MD SADDIK MD AB SOWDAGER (AP) FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW [2020] ScotCS CSOH

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[1] The petitioner is a citizen of Bangladesh. He arrived in the United Kingdom on

5 November 2007. In the present petition he seeks to judicially review a decision of the

Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber)(“UT”) to refuse to grant him

permission to appeal against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) in terms of which

he was refused leave to appeal against a decision refusing him right to remain in the UK on

article 8 ECHR grounds. The respondent is the Advocate General for Scotland as the

appropriate law officer in Scotland in relation to proceedings raised against the Secretary of

[2] Following arrival in the UK the petitioner was granted Leave to Remain until

13 December 2009. It is not disputed that after that date the petitioner was lawfully resident

in the UK until 25 April 2017, the date on which an application for Indefinite Leave to

[3] Subsequent to 25 April 2017 on 8 May 2017 the petitioner submitted another Leave to

Remain application which was refused on 5 July 2018. At a subsequent hearing before the

FTT counsel for the petitioner conceded that he could not succeed in an application for

Leave to Remain under the Immigration Rules (“IR”) 1. The petitioner’s application was

thereafter considered and determined under reference only to his article 8 rights. In the

present petition it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the concession made before the

FTT should not have been made and the fact that it was meant that the petitioner did not

have a fair hearing. In turn the concession and consequent decision of the FTT was said to

impugn the decision of the UT which is the subject of the present petition. The respondent’s

position in relation to this state of affairs is narrated in paragraph 19 of the answers.

[4] Determination of the issues raised in this petition require consideration of a number

of rules set forth in the IR. Rule 276B sets out requirements for Indefinite Leave to Remain

on the ground of long residence in the United Kingdom. Insofar as relevant to this petition

“276B. The requirements to be met by an applicant for indefinite leave to remain on

(i)(a) he has had at least 10 years continuous lawful residence in the United

(iii) the applicant does not fall for refusal under the general grounds for

(v) the applicant must not be in the UK in breach of immigration laws, except

that, where paragraph 39E of these Rules applies, any current period of

overstaying will be disregarded. Any previous period of overstaying between

(a) the previous application was made before 24 November 2016 and

(b) the further application was made on or after 24 November 2016

[5] Rule 276A(b)(i) of the IR defines “lawful residence” in Rule 276B(i)(a) as “ …

continuous residence pursuant to (i) existing leave to enter or remain”.

[6] Rule 39E of the IR applies where an application for Leave to Remain was made

within 14 days of the refusal of an earlier application timeously made. Rule 276C of the IR

provides that the Secretary of State will grant Indefinite Leave to Remain if he “ … is

satisfied that each of the requirements of paragraph 276B is met.” Rule 276D of the IR

provides that Indefinite Leave to Remain will not be granted if the Secretary of State is not

satisfied that each of the requirements of paragraph 276B is met.

[7] The “general grounds” for refusal referred to in Rule 276B are found in part 9 of the

“ … the following provisions apply in relation to the refusal of an application for

(1C) where the person is seeking indefinite leave to enter or remain:

(iv) they have, within 24 months prior to the date on which the application is

decided, been convicted of or admitted an offence for which they received a

non-custodial sentence or other out of court disposal that is recorded on their

[8] On the basis of the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner the issues arising

out of this petition were: (i) whether a period of overstaying that falls within IR 39E is

disregarded in assessing if an applicant has continuous lawful residence for the purpose of

IR 276B; (ii) whether, in respect of the general rule that prevents Indefinite Leave to Remain

being granted to an offender who has offended within the past two years, the disregarded

time commences with the date of conviction or the date of the offence and (iii) whether the

UT erred in refusing the petitioner permission to appeal to itself.

[9] The respondent framed the issues in a slightly different way. In essence the

argument was that the petitioner did not ask the FTT or the UT to construe IR 276B(i)(a) in

the way those provisions are construed in paragraph 20 of the petition, that the petitioner

did not ask the FTT to construe IR 322(1C)(iv) in the way he sought to construe those

provisions in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the petition and that the construction of those

[10] Although expressed differently the substance of both arguments is the issue of

[11] The first submission concerned the petitioner’s change of position, essentially

seeking to meet the respondent’s propositions outlined in the issues for determination as

narrated in paragraph [9] hereof. Counsel for the petitioner accepted that there had been a

position change since the matter was before the FTT and the UT. Counsel submitted he was

entitled to do so relying on the authority of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department,

Ex parte Robinson2, to the effect that an alteration in position is permissible where the point is

a “readily discernible … obvious point of Convention law” where “obvious” means that the

point has “strong prospects of success if argued”. Counsel accepted that Ex parte Robinson

(supra) concerned the application of the refugee convention but submitted that the principle

enunciated applied equally to cases where a right arose from the Human Rights Convention.

In the context of the application of this principle my attention was drawn to R v Immigration

Appeal Tribunal Ex parte Shen3 where it was observed that a matter could initially appear

obscure but might become “obvious” only after detailed argument in submission and that

[12] Counsel then addressed the issue of the interpretation and application of the IR. He

drew my attention to the fact that the IR are a statement of the Secretary of State’s policy in

relation to when persons should be granted leave to enter or remain in the UK. These are

not statutory provisions but the product of House of Commons papers presented to

Parliament by way of the negative resolution procedure. It followed that they should not be

construed as a statute would, although I note that the submission was not developed to

[13] Counsel then drew my attention to the provisions of IR 276A, which I have already

quoted. In particular my attention was drawn to the definitions of “continuous residence”,

“lawful residence”, “lived continuously” and “living continuously”. The requirements for

indefinite leave to remain on the grounds of long residence in the United Kingdom under

[14] The submission then proceeded by reference to two recent authorities where the

rules of the IR with which this petition is concerned have been interpreted. The first case is a

decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, R(Ahmed) v Secretary of State for the

Home Department4. The second is a decision in the Outer House of the Court of Session,

Mbomson v Secretary of State for the Home Department5. Counsel for the petitioner,

acknowledging that the construction he placed upon the relevant rules of the IR was

different from that in either of the cases to which my attention was drawn, advanced the

stark proposition that both those cases were wrongly decided. He further submitted that the

Lord Ordinary in Mbomson (supra) had simply adopted the findings and reasoning of the

[15] The submission was developed by advancing the proposition that in Mbomson (supra)

and R(Ahmed) (supra) the court treated the structure of IR 276B as consisting of a series of

hurdles each of which requires to be independently surmounted. In particular Rule 276B(v)

stood entirely separate from Rule 276B(a). It was submitted that there was what was

characterised as a “simple and straightforward difficulty” with that analysis because if it

was correct everyone who might benefit from the “concession” made in Rule 276B(v) would

fall foul of the provision in Rule 276B(a). It was said that Rule 276B(v) must be for the

benefit of someone but on the analysis of the Court of Appeal in R(Ahmed) (supra) and

adopted by the Lord Ordinary in Mbombson (supra) no one would benefit from

[16] The reason for the foregoing argument was said to be that IR 39E permits applicants

who apply in time for an extension of leave, that is before the previous leave expired, but

have that application rejected because of some defect in the form submitted or the fee paid,

may resubmit their application within 14 days without the fact that they have become an

overstaying stayer being held against them. It is an “entry qualification” to benefit from

IR 39E that the person concerned is an overstayer. It was submitted that there would be no

point in having Rule 276B(v) if it did not also remedy the failure to meet IR 276B(a).

IR 276B(v) must, it was submitted, cure a breach of IR 276B(a) because if it did not it would

[17] The last chapter of counsel’s submissions concerned the application of IR 322(1).

This related to the appropriate start date for the assessment of whether or not an applicant’s

past criminal conduct should bring about the refusal of an application. The issue is whether

the appropriate start date for the purposes of IR 322(1) was the date the offence occurred or

the date of conviction. It was observed by counsel that the date of conviction may bear

limited relation to the date of offending. It was accepted by counsel that if an offence

involved a course of conduct then the appropriate start date for the 2 year period in

[18] In the context of the present case the petitioner offended more than 2 years prior to

the decision being taken in his case but was convicted within 2 years of the decision under

challenge. The submission was that properly interpreted and in accordance with the

jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) the start date for the “clean

period” is the date of the offending and not the date of conviction. It was said to be well

established in the jurisprudence of the ECHR that the conduct of an individual since the date

of the offence and not the date of the conviction is the relevant date.6

[19] Counsel for the respondent advanced five reasons for the refusal of the prayer of the

petition. He characterised each of these reasons as fatal to the petitioner’s case.

[20] The first reason started from the undisputed proposition that the petitioner did not

ask the FTT to construe IR 276B(i)(a) in the way which this court was asked to construe that

provision. Counsel submitted that this was a petition for judicial review of a decision of the

UT. The UT’s appellate jurisdiction was restricted to errors in law in a decision of the FTT.7

It was submitted that subject to one exception the FTT did not err in law in failing to decide

in an appellant’s favour on a point that the appellant did not make before it. The exception

was that the point was a “readily discernible … obvious point of Convention law”, obvious

meaning a point that had “strong prospects of success if argued”.8

[21] In the context of the present petition the construction of IR 276B(i)(a) that was now

advanced on behalf of the petitioner was not readily discernible to the FTT and that because

it was contrary to an express concession on the part of counsel then representing the

petitioner. Further, it was not a point of convention law. Lastly it was submitted that the

point did not in any event have strong prospects of success if argued. It followed that the

UT could not rationally have given the petitioner permission to appeal.

[22] The second argument was that the petitioner did not ask the FTT to construe

IR 322C(1C)(iv) in the way that he now asked the court to construe it. The same arguments

were advanced as I have noted in the immediately preceding paragraph relative to

[23] The third argument advanced was a development of the argument I have noted in

paragraph [20] hereof. Save for where there is an Ex parte Robinson (supra) point, a petition

for judicial review of a decision by the UT not to give permission to appeal puts in issue the

8 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929 at pages 945G-946D.

legality of refusal of permission on the specific grounds on which it was sought.9 The

construction of IR 276B(i)(a) that the petitioner now advances is not an Ex parte Robinson

(supra) point and therefore for the reasons advanced in paragraph [20] hereof permission

[24] The fourth argument advanced by counsel for the respondent addressed the

petitioner’s construction of IR 276(B)(i)(a). The construction contended for on behalf of the

petitioner was said to be wrong and that for two reasons. The first, and most

straightforward, was because there was construction of the provision inconsistent with that

now advanced for the petitioner. That was the construction favoured in the two cases

already mentioned, R(Ahmed) (supra) and Mbomson (supra) which counsel for the petitioner

had conceded were against him but submitted were wrongly decided. By contrast counsel

[25] The fifth argument concerned the approach to construction of the IR. The correct

construction was to construe the rules “sensibly according to the natural and ordinary

meaning of the words used, recognising that they are statements of the Secretary of State’s

administrative policy”.10 It was said there was nothing in the background to the IR as the

Home Secretary’s statement of policy that bears on the construction of IR 276B(i)(a). The

natural and ordinary meaning of the words used, the exception in IR 276B(v) “where

paragraph 39E of these rules applies” has no bearing on the question of whether IR 276(i)(a)

is satisfied because (i) reading it with IR 276C and 276D, 276B sets five necessary conditions

for Indefinite Leave to Remain and the exception is expressed only to the condition in

IR 276B(v); (ii) there is no cross reference between subparagraphs (i) and (v) of IR 276B and

9 See HH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] SC 613 at paragraphs 14-15.

10 Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2010] 1 WLR 48 at paragraph 10.

(iii) the phrase “lawful residence” in IR 276B(i)(a) is expressly defined somewhere other than

[26] It is common ground between the parties that the petitioner seeks to alter his

position from that advanced before the FTT and the UT. Counsel for the petitioner’s

submission was, essentially, that he satisfied the criteria set forth in Ex parte Robinson (supra)

and was thereby entitled to advance an argument expressly conceded before the tribunals

below. Counsel for the respondent, drawing attention to the criteria set forth in Ex parte

Robinson (supra) submitted that these were not met in the present petition.

[27] The first of these criteria was the consideration that Ex parte Robinson (supra) was

concerned not with the Human Rights Convention but with the Refugee Convention.

Neither of the counsel appearing before me sought to analyse these conventions nor did

they advance propositions as to why on the one hand they could be equiparated or on the

other they fell to be treated as different and giving rise to different consequences in relation

to the argument with which the present point is concerned. In these circumstances beyond

noting that Ex parte Robinson (supra) is technically distinguishable on this point I am not

inclined to place much weight on the fact that two different conventions are involved.

[28] More important, in my opinion, are the other criteria, that is that the construction of

IR 276B was “obvious”, and that if argued there were “strong prospects of success”. I am

not satisfied that either of these criterion is necessarily met in the circumstances of the

present case. The first, and most obvious, point is that, as was accepted by counsel for the

petitioner at the hearing before me, counsel who represented the petitioner before the FTT,

where the concession was made, was an experienced practitioner in the area of immigration

law. That of itself is suggestive that the concession was made after consideration of the

relevant law. In my view it seems unlikely that if the point had been obvious it would have

been conceded. That view is, however, strengthened by consideration of observations made

in authority cited to me in this petition, admittedly in another context, in relation to the

construction of IR 276B; Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department (supra). That case

was a decision of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales on appeal from a decision of

the UT. The issue before the Court of Appeal was the construction of IR 276B, the pertinent

issue in the present petition. I observe that, in conclusion, after having construed the rule, a

matter I will deal with subsequently in this opinion, the court stated as follows:

“18. For the above reasons, this appeal does not have a real prospect of success.

19. In view of the fact that there are numerous appeals to this court which

advance the argument with which we have dealt, we direct that this

judgment be published, and may be cited notwithstanding that it is a decision

I acknowledge, of course, that the decision in Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home

Department (supra) post-dates the relevant decision in the present case. Notwithstanding

that I note that the court states that there were “numerous appeals” in relation to the

argument with which that court, and this court and this petition, are concerned. Again this

factor is strongly suggestive to me that counsel with experience of immigration law would

not have conceded a point in his favour of which it was “obvious”. Going further the same

considerations apply in relation to a concession made if counsel had thought there were

[29] For the foregoing reasons I am not satisfied that the petitioner has satisfied the

criteria set forth in Ex parte Robinson (supra) which would entitle him to advance a different

argument from that which was presented before the tribunals below.

[30] The issue of whether the argument which counsel for the petitioner now seeks to

advance should be permitted does not, however, rest at that point. Counsel for the

respondent submitted, based on statutory provision, that the UT’s appellate jurisdiction was

restricted to errors in law in a decision of the FTT. The argument was that the UT could not

be said to err in law in failing to decide in an appellant’s favour on a point that the appellant

did not make before it. I consider the reasoning of counsel for the respondent to be correct

in this argument. This view is supported by consideration of the further argument for the

respondent to the effect that, save for where there is an Ex parte Robinson (supra) point, a

petition for judicial review of a decision by the UT not to give permission to appeal puts in

issue the legality of refusal of permission on the specific grounds on which it was sought.

As was submitted by counsel the construction of IR 276B which is now sought to be

advanced by the petitioner does not fall into that category. In my view these considerations

support the view I have expressed in paragraphs [26]-[28] hereof.

[31] Counsel for the petitioner recognised and acknowledged that there was authority in

both Scotland and England contrary to the construction he advanced in respect of IR 276B. I

should make some general observations in relation to counsel’s submissions in relation to

these authorities before turning to the direct point of construction of IR 276B.

[32] Counsel correctly pointed out that the Scottish decision11 post-dated the decision in

the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.12 His submission was that the Scottish decision

simply followed that in England. That may be broadly correct but I consider it must be

borne in mind that the Lord Ordinary (Malcolm) required to give weight to the views

expressed by the Court of Appeal in an area where the law of Scotland and England and

Wales are the same. Moreover the Lord Ordinary did not, in my view, simply follow or

adopt what was said in the Court of Appeal. He explained his reasoning for doing so

[33] Turning to the point of construction given that counsel for the petitioner submits that

the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department

(supra) is wrong it is necessary to quote the relevant passages in that decision.13 These are as

“14. The point which arises is a short point of construction. The issue on this

application for PTA is whether it is arguable that paragraph 276B(v) operates so as to

cure short ‘gaps’ between periods of LTR so as to entitle persons such as the

Applicant in the present case to claim ’10 years continuous lawful residence’ under

(1) First, the provision of paragraph 276B(i)-(v) are separate, freestanding

provisions each of which has to be met in order to for an applicant to be

(2) Second, sub-paragraph (v) is not drafted as an exception to sub-paragraph

(i)(a) and makes no reference to it. There are no words which cross-refer

or link sub-paragraph (v) to sub-paragraph (i)(a), or vice-versa, whether

(3) Third, there is no difficulty in giving sub-paragraph (v) a self-contained

meaning. It makes use of the provisions of paragraph 39E of the Rules.

Paragraph 39E is the ‘exceptions for overstayers provision’ which, in

effect, grants a 14-day period of ‘grace’ in respect of the lodging of LTR

applications in certain circumstances. Under sub-paragraph (v), where

paragraph 39E applies, any current period of overstaying as well as any

previous period of overstaying after the advent of the amendment to the

rules on 24th November 2016 will be ‘disregarded’. In addition, periods of

overstaying of less than 28 days before that date are also disregarded.

The reference to the previous periods means that, in requiring that the

applicant should not ‘be in the United Kingdom in breach of immigration

laws’, the sub-paragraph is not looking simply at the applicant’s status at

the date of the application, but also looks back in time to his previous

immigration status. Mr Sarker confirmed that the sub-paragraph referred

to all previous periods of overstaying. This is, of course, subject to the

(4) The critical point is that the disregarding of current or previous short

periods of overstaying for the purposes of sub-paragraph (v) does not

convert such periods into periods of lawful LTD; still less are such

periods to be ‘disregarded’ when it comes to considering whether an

applicant has fulfilled the separate requirement of establishing ’10 years

(5) Fourth, there is a marked contrast in the drafting of the definitions of

‘continuous residence’ and ‘lawful residence’ in paragraph 276A sub-

paragraphs (a) and (b) respectively. In respect of continuous residence, in

addition to defining it as an unbroken period, the sub-paragraph goes on

to deem that ‘it shall not be considered to be broken’ by certain periods of

absence from the UK. Lawful residence, on the other hand, is simply

required to be continuous residence (i.e. unbroken) pursuant to certain

types of leave, temporary admission, immigration bail or exemption from

immigration control. Unlike sub-paragraph (a), in sub-paragraph (b)

there is no corresponding provision which allows residence which is not

continuously lawful to be deemed unbroken. It is here that one would

expect to find the saving which the Applicant incorrectly contends is

created by paragraph 276B(v), and one does not. We consider that to be a

clear indication that the lawfulness of continuous residence must be

(6) Fifth, by contract, there are examples elsewhere in the Rules expressly

providing that ‘continuous periods’ of lawful residence in the UK shall be

considered ‘unbroken’, notwithstanding periods of overstaying, where

paragraph 39E applies. There are to be found in specific areas where such

an exception was clearly intended, e.g. Appendix ECAA relating to ECAA

Nationals and settlement and e.g. Part 6A of the Rules in relation to the

Points Based System. Part 6A provides as follows (emphasis added):

The following rules apply to all requirements for indefinite leave to remain in

(a) References to a ‘continuous period’ ‘lawfully in the UK’ means, subject

to paragraph (e), residence in the UK for an unbroken period with valid

leave, and for these purposes a period shall be considered unbroken where:

(iv) the applicant has any previous period of overstaying between

periods of leave disregarded where: the further application was made

before 24 November 2016 and within 28 days of the expiry of leave;

and paragraph 39E of these Rules applied. …” (emphasis added)

(7) Sixth, applying ordinary rules of statutory construction and the

presumption of ideal, rational legislation, these differences in drafting

should be read as accidental or unintended (c.f. Bennion on Statutory

(8) If and insofar as reliance is placed on the SSHD’s ‘Long Residence’

Guidance (Version 15.0) published on 3rd April 2017, this does not avail

the Appellant. We note that ‘Example 1’ and ‘Example 2’ on page 16 of the

Guidance say that ‘gaps of lawful residence’ can be disregarded because ‘the

rules allow for a period of overstaying of 28 days or less when that periods ends

before 24 November 2016.’. This does not accord with the true construction

of paragraph 276B as set out above, although it may reflect a policy

adopted by the SSHD. However, it is axiomatic that the intention of the

Rules is to be discerned ‘objectively from the language used’ not from e.g.

guidance documents (per Lord Brown in Mahad (Ethiopia v. Entry Clearance

Officer [2010] 1 WLR 48 (2009) at paragraph 10). The SSHD may wish to

look again at the Guidance to ensure that it does not go any further than a

16. It will be apparent, therefore, that we agree with the decision and reasoning

of Sweeney J in Juned Ahmed (supra). As Sweeney J correctly held, paragraph 276B(v)

involves a freestanding and additional requirement over and above the requirements

17. In summary, it is clear as a matter of construction of the Immigration Rules

that an applicant cannot rely on paragraph 276B(v) to argue that any period of

overstaying should be disregarded for the purposes of establishing ’10 years

[34] Counsel’s argument as to why the approach of the Court of Appeal to construction is

incorrect is to submit that IR 276B(v) stands entirely separate from IR 276B(i)(a). It is

submitted that this creates a difficulty with the Court of Appeal’s analysis which, if correct,

means that everyone who might benefit from what is characterised as the “concession” in

IR 2765B(v) would fall foul of the provision in IR 276B(i)(a). I consider counsel’s

construction to be artificial and fallacious. As was submitted by counsel for the respondent

the IR must be construed “sensibly according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the

words used, recognising that they are statements of the Secretary of State’s administrative

policy”.14 No challenge was made by counsel for the petitioner to this approach of the

construction of the IR. Nothing was submitted on behalf of the petitioner in relation to the

background to the IR as the Home Secretary’s statement of policy that bears on the

construction of IR 276B(i)(a). Moreover, as a matter of plain English and on the natural and

ordinary meaning of the words used the exception in IR 276B(v) “where paragraph 39E of

these rules applies” has no bearing on the question of whether IR 276(i)(a) is satisfied and

that because reading it with IR 276C-276D, and 276B sets five necessary conditions for

Indefinite Leave to Remain and the exception is expressed to apply only to the condition in

IR 276B(v). Further there is no cross reference between sub-paragraphs (1) and (v) of

IR 276B. Lastly the phrase “lawful residence” in IR 276B(i)(e) is expressly defined

somewhere other than IR 276B(v). In my view all these considerations apply and render the

construction of IR 276B as set forth by the Court of Appeal in Ahmed v Secretary of State for the

14 Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2010] 1 WLR 48 at paragraph 10.

Home Department (supra) explicable and understandable. Having regard to these

[35] The only point at issue in relation to this argument is whether, in calculating time in

relation to previous criminal conduct, the date commences with the commission of the

offence or, in the alternative, from the date of conviction. Counsel for the petitioner

submitted that the rule requires to be construed in accordance with article 8 EHCR and, as

explained in Maslov (supra) that would require calculation to begin with the date of the

[36] In my opinion that approach is incorrect. IR are not construed in accordance with

convention rights. The duty on the Secretary of State in considering and applying the IR is

more general and less prescriptive and requires him not to act in a manner which is

incompatible with a person’s convention rights. As was stated in the Supreme Court in

“Compliance in an individual case does not necessarily depend on the Rules. As

‘The immigrant’s article 8 rights will (must be) protected by the Secretary of

State and the court whether or not that is done through the medium of the

immigration rules. It follows that the Rules are not of themselves required to

Further, and in any event, the decision of the European Court of Human Rights relied upon

by the petitioner16 is not of as wide import as submitted by counsel. That case did no more

than provide criteria to be used in order to determine whether an expulsion measure was

necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. In that regard the criteria

desiderated in relation to offending was the time elapsed since the offence was committed

and the applicant’s conduct during that period. In my view that is a wider and more case

specific consideration than the characterisation given to it by counsel for the petitioner.

[37] Having regard to the foregoing I do not consider that the UT materially erred in law

in reaching the decision challenged. I shall accordingly dismiss the petition.

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	Scottish Court of Session Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish Court of Session Decisions >> MD SADDIK MD AB SOWDAGER (AP) FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW [2020] ScotCS CSOH_32 (11 March 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2020/2020_CSOH_32.html Cite as: 2020 GWD 11-163, [2020] ScotCS CSOH_32, [2020] CSOH 32

Scottish Court of Session Decisions