accepted that his father was "running
around doing stuff for [Stephen McCann and the pursuer] ... he was doing
deals for us". When Mrs Michelle Edens was referring to her father,
she described him as: "quite good at talking to people". There was evidence of
Mr McCann's involvement in a number of land transactions or potential
transactions where the defenders were instructed to act. These related to the
shareholding of DMH Leisure Limited; woodland at Brunston Castle; land at
Main Street, Kirkoswald; ground at New Cumnock; and properties at Highfield
Avenue, Kilmarnock, 72 Templehill, Troon, South Harbour, Ayr, and Bogside
Road, Kilsyth.
[15] Stuart Jackson
was 31 years of age when he gave evidence. He was a member of a family of
business people in Northern Ireland whose interests included house building. These
interests were held by companies which in evidence were referred to as "the
Jackson group". One of these companies was EASSDA. Stuart Jackson was a
director of EASSDA and "ran Scotland for the family".
[16] Raymond Clyde
described himself as a builder. He carried out the business of land purchase
and development in partnership with his wife, either as Croftmore Developments
or Croftmore Developments Limited. He described a number of successful land
transactions in Northern Ireland. By 2005/2006 he was looking to buy land
in Scotland with potential for residential development. He had made a number
of purchases in Scotland, one of which was a site at Ayr Road, Kilmarnock,
which he bought from the pursuer. Mr Clyde's various investments were
funded by some £3 million of Croftmore's own money and some £10
million of borrowing. During the period 30 July to 16 August 2007
Croftmore Developments Limited held the sum of £2,759,055 on deposit with
their solicitors, MacDonald Henderson. That sum had been borrowed from
the Presbyterian Mutual Society of Belfast with a view to the purchase of a
site at Watson Terrace, Drongan, Ayrshire, in terms of an offer of loan dated
27 July 2007 (7/12/5 of process). Mr Clyde described himself as
having a good business relationship with the Presbyterian Mutual Society and
its secretary Mr Colin Ferguson.
[17] Mrs Michelle Edens
had been a civil servant in Northern Ireland, working in a VAT office. She had
taken a career break in 2004 and come over to Scotland to manage Brunston
Castle Golf Club. She was described on more than one occasion in the pursuer's
evidence as the person who "deals with the paperwork". She was company
secretary and director of XL Contracts Limited. She was company secretary
and a director of DMH Leisure Limited and company secretary (in succession to
the pursuer) and a director of Quartzite Circle Limited.
[18] James Alexander
Gibson was 70 years of age when he gave evidence. He had graduated LLB
from Edinburgh University in 1965. Since being admitted as a solicitor
in 1967 he has worked principally in chambers practice as a conveyancer. He
was formerly a partner with Wright Johnston & Mackenzie. From 1997 he
has worked as an employed solicitor with the defenders. At all relevant times
it was Mr Gibson who handled transactions for members of the McCann family.
[19] Mrs Jess Nisbet
has carried on business as an estate agent since 1996, latterly under the
style of The Homeseller Agency. Her premises are in Cumnock. She described
her business as basically residential with some commercial deals, mostly to do
with land development sites. Her work includes introducing potential buyers to
sellers. She has marketed houses which Stephen McCann had built at
Auchinleck. She had introduced Mr McCann Senior to the Jacksons with a
view to the sale of Sillyhole and she had similarly introduced Stephen McCann
(who explained that he was representing his father) to Mr and Mrs Clyde,
again with a view to a sale of Sillyhole.
Sillyhole
The site
[20] The
Sillyhole site is set at the edge of the village of Dalmellington, Ayrshire. Dalmellington
with its adjoining settlements of Burnton and Bellsbank, has a resident
population of around 2800. It is located on the A713 Ayr to Castle Douglas
road about 13 miles southeast of Ayr. At all relevant dates Sillyhole
comprised an undeveloped green-field site of irregular but approximately
triangular shape with a covering of grass and scrubland. It extends to
9.85 acres. Sillyhole was the larger of two areas of ground acquired by
the pursuer at about the same time. The smaller area extended to some
3.13 acres and was referred to as "The Glebe" or the "The Sawmill".
[21] Prior to
the pursuer becoming interested in the site it was understood by parties that
there had been a grant of planning permission for residential development of
The Glebe but that it had lapsed.
[22] Sillyhole
lies within the area of the East Ayrshire Local Plan. In the current Plan,
which was adopted in October 2010, Sillyhole is zoned for residential use.
However, in the previous version of the Local Plan, adopted in 2003, the
site was shown as an area of open countryside subject to countryside policies
which were aimed at preserving the land in agricultural use. The process of
evolution of the Local Plan included the publication in August 2006 of a
Consultative Draft Local Plan. That Draft identified Sillyhole as a potential
site for development by building fifty houses, with a proportion of these to
conform to the Affordable Housing Policy, that is to be available as social housing.
The significance to a developer of a requirement that a particular number of
housing units must conform to the Affordable Housing Policy is that the selling
price of these units will be lower than it would be otherwise. This has an
adverse impact on the value of site pro rata with the number of units
which must be subject to the Policy. In fact when the Local Plan was adopted
no requirement for an element of social housing was imposed.
[23] On 26 February
2009 the local authority approved Modifications to the East Ayrshire Local Plan
which had the result of Sillyhole being zoned for residential development.
Acquisition by the
pursuer
[24] The
pursuer acquired Sillyhole and The Glebe in July 2004 by virtue of a
transaction, the full details of which were not completely teased out in
evidence. Mr McCann Senior played a significant part. According to the
pursuer, Sillyhole was initially identified to him and his brother, Stephen, by
Wallace Milligan, a partner in the firm of Taylor Associates, Architects
and it was he who drew it to his father's attention. The Glebe again was
identified by a partner of Taylor Associates but this time it was Hugh Taylor
who took Mr McCann Senior to meet the proprietors and it was Mr McCann
Senior who negotiated the purchase price. The pursuer accepted that when it
came to the formal purchase of the two parcels of land instructions were given
to the professionals involved, Taylor Associates and the defenders, by Mr McCann
Senior. At that time Mr McCann Senior was acting on behalf of County
Commerce Limited. The request that the defenders act in the proposed purchase
came in a letter from Hugh Taylor, dated 2 April 2004. In that letter the
two parcels are described as having been purchased "by County Commerce (Mr Robert
McCann)". Notwithstanding the pursuer's evidence that it was he who was
initially interested, it was Mr McCann Senior who signed a manuscript
agreement to purchase Sillyhole, a copy of which was included in the
conveyancing file (7/17/122 of process). Formal missives were concluded
for The Glebe on 7 July 2004 and for Sillyhole on 13 July 2004
(7/16/88 and 7/17/101 of process), both in the name of County Commerce
Limited. However, in July 2004 Mr Gibson received instructions from Mr McCann
Senior that title was to be taken in name of the pursuer and he received
mandates from County Commerce Limited, dated 15 July 2004, confirming this
(7/16/69 and 7/17/91 of process). Dispositions were duly delivered and
the pursuer signed Land Transaction Returns in respect of each plot of land in
September 2004 (7/16/10 and 7/17/40 of process).
Sale
[25] The
contract for the sale by the pursuer of Sillyhole to EASSDA was concluded on
the basis of an exchange of missives between Frazer Coogans, Solicitors, acting
on behalf of EASSDA and the defenders acting on behalf of the pursuer. As I have
already indicated, these missives are dated, respectively, 27 August 2004,
1 October 2004, 29 October 2004, 9 November 2004,
11 November 2004, 20 January 2005, 21 January 2005, 10 February
2005, 18 February 2005 and 4 March 2005. It was the letter of offer
to purchase of 27 August 2004 which included clause 4.
[26] The initial
offer to purchase of 27 August 2004 comprehended both Sillyhole and The
Glebe at a price of £1 million but the defenders' missive of 29 October
2004 allocated a price of £650,000 to Sillyhole and £350,000 to the
Glebe with different provisions as to date of entry and payment.
[27] In relation
to Sillyhole outline Planning Consent was not obtained within the timescale
specified in clause 4 of the missives. Accordingly, the missives were
re-negotiated by the parties by letters dated 7 September 2006,
9 September 2006 and 11 September 2006. Clause 1 increased the
purchase price to £800,000 if outline Planning Consent for residential development
was obtained prior to 31 December 2006. Clause 3 provided that if
outline Planning Consent was not obtained by 31 December 2006 the amended
missives would fall and the original missives would remain unaltered.
[28] An
application for residential development at Sillyhole was registered with East
Ayrshire Council on 31 October 2006. As at that date it was contrary to
Local Plan policy in that the relevant area was not zoned for residential
development.
[29] The pursuer
did not obtain outline Planning Consent by 31 December 2006 with the
result that that the amended missives fell and the original missives continued
unaltered.
[30] With the
zoning of Sillyhole for residential development the local authority was free to
determine the pursuer's application for planning consent which it did by
granting outline consent on 4 June 2009. However EASSDA resiled from the
contract to purchase on 17 June 2009.
[31] The pursuer
re-marketed the subjects. He concluded a contract for their sale to JCR
Developments in terms of missives dated 15 July 2009 with entry on the
same date at a price of £500,000.
Expert evidence
Parties'
approach to the expert evidence
[32] The
parties led expert evidence on two topics: (1) solicitors' professional
practice and what amounted to the exercise of reasonable care in the conduct of
that practice; and (2) the market value of Sillyhole as at July 2007.
Professor Rennie and Mr Reid spoke to solicitors' professional
practice. Mr Bell and Mr King spoke to valuation. It was accepted
that all these witnesses were appropriately qualified and experienced to give
the evidence that they did. No criticism was made of the way in which they
approached their tasks. That is not to say that the evidence which the
witnesses gave was entirely uncontroversial. It was not. To an extent, Professor Rennie's
evidence diverged from that of Mr Reid and Mr Bell's evidence quite
clearly evidence diverged from that of Mr King. All the witnesses were
vigorously cross-examined and each counsel commended the respective approaches
of the witnesses which he had led, and relied on their evidence. There was
however a recognition at each side of the bar that well qualified experts may
differ as to, for example, acceptable professional practice or the most
appropriate approach to determining market value. Accordingly, neither Mr Bowen
nor Mr McBrearty suggested that the expert evidence led for the other
party should be rejected and neither put forward a basis which would have
entitled me to have done that. Rather, it was counsel's position that all the
expert evidence could be accepted, as long as it was seen as part of a
composite whole which included all the factual evidence in the case.
Solicitors' practice
[33] I
heard evidence on two matters relating to solicitors' practice: first, the
advice which should be given to a client selling property faced with an offer
containing a suspensive condition in the terms of clause 4; and, second,
whether a solicitor should accept instructions to conclude missives on behalf
of his client when these instructions come through an intermediary. In
relation to the first matter the expert witnesses were agreed as to what advice
should be given and I have simply accepted that evidence. In relation to the
second matter, while not doubting the soundness of what either witness said, I
have come to the view that what was being discussed did not properly come
within the province of what can be determined by opinion evidence. Rather, it fell
to be determined by the application of the law of agency to primary facts.
[34] In his
Opinion, 6/8 of process, and as he confirmed in his evidence, Professor Rennie
sets out the duties of solicitor of ordinary competence acting with ordinary
skill and care in relation to the sale of land for development where the offer
to purchase is subject to a suspensive condition. Generally speaking, these
are: to advise as to the meaning and effect of the suspensive condition and in
particular to advise on any time limits imposed for the purification of such a
condition; to advise on who had the obligation to take the steps necessary for
purification, in this case to make application for planning permission; to
advise that there should be a longstop date within which the condition must be
purified so that the parties would not be left in a situation where was doubt
as to their legal position; and to advise on the legal effect of the condition
not being purified. In relation to clause 4 in the missives in the
present case the duties of the defenders were: to advise that in the event that
planning permission was not obtained within the twelve month period only the
pursuers could resile but the seller could not; to advise that if the planning
permission was not obtained within the time limit an issue would arise as to
how long the missives would remain enforceable; to advise that until the
purchasers resiled the seller would be bound in the missives and therefore
could not sell to any other party with the result that there would be
uncertainty as to the legal position; and to advise that clause 4 did not
represent the normal suspensive condition for a sale and purchase of this type.
[35] Essentially,
Mr Reid agreed with Professor Rennie's analysis of the particular
duties of a solicitor in the position of the defenders who had received an
offer to purchase subject to a suspensive condition in the form of clause 4.
For that reason, as Mr Reid put it in his opinion letter of 28 March
2012, 7/18 of process, there is a case against the defenders which they
have to answer. In other words, if the defenders are not to be found to have
been negligent they must show that, at least in substance, they did indeed give
the advice specified by Professor Rennie.
[36] Whereas Professor Rennie
and Mr Reid were more or less at one on what advice should be given to a
seller faced with an offer to purchase subject to a suspensive condition in the
form of clause 4, there was a difference of view in relation to the
separate question of whether a solicitor of ordinary competence exercising
reasonable care can properly take a client's instructions to conclude an
onerous contract such as the sale of heritage, through an intermediary. The
evidence of Professor Rennie in chief was that a solicitor should never
take instructions from an intermediary without express antecedent authority
having been given to do so. He instanced the grant of a power of attorney as
an example of such express authority. In the event of the circumstances averred
by the defenders in the present case, with Mr McCann Senior purporting to
give instructions on behalf of his son, Professor Rennie would have
expected the defenders to have written to the pursuer, as their client, setting
out the risks associated with contracting in terms of clause 4 and seeking
confirmation of the instructions received from Mr McCann Senior. The
reason for doing this was to ensure that the client did indeed understand the
risks of proceeding in this way, although recording his advice in writing also
provided protection for the solicitor in the sense of documenting the advice
given lest there be any dispute as to what had been said in the course of
advising orally. In cross-examination, Professor Rennie conceded that
necessary advice might be given orally without the solicitor being in breach of
duty. He recognised that as a matter of law an agent might have authority to
instruct a solicitor on behalf of his principal but he emphasised the problem
for the solicitor in knowing the extent of the agent's authority. The
relationship between client and solicitor is a special sort of agency and the
solicitor has to have the sort of certainty as to his position which is
conferred by instructions in writing. The relevant Law Society of Scotland
Code of Conduct advised against taking instructions through an intermediary; a
solicitor just should not do it. Professor Rennie disagreed with the
proposition that a solicitor of ordinary competence exercising reasonable care
could properly take instructions from a father to conclude missives on behalf
of a son on the basis of a course of conduct which indicated that the father
repeatedly purported to act on his son's behalf and that the son was content
with that.
[37] Mr Reid
disagreed with Professor Rennie on what was necessary before a solicitor
could regard himself as instructed in a matter such as the conclusion of
missives. In his opinion a solicitor would be entitled to make what he
referred to as "a judgment call" as to whether he did have his principals'
authority on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
[38] Mr Bowen
relied on Professor Rennie's evidence for a submission that even if the
court were satisfied that there was a practice whereby Mr Gibson did in
fact accept instructions from Mr McCann Senior without objection from the
pursuer, the defenders were nevertheless in breach of duty, at least in the
instance of the sale of Sillyhole, by reason of not having obtained the
pursuer's written confirmation of his authority to conclude the transaction.
[39] Mr McBrearty,
for his part, submitted, under reference to the law as stated in Honisz
v Lothian Health Board 2008 SC 235 and Bothwell v DM Hall
[2009] CSOH 24, that it was not for the court to prefer the evidence of
either Professor Rennie, on the one hand, or Mr Reid, on the other. It
was Mr McBrearty's submission that Mr Reid's views could not be
criticised as illogical or without foundation. Accordingly, given Mr Reid's
unchallenged expertise, his evidence provides support for the conclusion that,
in advising Mr McCann Senior in relation to clause 4 (assuming that
that is what Mr Gibson did) Mr Gibson was acting in a manner
consistent with the standard to be expected of an ordinarily competent
solicitor, acting with ordinary care. Mr Reid's view should be taken as
representing that of a responsible and experienced practitioner. The pursuer
could only succeed on the narrow issue of advice not having been given to him
rather than his father, if the court were able to conclude that Mr Reid
had somehow failed to analyse the basis for his views and that these views did
not hold up on logical scrutiny. On the contrary, submitted Mr McBrearty,
Mr Reid's views were carefully reasoned and had regard to the consequences
of the solicitor getting the judgment call wrong (ie if he purported to
contract with a third party on behalf of a client who had not in fact given him
authority to do so, the solicitor would be liable to the third party for
damages for breach of warranty of authority). Mr Reid had recognised that
to obtain express authority would avoid problems and that it might be
preferable to do so, but that did not in any way detract from the force of his
evidence that it would be permissible to proceed without that express
authority, not least having regard his evidence that problems very rarely arise
in practice.
[40] I
recognised the prudence of the practice advocated by Professor Rennie and
the practicality of the practice considered acceptable by Mr Reid. Had it
been necessary for me to determine whether the method of giving advice and
taking instructions spoken to by Mr Gibson constituted a breach of duty,
as identified in Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200, by reference
to the opinion evidence given by Professor Rennie and Mr Reid, I
would have been obliged by the authorities discussed in Honisz to find
that Mr Gibson had not been negligent in this regard. However, as counsel
and the experts themselves essentially accepted, the issues here: whether the
pursuer was given or should be taken to have been given the appropriate advice
about clause 4, and whether he authorised or should be taken to have
authorised the conclusion of missives which included clause 4, are
questions either of simple primary fact, or of mixed primary fact and law,
there being no legal rule that a solicitor cannot be instructed on behalf of a
client by way of an intermediary. They are not issues which can be determined
by evidence as to what does or does not conform to acceptable professional standards.
Valuation of
Sillyhole
[41] The
purchase price agreed for Sillyhole in terms of the missives concluded on
4 March 2005 was £650,000. The price under the amended missives
concluded on 11 September 2006 was £800,000. These prices assumed
outline planning permission for a commercially viable residential development.
[42] Both
parties led expert evidence as to market value. Mr Kevin Bell, MRICS
gave evidence on behalf of the pursuer under reference to his report dated
16 April 2012, 6/9 of process and Gordon King FRICS gave
evidence on behalf of the defenders under reference to his report dated 13 April
2012, 7/35 of process. Mr Bell considered two valuation dates,
September 2006 and July 2007 but he came to the same figures for both
dates: £2,100,000 with the benefit of outline planning permission, and £2,000,000
with the benefit of zoning for residential development. Mr King
considered only one date, July 2007. His valuation was £500,000.
[43] As I have
already indicated, notwithstanding the apparent disparity in the figures
neither Mr Bowen nor Mr McBrearty asked me to come to a view as to
which valuation was correct or even preferable. The significance of the
July 2007 date was that that is when it is alleged that Raymond Clyde
offered to purchase Sillyhole at a price of £2,500,000. Accordingly, the
relevance of the valuations was that they might bear on the question as to
whether it is probable that Raymond Clyde did in fact make the offer he
claimed to have made, a question to which I shall have to return. Counsel
recognised that Mr Bell and Mr King had taken rather different
approaches to the assessment of market value but did not seek to commend one
over the other. Mr Bowen's position was that the valuation evidence could
not directly challenge the evidence of the pursuer and Mr Clyde that an
offer £2,500,000 had been made for Sillyhole in July 2007. It may
not have been a prudent offer but it was an actual offer by someone who was
prepared to speculate in the value of the land on what appeared to be a buoyant
market. For his part, Mr McBrearty did not seek to criticise Mr Bell's
conclusion but he pointed to the optimistic assumptions on which that
conclusion was based. These were not assumptions that any prudent purchaser
would have made. Much more realistic was the approach taken by Mr King
and the lower figures which that approach produced.
The principal issues
for determination
[44] In
presenting his overview of the case, Mr Bowen identified seven factual
issues derived from the pleadings which required to be determined for a
resolution of the case. These were as follows: (i) whether the pursuer
received no advice from the defenders regarding the meaning and effect of clause 4
of the missives; (ii) whether Mr McCann Senior had authority to
conclude missives on behalf of the pursuer; (iii) whether Mr Gibson
advised Mr McCann Senior on 27 August 2004 that clause 4 gave
the purchaser but not the seller the right to resile in the event that planning
permission was not obtained, that it was normal for both parties to have the
right to resile and that the clause should be deleted and replaced with an
appropriate alternative in terms of which the same right to resile would be
granted to the seller but that Mr McCann Senior instructed Mr Gibson
not to revise clause 4; (iv) whether Mr Gibson reminded Mr McCann
Senior on 29 September 2004 that only the purchaser would have the right
to resile and that it would be necessary to obtain planning permission within
the nine month planning permission then set out in the missives and Mr McCann
Senior approved clause 4 without revisal; (v) whether Mr Gibson
reminded Mr McCann Senior on 3 March 2005 and prior to conclusion of
missives that seller had no right to resile and that Mr McCann Senior
instructed him to conclude missives without revisal of clause 4;
(vi) whether if the pursuer had received such advice from the defenders he
would not have concluded missives unless clause 4 was amended to give him
a right to resile if outline Planning Consent was not obtained within the
twelve month period; and (vii) whether in July 2007 Raymond Clyde on
behalf of Croftmore Developments orally offered the pursuer £2.5 million
to purchase the subjects without outline planning permission which offer the pursuer
was unable to accept because he did not have a right to resile from the missives.
[45] I propose
in large part to follow the structure suggested by Mr Bowen's list of
issues. Their resolution depends on the credibility and reliability of the
factual witnesses and what is to be made of their evidence. It is to a
preliminary general evaluation of these witnesses that I shall shortly turn but
before doing so I would make a general observation. When assessing apparently
conflicting evidence, it is natural to look for explanations in difficulties
with memory or in honest mistakes as to facts or impressions rather than to
adopt the harsher assessment that witnesses have been deliberately dishonest. Certainly,
that is my own first instinct. However, that is not a course which I was
encouraged to follow in the present case. The position taken by both counsel
was that the witnesses whose evidence was criticised had lied rather than
simply been mistaken, and it is therefore upon that basis that it was submitted
I should approach my evaluation. That being so, I have given particular
consideration as to who should be believed.
The witnesses as to
fact: evaluation of credibility and reliability
James
Gibson
[46] I
shall begin with Mr Gibson, as Mr Bowen invited me to do. He is an
important witness. He requires to be accepted if the defenders are to have a
defence on the question of liability. His evidence therefore requires to be
scrutinised with particular care. A touchstone of that evidence, for both Mr Bowen
and Mr McBrearty, was what appears in Mr Gibson's various file notes.
Mr Gibson explained that the theory of his practice at the relevant time
was to record any discussion about a transaction in a note for inclusion in the
appropriate file. Sometimes these notes were in manuscript but they were more
usually, and by 2005/6 when the defenders "were computerised", always,
dictated, pretty well immediately after the event, and then typed up, usually
the following day. That was the theory. Mr Gibson admitted that his
practice sometimes fell short of his theory; however, it was his position that
while he may have failed to record some telephone calls, all meetings and
important instructions were recorded.
[47] Significantly,
while Mr Bowen submitted that the only proper inference from Mr Gibson's
evidence was that he was not telling the truth about the critical issues in the
case, Mr Bowen did not suggest that any file notes had been fabricated. Rather,
Mr Bowen's approach was to accept the file notes as genuine (although
perhaps not inevitably correctly dated, something Mr Gibson himself
conceded) and to rely upon what did not appear in the notes as an indication of
advice that had not been given. It appears to me that this approach to the
file notes has important implications for what is to be made of the evidence of
other witnesses whose instructions to or other interactions with Mr Gibson
bear to be recorded in the file notes. While I do not suggest that Mr Bowen
can be held to have conceded the factual accuracy of everything that appears in
the file notes, I do take him to have accepted that the file notes were
honestly and more or less contemporaneously compiled. That would in any event
have been my independent assessment of the file notes, based on their contents
and frequency, and what I took from the way in which Mr Gibson gave his
evidence. Mr Gibson's demeanour was that of a careful conveyancer, albeit
one facing the stress of an action for professional negligence. I had no
difficulty in accepting the complete accuracy of his "Absolutely not"; to Mr McBrearty's
question "Have you fabricated any file note?" Mr Gibson gave his
evidence in an apparently straightforward manner and I would accept, as Mr McBrearty
submitted, that there were occasions when he could have answered in a manner
which could have supported the defenders' case, but did not do so, something
which pointed to his wish to be accurate in his evidence as opposed to taking
any opportunity to advance the defenders' case. Such a view of Mr Gibson
would be consistent with my general impression of him as a witness; someone
who thought about the questions and who was considered in his answers without
being unduly cautious or defensive. There was nothing in his demeanour while giving
evidence that suggested that he was doing other than attempting honestly to
answer the questions that he was being asked. I found nothing internally
inconsistent in his evidence.
[48] However,
the crucial part of Mr Gibson's evidence related to the advice that he
said he gave to Mr McCann Senior and which Mr McCann Senior denied
having received. Mr Bowen was very critical of this aspect of Mr Gibson's
evidence. Mr Bowen squarely put to Mr Gibson that he was being
untruthful and in support of that proposition both during cross-examination and
in submission Mr Bowen pointed to what he identified as inconsistencies
between what Mr Gibson had said and the available documentation. The
points made by Mr Bowen were as follows. In evidence-in-chief Mr Gibson
had formulated the advice that he said he had given to Mr McCann Senior
about clause 4 by telephone on 27 August 2004 in terms of an
explanation that if Mr McCann did not get planning consent within the time
specified he "would be stuck with the contract and would not know how to go
forward". No doubt reflecting that formulation, when Mr McBrearty was
taking the evidence of Mr Reid he put to him a summary of the advice said
to have been given by Mr Gibson to Mr McCann Senior in these terms:
"If Mr Gibson had advised that, in relation to clause 4, the purchaser and not the seller had the right to resile, that resile meant to pull out, that the seller should also have the right to resile, that the absence of a double-sided right to resile would lead to difficulties or uncertainty with the seller being stuck with a contract which was not working and that the clause should be amended..."
Referring to that summary, Mr Bowen pointed out that that was not what had been pled, at least not in its entirety. In Answer 4 it is averred:
"[Mr Gibson] advised Mr McCann Senior that clause 4 of the missives gave the purchaser the right to resile from the missives in the event of planning permission not being obtained, but that the seller did not have the same right. He advised that it was normal for both parties to have the right to resile and that the clause should be deleted and replaced with an appropriate alternative in terms of which the same right to resile would be granted to the seller."
Mr Bowen emphasised that what was omitted from the pleadings was any reference to Mr McCann Senior being "stuck with a contract that was not working". Similarly there was no reference in the summary given by Mr Reid in his report (7/18 of process) of the advice he understood that had been given by Mr Gibson (presumably based on Mr Gibson's precognition) to a contract "which was not working". Further, submitted Mr Bowen, the defenders' averment in Answer 4 that on 27 August 2004 Mr McCann Senior instructed Mr Gibson not to revise clause 4 was inconsistent with Mr Gibson's evidence that he had received no instructions following the telephone conversation on that day. Moreover, while Mr Bowen accepted that Mr Gibson had not been asked any questions about this inconsistency either in chief or in re-examination, whereas Mr Reid's evidence was that, in relation to the letter of 14 October 2004 (7/32/294 of process) the precognition of Mr Gibson which had been provided to him stated that "this adjustment was never proposed or instructed to them by Mr McCann himself" and that he took from that statement that no advice had been given in relation to clause 1 of that letter (something consistent with the fact that the pleadings make no reference to it), Mr Gibson's evidence was that he did in fact give advice. In addition, Mr Bowen pointed to the absence of any unequivocal reference to the advice he claimed to have given in any file note or any letter. According to Mr Bowen, the inconsistencies which he had identified and the facts that (i) Mr Gibson had omitted to note the advice that he said he had given on at least three occasions, and (ii) failed to note the details of his purported advice on two further occasions, meant that his evidence on this central issue was not credible. I shall have to return to a consideration of that submission later in this opinion and in doing so I shall address the allegation that Mr Gibson had freely conceded to the pursuer and Michelle Edens that it was his fault that clause 4 had been retained in the missives, something Mr Gibson unequivocally denied, but first I shall say something about the other witnesses in the case.
The pursuer
[49] The
pursuer presented as a practical sort of man. During the relevant period he
had been working in Scotland as a site agent and it would appear from the
evidence that that had kept him busy. Asked by his counsel whether he regarded
himself as "a paperwork sort of man", he answered in the negative. He was
rather quick to agree with propositions put to him and did not appear to give
too much thought to precisely what it was he was being asked, or to the
internal logic of his answers. There was carelessness about some of his
answers, at least when they are considered as evidence given in court. For
example, when during cross-examination about the transaction for the
acquisition of woodland at Brunston, he was asked in whose name title was taken
he answered "Mine" and then "I am not sure"; then, in answer to the question
"Do you know in whose name title was taken?", "No"; and then when Mr Gibson's
file note of 13 July 2004 (7/57 of process) was placed before him:
"Yes the woodlands would be put in my name." Importantly, the pursuer did not
appear to face up to the potential complexity in his affairs introduced by his
father's involvement. An example of this can be seen in a passage of evidence
essentially volunteered by the pursuer during cross-examination. Speaking of Mr McCann
Senior the pursuer said:
"He did do deals for me ... he could make an offer on my behalf [but it] makes no difference till it comes to the crunch."
The explanation given by the pursuer that it makes no difference until it "comes to the crunch" was discussed during final submissions without any very satisfactory resolution from the pursuer's perspective. The matter had been taken up in re-examination and from answers given there I understood the pursuer to have confirmed that he was referring to a formal and therefore potentially binding offer. No doubt it is true, as the pursuer appeared to assume, that it will be unusual for an arms-length offer for land for development to receive an immediate unconditional acceptance and that therefore "the crunch", in the sense of conclusion of a contract, will be postponed. However, as Mr Bowen at the stage of final submissions had to accept, that is not necessarily the case. I had difficulty in understanding how what the pursuer was describing might work in practice. He conceded that his father had at least a certain amount of authority to act on his behalf. As well as "doing deals" for him, the pursuer accepted in cross-examination under reference to the file note of 3 March 2005, 7/29/7 of process, that Mr McCann Senior had authority to give instructions in relation to the grant of a servitude of access to the Sawmill site. Nevertheless, in an immediately preceding passage of evidence, the pursuer confirmed his position as being that it was he who would give instructions "at the point of conclusion of the missives". In fact 3 March 2005 was the point of conclusion of the missives. It was hard to escape the conclusion that the pursuer had not really thought through the consequences of his business practices or, for that matter, the implications of some of his evidence.
[50] Mr McBrearty
went somewhat further and submitted that the pursuer should not be taken to
have told the truth in relation to all of the critical issues and that close
attention should be paid to his evidence in a number of respects.
[51] According
to Mr McBrearty, in answering questions about his father's previous
litigation history, the pursuer showed a tendency to avoid difficult issues: in
cross-examination (near the beginning), his position was that he knew very
little about the action involving his father and Abbey National. When asked
what he knew about it, he answered:
"Not an awful lot. I was 15 or 16 then. They were suing my father and he was counter-suing them. That's the height of my knowledge of it."
Yet in cross-examination Mr McCann Senior stated that the whole family knew all about it, including the pursuer. I do not attach importance to these exchanges. I was not persuaded that the pursuer's answer was necessarily inconsistent with what his father said.
[52] On the
other hand, I found some of Mr McBrearty's criticisms more pertinent. He
submitted that the pursuer had sought to minimise his father's part in the
transaction for the purchase of Sillyhole. I would accept that submission. The
pursuer's evidence in chief was that it was he who had been involved in the
purchase of Sillyhole and the smaller site at The Glebe from the outset. Wallace Milligan
had approached him and his brother Stephen. The pursuer said it was he who had
showed the sites to his father. Mention was made of County Commerce Limited as
a possible lender. It was to be in Stephen McCann's name but he was too
busy to go through with the proposal. However, the pursuer departed from that,
admittedly very broadly sketched out, position under cross-examination when
reference was made to the defenders' files for the purchase of The Glebe (7/16 of
process) and Sillyhole (7/17 of process). As Mr McBrearty came to
submit, and as the pursuer conceded, initially Mr McCann Senior instructed
Mr Gibson in the name of County Commerce Limited, reached agreement with
the seller of the land on 9 June 2004 and, after missives were concluded
in the name of County Commerce, instructed first that title should be taken in
the name of Stephen McCann and then that it be taken in that of the
pursuer. Number 7/17/122 of process was the heads of terms agreed with
the seller of Sillyhole. The pursuer initially identified the signature as his
but then had to accept that it was his father's when presented with a separate
example of father's signature at 7/33/367 of process. I was left with the
impression that the pursuer's account of events was, at best, a simplified and
selective one, informed by hindsight and the exigencies of this litigation. On
the basis of what I saw as the pursuer's avoidance of complexity and lack of
precision when giving evidence, I did not regard him as a very reliable witness.
[53] Critical to
the success of the pursuer's case is that he establish that Raymond Clyde
offered to buy Sillyhole at a price of £2.5 million in July 2007. The
pursuer's productions include a letter from Raymond Clyde under the
letterhead of Croftmore Developments dated 18 August 2009 (6/5 of
process). It is headed "Our land deals with you in Scotland" and refers to Ayr
Road, Kilmarnock and Sillyhole, Dalmellington. In relation to Sillyhole there
is this:
"9.5 acres building land with offer to purchase in 2007 for the sum of 2.5 million pounds. We put on deposit with our solicitor the sum of 2.5 million pounds. Which remained with our solicitor for four weeks, until you conveyed to us that you could not complete on the deal because of a mix up with your contract with the Jackson group.
We write to confirm that the 2.5 million loan which we put with our solicitor has incurred interest and fees of around £25,000. As the failure of the deal has nothing to do with us we demand the sum of 25,000 pounds from you within 21 days.
Failure to comply with this request will force us to go legal which will incur further costs which we will claim from you."
In cross-examination the pursuer was asked whether this demand came as a surprise, to which, as I noted him, he replied "It certainly did". He continued, as I noted him, "I do not know if Mr and Mrs Clyde were asked to write supporting my claim [in the present litigation]" and then "I got a letter [6/5 of process] sitting in my house and I could not believe it". However, on the evidence of Raymond Clyde, that letter had been discussed with the pursuer and written at his request; as Mr Clyde would have it, both to clarify the £25,000 which he said was owed and to support the pursuer's claim. While he also had criticisms to make of Mr Clyde's evidence (as noted below), it was Mr McBrearty's submission that the pursuer's evidence about the letter could not be reconciled with what had been said by Mr Clyde and should be regarded as a very significant failure on the part of the pursuer to tell the truth in relation to a matter which went to the heart of the loss that he claimed to have suffered. I see the force of that submission. While some of the pursuer's answers can be explained by what I have described as carelessness, that is not so in the case of the pursuer claiming to have no knowledge about the Clydes being asked to provide assistance with the pursuer's claim against the defenders. The tenor and timing of the Croftmore letter of 18 August 2009 is eloquent of it being produced specifically for the purpose of helping the pursuer in the present case. Mr Clyde came to confirm that that indeed was so, and that it had been written in response to a direct request by the pursuer. I would hold that to be proved. That the pursuer effectively denied this of itself raises a question as to his general credibility but in particular as to his credibility in relation to the critical matter of whether Raymond Clyde did in fact make a serious offer to buy Sillyhole at a price of £2.5 million. I attach little importance to the bare fact of the pursuer requesting Mr Clyde's assistance. It is by no means unknown for parties to adopt some artifice in the attempt to embellish what may be a perfectly good case. The present example is perhaps more indicative of a surprising degree of naivety on the part of two experienced businessmen than anything else. However, what is much more significant is what I consider Mr McBrearty was entitled to describe as a failure on the part of the pursuer to tell the truth. Just as I concluded that there was a question about the pursuer's reliability I concluded that there was a question about his credibility.
[54] An aspect
of the pursuer's evidence bearing on his credibility, and also on the
credibility of Mr Gibson and Michelle Edens, was his claim that in or
about June or July 2006, Mr Gibson acknowledged to him that he had
"made a mistake" in allowing the missives for the sale of Sillyhole to have
included clause 4 in an un-amended form. Further, according to the
pursuer, Mr Gibson told him on numerous occasions that he expected the
pursuer to sue him and that, again in or about June or July 2006, Mr Gibson
told him that he was "seeking legal advice to cover his own back and look after
the firm". Mr McBrearty put it to the pursuer that this was a lie; and
moreover that it was unlikely that Mr Gibson would have acted (as he had) for
the pursuer in a transaction which involved transferring land out of his name
in 2009 if he had believed that the pursuer was about to sue him. The
pursuer was supported in his account of Mr Gibson having admitted making a
mistake by Michelle Edens, who in many ways I considered a quite
impressive witness. However, for reasons that I shall discuss more fully when
assessing Mrs Edens's evidence, I do not find it probable that Mr Gibson
made the admissions that they claim that he made. This reflects adversely on the
pursuer's credibility or at least reliability, as it reflects adversely on the
credibility and reliability of Mrs Edens. Looking at matters overall, I have
been unable to accept the pursuer as either entirely credible or entirely
reliable.
Robert McCann
Senior
[55] Neither could I accept Mr McCann Senior as a necessarily
credible and reliable witness. He was clearly anxious to negative the
suggestion that it was he who had given the critical instructions in relation
to the sale of Sillyhole and in relation to other transactions. This led him
to adopt the extreme position, which Mr McBrearty characterised as his
"default position", which was to say when shown a file note that what was
recorded was unlikely to have happened or that the conversation could not have
taken place. As Mr McBrearty put it, Mr McCann Senior's responses
were "not nuanced". There was force in Mr McBrearty's submission that if Mr McCann
were to be correct in many of his answers, it would be difficult to avoid the
conclusion that Mr Gibson must have engaged in a deliberate course of
fraudulently preparing file notes. As I have already observed, that was not Mr Bowen's
position on the file notes and, as Mr McBrearty reminded me, such an
allegation was not put to Mr Gibson in cross-examination. Moreover, as I
will touch on, not only was Mr McCann Senior's evidence contradictory of
what appeared from the file notes, it was contradictory of what was spoken to
by Jess Nesbit and, at least in some respects, by the pursuer. My impression
was of a witness who was trying just a little too hard to assist the case on
behalf of which he had been led.
[56] Mr McCann
Senior presented as a shrewd man of business with an eye for a good deal and
the negotiating skills to conclude it. He was conversant with the planning
history of Sillyhole and he claimed to have been in a position to assess the
likelihood of a grant of permission for residential development as at
August 2004. As I have already observed, when Michelle Edens came to
give evidence she acknowledged that her father was "quite good at talking to
people". I could readily believe that. It is true that Mrs Edens also
suggested that her father was something of a spent force: "He has not worked
since I do not know when ... he thinks he can give advice on everything ... he is
trying to help". However, while, as was explained in evidence Mr McCann
may have difficulties with his physical health (he said that he had suffered
two heart attacks), in the witness box he appeared mentally sharp and energetic,
with little doubt as to which side of the case he favoured. He was very alert
to avoid answering questions in a way that might harm the pursuer's position. A
feature of Mr McCann's evidence was the robust way in which his answers
were often couched - "Nonsense", "It never happened". By way of specific
example, when asked in evidence-in-chief whether he had ever instructed Jess Nisbet,
his answers, as I noted them, were:
"Definitely not, never ... she did send me a buyer, I cannot remember where, I think Ayr Road, Kilmarnock which had nothing to do with me".
This can be contrasted with Mrs Nisbet's evidence. According to her, and this is consistent with the terms of her invoice and correspondence (7/25/2, 7/25/6, 7/25/11 and 7/25/12 of process), it was Mr McCann Senior who instructed her in relation to the marketing of Sillyhole.
[57] Mr McBrearty
developed his attack on the credibility of Mr McCann Senior by reference
to the documentary evidence and in particular Mr Gibson's file notes. He
instanced a number of examples of what he submitted was the unsatisfactory
nature of Mr McCann Senior's evidence when faced with file notes which
bore to record his involvement in property transactions and which had not been
challenged as fabrications. On being asked about 7/57 of process, a file
note dated 13 July 2004, which recorded instructions from him to put the
title of the woodlands into the pursuer's name, Mr McCann Senior first
gave evidence that he had no idea if it happened. He then denied it: "No such
meeting ... I cannot understand it, none of this happened". In relation to
7/5 of process, the follow-on instructions, he stated that he did not
have the meeting with Mr Gibson which is recorded there: "I am saying this
meeting did not happen." Contrary to what is recorded in 7/59 and 7/62 of
process in relation to instructions from Mr McCann Senior to offer for
land at Kirkoswald in name of Regent Builders Limited, Mr McCann Senior's
evidence was that he definitely did not instruct Mr Gibson to make the
offer. Number 7/29/5 of process is a file note dated 15 March 2006.
It records that Mr McCann Senior was advising that a particular deal
should be done with Jones Finance whereas Mr McCann Senior's evidence was
that he would not have agreed that deal with anyone. He added the comment: "Mr Gibson
says more than his prayers", in other words, Mr Gibson was lying.
Similarly, in relation to 7/29/4 of process, a file note of 21 April
2006, the final sentence in the penultimate paragraph in which states: "Noting Mr McCann
... prepared to give security over Kilmarnock site..." Mr McCann Senior
disagreed that he would have said that, the file note had to be wrong. There
were responses similarly lacking in nuance in Mr McCann Senior's repudiation
of what was recorded in 7/29/3, 7/67 (a file note dated 6 July 2005
relating to Bogside Road, Kilsyth: "I do not even know where Kilsyth is",
and 7/50 (a file note dated 22 July 2003 relating to the purchase of
ground at New Cumnock). It is to be observed that the answers given by Mr McCann
Senior about the Kilsyth and New Cumnock properties would seem to be at odds
with the answers given by the pursuer whom I took to accept that in relation to
these transactions Mr McCann Senior had indeed given instructions to Mr Gibson
to make offers.
[58] I shall
have more to say about Mr McCann Senior's evidence about his involvement
in giving instructions in relation to the missives for the sale of Sillyhole,
but for present purposes I would note that there his initial position, as it
was with other transactions, was to distance himself from any involvement
whatsoever. That, as Mr McBrearty submitted, was to be contrasted with
him later coming to accept at least the possibility that the discussions
between him and Mr Gibson which are recorded in the file notes 7/29/6
and 7/29/7 indeed took place, respectively on 28 October 2004 and 3 March
2005. Overall, I was left with an impression of a general lack of candour on
the part of Mr McCann Senior.
Stuart Jackson
[59] Mr McBrearty
described Mr Jackson as an impressive and careful witness. Mr Bowen
did not demur. I am happy to agree with Mr McBrearty's assessment. There
was no issue between the parties but that his evidence should be accepted in
full.
Raymond Clyde
[60] It
came to be Mr McBrearty's submission that Mr Clyde's evidence on the
critical matter of an offer being made for the purchase of Sillyhole in
July 2007 was wholly unsatisfactory and simply should not be relied upon.
However, during all of his evidence-in-chief and much of his cross-examination,
Mr Clyde presented as a relaxed and confident witness despite the fact
that he was speaking to what to the uninstructed listener might appear to be
the inherently improbable proposition that an agreement for the sale of
un-zoned land had been struck at a price which was on any view well above its
market value even had outline planning permission been granted (which it had
not been), on no more rational principles than that it represented a splitting
of the difference between the seller's proposal of £3 million and the
buyer's proposal of £2 million and that the buyer happened to have
something in excess of £2.5 million on deposit with his solicitors.
Mr McBrearty mounted a sustained cross-examination, informed by the evidence
available to him from Mr King's report, which focused on the various
uncertainties associated with developing Sillyhole for housing as at July 2007
but Mr Clyde, while accepting that he would have had to take professional
advice on a number of matters before actually developing the site, maintained
the robust assertion that he did indeed make an offer of £2.5 million, the
offer admittedly being informal but nevertheless meant seriously. He accepted
that he did not know whether there might be special costs associated with the
development but that was "the gamble you take with un-zoned land". He thought
the £2.5 million price cheap.
[61] Mr Clyde
faltered only once during the initial part of his evidence, when in
evidence-in-chief he was asked whether the proposed purchase of the site at
Watson Terrace, Drongan, for which the funds held by MacDonald Henderson had
originally been allocated, had gone ahead. He replied that it had not, and
when asked why that was so he said that he had "never got to the bottom of
that". In a previous passage of evidence Mr Clyde had mentioned a
"hiccup" in relation to Drongan. He said that he had talked to Presbyterian
Mutual and told them about it. They were "happy to allow me to keep the
funding in place". The matter was not further explored.
[62] However, Mr Clyde
was less impressive when responding to the line in cross-examination that he
had assisted the pursuer with his case by generating three letters, two from
his solicitors, Messrs Lindsays, dated respectively 19 and 28 May
2010 (7/8/6 and 7 of process) and the other the letter on the Croftmore Developments
letterhead dated 18 August 2009, about which the pursuer had been asked. As
far the letters from Lindsays were concerned, Mr Clyde's initial position
was that he had requested those letters in order to support his claim against
the pursuer for the recovery of interest and fees associated with the drawdown
of the funds held by MacDonald Henderson (stated in the letter of 18 August
2009 at "around £25,000"). This was a claim which had first been made in
November 2008 and, even as at the date when Mr Clyde gave his
evidence had apparently not been met. Mr McBrearty was to go on to
challenge whether Mr Clyde had any basis for such a claim against the
pursuer, but initially he sought and obtained confirmation from Mr Clyde
that it was Mr Clyde's position that the letters from Lindsays were
written in support of a proposed claim against the pursuer, as opposed to the
claim now being made by the pursuer against the defenders. Mr McBrearty
then put to him that that was a lie. Mr Clyde denied that. However,
within the space of a few minutes Mr Clyde's position had changed. He
accepted in terms that he had been asked directly by the pursuer to confirm
that he had the necessary funds to purchase Sillyhole in July and that he knew
that this information had been requested for the purpose of supporting the
pursuer's claim against the defenders. The questions either by Mr McBrearty
or the court and the answers from Mr Clyde included the following:
Q - "You requested this letter in support of the pursuer's claim. There was no other reason for you to do so?"
A - "That's right"
Q - "You were asked to do that by ...?"
A - "Robert."
Court - "directly by Robert?"
A - "Yes."
Q - "You knew by May 2010 that you were providing evidence in support of Mr McCann's case."
A - "Yes. He had asked me for that information. I didn't know an awful lot about the court case but he asked me for information about the monies."
There was a similar change in position in relation to the Croftmore letter dated 18 August 2009 (6/5 of process). It was put to Mr Clyde by Mr McBrearty that he had been requested to write that letter by the pursuer, to which he replied "No it was not". However, within fifteen minutes of what seemed to have been a quite unequivocal answer by Mr Clyde, there was this exchange between him and Mr McBrearty, Mr McBrearty asking the questions or putting the propositions and Mr Clyde responding:
Q - "The first formal intimation of claim was in December 2009. An expert report was obtained on behalf of Mr McCann in October 2009. In the months leading up - he made preparations for the case against Waddell & Mackintosh. This letter was part of those preparations."
A - "Mr McCann had asked me to clarify these things and I did ... Obviously I was wanting the money, he wanted me to clarify where this money had come from".
Q - "He already knew you wanted your money. As far back as 2007."
A - "Yes."
Q - "You wrote the letter to clarify."
A - "I spoke to him. He said can you put that in a letter for me."
Q - "This letter was written at the request of Mr McCann."
A - "Yes I suppose it was."
Q - "I suggest that it was written in support of the case."
A - "I gather that it was probably the case that it was."
[63] Two other
aspects of Mr Clyde's evidence in relation to his supposed claim against
the pursuer for recovery of abortive expense in respect of his proposal to
purchase Sillyhole reflected adversely on Mr Clyde's credibility. The
first is that the letter of 18 August 2009 was misleading if not dishonest.
The letter includes the statement: "We put on deposit ... which remained with our
solicitor for four weeks" While it is true that this sum was put on deposit, Mr McBrearty
described the statement as at best economical with facts in that it gives the
impression that the funds were put on deposit specifically for the purpose of
purchasing Sillyhole whereas, as Mr Clyde explained in evidence, that was
simply not the case; the money had originally been intended for Watson
Terrace, Drongan. Moreover, as appears from Lindsays ledger card and their
letter of 28 May 2010 (7/2/6 and 7/2/7 of process) the money remained
on deposit for a little over two weeks rather than four. The sum of £25,000
seemed to have been plucked from the air without very much in the way of
thought as to how such sum, if indeed paid to the Presbyterian Mutual Society
related to the abortive proposal to purchase Sillyhole. Leaving aside Mr Clyde's
failure to explain why he did not proceed with the Watson Terrace transaction,
as was put to him under reference to the Presbyterian Mutual Society record,
7/12/13 of process, the interest actually charged was £9,931.84, of
which £4,349.14 had been recouped by Mr Clyde having the money on
deposit with his solicitors, therefore leaving only £5,582.70 for him to
pay. Mr Clyde's response was that he had also paid a fee of about £17,000
for "the money going back". As was submitted by Mr McBrearty, one might
suppose that any such fee would have been paid anyway given that it was taken
out for the purposes of purchasing the Drongan site, a transaction which did
not go ahead. Mr McBrearty pointed out however that there was no
indication of any such fee having been paid in the documents which had been
recovered from the Presbyterian Mutual Society. When pressed on the question
as to whether a fee of £17,000 had been paid, Mr Clyde's response was
that "it came after the event, they would need a fee, I do not know how they
came up with it, I paid it." When Mr McBrearty put it to him that that
was simply incredible, Mr Clyde accepted that "it sounds that way".
[64] The other
aspect of Mr Clyde's evidence which I would see as adversely affecting his
credibility is what I took to be his acknowledgement that he would see that he
has prospects of payment of the £25,000 which he has claimed from the
pursuer in the event of the pursuer being successful in this action. He
volunteered "I would like to think that if damages were awarded ... I would get
my money" and when Mr McBrearty picked up on that to ask whether he
expected to be paid in that event, Mr Clyde replied "It would be nice". As
was clear from Mr Clyde's evidence, the context was that the writing of
the letters in support of the pursuer's case was occurring in parallel to Mr Clyde
making a claim against the pursuer and the pursuer delaying rather than
refusing to make payment. As Mr Clyde put it at one point in
cross-examination, speaking of the pursuer, "he said he would try to get it
sorted out, he was under a bit of pressure". It is the case that when Mr McBrearty
suggested that he was assisting the pursuer in the hope of obtaining his £25,000,
Mr Clyde denied that. Moreover, I recognise the force of Mr Bowen's
submission that it would seem unlikely that someone with the resources of Mr Clyde
would contemplate perverting the course of justice by lying on oath, for such a
relatively insignificant sum as £25,000. Nevertheless, in relation to
this last matter, at best Mr Clyde cannot be regarded as an independent
witness. He is someone who, on his evidence, claims to have suffered loss in
consequence of "a mix up with [the pursuer's] contract with the Jackson group"
and who sees that he might recover that loss in the event of the pursuer
obtaining damages against the defenders.
[65] I
accordingly take the view that Mr Clyde's credibility is doubtful and that
his evidence must be approached with care.
Michelle Edens
[66] Michelle Edens
presented as an intelligent witness, whose good humour and pleasant disposition
appeared to have survived the stresses of litigation, as had her liking for Mr Gibson
("a nice and genuine person", as she described him). Mr McBrearty
described her as being, on the evidence, "the organiser of the family,
entrusted with the 'paperwork'". Indeed Mrs Edens described herself as
"more paperwork" and "better at speaking", particularly to officials, than the
pursuer. This was reflected in her answers to questioning. She was better
able to discern complexity in situations than were her brother and father, and
her evidence was more nuanced. No doubt due to her professional experience,
she appeared to have a more methodical approach to business. She had dealt
with planning matters in the course of forwarding the McCanns' business affairs
in Scotland and she was very much aware of the history of the evolution of the
relevant local plan. As Mr McBrearty accurately observed, a feature of
her evidence was an apparent ability to recall detail on a wide range of
subjects. She is not of course independent and on some points if her evidence
is to be accepted then Mr Gibson's evidence cannot be, and vice versa.
As is further discussed below, Mr McBrearty criticised her evidence on the
important issue of whether Raymond Clyde offered to purchase Sillyhole, as
unsupported by the sort of contemporary notes that someone of Mrs Edens's
business-like character might be expected to have kept, and lacking in
circumstantial detail. While these are all points for consideration, I cannot
say that there was anything in Mrs Edens's demeanour or anything internal
to her evidence which, taken in isolation, led me to doubt her credibility or
reliability.
[67] However, as
I have already noted when discussing the evidence of the pursuer, Mrs Edens's
credibility and reliability are very directly put in issue by the evidence of Mr Gibson,
at the very least on one matter; that is whether Mr Gibson admitted fault
on his part in concluding the missives in the terms in which they were
concluded. In evidence-in-chief Mrs Edens was asked whether the question
of fault had been raised with Mr Gibson. She indicated that it had; "Mr Gibson
told me and [the pursuer] on several occasions [that he had made a mistake]". She
went on to explain that Mr Gibson had told her that he had instructed
Balfour + Manson on his own behalf or on behalf of the defenders. According to
Mrs Edens, Mr Gibson mentioned this a few times in his office when
she was there with the pursuer. This was in the context of her explanation
that every time the pursuer was in the defenders' office, she was there with
him, as was, she went on, Mr McCann Senior. She was then asked whether in
any discussion she had had with Mr Gibson, he had suggested that he had in
fact given advice to Mr McCann Senior in relation clause 4. To that
she replied: "Never". The matter of Mr Gibson having admitted fault was
taken up in cross-examination, during which Mrs Edens unequivocally
committed herself to the position that Mr Gibson had admitted having made
a mistake. It was put to her by Mr McBrearty that she claimed that Mr Gibson
"expected to be sued" and she agreed. She went on to explain that Mr Gibson
had been very apologetic and that he had done everything he could to get the
McCanns out of the position in which the terms of the missives had placed them,
but that he had got advice on his own behalf from Balfour + Manson. It was put
to her that it was her evidence that Mr Gibson had had no difficulty in
conceding that he had made a mistake, to which she replied:
"I think that he was concerned about it. I have got to know Mr Gibson very well; he is a nice and genuine man. He made a mistake; he was under pressure due to illness. At that time I do not know if [the pursuer] was looking at a claim".
Mrs Edens's evidence that Mr Gibson had discussed the possibility of being sued by the pursuer was challenged. Mr McBrearty put to her that it was Mr Gibson's position that he only became aware of the possibility of a claim in December 2009. Her response was "The only discussion was Mr Gibson saying 'You will be suing me' to which [the pursuer] had said 'Let us see how we can get over this' ". Mrs Edens then reiterated her positive assessment of Mr Gibson: "I do not think that Mr Gibson will tell lies. ... I still like him ..."
[68] There was
much that was attractive in the way that Mrs Edens gave her evidence, not
least in her favourable references to Mr Gibson, and I have not therefore
been readily inclined to reject that evidence. However, on the important
matter of whether Mr Gibson ever admitted to having been at fault in the
matter, I do reject her evidence and that of the pursuer.
[69] In my
opinion it is improbable that Mr Gibson did make an admission of fault to
the pursuer and Mrs Edens, let alone the repeated admissions "on numerous
occasions" spoken to by the pursuer, or the "several occasions" spoken to by Mrs Edens.
It is to be supposed that a punctilious conveyancing solicitor, which is how Mr Gibson
presented in court, having the frank and straightforward character ascribed to
him by Mrs Edens, would indeed admit to his client a mistake of the
importance alleged in the present case. Accordingly, on the hypothesis that he
had made a mistake and was conscious of having done so, I see nothing
improbable about a solicitor, mindful of his professional responsibilities,
drawing to his client's attention circumstances which might amount to a failure
in the provision of professional services. What I see to be less probable is
such a solicitor making such an admission and then, apparently needlessly
repeating it on a number of occasions, and all the while continuing to act for
the client. Mr Gibson was an employed solicitor. As the pursuer suggests
by his reference to Mr Gibson "seeking legal advice to cover his own back
and look after the firm", at least by June or July 2006 when the pursuer
says the admissions were made, the supposed mistake was one which would have
had obvious and potentially adverse implications for Mr Gibson and the
defenders. In such a situation one would expect the prudent solicitor to
advise his employers and their insurers of the situation, take legal advice,
document such admission as he was prepared to make and, importantly, withdraw
from acting further for his client. A withdrawal from acting in such
circumstances is not entirely altruistic. It spares the solicitor the
difficulty of working for and with a client who can no longer have complete
confidence in him, and it leaves the client to mitigate his position as best he
can, giving the solicitor's insurers the option of arguing that mitigation of
damages was inadequate. That there was no discussion with his employers or
their insurers prior to receipt of the formal letter of claim from Brodies on
24 December 2009 depends entirely on the evidence of Mr Gibson that
he had not acknowledged to the pursuer and Mrs Edens that he had made a
mistake, that he had not anticipated being sued or been given any indication of
the possibility of a claim. However, there is uncontroversial evidence (in the
form of Mr Flint's affidavit) that neither Mr Gibson nor the
defenders sought the advice of Balfour + Manson (as claimed by both the pursuer
and Mrs Edens). Moreover, Mr Gibson clearly continued to act for the
pursuer. Indeed, as Mr McBrearty emphasised, he acted in a transaction in
October 2009 which had the result of divesting the pursuer of property
adjacent to his house, an unlikely act, in Mr McBrearty's submission, for
someone who anticipates being sued by the person whose assets are thereby
reduced. Mr Gibson confirmed in evidence that he would not have continued
to act for the pursuer had he anticipated being subject to a claim. I found
that believable. That Mr Gibson had not anticipated being sued is
consistent with his unforced and un-defensive cooperation with Brodies in providing
his files in the period 18 August 2009 to 17 December 2009 and the
terms of the covering letters (as demonstrated by the
correspondence, 7/33/ 1 to 4 and 8 of process). As it would
appear from the letter of 18 August 2009, it was Mr Gibson's belief
that the files were required in connection with a possible claim against EASSDA.
As appears from the dates of Professor Rennie's opinion of 2 October
2007 and first additional note dated 20 October 2009 (7/36 and 7/37),
a claim against the defenders by the pursuer was by then under very active
consideration; the files were needed in order that Professor Rennie could
advise further on negligence. However, there is nothing in the correspondence
that I have seen from Brodies to suggest that any admission is being founded
upon or that there has been any discussion between the parties on the matter of
fault. There is no reference to any admission by Mr Gibson in the pursuer's
pleadings.
[70] Because I
think it improbable that Mr Gibson made the admissions that Mrs Edens
said he had made and because there had been no exploration in the evidence of a
basis upon which Mrs Edens might have made an honest mistake about that,
for example by interpreting an expression of regret on Mr Gibson's part at
the situation in which the pursuer found himself as a confession of
culpability, I can only draw an adverse conclusion as to her credibility, at
least on this matter. As I have already indicated, this also has adverse
implications for the pursuer's credibility.
Jess Nisbet
[71] Although her evidence was in fairly short compass I have no reason to
dispute Mr McBrearty's assessment of Mrs Nisbet as an impressive
witness. I accept her as credible and I accept her as reliable. She was
confident and clear in what she said. While it might be said that she has no
reason to be well disposed towards members of the McCann family given her
apparent difficulty in recovering commissions which she considered to be due to
her in respect of introductions to purchasers, that was not a point on which
she was challenged and indeed Mr Bowen, no doubt wisely, adopted a notably
cautious and economic approach to Mrs Nesbit's cross-examination.
Resolution of factual
issues
(i) Whether the pursuer received no advice from the defenders
regarding the meaning and effect of clause 4 of the Missives
[72] While the defenders' pleadings are open to the construction that they
aver their client to have been Mr McCann Senior, by the time of the proof
I took it as accepted on their behalf that it was the pursuer who had
instructed the defenders to act as his solicitors for the sale and conveyance
of the subjects to EASSDA, albeit that it was their position that the conduit
for these instructions was Mr McCann Senior. It follows that the
defenders were bound, as a matter of contract, and, to the extent that in the
circumstances that is in any way different, as a matter of duty of care, to
exercise that degree of care and skill in the conduct of the transaction as was
to be expected of reasonably competent solicitors and that obligation was owed
to the pursuer. Given the agreement between Professor Rennie and Mr Reid
on the matter, that degree of care and skill required Mr Gibson to give
advice along the lines of identified by Professor Rennie. The pursuer
complained that he had not received such advice and Mr Gibson did not
claim to have given such advice directly to him. As he freely accepted, Mr Gibson
did not check his instructions with the pursuer and he did not give advice to
the pursuer. His evidence was that he took his instructions from and gave
advice to Mr McCann Senior whom he regarded as well versed in planning
matters and in making decisions for the family. I accordingly find that the
pursuer received no direct advice from the defenders regarding the meaning and
effect of clause 4.
[73] The
uncontroversial conclusion that the pursuer received no advice from the
defenders directly leaves open the question as to whether the pursuer should
nevertheless be treated as having received the requisite advice. Once it is
accepted that the defenders' client or principal was the pursuer, the status of
Mr McCann Senior has to be considered, as is anticipated in Mr Bowen's
list of issues. When asked in what capacity Mr McCann Senior was acting
from the perspective of the pursuer, Mr Gibson's response was "As an
agent, I suppose". That is a proposition that the defenders must establish. The
pursuer denies it.
(ii) Whether
Mr McCann Senior had authority to conclude missives for the sale of Sillyhole
on behalf of the pursuer
[74] I
find that Mr McCann Senior had actual authority to conclude missives for
the sale of Sillyhole on behalf of the pursuer. Were I to be wrong about that,
I find that he had apparent or ostensible authority. In considering the
question of apparent authority I am conscious that while the conduct of the
supposed agent is relevant, what is critical is the conduct of the supposed
principal and in particular whether the principal has so conducted himself as
to lead third parties reasonably to believe that the supposed agent does indeed
have the principal's authority to transact on his behalf (see eg Armagas
v Mundogas SA [1986] AC 717; Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency
(19th edit) para 8-013). Were it the case that the
pursuer was unaware that Mr McCann Senior was purporting to act in his
name then Mr McCann Senior's actings could not bind the pursuer. However,
that is not how I understood the evidence.
[75] Underpinning
the defence on the merits of this action is the assertion that although he
chose not to contract in his own name, "the boss" of or "the driving force"
behind the various transactions for the acquisition or sale of land in Scotland
in which members of the McCann family or their companies were involved was Mr McCann
Senior, and that the purchase and then sale of Sillyhole were examples of such
transactions. As Mr Gibson put it: "[Mr McCann Senior] held himself
out to be the person who gave all instructions and made decisions in relation
to the family business. Whenever I spoke to [the pursuer] or Michelle Edens
with a query, they referred me to [Mr McCann Senior]; that they did not
take decisions is my understanding". Jess Nisbet gave evidence to similar
effect; "the boss" and "the driving force" were expressions which she applied
to Mr McCann Senior. She explained that she normally dealt with Stephen McCann
but this was on behalf of his father. She regarded the pursuer as having a subordinate
role and did not deal with him at all in relation to Sillyhole; the
decision-maker was Mr McCann Senior. I accept Mrs Nisbet's evidence.
It was given clearly and confidently. It was not really challenged in
cross-examination. Of course that evidence has its limitations in that it
relates to what was Mrs Nisbet's impression of relationships within the
McCann family. Moreover, it was Stephen McCann with whom Mrs Nisbet
normally dealt; she accepted that she had only actually met Mr McCann Senior
twice. Mr Gibson's evidence was consistent with what Mrs Nisbet said
about Mr McCann Senior. According to Mr Gibson, virtually all his
instructions came from Mr McCann Senior; it was
"clear at a very early stage that he was 'the boss' in the family ... he drove everything ... effectively he was the client".
[76] As Mr McBrearty
emphasised, Mr Gibson's evidence that he was repeatedly instructed by Mr McCann
Senior in relation to property transactions, both before and after the
conclusion of missives for the sale of Sillyhole, was supported by the terms of
the numerous file notes made by him. Mr McBrearty asked me to accept Mr Gibson's
evidence. He reminded me that no suggestion had been made that the file notes
were other than genuine. Mr McCann Senior repudiated the references in
the file notes to him giving instructions, indicating a sharp conflict between
his version of events and that of Mr Gibson. There were occasions however
when Mr McCann Senior's position of absolute denial was qualified. Asked
whether he might have given instructions to Mr Gibson in relation to
property at New Cumnock, as indicated by the file note 7/50 of process, he
conceded that he would have done so had the pursuer asked him to do it. As I
note elsewhere in this opinion, the evidence of the pursuer was that Mr McCann
Senior did give instructions on his behalf in relation to the New Cumnock
transaction.
[77] I accept Mr Gibson's
evidence on this matter, not only because of my general impression as to his
credibility and reliability and because he is supported by his contemporaneous
file notes but because, on a detailed consideration, I take the evidence given
by the pursuer and Mr McCann Senior, insofar as I accept it, to be
consistent with what was spoken to by Mr Gibson.
[78] In relation
to the acquisition of Sillyhole I took it to be uncontroversial that Mr McCann
Senior instructed the defenders to conclude missives and then take title, first
on behalf of County Commerce Limited and then in the name of the pursuer. In other
words, in relation to the acquisition of the property the pursuer accepts that
his father had all necessary authority (at that stage either because he was
acting on his own behalf, as Mr Gibson would have it, or because he was
acting on the instructions of the pursuer, as I would take the pursuer to have
it: "My father worked on it but it was my transaction"). In relation to the
sale the position is different. In examination-in-chief the pursuer was asked
whether at any time after he had become the proprietor of Sillyhole he had
authorised Mr Gibson to take instructions from anyone other than him. He
answered "No". Similarly, Mr McCann Senior was asked whether he had ever
said to Mr Gibson that he had been authorised by the pursuer to discuss
the terms on which Sillyhole was to be sold, he said "No".
[79] These
specific answers as to communications with Mr Gibson in relation to the
sale of Sillyhole, can be contrasted with other passages in the pursuer's
evidence, relating to other transactions. Although, when it was put to the
pursuer in cross-examination that, as a matter of routine, Mr McCann
Senior had authority to make offers on behalf of Regent Builders, the pursuer, Stephen McCann
and any other member of the family, he denied that, he did accept that Mr McCann
Senior did "deals" for him and that "he would have authority to put in an offer
in my name". When he came to give evidence, Mr McCann Senior explained,
at the beginning of cross-examination, that: "I ran about looking for sites ... I
never bought sites in my name". That formulation suggests that he did indeed
buy sites and begs the question in whose name he bought them. An answer to
that question is to be found in the admittedly very general evidence as to his
activities in Scotland from about 2003 which Mr McCann Senior gave in
chief: "I started looking for sites, anything cheap ... It was always my idea
to help the family, if I got a good site I would have tried to pass it on ... I
got involved in most of these sites just for the family." That comes close to
an acceptance that the affairs of members of the McCann family were linked,
that they cooperated one with the other and that Mr McCann Senior acted on
behalf of other family members including the pursuer.
[80] The pursuer
accepted that while Mr McCann Senior was never a client of the defenders,
he was aware that his father contacted Mr Gibson "about sale prices". He
accepted that the proposed purchase of a site at South Harbour Street, Ayr at a
price of £1 million, which is the subject of Mr Gibson's file note of
3 November 2004 (7/61 of process), was an example of Mr McCann
Senior instructing the making of an offer on the pursuer's behalf, as was the
proposed purchase of a site at Bogside Road, Kilsyth at a price of £750,000,
which is the subject of Mr Gibson's file note of 6 July 2005
(7/67 of process). Another example of Mr McCann Senior giving
instructions to the defenders on behalf of the pursuer is recorded in the file
note of 7 December 2004 (7/65 of process). This relates to the sale
of a property at Highfield Avenue, Kilmarnock in the name of the pursuer.
Mr McCann Senior instructed Mr Gibson as to the application of the
sale proceeds. The pursuer explained that whereas his father had "done the
deal", it was he who had bought and sold the land and who had decided where the
resulting funds should go. However, he did accept that it was his father who
had actually given the necessary instruction to Mr Gibson.
[81] That the
defenders had the pursuer's authority to conclude missives for the sale of
Sillyhole (however communicated) is probably sufficiently apparent from the
pleadings but at the beginning of cross-examination Mr McBrearty
methodically took the pursuer through a list of his complaints against the
defenders and a list of matters with which he had no quibble. During this
process the pursuer confirmed that his complaints were: that he had not been
advised that it was only EASSDA who could resile in the event of planning
permission not being obtained (had he been advised he would have insisted on a
reciprocal provision); that missives had been concluded with EASSDA being able
to pull out but he not being able to do so; and that he was therefore deprived
of the opportunity to resile which he otherwise would have taken by July 2007.
The pursuer however also indicated that he had no quibble with: both Sillyhole
and The Glebe being bought in his name; binding missives for the sale of Sillyhole
being concluded in March 2005; proceeds from the sale of The Glebe being
applied by the defenders to payment of various debts in 2005; and
amending missives being concluded with EASSDA in his name. Mr McBrearty
then put it to the pursuer that the defenders had had his authority to do each
of the things with which he had no quibble and the pursuer confirmed that that
was the case. That was consistent with what was said by Mr Gibson in
evidence-in-chief when he freely accepted that the advice on the terms of the
missives for the sale of Sillyhole had been given to Mr McCann Senior and
not to the pursuer, that being because, as he put it, "I had authority from Mr McCann
Senior". Mr Gibson was then asked whether it had ever been suggested to
him since March 2005 that he did not have authority to conclude missives
to which he replied
"No. On the contrary, my instructions were to pursue the transaction to completion as quickly as possible."
[82] If then the
defenders must be taken to have been instructed to conclude missives on behalf
of the pursuer but Mr McCann Senior neither had authority to give such
instructions nor gave them, the question arises as to how it was that the
defenders came to be instructed. Whereas, on the defenders' version of events,
Mr Gibson's evidence provides a clear and specific answer to that, the
same cannot be said for the evidence of the pursuer on his version of events. According
to the pursuer he met with Stuart Jackson in the summer of 2004, having
been put in contact with him by Jess Nisbet. The pursuer showed
Sillyhole to Mr Jackson. Mr Jackson expressed an interest in
acquiring it. They agreed a price of £1 million for Sillyhole and The
Glebe. The pursuer told Mr Jackson to send a formal offer to the
defenders. Thereafter, in the pursuer's evidence-in-chief, there was nothing
to suggest a contact between him and Mr Gibson on a specific occasion with
a view to discussing the missives. The pursuer spoke of having an
understanding of the terms of the missives but he had no memory of being shown
either of the two letters to which he was referred, and he made no reference to
any specific telephone call to or meeting with Mr Gibson. In
cross-examination the pursuer did make reference to telephoning or meeting with
Mr Gibson "on numerous occasions"; he could not remember how often. He
remembered talking to Mr Gibson on the telephone about the price which had
been offered. Although it did appear from the file note of 28 October
2004 (7/29/6 of process) that Mr McCann Senior had discussed the
terms of payment for The Glebe with Mr Gibson, the pursuer said that the
matter was confirmed with him and that he remembered speaking to Mr Gibson
about it. However, the pursuer accepted that this was not reflected in the
file notes and a feature of the pursuer's evidence was a lack of specifics as
to when and to what effect he gave instructions to Mr Gibson in relation
to the missives for the sale of Sillyhole.
[83] The pursuer
accepted that it was possible that his father and Mr Gibson discussed the
Sillyhole transaction between 27 August 2004 and 3 March 2005; as
the pursuer put it, "[Mr McCann Senior] talked to Mr Gibson a lot".
When shown the file note of 7 December 2004 (7/32/219 of process)
which records a number of actions undertaken by Mr Gibson in relation to a
servitude right of access and reported on to Mr McCann Senior, the pursuer
explained that while it was his transaction, his father "helps when he can and
how he can". The nature of that help was not fully explored but Mr McBrearty
followed up to the extent of obtaining the pursuer's confirmation that the help
related to "prices and stuff" and included servitudes.
[84] If, as the
pursuer claims, Mr McCann Senior did not have his authority to give
instructions on his behalf in relation to Sillyhole, it was not easy to
understand why that it should be that he talked to Mr Gibson "a lot". True,
other transactions or potential transactions were on-going, but if Mr McCann
Senior had authority in relation to them, as he apparently did in the case of
South Harbour Street, Ayr and Bogside Road, Kilsyth, why should it be that he
did not have authority in relation to Sillyhole? If he did not have authority
in relation to Sillyhole, why did Mr Gibson report to him and what
precisely did the pursuer mean by Mr McCann Senior helping when and how he
could. There is also what I regard as a persuasive point made by Mr McBrearty
which was that the pursuer's insistence that while his father and also his
sister did communicate with Mr Gibson on his behalf, matters, or at least
important matters, were always confirmed with him. Such an unnecessary
duplication of effort simply does not make practical sense whereas it was clear
to me that the McCanns were practical people.
[85] On the face
of the file note of 3 March 2005, 7/29/7 of process, it was Mr McCann
Senior who gave instructions for conclusion of the missives for the sale of
Sillyhole. The pursuer's evidence on this was much to the same effect as his
evidence under reference to the file note of 28 October 2004; he did not
dispute that Mr McCann Senior gave the instructions there recorded
(something that Mr McCann Senior had difficulty accepting when he was
asked about it) but he explained that Mr Gibson would have previously
received instructions from him. Mr McCann Senior reluctantly conceded
that he may have given the instructions recorded in 7/29/7 but "it
definitely would be confirmed with [the pursuer]".
[86] If
anything, re-examination of the pursuer underlined the difficulty of squaring
the evidence pointing to the facts that it was Mr McCann Senior who
purported to instruct conclusion of the missives on 3 March 2005 and that
the pursuer has been content to proceed on the basis that the missives were
indeed concluded, on the one hand; with the proposition that Mr McCann
Senior did not have the pursuer's authority to act on his behalf, on the other.
At the very beginning of re-examination Mr Sandison asked the pursuer
whether he expected Mr McCann Senior to do anything without his authority,
to which the pursuer answered "No". He was then asked whether he was aware of Mr McCann
Senior doing anything on his behalf without his authority, to which he answered
"I found out later ... it was in 2006, the amendment of the missives."
Questioning then turned to other transactions, the pursuer generally giving
answers which in broad terms indicated that he was aware of what was going on
and that it was he who would confirm instructions to Mr Gibson. Perhaps
because by then that seemed to be the established theme of counsel's
questioning, when the pursuer was asked whether he knew if such a conversation
as is recorded on 7/29/7 of process (the file note of 3 March 2005)
took place, he replied that he knew all about this. That may not have been the
answer counsel for the pursuer anticipated receiving. Mr Sandison
therefore essentially repeated the question (having first reminded the pursuer
what the file note recorded), in the slightly different formulation "Were you
aware that that had happened?" The pursuer's reply on this occasion was "I was
aware that it was going to happen". Counsel continued with the question "Did
you know [Mr McCann Senior] was on the phone, discussing the contract?" to
which the pursuer replied "I am not sure". After a few further questions,
counsel had the pursuer replying "No" to counsel's inquiries as to whether he
had been aware that Mr McCann Senior was giving instructions to go ahead
and conclude the deal and as to whether he had authorised Mr McCann Senior
to do such a thing. I saw this as a clear change of position, albeit shepherded
by counsel, which reflected the pursuer's difficulty in accommodating his wish
to assert, in accordance with his case on record, that the transaction was
entirely his and under his control, with the reluctantly conceded activity on
his behalf on the part of Mr McCann Senior. The passage in re-examination
may reflect well on the skill of counsel. It does not reflect well on the
credibility and reliability of the pursuer.
[87] Moreover, Mr McBrearty
was able to point to the pursuer's concession, under reference to 7/33/364
and 7/33/367 of process, that it was Mr McCann Senior who had given
the instructions to conclude the amending missives on 11 September 2006 (a
matter of sufficient importance to be specifically noted in Professor Rennie's
first additional note of 20 October 2009, 7/37/1 of process, a
document which precedes the defenders being put on notice of the pursuer's
intention to bring proceedings). In re-examination the pursuer was asked
whether he was aware that such a thing had occurred to which he answered that
he had become aware "when I saw the fax in Brodies' office" (presumably at a
consultation at about the time of issue of Professor Rennie's first
additional note, and therefore some time after the event). The pursuer was
unable to explain why it was Mr McCann Senior rather then he who had
signed the relevant document confirming the instruction to amend the missives,
beyond suggesting that at the critical time he had been working on site, that
the matter was urgent and that it provided for an increase in the price. As Mr McBrearty
emphasised, the pursuer has never asserted that the missives were concluded
without his authority. I see the pursuer's evidence, looked at as a whole but
in particular in relation to the conclusion and amendment of the missives for
the sale of Sillyhole, to come very close to an acceptance that Mr McCann
Senior had his general authority to contract on his behalf in the purchase and
sale of heritable property and, in particular, that heritable property.
[88] Insofar as
the pursuer and Mr McCann Senior gave evidence to the effect that Mr McCann
Senior did not have the pursuer's authority to conclude missives on his behalf
and that Mr Gibson should be taken to have been aware of that, I reject
that evidence. It may be that there was no express agreement between father
and son conferring the authority of the latter on the former. Indeed I would
be surprised were that so. What is more probable is that they developed a way
of working over a series of transactions, without ever formalising it. They
were practical men operating in a very dynamic environment who were, reasonably
enough, interested in making money in a booming market. Neither had much
interest in "paper work". I would see it as improbable that they thought very
carefully at the time about the implications of their business methods. They
may have thought more carefully about matters since then, but the version of
events presented by them to the court has appeared to me a highly selective
rewriting of history which conflicts with the evidence both of Mr Gibson
and Mrs Nisbet and is not internally coherent. On the matters of whether Mr McCann
Senior acted on the pursuer's behalf with the pursuer's approval and agreement
and whether Mr Gibson was entitled to treat Mr McCann Senior as the
pursuer's agent with power to contract on his behalf, I prefer the evidence of Mr Gibson
and Mrs Nisbet to that of the pursuer and Mr McCann Senior.
[89] Accordingly,
on this issue, having regard to all the evidence, I conclude that Mr McCann
Senior did have the pursuer's actual authority to conclude missives for the
sale of Sillyhole on his behalf. I infer that as a matter of fact, but if I
were to be wrong about that, it appears to me that on the evidence, in a question
between the pursuer and the defenders that the pursuer is to be regarded as
having held out Mr McCann Senior as apparently or ostensibly having full
authority to contract on the pursuer's behalf in relation to the purchase and
sale of heritage, including the sale of Sillyhole.
[90] Mr Bowen
identified the relevant issue in terms of authority to conclude missives. As I
understood him, and Mr McBrearty, that was on the basis that if an agent
has authority to instruct a solicitor to conclude missives on behalf of a
principal, it must follow that, although the principal will be the solicitor's
client, the agent will have authority to receive and act on any advice given by
the solicitor in relation to the conclusion of missives. I would agree that
that must be so. What I find to have been established is full actual authority
on the part of Mr McCann Senior to contract on behalf of his son together
with everything incidental to that, including authority to receive advice and
then act in the light of it either by accepting it or rejecting it. As I have
indicated, if I am wrong about that I find that, in a question between the
pursuer and the defenders, Mr McCann Senior must be held to have apparent
or ostensible authority to the same effect.
(iii) Whether Mr Gibson
gave the advice he claimed to have given on 27 August 2004
[91] In
identifying the principal issues for determination, Mr Bowen took the
three occasions when Mr Gibson claimed to have advised Mr McCann
Senior on the meaning and effect of clause 4 as three events to be
considered separately. As indicated above, I shall follow that approach. In
doing so, I bear in mind that it is for the defenders to establish that the
advice claimed to have been given was in fact given. That I do not accept Mr McCann
Senior as a credible and reliable witness only takes the defenders so far. Rejecting
Mr McCann Senior's evidence may make it possible to accept Mr Gibson's
but unless I can accept Mr Gibson as accurate on what he said, the
defenders cannot succeed.
[92] Mr Gibson's
evidence was that Frazer Coogans offer to purchase Sillyhole, dated
27 August 2007, was initially sent to the defenders' office by fax. The
letter arrived by post the following day. The fax copy is 7/32/306 of
process. The original letter is 6/1/1 of process. According to Mr Gibson
his initial view was that he was unhappy with clause 4 on three counts:
its reference to "onerous conditions" was vague, the 9 month period within
which to obtain planning permission was short, and the right to resile was
drafted solely in the purchaser's interest. He explained that one did see such
clauses "coming in" but generally such a provision would give the right to
resile to either party. His preference was to delete the clause and reword in
his own way. He telephoned Mr McCann Senior on receipt of the fax. During
that telephone call Mr Gibson confirmed to him that the purchase price was £1
million with entry a month after the grant of planning consent. In relation to
clause 4 it was Mr Gibson's evidence that he told Mr McCann
Senior that it was drawn in a one-sided manner. He asked Mr McCann Senior
whether he thought that 9 months was sufficient time within which to
obtain planning consent, to which Mr McCann responded that there was no
problem. Mr McCann, as Mr Gibson put it, seemed to be perfectly
happy. As far as the expression "not to be subject to onerous conditions" was
concerned, Mr Gibson thought it too wide; he wanted it altered. He
advised Mr McCann Senior about the right to resile, albeit that this was
the least of his concerns before he spoke to Mr McCann Senior because he
thought that there would be no problem in altering it; the "other side" would
expect that. Mr McCann Senior did not seem to quite grasp the point to
begin with but Mr Gibson read through the clause, explained that "resile"
meant "pull out", and further explained that the effect of the clause as it
appeared in the offer was that the purchaser could pull out but that the seller
could not. Mr Gibson strongly advised that it should be altered so that
either party could resile in the event of planning consent not being obtained.
To his surprise, Mr McCann Senior responded by saying that he did not want
to give the Jacksons the idea that he might pull out. Mr Gibson then
advised that this would be unlikely to happen as the Jacksons' solicitor would
advise them that this would be normal. He tried several times to persuade Mr McCann
Senior to change the wording of the clause so as to make it a double-sided
right, explaining that if it remained as it was, as a one-sided right, and if Mr McCann
Senior did not get planning consent in the time stated, he would be stuck with
the contract and would not know how to go forward. According to Mr Gibson,
at the end of what was quite a long discussion, Mr McCann Senior told him
to "leave everything ... I will speak to Stuart Jackson again". Therefore
at that point Mr Gibson had no instructions. He did not compile a file
note to record his telephone conversation (a point made against him by Mr Bowen)
but, according to him, that did not adversely affect his memory of the
conversation.
[93] Mr McCann
Senior denied having received such advice on 27 August 2004 or otherwise.
In evidence-in-chief his response was:
"Definitely not ... it would have been completely unacceptable ... never would be ... not zoned until September 2006 ... it was common knowledge, all the planners were able to tell you."
In cross-examination he was to similar effect. While at points Mr McCann Senior expressed himself as not remembering or not recollecting such a conversation, formulations he reiterated when he came to be cross-examined in relation to the conversation which Mr Gibson spoke to as having occurred on 29 September 2004, I took his position to be, as he had said at first during cross-examination, that the conversation simply did not take place. This is what Mr McBrearty described as an absence of nuance. In other words, the conflict in the evidence is not about exactly what was said, but rather whether anything was said at all. Of course, in the event of that issue being resolved in favour of the defenders it is still necessary to consider whether they have established that what was said met what Professor Rennie and Mr Reid agreed would amount to an exercise of reasonable care.
[94] Were what Mr McCann
Senior said to be correct one would suppose that Mr Gibson must have got
his instructions on what to do in response to the offer of 27 August 2004
directly from the pursuer. However, a feature of the pursuer's evidence is its
vagueness as to his involvement in the conclusion of missives for the sale of
Sillyhole and although in the course of what was a very vigorous
cross-examination it was repeatedly put to Mr Gibson that he had not given
the advice he claimed to have given to Mr McCann Senior, it was not
specifically put to him that it was the pursuer from whom he had received his
instructions on the offer. In examination-in-chief the pursuer explained that
he had negotiated the price directly with Stuart Jackson but when shown the
letter of 27 August 2004 he said that he did not see that letter in
August 2004. Nor could he remember seeing the missive of 20 January
2005. How or when the pursuer might have given instructions to Mr Gibson
was not further explored. In cross-examination the pursuer said that he did
remember discussing on the phone that an offer was in and what was the price
offered but he gave no further details and the matter was left there. The
pursuer was re-examined as to his involvement in a number of transactions, as I
have noted above, but he was not asked about any specific contacts that he may
have had with Mr Gibson between August 2004 and March 2005. In
the result I heard only the most general evidence as to whether or how the pursuer
claimed to give instruction on the missives, either on or about 27 August
2004 or thereafter.
[95] Looking to
the whole of the evidence and my assessment of the credibility and reliability
of the various witnesses I have come to the view that the defenders have
established, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr Gibson did indeed
speak by telephone to Mr McCann Senior on 27 August 2004 and that in
the course of that conversation he gave the advice on clause 4 which he
claimed in his evidence to have given. My reasons for coming to that
conclusion are as follows.
[96] There is no
reason to doubt Mr Gibson's evidence that he first saw the faxed version
of the first missives letter (7/32/306 of process) on the morning of
27 August 2004. The hard copy (6/1/1 of process) arrived thereafter.
True, there is no file note of the discussion between Mr McCann Senior and
Mr Gibson on 27 August 2004. Mr Bowen understandably made much
of that and Mr Gibson accepted that, if he had followed his own systems he
should have compiled a file note. However, as Mr McBrearty submitted, it
would be very surprising if Mr Gibson did not discuss the offer with
someone in order to discover what he was to do in response. The complete
absence of a file note therefore loses much of its force unless it were to be
suggested did not discuss in the offer with anyone, something which appears to
me to be very unlikely. Mr Gibson's evidence was that, having considered
the terms of the offer, he telephoned Mr McCann Senior. That, on my
assessment of the evidence as to previous dealings, would have been the natural
thing for him to do and, as I have indicated above, there is no very clear
alternative version of how Mr Gibson obtained his instructions. That Mr Gibson
was concerned over the terms of clause 4 is supported by the presence of
his handwritten annotation "del" on the faxed copy and if he was concerned
about that it would seem likely that he discussed the matter with the person
from whom he generally took instructions. That person I find to have been Mr McCann
Senior. Mr McCann Senior denied this but I do not consider him to be a
necessarily credible and reliable witness and on this matter I do not believe
him. Mr Bowen put it to Mr Gibson that it was simply incredible that
a property developer of the experience of Mr McCann Senior would not take
the advice of his solicitor. That is not my assessment of Mr McCann
Senior. I would regard him as someone who would be quite confident that he had
a much better understanding of a land deal than any solicitor. Mr McCann
Senior did not strike me as a man who would necessarily do what he was advised
to do. Consistent with Mr Gibson's observation "That was the way [Mr McCann
Senior] operated; he liked to negotiate himself", my impression of Mr McCann
Senior was of someone who saw himself as a fixer, someone who could sort out a
problem. Mr Gibson's account of Mr McCann Senior saying "leave
everything ... I will speak to Stuart Jackson again" had the ring of truth about
it (it is also consistent with an answer given by Mr McCann Senior in
cross-examination, albeit without any very clear context to it: "I phoned the
father [Alistair Jackson], he assured me he would get things sorted out with
the son [Stuart Jackson] but nothing happened"). True, nothing seems to have
come of that but, as Mr McBrearty submitted, Mr Gibson's evidence of Mr McCann
Senior not wishing to give Stuart Jackson "the wrong impression" is consistent
with Mr McCann Senior being keen for the sale to proceed without difficulty
(influenced, in turn, by the need to be able to pay others from the proceeds),
and therefore not wishing to do anything which could possibly give the
purchaser the impression that he might wish to pull out. That gets support
from the contemporaneous file notes relating to the dispute with Jones
Finance (7/29) which indicate that with a view to resolving that dispute, Mr McCann
Senior was suggesting paying the proceeds of "Dalmellington" over to Jones. A
one-sided option to resile did not represent a difficulty if planning consent
was obtained within the stipulated period and, unusually, in this case it was
for the seller to obtain the consent.
(iv) Whether
Mr Gibson gave the advice he claimed to have given on 29 September
2004
[97] A
qualified acceptance was sent by the defenders to Frazer Coogans by letter
of 1 October 2004. Among the qualifications was a proposed alternation to
clause 4 directed at Mr Gibson's concern over "onerous conditions"
but with no alteration to the one-sided right to resile. According to Mr Gibson
he had by then spoken to Mr McCann Senior again. To judge by Mr Gibson's
file note dated 1 October 2004 (7/32/299 of process) this telephone
conversation was on 29 September 2004. To the best of Mr Gibson's
recollection, Mr McCann Senior had had a conversation with Stuart Jackson
but he still did not wish to alter the single-sided right to resile despite Mr Gibson's
advice that he should. Advising Mr McCann Senior on the one-sided nature
of the provision had been extremely important. Mr Gibson had said to him
that altering it would not be contentious but the response was that Stuart
Jackson could be impulsive and Mr McCann did not want to give him the
wrong impression. According to Mr Gibson, he emphasised that it would be
necessary to obtain planning permission within the nine-month period. As Mr Gibson
recollected, Mr McCann responded by saying that there had been planning
consent for part of the site but it had lapsed. He repeated what had become
something of a "mantra" that "planning was not a problem".
[98] As Mr Gibson
had to accept, his file note contains no specific reference to his giving
advice to alter the terms of clause 4 beyond "JAG also advising that the
offer gave a period of 9 months wherein the sellers had to obtain planning
for the whole unit and noting this appeared satisfactory". The file note was
what Mr Gibson described as an inadequate précis. While Mr McCann
Senior's response to the proposition being put to him in cross-examination that
he had had a conversation with Mr Gibson on 29 September 2004 of a
similar nature to that on 27 August 2004, was that he could not remember,
he disagreed very much with the suggestion that Mr Gibson had advised on
the dangers associated with clause 4.
[99] For essentially
the same reasons as apply to his evidence in relation to the telephone call on
27 August 2004, I accept Mr Gibson's account of the advice he gave on
29 September 2004. Moreover, the fact that a change was made to clause 4
in the course of the missives tends to support Mr Gibson's position.
Clause 4 had not simply been completely over-looked and it would be
curious if Mr Gibson had highlighted the "onerous conditions" issue but
yet had missed what was accepted by everyone as being a very unusual one-sided
right to resile.
(v) Whether
Mr Gibson gave the advice he claimed to have given on 3 March 2005 prior
to conclusion of missives
[100] Missives
were concluded by the exchange of the defenders' and Frazer Coogans'
letters both dated 4 March 2005. The defenders' file note of 3 March
2005 (7/29/7 of process) records a telephone call between Mr Gibson
and Mr McCann Senior. Three distinct items of business are noted as
having been discussed. The third was the sale of Sillyhole. That part of the
file note included reference to a servitude right of access. The final
sentence was in the following terms:
"JAG pointing out to Robert that entry to the 9.41 acres will therefore be 12 months after conclusion of the contract with no conditional element so far as the seller is concerned but noting that Robert is quite happy that there is more than enough time to obtain the planning consent within that time scale and we are to conclude the deal on that basis."
Mr Gibson gave clear and detailed evidence as to the advice he claimed to have given to Mr McCann Senior on 3 March 2005. He explained that it was not all recorded in the file note. He had emphasised that "he" (meaning Mr McCann Senior) had to get planning consent within 12 months. Mr McCann Senior had told him that the architects were working on it but it had proved more lengthy and problematic than Mr McCann Senior had originally thought. In what I have noted as an answer to a leading question, Mr Gibson confirmed that he had asked Mr McCann Senior whether he would not consider revising clause 4 to include a double-sided resiling provision and that when Mr McCann Senior said "no", Mr Gibson told him that he had to get planning permission within 12 months otherwise the contract would be "a nonsense". Mr McCann Senior's response was "Don't concern yourself with planning, planning is no problem."
[101] I found Mr McCann
Senior's evidence on the matter to be less than clear and straightforward. He
recalled that there had been a question over a servitude right of access. When
it was put to him in cross-examination that the file note of 3 March 2005
accurately recorded him giving instructions to Mr Gibson in relation to
the servitude question, Mr McCann Senior's response was "It may have
happened but I do not recall". When that was followed up with the proposition
being put that he was giving instructions on behalf of the pursuer, Mr McCann
Senior's response was:
"Only in relation to the ransom strip, if I gave instructions on behalf of [the pursuer] they would definitely be confirmed with [the pursuer]."
Mr McCann Senior then went on to disagree when it was put to him that he instructed conclusion of the missives after Mr Gibson had reminded him of the terms of clause 4. When Mr McBrearty again put it to him that Mr Gibson had repeated his advice on clause 4 Mr McCann Senior's response was "Why would anyone do that, it does not make sense, I disagree."
[102] Again, I
accept the evidence of Mr Gibson and, insofar as it contradicts Mr Gibson,
I reject the evidence of Mr McCann Senior. Mr McCann Senior seemed
to accept that he probably had had a conversation with Mr Gibson about the
sale of Sillyhole at about that time. He offered no explanation as to why in
that case the conversation should only relate to the servitude (the "ransom
strip") or why (and this was a point made generally by Mr McBrearty about
similar answers given both by Mr McCann Senior and Mrs Edens) he
should give instructions on behalf of the pursuer which "would definitely be
confirmed" with the pursuer. I found no such incongruities in the evidence of Mr Gibson
and what he said was at least consistent with his contemporaneous file note. At
this point I would revert to an earlier observation. I have been conscious
that a witness in the position of Mr Gibson might unconsciously somewhat
embellish his account in evidence of the advice he gave to his client. In
other words, looking back with the knowledge of how significant the terms of the
clause turned out to be but nevertheless intending to be honest, there might be
a tendency on the part of such a witness to present his evidence on the advice
he gave in a particularly favourable way, suggesting, for example, a greater
clarity or emphasis than might truly have been the case. After all, Mr Gibson
accepted that at the relevant time the single-sided option to resile was "the
least of my worries". It might possibly therefore be the case that while he
drew the problem with option to the attention of Mr McCann Senior he did
not do so in the repeated and emphatic way that he described in his evidence. However,
this is not a route that I was encouraged to follow by counsel and it has no
basis either in the cross-examination of Mr Gibson or in the evidence of Mr McCann
Senior. The critical issue as to whether the defenders have established their
defence that on the three occasions identified Mr Gibson gave advice to
the person I accept was the pursuer's agent in terms which met Professor Rennie's
requirements therefore comes to be determined on the assessment of the veracity
of Mr Gibson when giving his evidence. As I have indicated, my assessment
is that he was an honest witness and, no attack having been advanced as to his
reliability (as opposed to his credibility) and I having discerned no
independent reason to doubt his reliability I have accepted his evidence.
(vi) Whether
had the pursuer received the requisite advice from the defenders he would not
have concluded missives unless clause 4 was amended to give him a right to
resile if outline planning consent was not obtained within the twelve month
period
[103] The pursuer's evidence was that had he been advised of the effect of clause 4,
he would have insisted on it being altered. As was accepted by Mr McBrearty
on the basis of Mr Jackson's evidence, had it been requested EASSDA would
have accepted a revisal to make the right to resile double-sided. Accordingly,
had I found that the pursuer had not received, and should not be taken to have
received, the requisite advice I would have had to consider whether he would
have followed that advice with a view to determining whether the failure to
give advice was causally connected to what the pursuer would claim to be his
damage. However, given that, in a question with the defenders, I find Mr McCann
Senior to have had the pursuer's authority to conclude missives on the
pursuer's behalf for the sale of Sillyhole on such conditions as Mr McCann
Senior thought best, using the professional services of the defenders, and that
incidental to that authority was authority to receive and act or not to act on
such advice as was given by the defenders, I consider that this question
becomes hypothetical and not really capable of answer. On the facts as I find
them to be, the pursuer had put decision-making out of his own hands and into
the hands of his father. How he would have responded to the advice which Professor Rennie
would require a reasonably careful and ordinarily competent solicitor to give
to a seller in the circumstances, is therefore not a question that arises. If,
however, question (vi) is one that I must determine, I would find that the
pursuer has not established that he would have taken a different course from
that taken by his father, that is concluding the missives with a one-sided option
to resile left in place.
(vii) Whether in
July 2007 Raymond Clyde on behalf of Croftmore Developments orally offered the
pursuer £2.5 million to purchase the subjects without outline planning
permission which offer the pursuer was unable to accept because he did not have
a right to resile from the missives
[104] Mr Bowen submitted that I should find it established on the basis
of the evidence of the pursuer, Raymond Clyde and Jess Nesbit, that
an oral offer had been made in July 2007 to purchase Sillyhole for £2,500,000
without outline planning permission and that Croftmore Developments had the
funding available to pay the price. Mr McBrearty submitted that the court
should find that there had been no verbal offer of £2.5m for the land in
July or August 2007; and even if there had been, Raymond Clyde/Croftmore
Developments Limited would not have secured funding to allow them to proceed
with that purchase.
[105] The
pursuer's evidence was that Jess Nesbit had introduced Raymond Clyde
as someone who wished to buy ground for development. Mr Clyde had
expressed interest in the site at Ayr Road, Kilmarnock, a site in Cumnock and
Sillyhole. They had a meeting at Brunston Castle Golf Club in July 2007.
Mr Clyde had made a verbal offer to purchase Sillyhole, "as it stood", in
other words without requiring that it be subject either to planning permission
or zoning. Mr Clyde had proposed a price of £2 million. The pursuer
had asked for £3 million. Then "after 15 minutes we agreed to split the
difference" at £2.5 million. Asked by his counsel for the basis for his
proposing £3 million, the pursuer replied that, at that time it was the
start of the property boom, sites were selling at £300,000 per acre. He
thought £3 million a fair price. When asked why Mr Clyde was
prepared to pay £2.5 million the pursuer explained that he had money for a
different site on which he did not complete. According to the pursuer at that
meeting he explained to Mr Clyde that he was in the process of trying to
get out of the contract with EASSDA.
[106] Raymond Clyde's
evidence in very large part mirrored that of the pursuer: a meeting over lunch
at Brunston Castle Golf Club, the pursuer proposing to sell for £3 million,
Mr Clyde proposing £2.5 million because that sum was available. An
apparent conflict was that whereas the pursuer indicated that he was "trying to
get out of the contract" with EASSDA, the impression given by Mr Clyde was
that he only learned of a difficulty with a previous contract at a much later
date. Towards the end of evidence-in-chief he was asked why the transaction
had not gone ahead Mr Clyde replied:
"I did not get to the bottom of it ... it did not seem to be happening ... Now I understand that he was tied into a contract and they could not sell it."
[107] Mrs Nesbit
was able to support the account that it was she who had introduced the Clydes
to the McCanns but had nothing to add beyond that. When making his closing
submissions, Mr Bowen did not specifically refer to Michelle Edens's
evidence but she also spoke to the Clydes offering £2.5 million for
Sillyhole, possibly at a lunchtime meeting at Brunston Castle Golf Club. When
cross-examined, she described it as a serious offer. She had talked to Mr Clyde
about it. She was at several meetings when it was discussed. When challenged
on that, Mrs Edens responded, with every indication of sincerity: "I am
telling you, standing here on oath, there certainly was an offer." There was an
impressive energy in that answer. There was a similarly lively answer when Mrs Edens
was asked about the source of the Clydes' funds:
"They were getting money from the Presbyterian Mutual Society ... It sounded too good to be true, their criteria for lending were less [than] stringent, the only requirements, right or wrong, were that the borrowers had clear title ... and were Presbyterian."
However, vivid as this evidence was, as was submitted by Mr McBrearty, it was unsupported by any document or indeed much in the way of circumstantial detail. The same observation can be made in respect of the evidence on the matter which was given by the pursuer and by Mr Clyde. However, staying for the moment with Mrs Edens, as Mr McBrearty submitted, something notable about her evidence generally was her ability to recall detail on very wide-ranging subjects; she remembered details of shareholding and directorships, for example. By contrast, her recall of the offer of £2.5m was limited. She said that it was discussed at various meetings but she had appeared uncertain as to whether she had been at the first meeting when it was first made (neither the pursuer nor Mr Clyde had spoken to her being at the meeting they described). Nor could Mrs Edens recall the location of the meeting she attended when the matter was discussed. She also accepted that she would have taken notes of the meeting, but no supporting documentation was provided to the court. Moreover, her evidence towards the end of cross-examination was that the meetings at which the verbal offer was discussed and remained open ("when Raymond Clyde was firm on the offer") were over a period of a month or two. While admittedly Mrs Edens described her assessment of a month or two as "just a guess", that did not sit very well with the fact that the money was on deposit only from 30 July to 16 August 2007. Moreover, not only was it the case that neither any member of the McCann family nor Mr Clyde could offer any contemporaneous written evidence of this offer having been made, nothing had been recovered from Presbyterian Mutual or MacDonald Henderson, despite attempted recovery by commission and diligence.
[108] Mr Bowen
observed that although the pursuer, Michelle Edens and Mr Clyde had
been extensively cross-examined on the veracity of their evidence about an
offer for £2.5 million, no separate evidence had been adduced to support
that cross-examination. That was true, as far as direct evidence was concerned.
The observation however only goes a certain distance. Mr Bowen confirmed
that he was not suggesting that there was evidence which might have been led on
behalf of the defenders but had not been. Moreover, Mr McBrearty was able
to rely on the evidence that had been led about the market value of Sillyhole
in July 2007 in putting to Mr Clyde that his evidence that he had
been prepared to offer £2.5 million for the site was simply incredible. The
pursuer's expert, Mr Bell, had valued Sillyhole at £2.1 million with
outline planning permission for residential development. It will be
recollected that the land had not as yet been zoned for housing in July 2007,
albeit that the Consultative Draft Local Plan published in 2006 had
identified Sillyhole as a potential site for the development of fifty houses.
Mr Bell's valuation therefore assumed that when the new local plan came to
be adopted it would reflect the Consultative Draft, a matter which was still
uncertain as at July 2007. Mr Bell also made a variety of further
favourable assumptions to the effect that dealing with flooding risk,
installing services, accommodating ground conditions, providing for the traffic
assessment and meeting affordable housing and developer contribution
requirements could all be achieved at no great cost. When regard was had to
these imponderables and the consequential risk which a developer was assuming if
he acquired the site in July 2007 in the hope that he would be able to
build a sufficient number of houses sufficiently cheaply to ensure the expected
profit, even on the basis of the valuation proposed by pursuer's expert, £2.5
million seems a rather high price. That proposition is underscored when the
undisputed sales are taken into account. In March 2005 the sale price was £650,000,
subject to planning permission being granted. In September 2006 the sale
price was £800,000, again subject to planning permission. In July 2009,
admittedly after the economic downturn had depressed the housing market, the
sale price was £500,000, with planning permission.
[109] Although he
had put it to Mr Clyde, on the basis of the market value evidence
available from the reports of the valuation experts, that it was just
incredible that anyone would offer as much as £2.5 million for Sillyhole
in July 2007, particularly on an entirely unconditional basis, Mr McBrearty
took a more restrained position when it came to submissions. He accepted that
there was always the possibility of a purchaser who is prepared to pay "above
the odds", as he put it, albeit that the market value of the site in July 2007,
even on Mr Bell's approach, gave reason to pause before accepting Mr Clyde's
evidence. That was an acknowledgement of the way the matter had been put by Mr Bowen
who had emphasised that market value is an estimate of the price that would be
struck between a prudent buyer, on the one hand, and a prudent seller, on the
other. That model does not accommodate the speculator, that is the purchaser
who is prepared to take a significant risk in the hope of a significant profit.
As I understood the evidence and the submissions on that evidence, it is not
that a prudent buyer does not take risks (a wholly risk averse purchaser would
not have offered more than agricultural value for Sillyhole in July 2007)
but he reflects them by discounting on the price he would otherwise offer in
the way which was illustrated in the evidence of Mr King. The speculator,
on the other hand, may be less prudent and more sanguine. On the optimistic
view of Sillyhole which Mr Clyde said that he took, even at £2.5 million,
there was the potential for a speculator's profit. By July 2007 the
Consultative Draft Local Plan had identified the site as having potential for
housing. That took away some of the risk but Mr Clyde was also relaxed
about possible technical problems. He had viewed the site and liked it because
it was large and flat albeit, on his evidence, he appears to have instructed no
assessments of, for example, flood risk, ground conditions or likely traffic
requirements. According to Mr Clyde he had had experience of land prices
in Northern Ireland where prices had reached £1 million per acre for a
10-acre site even with a housing density of five houses per acre. Moreover,
notwithstanding the terms of the Consultative Draft Local Plan which indicated fifty
houses for the whole of the Sillyhole site with an element of (less profitable)
Affordable Housing, he had hopes of obtaining consent for ten to twelve houses
per acre. In other words, although £2.5 million appeared a high price
when compared with the valuations spoken to by the expert witnesses, at least
if Mr Clyde is accepted, it was not so high that a land speculator who
took an optimistic view of the site and an optimistic view as to the direction
of the market would not offer it.
[110] Understandably,
given the importance of the issue, cross-examination of the pursuer and Mr Clyde
had been, as Mr Bowen put it, quite extensive. Some of that
cross-examination has been detailed above. On the basis of the answers he
received, Mr McBrearty submitted that the evidence of the pursuer and Mr Clyde
on this issue could not be reconciled and the conclusion that the pursuer had
lied could not be avoided. It was Mr McBrearty's position that the
Croftmore letter of 18 August 2009 and the demand for £25,000 was
nothing other than a spurious attempt to give credence to the suggestion that
an offer had been made in 2007. It was relevant to consider the timing of
that letter. It came two years after the return of the loan money to
Presbyterian Mutual, yet shortly after the onward sale of the land in July 2009
and shortly prior to Professor Rennie preparing his further report
(7/37 of process) and the first intimation of claim (7/38 of process).
Mr Clyde's evidence had been unsatisfactory in relation to the issue of
the fees and interest which he alleged that he had incurred and wished to claim
from the pursuer. When considered in light of the evidence of Mr Clyde
and the pursuer, the conclusion that the Croftmore letter was prepared at the
pursuer's request purely to further his litigation became irresistible. As I
have already noted, the pursuer denied knowing about Mr and Mrs Clyde
being asked to write supporting his claim and recollected his surprise at
receiving the Croftmore letter. That, as I was reminded by Mr McBrearty,
did not square with Mr Clyde's answer to me that he had been asked directly
by the pursuer to write the letter, and should be regarded as a very
significant failure to tell the truth on the part of the pursuer in relation to
a matter which went to the heart of the loss that he claimed to have suffered.
[111] I was not
particularly impressed by Mr Clyde as a witness but I do not regard it as
probable that he would be prepared to collude in putting forward an account of
making an offer of £2.5 million which had no basis in fact whatsoever. Similarly,
while I have serious reservations about the credibility and reliability of the
pursuer and I have come to find Mrs Edens incredible on the question as to
whether Mr Gibson admitted fault in concluding the missives, I think it
unlikely that they would attempt to perpetrate what would so very obviously
amount to fraud. I see it as more likely that there was some basis in fact for
the evidence given by these witnesses in relation to a possible offer for
Sillyhole. However, accepting it as probable that there was some conversation
between the pursuer and Mr Clyde to which Mrs Edens was party or
which otherwise came to her attention to the effect that Mr Clyde had an
interest in Sillyhole and that a sum of £2.5 million was mentioned, is not
the same as accepting that, on the balance of probabilities, the pursuer has
established his probandum. What the pursuer avers is the he received an
unconditional offer from Croftmore Developments to purchase the subjects for £2,500,000.
I am unable to find that he has proved that averment. It is true that there was
no evidence to contrary effect. However, the evidence in support was less than
entirely convincing. The principal witnesses were the pursuer and Mr Clyde.
Notwithstanding my previous observations on how counsel encouraged me to
approach the assessment of witnesses, I do not go the distance of regarding
them as out-and-out liars who have colluded to fabricate an entirely fictitious
account. That would be unwarranted. However, for the reasons given above I
cannot regard either the pursuer or Mr Clyde as a necessarily credible and
reliable witness. While I am inclined to be less critical of the credibility
of Mrs Edens, notwithstanding the one issue on which I have held her to be
incredible, her uncharacteristic lack of command of the detail leads me to
question her reliability as to whether there was in fact a "serious" offer. There
was nothing in writing and therefore nothing which, by formal acceptance, could
have had contractual effect. I do not suggest that it was necessary in order
for the pursuer to satisfy his probandum that he produce a formal offer
to purchase Sillyhole but the fact that writing is required for the
constitution of a contract for the sale of heritage means that when matters do
not progress beyond purely oral communings it is not easy to determine whether
a truly "serious" and unconditional offer has been made. To do that requires
the evidence of careful and reliable witnesses. Here there was an absence of
such witnesses.
[112] Mr Clyde
did not claim to have consulted any professional advisers on the wisdom or
feasibility of offering £2.5 million unconditionally for the purchase of
Sillyhole. While he expressed his confidence that Presbyterian Mutual would
allow him to use the funds on deposit to purchase Sillyhole, I did not
understand Mr Clyde actually to have consulted Presbyterian Mutual on the
subject. It was explained by Mr Clyde that his principal contact with
Presbyterian Mutual, the secretary Mr Colin Ferguson, was seriously ill at
the time of the proof and I took it that this may have precluded him from being
led as a witness but, for whatever reason, I heard no evidence from either Mr Clyde's
potential lender or his then solicitors as to whether funds would have indeed
been available for the purchase of Sillyhole. On any view, the sum of £2.5
million was in excess of market value for the site. That is a factor which
bears on the probability of Mr Clyde making a serious offer at that price
but it also bears on the probability of a lender advancing funds for such a
purchase.
[113] I have
accordingly not been satisfied, as Mr Bowen had submitted that I should be
satisfied, that the pursuer has established on the on the balance of
probabilities that an oral offer had been made in July 2007 to purchase
Sillyhole for £2,500,000 without outline planning permission and that
Croftmore Developments had the funding available to pay the price.
Conclusion
[114] For the reasons given above I find that the defenders have succeeded
in establishing that they were not guilty of a failure to exercise reasonable
care. However, had I come to the opposite conclusion I would have held that
the pursuer has failed to prove any consequential damage.
[115] In relation
to the assessment of damage, it was Mr Bowen's submission that the
pursuer's claim, depending as it did on the hypothetical actions of a third
party, was for the loss of a chance and therefore, providing that he could show
that his chance was substantial rather than merely speculative he was entitled
to damages, assessment being based on the court's evaluation of how likely it
was that the chance would eventuate. Mr Bowen referred to Jackson
& Powell on Professional Liability (7th edit and
1st supp) paras 11-165 to 11-168 and 11-182 and Allied
Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons [1995] 1 WLR 1602
at 1610D, 1621E-G and 1625F-H. I saw in Mr Bowen's submission a
recognition that there were, at best, uncertainties associated with Mr Clyde's
supposed offer which might be reflected in a discount from the £2 million
sum sued for. In my opinion, the route which Mr Bowen pointed to is not
open to me. I do not doubt that damages may be awarded for what can be
described as a loss of a chance, as is variously explained by the members of
the Court of Appeal in Allied Maples but, for understandable reasons,
that is not the way in which the claim before me was presented. The pursuer
set out to establish that he was the relevant decision-maker, that reasonable
care required that the defenders give him certain advice in relation to the
proposed clause 4, that that advice was not given, that had it been given
he would have taken it, that EASSDA would have agreed to double-sided provision
and the result would have been that he would have had the option to withdraw
from the contract with EASSDA and then contract with any alternative purchaser
who might present himself. Thus far, nothing is hypothetical, other than the
question of how the pursuer would have responded to advice, but then he is
available to give direct evidence about that. Nothing depends on the
unknowable actions of a third party. The pursuer was in a position to lead
evidence and did lead evidence on all these points. All were capable of being
established on a balance of probabilities and had they all been established on
that basis the pursuer would have succeeded in proving that he had suffered
loss and damage as a result of negligence and breach of contract on the part of
the defenders. As Stuart-Smith LJ observed in Allied Maples supra at 1610A
and is very familiar, in civil proceedings once something is established on a
balance of probabilities that fact is taken to be true; it is no less true
where the balance tips at 51 per cent than where the fact-finder is
100 per cent certain. Had the pursuer established that he had suffered
loss and damage as a result of negligence, the question would then arise as to
how that loss and damage was to be quantified. There is no one way of doing so.
It depends on what evidence a pursuer considers is available to him and how he
deploys that evidence. In this case it was the pursuer's contention that there
was an actual potential purchaser for Sillyhole in the person of Mr Clyde
and that Mr Clyde went the distance of making an actual and "serious"
offer, that is an unconditional offer which was open to acceptance and which
would have resulted in a binding contract of purchase and sale. Had the
pursuer established that on a balance of probability he would, in my opinion,
have been entitled to recover damages assessed at the sum sued for, being the
difference between what he would have received for Sillyhole from Mr Clyde
and what he actually received. However, having failed to establish on the
balance of probabilities that Mr Clyde indeed made a serious offer for
Sillyhole, the necessary conclusion is that this simply did not happen and, in
the absence of further evidence as to what would or might have happened (of
which there was none), the pursuer must be taken to have failed to put before
the court any basis upon which damages could be quantified.
[116] Accordingly,
I shall repel the pursuer's first and second pleas-in-law, uphold the
defenders' second and third pleas-in-law and assoilzie the defenders from the
conclusions of the summons. I shall reserve all questions of expenses.