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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> Scottish Water Business Stream Ltd v Automatic Retailing (Scotland) Ltd [2014] ScotCS CSOH_57 (21 March 2014) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2014/2014CSOH57.html Cite as: [2014] ScotCS CSOH_57 |
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OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
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A448/12
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OPINION OF LORD DOHERTY
in the cause
SCOTTISH WATER BUSINESS STREAM LIMITED Pursuers;
against
(FIRST) AUTOMATIC RETAILING (SCOTLAND) LIMITED (IN ADMINISTRATION) First Defenders:
And
(SECOND) ARTHUR McKAY & CO LIMITED Second Defenders;
________________
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Pursuer: Duncan QC, MacFarlane, solicitor advocate; Simpson & Marwick
First Defender: Di Rollo QC, O'Brien; HBM Sayers
Second Defender: Shand QC; DAC Beachcroft
21 March 2014
Introduction
[1] In August
2009 the pursuers took up occupancy of first floor office premises in a three
storey modern office block at 7 Lochside View, Edinburgh Park, Edinburgh.
Thereafter they fitted out the premises with a view to commencing use of them
as a call centre in January 2010. The pursuers contracted with the first
defenders for the supply and fitting of a coffee dispensing machine. On 17
November 2009 the machine was installed in a staff break-out area, "the
Gallery". The position which had been selected for it was on a kitchen-type
worktop. It was not attached to the worktop. It rested on top of it. It was
connected to the cold water supply using a flexible hose. The hose was
attached at one end to the coffee machine. It then passed through a hole which
had been made in the worktop to the cupboard space underneath, where it was
connected to the cold water supply (a 15 mm copper pipe). On that end of the
hose there was a brass spigot. A non-return compression fitting was fitted on
the end of the copper pipe. The spigot was inserted in the other end of the
non-return fitting. It was connected to it using a brass olive and a nut which
was screwed over the olive. The machine was in use to dispense drinks on that
day and on subsequent days. There were no reports of any leaks of water. On
the morning of 30 November 2009 substantial flooding was discovered in the
premises. The olive and the nut were still in situ on the non-return fitting,
but the spigot had become completely disconnected from it.
[2] The
pursuers seek reparation from the defenders for loss and damage which they
suffered as a result of the flooding. Their primary case is against the first defenders.
They aver that the first defenders' employees failed to properly secure the
connection between the hose and the non-compression fitting. The first
defenders aver that the relevant connection was in fact made by an employee of
the second defenders, Stephen Noon. On that hypothesis the pursuers aver that
Mr Noon failed to secure the connection properly. The defenders deny that
the connection was not secured properly. They aver that it was checked after
the connection was made and was water-fast. The first defenders aver that it
was not reported to be sweating or leaking at any time between 17 November and
the discovery of the flooding. The pursuers aver that if there was no sweating
or leaking on 17 November "the water pressure was not sufficient at that time
to result in water escaping from the connection". The first defenders aver
that the connection came apart "because it was interfered with inadvertently or
deliberately". In response the pursuers aver:
"None of the people on site required to deliberately interfere with the connection. A load of approximately 30 kilograms was required to physically disconnect the fitting."
[3] The
pursuers aver:
"It was the first defenders' duty (ex contractu and ex delicto) to take reasonable care to exercise the degree of skill and competence to be expected of ordinarily competent contractors engaged to install a coffee machine. When installing the coffee machine ... it was their duty to take reasonable care to see that the hose of the machine and the water supply pipe were safely connected...It was their duty to ensure that the connection was secure..."
On the hypothesis that Mr Noon fitted the connection those duties had been incumbent upon him ex delicto and the second defenders were vicariously liable for his breach of them.
[4] The matter
came before me for a proof before answer on the issue of liability. The proof
occupied five days. The spigot, olive, nut and non-return valve had not been
lodged. All but the non-return valve were no longer in the pursuers'
possession. At the outset of the proof Mr Di Rollo indicated that he was
objecting to the pursuers seeking to lead evidence as to the condition which the
missing parts were observed to be in after the flood. While the pursuers were
not seeking to prove that any of the components were defective it might
transpire that the first defenders had been prejudiced by their inability to
have the actual parts examined by appropriate experts. Mr Di Rollo was content
that evidence in relation to the parts be led subject to competency and
relevancy. Mr Duncan was agreeable to that course being followed. Miss Shand
sought to reserve an opportunity to ally herself with Mr Di Rollo's objection
in the event of the second defenders being prejudiced by secondary evidence led
relating to the parts. The first defenders lodged two sets of the same sort of
kits which had been used (comprising, inter alia, hose with spigot,
non-return valve, olive and nut).
The evidence on the
contentious matters
The
pursuer's case
Mrs
Sharon Gardiner
[5] Mrs
Gardiner was now a manager with the pursuers. In November 2009 she had
been a procurement executive. The date of entry of the lease of the first floor
at 7 Lochside View had been 3 August 2009. The premises were to be used as the
pursuers' main office. They were to house corporate staff and a call centre.
She had been involved with the fit out but a consultant, Stephen Aird, had been
brought in to supervise most of it. The main contractors had been Sharkey. The
project managers had been Thomas & Addison, and the mechanical and
electrical contractors had been the second defenders. FESFM Ltd had been
engaged to take over the ad hoc maintenance after employees had moved in. There
had been a substantial IT fit out. The first defenders had supplied and
installed a hot drinks machine in the Gallery. The Gallery contained a small
kitchen area. A cold water supply pipe had been installed there by the second
defenders.
[6] On the
morning of 17 November 2009 the first defenders' employees Richard McFarlane,
Joe Feeney senior and Joe Feeney junior had arrived to install the coffee
machine and a snack machine. The coffee machine was to be installed on the
kitchen worktop in the Gallery. Mr McFarlane and Mr Feeney senior were installing
it, but they had not been able to locate the cold water pipe in the cupboard
under the worktop. Mrs Gardiner had looked for it too and had not seen it. She
contacted Mr Noon. He had arrived within about 15 minutes. He did not have any
tools with him, but he had brought a washing machine connection in case one was
needed. The water pipe had indeed been in the cupboard beneath the worktop. It
was high up and had been partially hidden by a lip of the cupboard. Mr Noon had
showed them where it was. He had made a joke about them needing glasses. Mr
McFarlane had said he had a connection and didn't need the washing machine
connection. Mr Noon had joked, sarcastically, "Do you want me to fit it for
you?" "They" had said that wouldn't be necessary, they could do it. There had
been some "small talk" before she had left to go back to her desk. Before she
had left she had seen someone assuming a position to make the connection - she
believed it had been Mr Feeney senior. Tools were laid out and he was on his
hands and knees to go into the cupboard. She thought Mr Noon had left with
her. She thought there might have been an issue with air conditioning for his
attention. The pipe which Mr Noon had showed them had looked like the pipe
seen in photograph 6/19 of process. It had had a yellow plastic cap on the end
of it like the one in the photograph.
[7] After the
machine was up and running cups of coffee and hot chocolate had been dispensed.
It had been significantly later in the day before the first defenders'
employees had left. Between then and 30 November 2009 she believed that Mr McFarlane
had been back in the office on a number of occasions. She recalled that he had
brought sugar and stirrers prior to the Friends and Family Day. After that she
recalled a further occasion when there had been a discussion about using tokens
with the machine.
[8] On
Saturday 21 November 2009 about one hundred people had attended a Family and
Friends Day in the office. The coffee machine had been on "free vend". Coffee
cups, lids and coffee were stored in the cupboard underneath the machine (just
below where the hose was connected to the non-return valve), but for that day
she thought they had been taken out and put on "a surface". They would
probably have been put back in the cupboard on the following Monday.
[9] Between 17
and 30 November 2009 she and other staff - particularly IT staff - were in and
out of the office. There would only have been about three or four staff there.
She may have used the machine. Other staff may have used the machine. She
did not think that security staff would have entered the building between those
dates. If there had been a leak between those dates she would have been told
about it. No leak had been reported.
[10] On the morning
of 30 November 2009 Mrs Gardiner had been telephoned at home by an IT manager. He
had informed her of the flooding. She had come in to the office. She had a
look at the damage. She telephoned the first defenders to ask that Mr
McFarlane attend. It was after 4 p.m. when he arrived. She hadn't been aware
of his arrival. She phoned his mobile phone and discovered he was in the
Gallery. She had gone to see him. He had said that he had remade the
connection using the existing nut, olive and spigot. He had said to her that
he had not made the original connection - that it had been Mr Noon. Mrs
Gardiner had said that he and Mr Feeney had made it, but he had denied that. She
described him as being quite nervous. Mrs Gardiner was concerned that there
would not be further flooding. He had said he could fit a different type of
connection which was more robust. He had gone to his van to get it. He had
fitted it. He had taken the original connection "kit" back to his van.
[11] A meeting
with Roger Topping, a loss adjuster instructed by the pursuers' insurers, had
taken place at the office a few days after the flooding. Mr McFarlane had been
at the meeting. Her recollection was that Mr McFarlane had admitted taking the
nut and olive away with him but that he had brought them back to the meeting
and had given them to Mr Topping. He may have brought the non-return valve as
well - she could not recall. The hose had remained on the machine. The coffee
machine had been removed from the building in March 2010. A new coffee company
had been engaged by the pursuers to maintain the machine. They had taken
everything away to reprogramme it. She believed they had removed the hose and
that it had been disposed of.
[12] In
cross-examination by Mr Di Rollo, and under reference to page 19 of Dr Graham's
report (7/1 of process), she was asked whether she had mentioned to him that
around 200 cubic litres of water may have flowed out of the disconnected pipe.
She replied "It looked that way."
Stephen Aird
[13] In November 2009 Mr Aird was employed by Strategic Occupiers
Facilities. He co-ordinated the relocation of the pursuers from their previous
office at Fairmilehead to 7 Lochside View. On 16 November 2009 he took the
photograph 6/19 which showed the cold water supply pipe in the cupboard
under the Gallery worktop. When photographed the pipe had a white plastic cap
on the end. There had been no non-return valve in situ.
Mrs Margaret Reid
[14] Mrs Reid worked for Allander Security. On 30 November 2009 she had
arrived outside 7 Lochside View at about 8.45 a.m. The building had been
opened already - a colleague would have done that at 5.30 a.m. She went in the
main entrance on the ground floor. She heard water coming through the ceiling.
Once she went to pursuers' office she was able to hear a moisture alarm - it
had been quite dull. There was water on the floor. It got deeper as she
walked towards the Gallery. It was coming from the cupboard under the coffee
machine. She opened the cupboard door. The white flexible hose fell out, as
did sugar and tea bags. The hose was detached from the pipe. Water was
gushing out of the pipe. She called Kevin MacFarlane the Facilities Manager. He
arrived about 9 a.m.
[15] Allander
Security's duties on the night shift involved going in to each of the buildings
at Edinburgh Park to make sure windows were closed and to do the "lockdown". The
buildings would then be opened up for business at about 5.30 a.m. Any leaks
spotted by security staff were to be reported.
Kevin MacFarlane
[16] Mr MacFarlane was a building supervisor with the Miller Group. His
responsibilities included the day to day running of 7 Lochside View. When he
arrived in response to Mrs Reid's call he found the stopcock and switched the
water off. His line manager, Jacqueline McAinsh, arrived shortly afterwards. She
took the photographs 6/17/1 and 6/17/2 of process. The photographs showed the
hose, non-return valve and nut as they had been when he had first seen them
that morning. Between 17 and 30 November 2009 he would have been in the
building once or twice a day, Mondays to Fridays. There had been no reports to
him of leaks.
Jacqueline McAinsh
[17] Mrs McAinsh was a property manager with Miller Developments. She
confirmed taking the photographs 6/17/1, 6/17/2 and 6/17/3 at about 9.37 a.m.
on 30 November 2009. During the fit out she had probably been in the
building every other day talking to contractors. No report had been made to
her of any leak prior to 30 November 2009.
Douglas Hopkins
[18] In November 2009 Mr Hopkins had been employed by FESFM Ltd as a
service engineer (mechanical side). He dealt mainly with plumbing. Around
9a.m. on 30 November 209 he was asked to attend at the pursuers' office. When
he arrived at the Gallery the water had been turned off and the hose and
non-return valve were as shown in photograph 6/17/1. He used a couple of
spanners to unscrew the nut. It wasn't as tight as he had expected. Underneath
it was a brass olive. The olive looked perfectly normal as if it hadn't been
used. Normally he would expect the olive to be squashed down and crimped; to
be deformed to some extent. When a nut was screwed down on an olive on a
copper pipe it would bend and cut down into the copper of the pipe. But where
what was being connected was made of brass (like the spigot) the nut had to be
very tight because brass didn't give as easily as copper. Once he had removed
the olive and nut he had put them on the spigot. They had gone on easily. He
had concluded that the olive wasn't deformed and that the nut hadn't been
tightened properly.
[19] In
cross-examination Mr Hopkins confirmed that his conclusion that the nut had
been insufficiently tightened was based upon his belief that with a properly
tightened nut the olive would have deformed.
Roger Topping
[20] Mr Topping is a chartered loss adjuster. He was first instructed by
the pursuers' insurers on 30 November 2009. He had attended a meeting on 2
December 2009 at the pursuers' office. Mrs Gardiner, Mr McFarlane and the first
defenders' managing director had been present. Mr McFarlane had said that when
he had come to install the machine a non-return valve had already been fitted
to the end of the cold water pipe. He didn't know who had fitted it. He said
that Mr Noon had volunteered to fit the hose and had done so. Mr McFarlane had
given him the non-return valve which he had removed when he had fitted a new
valve. Mr McFarlane had told him that he had remade the connection using the
existing nut and olive. Mr Topping gave evidence that the olive might
have provided good evidence of how tight the nut had been, but if it had been
re-used that evidence might have been corrupted. He had asked Mr McFarlane for
"the fitting". He thought he may have asked for the olive and the nut - that
he had asked him for all he had. He had expected to get all of the relevant
parts. What he had been given had been the non-return valve, nothing else. Mr
Topping had not instructed any specialist expert input as to the cause of the
failure of the connection.
[21] In
re-examination Mr Topping indicated that his understanding "from discussions"
was that the olive had simply been thrown away. He could not remember exactly
what had been said about the olive at the meeting. He could not recall if he
had asked specifically for it: he observed "I didn't take it that far. I asked
for the fitting and expected to get what there was."
Mrs Daphne Wasserman
[22] Mrs Wasserman is a is a mechanical and materials engineer. She is a
Technical Director with the engineering firm Cadogans. In October 2013 she was
instructed by the pursuers to prepare a report. She was asked to comment on
the cause of the leak. She was also asked to comment on the question of how a
reasonably competent plumber, acting with ordinary skill and care, would have
approached making the connection. Her report is 6/7 of process. For the
purposes of preparing her report she had been able to consider the report (7/1
of process) of the expert instructed by the first defenders, Dr Graham, and the
photographs in that report. She had not had the opportunity to examine any of
the actual components which had been used to make the connection: "I gather
that they may not be available." In examination-in-chief she indicated that she
had been aware of comments made about the olive and its condition after the
failure. She was asked "How significant is the evidence of re-use of the olive
and the nut?" She replied "It is quite significant." She was then asked "To
what extent does your opinion evidence depend on assessment of the actual
condition of the olive [after the leak]?" Her response was "It is part of the
evidence that leads me to conclude that the nut and olive were not tightened
sufficiently." She observed that the fact the olive could be re-used suggested
that it could be taken on and off the spigot with relative ease. That was quite
significant. She added "There is also other evidence independent of the
condition of the olive which I rely upon for my opinion."
[23] Mrs Wasserman
dealt with the cause of the leak in section 4.1 of her report:
"4.1.3 Cause of the leak
4.1.3.1 Dr Graham has shown that under some circumstances the hose can be forced out of the fitting by water pressure. He also notes that at the time of his visit the water pressure adjacent to the coffee machine was about 2.4 bar but that on occasion it had risen to 5.7 bar.
4.1.3.2 In my view, the most likely explanation for the failure is that the nut was not tightened sufficiently. Under a relatively low water pressure no leak would be evident. If, at some later stage, the water pressure increased the hose could be forced out of the fitting.
4.1.3.3 Dr Graham also noted that the hose could be pulled out of the fitting if sufficient force was used. During the period of the installation and the failure the building was not occupied. The cupboard was used to store some plastic cups but the kitchen area and the coffee machine did not have heavy use.
4.1.3.4 It is possible that a contractor may have moved the coffee machine between November 17th and November 30th. As the hose passed through the counter top I would not expect a large force to be transmitted to the connection as a result of this.
4.1.3.5 I therefore think it is unlikely that the hose was pulled out of the fitting by a person.
4.1.4 Conclusion on the cause of the leak
4.1.4.1 On the balance of probabilities, therefore, I am of the opinion that the nut on the fitting was not tightened sufficiently and that the hose was forced out of the fitting by an increase in water pressure."
[24] In
section 4.2 she considered the actions of a competent plumber:
"4.2 Actions of a competent plumber
....
4.2.1.6 When fitting the hose the compression nut should be tightened to the correct level. Dr Graham quotes one hose manufacturer as stating that the nut should be tightened to a torque of 4 to 5 Nm. Dr Graham's tests suggest that if the nut was tightened to this torque the joint would withstand a water pressure of 12 bar.
4.2.1.7 I have seen no evidence that either Defender had a torque wrench. If they had used one it is likely that the joint would have been correctly tightened.
4.2.1.8 The alternative method often adopted is to tighten the nut finger tight then continue to tighten it by a certain amount, for example a quarter turn, using a conventional spanner. This method is less accurate as the amount of turn has to be estimated.
4.2.1.9 Tightening using a conventional spanner to turn the nut by a certain amount is a technique regularly used by plumbers. However, it must be done carefully to ensure sufficient tightening without over-tightening the coupling ...."
[25] In section
4.3 she considered the appropriate method of testing for water tightness. She
concluded that it would not be normal practice to carry out a pressure test on
an individual fitting: rather, common practice would be to check the fitting
visually for leaks.
[26] In
examination-in-chief Mrs Wasserman conceded that the activity in the office and
the use of coffee machine appeared to be greater than she had understood when
she had prepared her report: but that was "of small importance to my
reasoning". She accepted Dr Graham's test results, but she did not agree with
his conclusions. She now believed that the reference to 4 to 5 Nm in the
manufacturers' guidance (and the associated diagram of a wrench) (Appendix A to
Dr Graham's report) referred to the torque to be applied to the connection
between the hose and the coffee machine, not the connection to the non-return
valve. She departed to that extent from what she had said in her report. She
thought it unlikely that the leak would have been caused by external force
being applied to the connection. The sort of force Dr Graham contemplated, 30
kg, was considerable. From the photographs it looked like the hose had not
been taut - there had been some slack - making it less likely that such force
could have been applied inadvertently. If someone had inadvertently pulled the
hose right out it would have leaked immediately and the person who did it would
have been likely to do something about it. From photograph 6/17/2 one more
screw thread was visible between the nut on the hose side of the non-return
valve and the centre of the valve than appeared between the nut on the opposite
side and the centre of the valve. From examining the specimen fittings lodged
in court she thought one thread equalled a complete turn of the nut. She
clarified the only information about water pressure which she had had were (a)
that after the leak the pursuers had commissioned a period of continuous
monitoring of the water pressure at the local main between 5 and 12 December
2009; the pressure logged had been about 5 bar with minor variations above and
below that figure; (b) when Dr Graham visited on 7 October 2010 he noted that
the water pressure a short distance upstream of the coffee machine was 2.4 bar,
and from a sweeping telltale had been a maximum of 5.7 bar at some time. She
accepted that the connection appeared to have been sufficiently tightened to be
leak‑free until about 30 November. Her explanation was "It may be
explained if the pressure was relatively low for the first 12 days but then
rose and caused the fitting to come apart."
[27] In relation
to what a competent fitter would have done she had looked at other
manufacturers' recommendations and information published by the UK Copper
Board. These suggested tightening to finger tight and then a further three-
quarters of a turn up to one and a quarter turns.
[28] In
cross-examination Mrs Wasserman indicated that she had been told that the
original components - other than the non-return valve - had not been retained.
She had not enquired further about them. She had been shown the non-return
valve. It was the same as the specimens. She accepted that the nut, olive and
spigot could have been of evidential value: more so the olive and the spigot
than the nut. (Unless there was a fault in the nut - which had not been
suggested). The olive and the spigot could have been tested, in the same way
as Dr Graham had tested specimens. It would have been useful to see if the
olive could be easily moved on the spigot. She said her understanding of the
recommended approach to tightening was to tighten to about half a turn to
three-quarters of a turn past finger tight, and if the joint still leaked to
tighten a little bit more. In addition to looking at manufactures' guidance
and the UK Copper Board material she had looked at DIY website discussions. She
had done this research after the preparation of her report. She had not
contacted the suppliers of the hose. She had not been asked to consider the
possibility of deliberate vandalism.
[29] In
re-examination Mrs Wasserman confirmed that in her view where the connection
used a brass spigot and a brass olive the nut should be tightened to between
half a turn and three quarters of a turn past finger tight and if leaking
tightened by a small further amount. She considered she was able to provide
her opinions on the basis of a desk top study. It would have helped to have
had the parts but she was nonetheless able to provide an opinion without them. If
the olive and spigot had been re-used twice after the leak they would have been
of very little evidential value. The olive could well be very deformed. The
spigot would only be useful if there more than one set of marks on it - it
might show it had been differently inserted on different occasions. While she
did not have the figures to hand she strongly suspected that brass would
require a higher force to deform plastically than copper would.
Stephen Noon
[30] In November 2009 Mr Noon was a project manager in the second
defenders' mechanical division. He was qualified as an electrician and as a
gas fitter and engineer. The second defenders installed the pipework in the
petitioners' office. After the contract works had been done the second
defenders were asked to provide, as an extra, a water point to a vending
machine in the Gallery. On Mr Noon's instructions one of the second defenders'
plumbing engineers did the work. On 17 November 2009 Mrs Gardiner
telephoned to say that the supply point could not be located. He had driven to
plumbing suppliers and picked up a couple of fittings that might be required -
a 90 degree compression elbow and a "washing machine valve". On arrival at the
Gallery he had located the pipe. He showed it to Mrs Gardiner and the two
men who were installing the machine. The end of the pipe had been capped off
with a push fit fitting as shown in photograph 6/19. There had been a little
bit of banter. Mr Noon had asked if either of the fittings he had brought was
required. The men had said no. They had got on with what they were doing. Mr
Noon had remained in the vicinity of the Gallery. He did not recall if Mrs Gardiner
had asked him about air conditioning at that time. When they had finished Mr
Noon had turned the water back on. He had checked visually that there had been
no leaks. He considered that he had had a responsibility to do that.
[31] During
cross-examination by Mr Di Rollo Mr Noon confirmed it had been a little
difficult to see the pipe because of the lip of the cupboard. He had been confident
that his men had installed the water pipe "but it was possible the final
connection wasn't correct" so he had stopped at plumbing suppliers to pick up a
couple of items that might be needed. If he had had to install the items he
had bought he would, reluctantly, have put them together by hand and tightened
them with spanners from his car. He believed he may have taken his screwdriver
and a set of Gordon grips - pliers for water pipework. He had those tools in
his hand, the other items would have been in his jacket pocket. He didn't
bring a toolbox or a bag. He had never connected a coffee machine before. He
had connected lots of washing machines. He removed the push head which was
capping off the pipe then he left the men to get on with it. He had not put
anything on the pipe. If he had had to, he would have. He had jokingly said
when he had pointed it out "Do you want me to connect it up as well?" He had
not meant it - it had been "a slight dig at them". When the men told him they
were ready he had turned the water back on using his screwdriver. He had then
checked the downstream pipework from the stop valve to the connection which had
been made to ensure that there was no leakage. He had been clear there wasn't.
He visually looked at the various joints and he would have run his hand along
to ensure that there was no water. He said he had a responsibility to do that.
[32] Under
cross-examination by Miss Shand Mr Noon indicated that he was present when the
connection was made but he wasn't paying attention. He had been in the
general, but not the immediate, vicinity. He may have been talking to Miss Gardiner.
He had connected washing machines at home. He had connected dishwashers
professionally before he worked with the second defenders. The non-return
valve which had been used in the connection was completely different from a
washing machine valve.
The first defenders'
case
Richard
McFarlane
[33] In November 2009 Mr McFarlane was a senior engineer with the
first defenders. He had been employed with them since 2000. He had been in
the vending machine industry since 1970. He was a time-served electrician. On
17 November 2009 he and two colleagues, Joe Feeney senior and Joe Feeney
junior, had arrived to deliver and install three vending machines. A
(table-top type) coffee machine was to be installed on a worktop in the
Gallery. Mrs Gardiner showed them where. He and Joe Feeney senior unpacked
the machine and lifted it on to the worktop next to a hole in the worktop which
had already been cut for the flexible hose to go through.
[34] The
installation kit which came with the machine included a flexible hose with a
brass spigot on the water connection end, a non-return valve, and nuts and
olives. With such kit the non-return valve went on the end of the water pipe
and the spigot was inserted inside it. It was then secured in place by
slipping an olive over it and screwing the nut over the olive, tightening it to
make a seal. This was a standard task of a sort which he had done countless
times over a period of forty years. With such a connection he would use an
adjustable spanner to get it tight using about three-quarters of a turn of the
nut. That was what the manufacturers recommended and that was what he normally
did.
[35] After the
machine was in position on the worktop Mr McFarlane and his colleagues were
unable to locate the water pipe. They contacted Mrs Gardiner. She could not
see it either. Mr Noon had been asked to come. Mrs Gardiner had said he was
the lad who organised the pipework. When he arrived Mr Noon got on his knees
and located the water pipe. It had been very close to the underside of the
worktop. Mr McFarlane thought that the pipe had a non-return valve fitted to
the end but he could be mistaken. It had been quite embarrassing. There had
been a bit of banter. Mr Noon had then said "Do you want me to connect it?" Mr
McFarlane had said "Well you are there, carry on." Mr Noon had seemed to know
what he was doing; he hadn't asked any questions. Mr McFarlane had assumed he
was a plumber. The hose had already been dropped through the hole. Mr
McFarlane thought that Mr Noon had had a small toolbag with him. It was some
sort of bag. Mr Noon had said "That's it." Then Mr Noon had gone along to the
cupboard with the water supply and had turned it on. He had said "That's you
ready to go." At the end of the job, at about 3 p.m., Mr McFarlane put his
hands round all the joints to see if there was any sweating or leaking. He ran
his hand round the non-return valve where it connected with the hose. There
was no dampness. At that point the machine had been running for about four
hours.
[36] Between 17
November and 30 November Mr McFarlane had been back at least three times. The
first visit had been to adjust the drink levels - for it to dispense quantities
for staff mugs. He would have had no reason to go into the cupboard on that
occasion. On the second occasion he upgraded the machine so that it accepted
tokens. He had not gone into the cupboard on that occasion. The third
occasion was the Family and Friends Day. His daughter was an employee of the
pursuers. The coffee machine was in operation and had been on free vend. He
had had to restock it because it had been used so much. He had used the coffee
and milk in the cupboard. The stock was directly below the connection. Had it
been leaking the stock would have been wet. It wasn't.
[37] On 30
November 2009 he was asked to attend at the pursuers' office in connection with
a leak. He knew it could only be the coffee machine. (Neither of the other two
vending machines were connected to the water supply.) It was later in the day
before he got there. He went to the Gallery. The cupboard door was open and
the hose was hanging out. The nut and olive were on the hose. The scenario
shown in photograph 6/5/7 of process was the one which greeted him. It looked
like the connection had been disconnected. He reconnected the hose and parts
because he wanted to find out where the problem lay. He switched the water on
and turned the machine on. The machine and the connection were working as they
should. He made himself a cup of coffee. Mrs Gardiner had arrived. She asked
him if he knew what had happened. He said no, but that he had reconnected the
machine and it was working. She had not been comfortable with that and had
asked if anything else could be done. Mr McFarlane had said he had a safety
block in the van. She asked him to fit it. He had fetched it, undone the
connection, removed the return valve and remade the connection using the block
and the same nut and olive. He had explained to Mrs Gardiner that he had not
found any fault but that the water block would shut off the water if there was
an incident. He had put the non-return valve in his van.
[38] Later he
and the first defenders' managing director had attended a meeting with Mr
Topping and Mrs Gardiner. He had told Mr Topping about remaking the connection
using the water block. Mr Topping had asked what had happened to the equipment
used. Mr MacFarlane had told him he had the non-return valve. He had given it
to him.
[39] During
cross-examination Mr McFarlane accepted that it had been a little unusual for
them to leave it to someone else to make the connection and that was not his
habit. However, some customers did not allow the first defenders to do it,
preferring to make their own arrangements. In addition, sometimes when they
came to make a connection plumbers had already fitted a non-return valve. He
adhered to his view that Mr Noon arrived about five minutes after being called
- he didn't think it was possible it was as long as fifteen to twenty minutes. He
felt sure that there was a non-return valve on the pipe already. When it was
put to him that he or Mr Feeney senior, not Mr Noon, had connected the hose to
the non-return valve he replied "No. It is a definite. I did not connect it. Mr
Noon did. I have a clear recollection of who did this work." He and Mr Feeney
had been standing up to the left side of Mr Noon while he did the work. He
remembered this occasion well because Mr Noon had showed them the pipe and it
had been highly embarrassing. When he had returned on 30 November and
reconnected it he had been trying to find out where the leak had come from and
whether a component had failed. He didn't recall Mrs Gardiner, on 30 November,
raising the issue of who made the connection. Her concerns appeared to be more
what had happened and how she could prevent it happening again. He did not
recall mentioning to Mr Topping that he had re-used the nut and olive.
Patrick Joseph Feeney
senior
[40] In November 2009 Mr Feeney had been employed by the first defenders
as a service engineer. He was not a time-served tradesman but he had worked in
the vending machine industry since he was 16. (He was 49 at the proof). When
they had arrived at the pursuers' office on 17 November Mrs Gardiner had told
them where the machines were to go. She said that there was a copper pipe
sticking up on the Gallery worktop where the coffee machine was to go. When he
saw it Mr Feeney had asked her whether it was live because it did not have a
cap on it. She went to get someone who knew. He had not looked in the
cupboard at that time and he did not think anyone else had. Ten or fifteen
minutes later she had returned with a gentleman. He had assumed it was the
person who had dealt with the water supply. Mr Noon had lifted the pipe out of
the hole - it had merely been a loose piece of pipe marking where the hole was.
Then he had got down on his knees and had pointed out the water pipe in the
cupboard. The pipe had had a non-return valve on the end of it. Mr Noon had
said something about them needing glasses. Mr Noon had then said as he was
down there anyway he would just connect it. The hose had been passed down to
him and he had connected it. He had had tools with him in a handy-tools belt. Mr
Feeney thought that he passed Mr Noon the nut and olive to make the connection.
Once he had made the connection Mr Noon went to the stopcock and turned the
water on. Mr Noon had then checked the joints. Mr Feeney said that he would
have checked the joints too. He always checked both ends of the hosepipe. He
was shown photograph 6/19 (which showed a pipe with a cap on the end rather
than a non-return valve). He said that if that was a picture of the pipe at
the time then he obviously didn't see a non-return valve on it when he looked
in the cupboard. He suggested that he must have assumed from looking at the
photographs of the pipe after the event that the non-return valve had already
been fitted. Quite often a non-return valve would have been fitted already
when he came to make a connection. Mr Noon could have fitted it when he made
the connection.
[41] Under
cross-examination by Miss Shand Mr Feeney clarified that he had been shown some
photographs by a lawyer about three weeks before the proof. He had felt stupid
when Mr Noon had removed the loose piece of pipe, pointed out the water pipe,
and joked with them that they needed glasses. The loose piece of pipe seen
lying at the base of the cupboard in photograph 6/19 could have been the piece
used to mark the hole. It was put to him that Mr MacFarlane had said they had
looked in the cupboard but could not see the pipe. Mr Feeney replied that may
well have been the case. He did not remember Mrs Gardiner looking in the
cupboard. The reason she had gone to get Mr Noon was to see if the pipe
sticking up was live, not because they couldn't find the water pipe in the
cupboard. Mr Feeney had bent down to look in the cupboard and had seen the
pipe when Mr Noon had been down there. Mr Feeney had put the flexi-pipe
through the hole and Mr Noon had fitted it. Mr Noon had had a tool tidy belt -
like "a wee bag"- strapped to his leg. He assumed Mr Noon must have fitted the
non-return valve. He was adamant that he did not make the connection. He
checked the fittings by hand after they had been fitted - to make sure there
were no sweats or drips from the joints. He had worked for very many years
doing this sort of work and he had never had a leak. He couldn't say
categorically that Mr McFarlane had checked them on this occasion but that was
what he normally did. Usually they both checked, one after the other. He was
asked why Mrs Gardiner would say that Mr Mcfarlane had declined Mr Noon's offer
and she had seen Mr Feeney at the cupboard preparing to do the job if those
things were not true. He replied:
"No - I can't explain it. I know for a fact 100% what I am saying is true. When I tell you I didn't fix it - if I had done it I would have said. If I had done it I would have told you."
[42] Under
cross-examination by Mr Duncan Mr Feeney accepted that he should have looked
under the worktop at the outset. He could not remember doing that. It was
suggested to him that for he and Mr MacFarlane to let someone else make the
connection suggested a degree of casualness on their part. He agreed. It was
put to him that in fact it was Mr McFarlane or him who did it. He replied
"100% not". He was asked how he would have approached it if he had made the
connection. He said he would have put the olive and nut on and tightened the
nut up to hand-tight. He would then have turned the nut a further half turn,
or slightly more, to make sure it was watertight. In 27 years he had never had
a leak.
Dr Jan Graham
[43] Dr
Graham is a consulting engineer. He is a partner in Geoffrey Hunt &
Partners. On 19 May 2010 he was instructed on behalf of the first defenders to
attend at the pursuers' office to inspect the equipment present and to examine
components which had been retained by Mr Topping. He did so on 7 October 2010.
Subsequently he carried out further investigations and prepared a report dated
21 December 2011 (7/1 of process). Part of his investigations involved
carrying out tests on fittings of the same type as those which had been
employed to make the connection. Dr Graham was present in court during the
evidence of the factual witnesses.
[44] At the time
of Dr Graham's attendance on 7 October 2010 the original flexible hose had been
replaced (in about January/ February 2010) and other changes had been made to
the fittings connecting the coffee machine to the water supply. Dr Graham
noted in paragraph 3.2 of his report:
"As a result, the only component of the original pipework that remained at the time of my attendance was the body of a double check valve that Mr Topping had retained... This was the least evidentially significant component of the original installation: the brass male spigot on the end of the original flexible hose, and the copper or brass olive installed within the compression fitting, the condition of either or both of which may have provided physical evidence to confirm the mechanism of failure of the joint, have apparently been disposed of."
[45] Dr Graham
explained that the pursuers had commissioned a five day period (5 - 11 December
2009) of continuous monitoring of water pressure at the local main. Mains
pressure averaged 4.96 bar (48.6m) with only slight variations (a peak of
50.05m and a minimum of 42.14m). He had seen no evidence as to what mains
water pressure was at any earlier time. The local supply branch serving the
coffee machine had a pressure gauge installed. At the time of his visit on 7
October 2010 Dr Graham noted that the water pressure a short distance upstream
of the coffee machine was 2.4 bar. A sweeping telltale indicated that at some
point pressure had reached a maximum of 5.7 bar. Mrs Gardiner had informed him
that it was estimated up to 200 cubic metres of water had escaped during
the leak. If that was indeed so the discharge was likely to have taken place
over a period of at least 10 hours (but it could have been as long as 30
hours). It depended on the water pressure at the time and the applicable
discharge co-efficient.
[46] Dr Graham
explained that the brass spigot was much harder than a copper pipe and, because
it was a machined fitting, it was also much rounder and smoother. By comparison
a copper pipe was out of round, unsmooth and comparatively soft. It was much
more liable to be indented by an olive in the course of compression. That
didn't happen with brass. A compression join on to brass tended to be more
secure against leakage than one on to copper because a closer join was
achieved; but a join on to copper tended to be more secure against movement. Ordinarily,
a compression join on to a copper pipe could be expected to withstand 70-90 bar
before the join separated. This was a fortuitous incidental mechanical
benefit, because a compression joint was not intended to be a mechanical joint.
Its purpose was simply to make the joint leak-tight. Pipework should be
independently supported to resist thrust pressure. The conventional
requirement for leak-tightness of joints was that they should be leak-tight up
to 12 bar.
[47] Dr Graham
spoke to the tests which he carried out on 22 August 2011 using the hose kits
supplied to him by the pursuers. These were recorded in section 6 of his
report. He noted that the flexi-hose was marked for a maximum pressure of 12 bar.
In Test Series 2 he made a connection using a brass olive and tightened it to
a one-quarter turn of the nut past finger tight (a torque of 6.6 Nm). He then
increased water pressure in 1 bar increments. A slight weep commenced at 5
bar. At 8 bar the connection held with no motion and no pressure drop for 5
minutes. He increased the water pressure in 1 bar increments to 12 bar. The
leakage rate did not appear to increase. He pulled firmly on the end of the
hose and found that the brass spigot could fairly readily be extracted from the
fitting leaving the olive behind. He described the force used as being akin to
a hearty handshake or pulling a garden hose off its hoserail; it had not been
a bracing tug-of-war type pull. He dismantled the connection and found that
the olive could be re-installed on the spigot. He remade the connection to
one-quarter turn past finger tight (6.6 Nm). He applied 15 bar pressure. The
connection wept but did not appear to be at risk of separation. He increased it
to 18 bar with the same result. It was then increased to 20 bar at which point
the leakage rate increased and the spigot eased slowly out of the connection
over about 5 seconds. Dr Graham repeated the test with greater tightnesses of
the nut. Where the nut was tightened to 7.7 Nm (about one twenty-fourth of a
turn tighter than before) a very slow leak occurred at about 5 bar and the
connection eased apart at 24 bar. Tightened to 8.2 Nm it eased apart at 28
bar. Tightened to 8.5 Nm it dripped slowly at 15 bar and started to move at 28
bar: upon dismantling the olive could still be removed and replaced on the
spigot with light finger pressure. Tightened to 8.8 Nm (just short of
one-third of a turn from finger tight) slow leakage commenced at about 20 bar. The
leakage rate increased significantly at 30 bar and the connection mobilised at
31 bar. Upon dismantling the olive was no longer free but could be removed
from the spigot using the compression nut as a "drift", and the olive could be
re-seated after careful alignment. Tightened to 9.5 Nm (about nine
twenty-fourths of a turn past finger tight) a slight weep commenced at 15 bar,
and a slow drip at 20 bar. Pressure was raised incrementally to 30 bar and
then 3 bar with no apparent difficulty. The spigot pushed through the olive at
40 bar. Upon dismantling Dr Graham found the olive to be a very close fit but
it was still just possible to reinstall it on the spigot. There was no sign of
any gross scoring on the spigot but the spigot's surface appeared slightly
burnished. There were no plastic compression rings visible inside the spigot.
Dr Graham reassembled the connection, tightened to 10.4 Nm (five-twelfths
of a turn past finger tightness), and applied and maintained 45 bar pressure. The
spigot moved and popped out of the fitting in about 5 seconds. There remained
no obvious sign of damage to the spigot.
[48] Dr Graham
concluded that the connection made on 19 November must have been tightened to
at least a one-quarter turn past finger tight - otherwise it would have leaked
freely from the outset. If it had been tightened to one-quarter turn past
finger tight it would have oozed or wept at about 5 bar. However, even in
those circumstances the instantaneous failure pressure would have been in
excess of about 13 bar - far in excess of the maximum water pressure to which,
on the evidence, it may have been exposed. If it had been tightened to
one-third of a turn past finger tight (still a relatively light tightening
torque) the failure pressure of the connection would have been in excess of 30
bar. Tightened to five-twelfths of a turn, 45 bar pressure was required to
cause failure; but even then the olive could be reinstalled and the spigot was
undamaged. It followed that the fact that after the incident the olive could
be reinstalled on the spigot was not an indication that the nut had been
insufficiently tightened. Mr Hopkins' observations in that regard had not been
well founded. While with a compression joint on a copper pipe and a copper
olive some deformation might have been expected with a sufficiently tightened
nut, that was not so with a brass olive on to a brass spigot.
[49] The
manufacturer's instruction for use of the fitting were appended to Dr Graham's
report. These appeared to indicate "Brass fittings maximum torque 4 to 5Nm". Under
the heading "Post Installation" was the instruction "Verify all connections are
secure and leak free." Dr Graham was satisfied from his test results that an
installation torque of 4 to 5Nm would have been sufficient to provide an
instantaneous failure pressure of the connection greater than 12 bar.
[50] If the
connection made had been capable of being separated by a water pressure of 5.7
bar it would have leaked freely in the period between 17 and 30 November. There
was no evidence of any such problems. To be leak-tight at a pressure of 2.4
bar the nut would have to have been tightened at least one and one-quarter
flats (one flat of the nut was one-sixth of a turn) past finger tight. At that
tightness the failure point would have been in excess of 11 bar.
[51] For these
reasons Miss Wasserman's theory of how the failure occurred appeared to him to
be extremely unlikely. In his career he had seen a number of failures of
compression fittings In none of them had the joint been leak-tight when
fitted, leak-free for a substantial period, but then failed with no intervening
cause. What was being suggested was a very unusual scenario. A more likely
cause was that the failure had been the result of interference with the
connection - inadvertent or deliberate. If, say, the connection had been
tightened so as to have a failure pressure of 20 bar it would have had a
reserve strength of 15 bar (allowing for a water pressure of 5 bar). In such
circumstances a pull force applied to the hose of 30kg would be sufficient to
mobilise the connection. That force could have been induced by no more than a
sharp yank, such as could have occurred if someone was attempting to remove
something from the cupboard when it was entangled with the hose; or by moving
the machine during cleaning or the like.
[52] Dr Graham
indicated that it would have been of value to him to have had the original
components - particularly the spigot and the olive. They might have had marks
on them which assisted in determining how tightly the nut had been secured. It
was less likely there would have been marks inside the nut but sometimes there
were, and sometimes they did provide an indication of the turns applied to
them. Even if a connection had been remade twice after the failure using the
nut, olive and spigot examination of them could still be of value. He would
have liked to have put the parts under a microscope. Sometimes it was possible
to discern overlapping markings, and to say the order in which markings had
been made.
[53] Under
reference to photograph 6/17/2 and paragraph 4.15.2 of his report Dr Graham
observed that the nut on the hosepipe side of the non-return valve appeared to
have been tightened tighter than the nut on the copper pipe side of the
non-return valve. He did not consider that that assisted in determining the
cause of the failure. If he had had the original components it might have been
possible to reproduce the position seen in the photographs. The test results
he had were the best available evidence.
[54] In
cross-examination by Mr Duncan Dr Graham agreed that the precise magnitude of
the external force required to produce failure depended upon how tightly the
connection was made. The example of 30kg which he had given applied where
there had been a one-quarter turn past finger tight (6.6 Nm) and water pressure
of 5 bar. He agreed that in the case of the coffee machine being moved force
would only be applied to the joint if the hose was pulled taut. A small
movement of the machine would not have done that - it would have to have been
moved a foot or two before the hose became taut. It would not have been
difficult to slide the machine along the worktop. He was in no doubt that that
sort of force could have been generated by movement of the coffee machine. That
was one possibility. The level of force involved (30 kg) was about the same as
would be generated by a sharp application of a car handbrake. It was put to Dr
Graham that there was an inconsistency between paragraphs 6.11 and 7.13 of his
report in respect that in the former case a firm pull had produced failure
whereas in the latter a sharp yank had been required. Dr Graham denied that
there was any inconsistency. Greater external force was being applied in the
second instance. His opinion was that a joint which was leak-free at 2.4 bar,
and whose failure pressure was 11 bar, would not begin to mobilise at 5.7 bar. The
mobilisation point would be lower than the instantaneous failure point. It
would be likely to begin mobilisation at a point about 80% of 11 bar (the
instantaneous failure point), that is at about 8.8 bar. A joint could reach
the point where it mobilised but take further time before it reached the point
where it failed. He agreed that conventional guidance in relation to
compression fittings tended to be for tightening to about three-quarters of a
turn past finger tight: but that was not directed towards the particular
circumstances here of a connection between a brass olive and a brass spigot. If
the nut had been tightened to that extent here the failure pressure would have
been grossly in excess of 45 bar and the olive would have been locked on the
spigot.
Second defenders
[55] The
second defenders led no evidence.
The pursuers'
submissions
[56] Mr
Duncan moved the court to sustain the pursuers' first plea-in-law and allow a
proof on quantum between the pursuers and the first defenders. In the event of
the court holding that Mr Noon had made the connection he moved that the
pursuers' first and second pleas-in-law be sustained and that a proof on
quantum be allowed.
[57] The
evidence of Mr Noon and Mrs Gardiner should be accepted as to who made the
connection. The evidence of Mr Feeney and Mr McFarlane should be rejected.
[58] Mrs
Wasserman's evidence as to the likely cause of the failure of the connection
should be accepted. While the onus was on the pursuers to establish the cause
of the failure on the balance of probabilities (Rhesa Shipping SA v
Edmunds [1985] 1 WLR 948) it was legitimate to proceed by way of exclusion
if that process was approached properly (McGlinchey v General Motors [2012] CSIH 91; Clerk and Lindsell, Torts (20th ed.), para. 2-08; Drake
v Harbour [2008] EWCA Civ 25, per Toulson LJ at para. 28). On
the evidence the application of external force could be excluded. That left
Mrs Wasserman's theory. Mrs Wasserman was a more impressive witness than Dr
Graham. Support for her explanation was to be found in the evidence of Mr
Hopkins and in the photograph 6/17/2. Dr Graham had been somewhat combative in
the witness box. He had not been prepared to concede matters which he ought to
have. He had sought to bamboozle the court with calculations. His evidence
contained inconsistencies - particularly between paragraphs 6.11 and 7.13 of
his report. There was no evidence of any external force having been applied,
and Dr Graham's examples of circumstances in which it might have been were
implausible. Had external force been applied it would have been likely to have
led to immediate failure. The person responsible would have done something
about it. Deliberate interference was very unlikely.
[59] In the
event that the failure was caused as the pursuers aver then the first
defenders' would have been in breach of their duty (ex contractu and
ex delicto) to exercise the degree of skill and competence to be expected
of ordinarily competent contractors engaged to install a coffee machine. In
this connection Mr Duncan relied upon the evidence of Mrs Wasserman and Mr
McFarlane that such contractors would have tightened to three-quarters of a
turn past finger tight. He relied upon the evidence of Mrs Wasserman, Mr
Hopkins and the photograph 6/17/2 as establishing breach of the duty.
[60] The
objection to the admissibility of evidence of the condition of the olive,
spigot and nut should be repelled. The general principles applicable were not
in dispute: Scottish & Universal Newspapers Ltd v Gherson's
Trustees 1987 S.C. 27; Peacock Group plc v Railston Ltd 2007
SLT 269; Haddow v Glasgow City Council 2005 SLT 1219. Mr Duncan
stressed that the pursuers do not rely on evidence from Mr Hopkins that the
olive was not deformed and was able to be re-used. What they relied on was his
evidence that when he untightened the nut it was not as tight as he had
expected it to be. It was not possible to say what had happened to the olive
and the nut after the leak. Mr McFarlane's evidence that he had re-used them
ought not to be accepted. He had not given them to Mr Topping - Mrs Gardiner's
evidence to that effect was plainly wrong. The evidence was that the hose was
later disposed of, but there had been no suggestion at that time that it had
been important to retain it. No blame should attach to the pursuers for the
non-availability of any of the items. There was no prejudice to either
defender. Mrs Wasserman said that examination of the olive and the spigot
would have been likely to be of little assistance if they had been re-used
twice since the failure. Her evidence should be preferred to Dr Graham's on
that matter.
[61] If,
contrary to the pursuers' submission, the court was satisfied that the
connection had been made by Mr Noon rather than by one or other of the first
defender' employees, its failure would have been caused through Mr Noon's negligence.
The second defenders would be vicariously liable for Mr Noon's breach. In that
event the failure would also have been caused through the first defenders'
breach of contract - they would have failed to exercise ordinary care that the
connection was made securely.
The first defenders'
submissions
[62] Mr
Di Rollo insisted on his objection to the admissibility of evidence concerning
the condition of the nut, olive and spigot. In this connection he agreed that
the relevant principles were to be found in the authorities which Mr Duncan
referred to. On being pressed as to which particular passages of evidence
ought not to be admitted he confined his objection to Mr Hopkins' evidence of
what he found when he unscrewed the nut and examined and moved the olive, and to
Mrs Wasserman's observations in relation to that evidence. The olive, nut
and spigot had been in the pursuers' possession after the failure - the
inescapable fact was that they had not taken proper steps to preserve them, and
that therefore there had been fault on their part. The defenders were
prejudiced because expert examination of the parts might have provided evidence
relating to the cause of the failure. Dr Graham's evidence in that connection
should be accepted. Even Mrs Wasserman had conceded that examination of them
could have been useful, though she doubted whether that would be so if they had
been re-used twice. Mr Topping acknowledged that it would have been useful to
have them. If the objection was not sustained and the evidence was admitted
the Court should bear in mind the prejudice caused to the defenders because of
the absence of the parts when determining whether the cause of the failure
which the pursuer suggested had been established (Stirling Aquatic Technology
Ltd v Farmocean AB (No. 2) 1996 SLT 456).
[63] In any
event decree of absolvitor should be pronounced. While it was accepted that,
whoever made the connection, the first defenders had a duty to exercise the
ordinary care of installers that it was securely made, the pursuers had failed
to prove (i) that it had not been securely made; (ii) what the standard of
care of an installer was; (iii) that that standard had not been attained; and
(iv) that any such breach had caused the failure.
[64] The pursuers
had not proved on the balance of probabilities that the cause of the failure
was insufficient tightening of the nut. In that connection they could not
succeed unless Mrs Wasserman's opinion evidence as to the cause was accepted. It
ought not to be. It was without any sound foundation. It depended upon her
assumption that at the time the connection was made on 17 November water
pressure was low, and that it remained that way until shortly before the leak
but then rose. There was no evidence of water pressure readings over the
relevant period. Readings over a five day period the following month provided
no support for the theory. Even if, despite that, one assumed the unlikely
scenario that pressure on 17 November had been at the sort of level noted by Dr
Graham (on 7 October the following year) (2.4 bar) but had risen to around 5
bar just before 30 November, it was clear from Dr Graham's test results that a
connection which was tightened so as to be leak-free on 17 November would have
required a water pressure of 11 bar to separate. Mr Graham's results had been
accepted by Mrs Wasserman. He had been a more satisfactory and persuasive
witness than she had. There was no discrepancy between his evidence at 6.11
and 7.13 of his report. They were dealing with different scenarios. At 6.11
the reserve pressure being overcome was 8 bar. In 7.13 the reserve pressure
was 15 bar. Not only did Mrs Wasserman's theory not stack up, it was plain the
possibility of the failure having been caused by the application of external
force could not properly be excluded. More than that, it was a much likelier
scenario than that posited by Mrs Wasserman. As Dr Graham's test results
showed, Mr Hopkins' evidence had been predicated on his erroneous
assumption that if it had been properly tightened the brass olive would have
been deformed. The fact that in photograph 6/17/2 the nut securing the return
valve to the copper pipe appeared to have been turned more than the nut over
the olive and spigot did not indicate that the latter nut was under-tightened.
[65] Whoever
connected the fitting it had not been shown that they failed to exercise the
ordinary skill and care of a reasonably competent installer. There was no
evidence from anyone qualified to speak to the standard of care to be expected
of such a person. Mrs Wasserman wasn't qualified to give that evidence. In any
event she had been unable to give clear evidence as to how far the nut should
be turned where it was securing a brass spigot. Such evidence as there was
indicated that ordinary practice would be to tighten to finger tight, tighten a
little more using a spanner, and check it was leak-tight. If not, it would be
tightened a little more until it was leak-tight.
[66] As to who
made the connection the evidence of Mr McFarlane and Mr Feeney should be
accepted in preference to that of Mr Noon and Mrs Gardiner. Mrs Gardiner's
evidence had been demonstrably erroneous in several respects. While the
evidence of McFarlane and Feeney did not dovetail it did provide confirmation
and support of their account on the material matters. I should find them to be
credible and reliable on those matters.
[67] If Mr Noon
made the connection and if, contrary to the first defenders' submissions, the
failure of the connection was caused through the first defenders' breach of
contract/negligence and the second defender's negligence, liability should be
apportioned 75% to the second defender and 25% to the first defender.
The second defenders'
submissions
[68] Miss
Shand moved for the second defenders to be assoilzied. She urged me to accept
the evidence of Mr Noon that he had not made the connection, and to accept Mrs
Gardiner's evidence in relation to that matter. The evidence of Mr McFarlane
and Mr Feeney as to who had made the connection was contradictory. I should
find their evidence on that matter to be incredible, or at least unreliable.
Even if I was satisfied that Mr Noon made the connection the pursuers had not
established that he was in breach of any duties incumbent upon him, nor was it
established that the cause of the failure of the connection had been any such
breach of duty. Undaunted by the absence of any record, or any raising of the
issue during the proof, Miss Shand submitted that it had not been demonstrated
that Mr Noon was acting in the course of his employment if and when he made the
connection. Reference was made to Wilson v Excel UK Ltd 2010 SLT 671. Mr Di Rollo's submissions in relation to the cause of the failure were
adopted. When considering the cause of the failure the court should bear in
mind that the defenders had been prejudiced by the non-availability for expert
examination of the olive, spigot and nut: Scottish & Universal
Newspapers Ltd v Gherson's Trustees, supra, per Lord President
Emslie at p. 48. If, contrary to her submissions, the second defenders were
liable, the first defenders ought to bear the major responsibility. They were
the persons with whom the pursuers had contracted to carry out the work. Their
employees ought not to have allowed Mr Noon to make the connection -
particularly as they had no knowledge of his experience or qualifications. An
appropriate apportionment of liability would be 75% to the first defenders and
25% to the second defenders.
Vicarious liability
and Mr Noon - the pursuers' response
[69] Mr
Duncan contented himself by observing that not only was Miss Shand's suggestion
that Mr Noon was acting outwith the course of his employment not one that was
open to her on the pleadings or on the evidence, it also flew in the face of
the modern authorities on the subject from Lister v Hesley Hall [2002] 1 A.C. 215 onwards.
Discussion
Mr
Di Rollo's objection
[70] There
was no real dispute as to the relevant principles to be applied: Scottish
& Universal Newspapers Ltd v Gherson's Trustees, supra; Peacock
Group plc v Railston Ltd, supra; Haddow v Glasgow City
Council, supra; Stirling Aquatic Technology Ltd v Farmocean AB (No. 2),
supra.
[71] There is no
doubt that the spigot, olive and nut were not made available for examination by
the defenders. I accept the evidence of Mr McFarlane that he re-used them and
that they remained in the coffee machine after he left on 30 November 2009.
[72] In my
opinion the pursuers can be criticised for not taking immediate and appropriate
steps to preserve the evidence. They knew they were dealing with a major
incident. They knew or ought to have known that retaining the parts involved
was important - Mr Topping appreciated that. At the time the non-return valve
was produced it was incumbent upon them to clarify and locate the whereabouts
of the other parts, and to secure their retention. Those obvious steps were
not taken. Had they been it would have become apparent to them that the parts
were still in their possession and control - within the machine.
[73] Have the
defenders been prejudiced by that failure? They are not in a position to
contest that the olive was not deformed or that it moved easily on the spigot. Had
they had the original parts they might have been. Of course, Dr Graham
has been able to demonstrate that even if the olive had those characteristics
they were not demonstrative of insufficient tightening, so the evidence of lack
of deformity and ease of movement is not compelling. Nonetheless, the
objection to the admissibility of secondary evidence as to the state of the
olive appears to me to be well founded.
[74] Mr Duncan
appreciated the difficulty which he faced in this regard. He made clear that
he did not seek to rely on Mr Hopkins' evidence as to the condition of the
olive and the fact that it could be replaced on the spigot with ease. However
he did rely on Mr Hopkins' evidence that when he untightened the nut it was not
as tight as he had expected it to be. He submitted that that point was a
separate one, distinct from Mr Hopkins' evidence about the lack of deformity
in, and ease of movement of, the olive. I disagree. In cross-examination Mr
Hopkins clarified that his conclusion that the nut had been insufficiently
tightened was based upon his belief that with a properly tightened nut the
olive would have deformed.
[75] Notwithstanding
Mr Duncan's concession, the proper course appears to me to be to sustain Mr Di
Rollo's objection. The consequence is that Mr Hopkins' evidence as to the state
of the olive, and Mrs Wasserman's comments thereon, are inadmissible secondary
evidence.
[76] The
inability to comment on the deformity or otherwise of the olive was not the
only prejudice said to have been caused by the non-availability of the parts. Dr Graham
indicated that had he had the parts he would have examined them
microscopically. Markings on them might have been of assistance in determining
how tightly the connection was made. Mrs Wasserman accepted that it would have
been helpful to have had the parts. Although she was sceptical as to the
likelihood of worthwhile evidence being available after two subsequent
tightenings, she recognised that having the spigot could have been useful if
there had been more than one set of marks on it. That might show it had been
differently inserted on different occasions. I shall return to the question of
prejudice later.
Who made the
connection?
[77] I
accept the evidence of Mr Noon that he did not make the connection and that it
was made by one or other of Mr McFarlane or Mr Feeney. Mr Noon gave his
evidence in a straightforward manner. His evidence was not undermined during
cross-examination. I found him to be a credible and reliable witness. I draw
support for his account from the evidence of Mrs Gardiner and from Mr Aird's
evidence as to the fact that when photographed the day before the pipe had been
capped and did not have a non-return valve on it.
[78] By contrast
neither Mr McFarlane nor Mr Feeney were impressive witnesses when it came to
recounting what took place in the lead-up to, and the making of, the
connection. There were numerous inconsistencies between their respective
accounts, and between their accounts and the evidence of Mr Noon and Mrs
Gardiner. While my impression was that Mr Feeney was genuinely trying to
answer questions to the best of his recollection, I was not persuaded that his
recollection of these aspects was at all good or accurate. It is possible that
both he and Mr McFarlane have convinced themselves that the connection was
indeed made by Mr Noon, but whether that be so or not I reject their evidence
on the issue as being unreliable. Further, I do not accept that the non-return
valve was pre-fitted.
The cause of the leak
[79] I
accept that the joint was leak-free at the time of installation - the evidence
in relation to that (from Mr Noon, Mr McFarlane and Mr Feeney) was all one way.
It remained leak-free until shortly before the failure.
[80] Mrs
Wasserman had the disadvantage of having been instructed late in the day. She
did her best to assist the court, but I did not find her evidence on the
contentious matters to be persuasive. Her opinion was based, in part, upon
inadmissible evidence (though she maintained that even without it she stood by
her opinion). Even had I not ruled that evidence to be inadmissible, I would
not have accepted that it had the significance which Mr Hopkins and Mrs
Wasserman appeared to attach to it. In that connection I accept Dr Graham's
findings that, even where tightening was such that the instantaneous failure
rate of the connection far exceeded any water pressure which the joint could
reasonably have been expected to be exposed to, the olive appeared to remain
undistorted.
[81] Mrs
Wasserman considered two possible causes - insufficient tightening and the
inadvertent application of external force to the connection. She had not been
not been asked to consider the deliberate application of external force
(vandalism). She accepted that the absence of any reported leaks over the
lengthy period between installation and 30 November indicated that the joint
was sufficiently tight to be leak-free during that period.
[82] In my
opinion the scenario favoured by Mrs Wasserman is conjectural. There is no
evidence as to what the water pressure was at the time of installation. There
is no evidence as to the water pressure level or levels between that time and
the time of the failure. Her theory requires a supposition to be made that the
water pressure range at the material times was 2.4 bar to 5.7 bar. More than
that, it involves the following assumptions: (i) that the relevant water
pressure level at the time of installation was 2.4 bar; (ii) that the degree of
tightening was insufficient, but just sufficient to make it leak-free at around
that pressure; and (iii) that it continued at about that pressure until very
shortly before the failure, when pressure rose significantly causing the
failure.
[83] Even
without Dr Graham's test results I would have found it impossible to hold that
the scenario suggested by Mrs Wasserman was established on the balance of
probabilities. The application of external force appears to me to provide a
much more plausible, and a more likely, explanation of the failure. In that
regard it was not without significance that when Mrs Wasserman prepared her
report she proceeded on an assumption that the level of activity in the
building was lower than it in fact was. Once regard is had to Dr Graham's test
results Mrs Wasserman's theory appears even more untenable.
[84] I turn then
to Dr Graham's evidence. He was an impressive witness. His evidence was clear
and his reasoning was cogent. He has considerable experience in dealing with
compression joint failures - more experience in that regard than Mrs Wasserman.
His report was thorough. His test results were accepted by Mrs Wasserman.
He was able to explain his results and his reasoning, and was both logical and
persuasive. I accept his evidence.
[85] In order to
be sufficiently tightened to be leak-free at a water pressure of even 2.4 bar
the joint would have had an instantaneous failure pressure of about 11 bar.
There was no evidence of water pressure ever being that high. The pressure at
the local main when it was monitored over a five day period in December 2009 was
around 5 bar, and when Dr Graham visited on 7 October 2010 water pressure in
the branch pipe upstream of the joint was 2.4 bar with a telltale indicating
that at some time in the past it had reached 5.7 bar.
[86] I agree
with Dr Graham that a likelier explanation for failure of the connection (than
the scenario suggested by Mrs Wasserman) is the application of external force -
inadvertent or deliberate. The examples he gave of how the requisite level of
force might have been applied inadvertently - by movement of the machine or by
force being applied directly to the hose - are entirely plausible. So far as
the inadvertent application of force was concerned, I do not accept that the
person responsible would have been bound to have noticed leaking and done
something about it. The application of force may not have caused immediate
failure. A joint could become mobile at a pressure about 80% below the
instantaneous failure point, with failure following later. Further, even if a
person responsible for exerting force had become aware of the problem, it is
not a given that he or she would have admitted to what they had done.
[87] I do not
accept that there is any inconsistency between paragraphs 6.11 and 7.13 of Dr
Graham's report. In paragraph 6.11 the "firm pull" was applied in
circumstances where the water pressure had been increased to 12 bar. The
reserve force was only 8 bar. In 7.13 the scenario was that the reserve force
to be overcome was 15 bar (20 bar minus 5 bar).
[88] I do not
consider that the evidence about photograph 6/17/2 is worthy of much weight. It
was not a matter Mrs Wasserman thought important enough to mention in her
report. Dr Graham noted it in his report and referred to it in his evidence
but it did not impact upon his conclusions. Had there been evidence (i) that
the nut on the copper pipe end of the non-return-valve had been turned no more
than was necessary to be adequately tightened, and (ii) that the tightness of
both nuts ought to have been the same, it might have been more significant. There
was no such evidence.
[89] It is not
necessary for me to find, or for the defenders to establish, what the cause of
the failure was. It is for the pursuers to show that it was caused in the way
they aver. In my opinion the evidence falls far short of establishing on the
balance of probabilities that the failure was caused in the way Mrs Wasserman
suggests. Not only do I consider Mrs Wasserman to have been wrong to exclude
the application of external force as a possible cause: on the evidence that
appears to me to be a more likely explanation than the one she puts forward. I
reach that conclusion without having had to resort to viewing the pursuers'
case more cautiously or carefully than might otherwise have been necessary had
the missing parts been preserved (cf. Scottish & Universal
Newspapers Ltd v Gherson's Trustees, supra, per Lord President
Emslie at p. 48; Stirling Aquatic Technology Ltd v Farmocean AB (No.
2), supra, per Lord Johnston at p. 456L). Nonetheless, had matters
been less clear cut, in my view the potential prejudice to the defenders caused
by the non-preservation of the parts would have provided good reason for
exercising caution before accepting that the pursuers' case was proved.
[90] The
circumstances of the present case are readily distinguishable from those in Drake
v Harbour, supra. In that case the court held it to be clearly
established that the defendants had been negligent. The damage which had
occurred was the kind of damage which was likely to have resulted from their
negligence. The trial judge had held the other suggested explanations were
improbable. On those facts it was held on appeal that he had been entitled to
infer that the damage was caused by the negligence even though the claimant was
unable to prove positively the precise mechanism. By contrast, here the very
evidence which is relied upon by the pursuers to establish causation is also
the crucial evidence from which they ask the court to draw the inference of
negligence: and, far from there being no credible alternative explanation of
how the failure was caused, the alternative explanation is more plausible.
Did the first
defenders' employees fail to exercise the care expected of installers of
ordinary competence?
[91] How
tightly would such installers have made the nut? In her report the degree of
turn past finger tight which Mrs Wasserman mentions
(4.2.1.8) is a quarter turn. In examination-in-chief she initially suggested
somewhere between three-quarters of a turn to one and a quarter turn past
finger tightness. In cross-examination she said her understanding of the
recommended approach to tightening was to tighten to about half a turn to
three-quarters of a turn past finger tight, and if the joint still leaked to
tighten a little bit more. That seemed more consistent with the other
evidence. Mr Feeney said that if he had been doing the task he would have
turned the nut a half turn past finger tight, or slightly more, and made sure
it was watertight. Mr McFarlane suggested he might have turned it about a
three-quarter turn past finger tight. Both Mr Feeney and Mr McFarlane were
very experienced installers. It is clear from Dr Graham's evidence that
tightening a half turn past finger tight would not have involved applying a
torque lower than that recommended by the manufacturers. Checking for leaks
after tightening would have been in accordance with their guidance. Had the
evidence been that the nut had indeed been tightened to about half a turn past
finger tight and that the joint had been found to be leak-free in my opinion
there would have been no proper basis for holding that the installation had
been negligent.
[92] The fact is
that there is no direct evidence of how far the nut was turned. There is clear
evidence that on checking the joint after installation it was leak-free. There
is no evidence of there having been any leak until shortly before the flood was
discovered. The evidence upon which the pursuers rely to justify the inference
of negligence is essentially the same evidence upon which they rely to prove
causation. In my opinion they have failed to prove on the balance of
probabilities (i) that the failure was caused in the way they suggest, or (ii)
that the installation of the joint was carried out negligently.
Vicarious liability
of Mr Noon and apportionment of liability between the defenders
[93] Since
the pursuers have failed to establish liability against either of the defenders
the issues of the second defenders' vicarious liability for Mr Noon, and the
appropriate apportionment of liability between the defenders, do not arise.
[94] Had it been
established that Mr Noon made the connection, that he was negligent in doing
so, and that that was the cause of its failure, I would have had no difficulty
in holding that the second defenders' were vicariously liable for his
negligence. I would have rejected the proposition that Mr Noon was engaged on
a frolic of his own. The context was that he had attended to represent his
employers at the request of the pursuers. His employers had installed the
pipework. He regarded it as his responsibility to bring a fitting which might
be needed to make the connection between the machine and the pipe ("it was
possible the final connection wasn't correct"). His evidence was that while he
hadn't made the connection between the hose and the pipe, "If I had had to I
would have." He also regarded it as being part of his responsibility to check
that the connection for the coffee machine was leak-free once it had been
installed. Applying the principles discussed in Lister v Hesley
Hall, supra and Wilson v Excel UK Ltd, supra I have no
hesitation in concluding that had Mr Noon connected the joint he would have
been doing something which was closely connected with the duties he was authorised
by his employers to perform; and that it would have been fair and reasonable to
hold the second defenders vicariously liable. In that event I would have
apportioned liability equally inter se the defenders. Among the factors
which would have weighed in the balance are (i) the second defenders' employee
would have been the person who failed to tighten the nut adequately; (ii) the
first defenders would have been in breach of their contract with the pursuers;
(iii) Mr Noon had been presented to the first defenders' employees by Mrs
Gardiner as being the person responsible for the pipework: in those
circumstances it would not have been unreasonable for them to assume that he
was competent to make the connection.
Conclusion and
disposal
[95] The
pursuers have failed to prove the case against either defender. I shall repel
the first and second pleas-in-law for the pursuers, sustain the second and
third pleas-in-law for each of the defenders, and pronounce decree of
absolvitor. I shall reserve meantime all questions of expenses.