AJR, APPEAL BY AJR AGAINST A DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL [2019] ScotCS CSIH

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> AJR, APPEAL BY AJR AGAINST A DECISION OF THE UPPER TRIBUNAL [2019] ScotCS CSIH_24 (28 March 2019) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2019/2019_CSIH_24.html Cite as: 2019 SLT 509, [2019] ScotCS CSIH_24, 2019 GWD 13-205, [2019] CSIH 24

a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

[1] This is an appeal under section 13 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007

against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the UT”)

dated 7 September 2017, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the First Tier

[2] The appellant is an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity who left Iraq in January 2016.

Prior to leaving Iraq he had lived in Kirkuk. He arrived in the UK on 25 January 2016 and

claimed asylum. The respondent is the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

[3] In the course of the hearing before this court, having heard the submissions made on

behalf of the appellant and the exchanges between counsel for the appellant and the court,

counsel for the respondent conceded that the appeal should be allowed and accordingly

that, in terms of section 14(2)(a) and (b) of the 2007 Act, the decision of the UT should be set

aside and the case remitted to the UT with directions for its reconsideration. We have

acceded to that proposal. The purpose of this Note is briefly to record the history of the case

and the circumstances in which the respondent’s concession came to be made. It is hoped

that the Note may be of assistance to the UT but it is not intended that the UT should feel

[4] The respondent refused the appellant’s claim for asylum on 19 July 2016. The

appellant appealed that refusal to the FTT, in terms of section 82(1) of the Nationality,

Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. It was his contention that he was a refugee as defined in

the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006

or, alternatively, that he was eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection as that is defined

within paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules, and that his removal to Iraq would be

contrary to articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

[5] The appeal to the FTT was dismissed on 11 April 2017. In paragraph 6 of its decision

and reasons the FTT sets out a summary of the appellant’s evidence. At paragraph 14 the

FTT accepts, for the reasons it gives, that the appellant was and would be at risk to a

relevant extent in Kirkuk. However, the FTT found that the appellant could be returned to

another area, namely the Iraqi Kurdish Region (“the IKR”) where he would not be at risk. It

was the opinion of the FTT that the appellant would be able to gain employment as he spoke

three languages, was young, healthy and had practical qualifications. Relocation to the IKR

would accordingly be neither ineffective nor too harsh. The FTT therefore found that the

appellant had failed to satisfy it (a) that he had a well-founded fear of being persecuted if he

were returned to Iraq, (b) that he had a well-founded fear of serious harm such as to qualify

for humanitarian protection as defined in paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules, or (c)

that there could be a breach of articles 2 or 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

[6] The appellant appealed to the UT. He contended that the FTT Judge had erred in

law in not applying the country guidance set out in AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT

544. In particular, it was argued on his behalf that the Judge had failed to enquire about the

documentation required to facilitate the return of an individual to the IKR and factors

concerning relocation to Baghdad, including the availability of a Civil Status Identity

Document (“CSID”), ability to speak Arabic and family support.

[7] At the hearing before the UT, it was acknowledged on behalf of the respondent that

the decision of the FTT failed to set out the relevant factors for return to Baghdad but the

refusal of the appellant’s claim was primarily on the basis that return to Baghdad would

only be a transitional move for onward travel to the IKR. It was submitted on behalf of the

appellant that he would be stranded in Baghdad as his “laissez passer” (the document

issued by the Iraqi authorities allowing a person such as the appellant to return to Iraq)

would be taken from him upon arrival. The country guidance was silent about the

[8] The UT issued its decision on 7 September 2017, concluding that there had been no

material error of law in the decision of the FTT and dismissing the appeal. The

“6. The evidence was that the appellant is educated to graduate level and

worked as an engineer as well as in journalism. He spoke Kurdish, Arabic

and some English. He was a young single male with no significant health

problems. The judge concluded that he was likely to be able to obtain

8. When he came to the United Kingdom he brought documentation to support

his claim. He brought his degree certificate. He provided his journalist union

card. He brought a letter from a British soldier in respect of the work he did.

He was able to provide his Iraqi identity card number. He did not produce a

passport but he indicated that he had been issued with one. It is my

conclusion from this and the fact that he has family members in Iraq he

should have little difficulty establishing his identity with the Iraqi authorities.

Following from this, I concluded he would be able to obtain the CSID

necessary to access aid within the country. For the same reason I find that he

11. The nature of the laissez-passer is that it is issued by the Iraqi authorities to

facilitate return. If this is taken from the appellant on arrival at Baghdad

airport the country guidance is silent as to the need for documentation for

onward travel within the country. Put another way, I have not been referred

to any evidence that further documentation was required for onward travel

within Iraq. The onus was not on the respondent to prove in each case what

documents are required to board an internal flight from Baghdad to the IKR.

Nor does she have to show that the appellant has them or can access them…”

[9] The appellant sought permission from the UT to appeal to the Court of Session on

the basis that the UT Judge had misunderstood or misapplied the revised (by the Court of

Appeal) country guidance in AA (Iraq) in relation to internal movement from Baghdad to the

IKR and that there were insufficient findings of fact by the UT in relation to that country

[10] Permission to appeal was refused by the UT on 6 November 2017. However, on

5 October 2018, the appellant was granted permission to appeal by this Court. In his appeal

the appellant maintains that both the UT Judge and the FTT Judge materially erred in law in

[11] The Court heard submissions from Mr Forrest on behalf of the appellant. As we

have already indicated, in the light of these submissions and having taken instructions

Ms Smith, on behalf of the respondent, conceded that the appeal should be allowed and

accordingly, in terms of section 14(2)(a) and (b) of the 2007 Act, the decision of the UT

should be set aside and the case remitted to the UT with directions for its reconsideration.

Ms Smith’s concession went no further. We understood that she took the view that the

argument which had been presented by Mr Forrest had gone beyond what had been

foreshadowed in the note of appeal and that, on the basis of the materials available to her,

she could not responsibly take a position on all the matters which appeared to concern the

Court. We proceeded as Ms Smith had proposed. Although not encouraged to do so by

Ms Smith we see it as appropriate and perhaps helpful to indicate the nature of our concerns

in relation to the decision-making by the UT and FTT. In doing so we acknowledge, as

Ms Smith reminded us, that we did not hear submissions from her and therefore are not in a

position to come to a final decision. As we have said, the UT should not feel bound by what

[12] A person claiming asylum or other form of international protection may demonstrate

that he is at risk of persecution or other relevant harm in one part of his country of origin. It

will not necessarily follow that he will face such risk in another part of that country. In such

a case the question will arise as to whether, on being returned to that country, it is

reasonable to expect him to relocate to a safer area. In AH and others (Sudan)v Secretary of

State for the Home Department [2008] 1 AC 678 at para 5 Lord Bingham, referring to what he

had said in Januzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] 2AC 426 about the

“The decision-maker, taking account of all relevant circumstances pertaining to the

claimant and his country of origin, must decide whether it is reasonable to expect the

claimant to relocate or whether it would be unduly harsh to expect him to do so …

There is, as Simon Brown LJ aptly observed in Svazas v Secretary of State for the Home

Department [2002] 1 WLR 1891, para 55, a spectrum of cases. The decision-maker

must do his best to decide, on such material as is available, where on the spectrum

the particular case falls … All must depend on a fair assessment of the relevant

In the present case the FTT found that the appellant was a Kurd from Kirkuk. It accepted

that, by reason of his work as a journalist, the appellant would be at risk of relevant harm

from certain elements in Kirkuk should he be required to return there but that this would be

avoided if, having been flown to Baghdad, he relocated to the IKR. It accordingly became

relevant, with a view to determining whether it would be reasonable to expect him to

relocate or, alternatively, unduly harsh, to consider on the basis of the available evidence

whether there were practical difficulties which would face the appellant were he to attempt

to establish himself in the IKR and, if so what they were and how easily (or otherwise) they

[13] The practical difficulty raised by the appellant in his grounds of appeal to the UT

was his lack of necessary documentation of his identity. The grounds of appeal refer

specifically to the need for documentation for the purposes of internal travel in Iraq. The

grounds of appeal to this court are less specific but it is understandable if they were

understood by the respondent’s representatives as referring only to documentation for the

purposes of travel. However, one does not need to look very far in the available information

in order to see that whether a person, particularly a displaced person such as the appellant,

has the necessary documentation, impacts not only on the practicality of travel but also on

the possibility of securing employment and accommodation, and the availability of State

assistance. These are all obviously very relevant circumstances in determining whether it is

reasonable to return the appellant to Baghdad with a view to him being relocated to the IKR.

[14] When we refer to the available information we mean the general information as to

conditions in Iraq as expressed in the country guidance cases which are current from time to

time and the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal relocation, civil

documentation and returns in its version 8.0 of October 2018. As is familiar, until expressly

superseded or replaced, a reported decision of the UT bearing the letters “CG” is to be

treated as an authoritative finding on the country guidance issue identified in the decision.

Failure on the part of the FTT or UT to follow country guidance may amount to an error of

[15] As at the date of the UT decision of 7 September 2017the relevant country guidance

was to be found set out in AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 544 (IAC), as revised and

replaced by the guidance set out in the annex to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the

same case, reported as AA (Iraq) [2018] 1 WLR 1083. That guidance emphasised the

importance of a person (P) who had been returned to Iraq having or being able to obtain a

Civil Status Identity Document (“CSID”), reasonably soon after arrival in Iraq. At

“9. …A CSID is generally required in order for an Iraqi to access financial

assistance from the authorities: employment; education; housing; and

medical treatment. If P shows that there are no family or other members

likely to be able to provide means of support, P is in general likely to face a

real risk of destitution, amounting to serious harm, if, by the time any funds

provided to P by the Secretary of State or her agents to assist P’s return have

been exhausted, it reasonably likely that P will still have no CSID.”

What is required to obtain a CSID is addressed at paragraphs 10 and 11 of the guidance:

“10. Where return is feasible but P does not have a CSID, P should as a general

matter be able to obtain one from the Civil Status Affairs Office for P’s home

Governorate, using an Iraqi passport (whether current or expired), if P has

one. If P does not have such a passport, P’s ability to obtain a CSID may

holding P’s information (and that of P’s family). P’s ability to persuade the

officials that P is the person named on the relevant page is likely to depend

on whether P has family members or other individuals who are prepared to

11. P’s ability to obtain a CSID is likely to be severely hampered if P is unable to

go to the Civil Status Affairs Office of P’s Governorate because it is in an area

where [“serious harm” as is defined in article 15 (c) of Council Directive

2004/83/EC (the Qualifications Directive)] is occurring. …There is however a

National Status Court in Baghdad, to which P could apply for formal

recognition of identity. The precise operation of this court is, however,

[16] When refusing leave to appeal to this Court the UT referred to paragraphs 17 to 21 of

the annex to AA (Iraq). These paragraphs are headed “Iraqi Kurdish region”. They address

the requirement for documentation for travel to the IKR but they include this:

“17. The [Secretary of State] will only return P to the IKR if P originates from the

IKR and P’s identity has been ‘pre-cleared’ with the IKR authorities. …

20. Whether [a Kurd (K)] if returned to the IKR, if returned to Baghdad, can

reasonably be expected to avoid any potential undue harshness in that city

will be fact-sensitive; and is likely to involve an assessment of (a) the

practicality of travel from Baghdad to the IKR (such as to Irbil by air); (b) the

likelihood of K securing employment in the IKR; and (c) the availability of

[17] In the present case when it was before the FTT and the UT, consideration of the

question as to whether a requirement for relocation to the IKR would be unduly harsh,

appears to have focused on the need for documentation for the purpose of travel, the

assumption being that if the appellant could make his way to the IKR all would be, if not

well, at least tolerable. It appeared to us that that approach is rather to ignore other

difficulties (in obtaining assistance from the State and obtaining employment and perhaps

accommodation) which the appellant may face consequent on inadequate documentation,

coupled with the absence of immediate family support. We have in mind the importance of

having a CSID and the potential difficulty of obtaining it, particularly where the appellant

would be at risk in his home Governorate and may be unable to enlist family assistance. The

FTT assumed that the appellant would be able to obtain employment in the IKR. Clearly that

is of importance if the appellant is to be taken to be likely to be able to support himself in an

area where he would appear to have no family, and therefore no help from that quarter.

Because the ability to secure employment is important the question arises as to what

documentation might be required in that connection (a matter addressed in the following

paragraph of this Note under reference to the now current country guidance). This would

seem to point to a need to make enquiry about a number of matters before it could be

concluded that requiring the appellant to relocate to the IKR would not be unduly harsh.

That enquiry might begin, but not necessarily end, with consideration of how likely it is that

[18] Thus far we have referred to the country guidance current at the date of the UT

decision of 7 September 2017. Sections C and E of that guidance has since been replaced by

what is set out in AAH (Iraqi Kurds – internal relocation) Iraq CG [2018] UKUT 00212 (IAC). It

is that guidance, as we understand matters, that would be relevant to any further

consideration of the appellant’s claim. We do not intend to go into the detail of what

appears in AAH. It is sufficient to note that possession of a valid CSID or Iraqi passport is

stated to be necessary for travel from Baghdad to the IKR, and that a displaced person

cannot work without a CSID. We also note that for those without the assistance of family in

the IKR, and there is no suggestion that the appellant has family there, the accommodation

[19] We have mentioned the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note Iraq: Internal

relocation, civil documentation and returns in its version 8.0 of October 2018. We note the terms

of the copy of the letter from the Iraqi Ambassador dated 5 September 2018 which is to be

found at Annex A but have not noted or been referred to anything in the Information Note

which seeks to challenge the guidance in AAH.

Scottish Court of Session Decisions