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Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Broadley v. Her Majesty's Advocate [2005] ScotHC HCJAC_96 (13 July 2005)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2005/HCJAC_96.html
Cite as: 2005 SCCR 620, [2005] HCJAC 96, 2005 GWD 28-520, [2005] ScotHC HCJAC_96

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Broadley v. Her Majesty's Advocate [2005] ScotHC HCJAC_96 (13 July 2005)

APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

Lord Justice Clerk

Lord Osborne

Lord Johnston

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[2005HCJAC96]

Appeal No: XC333/04

OPINION OF THE COURT

delivered by LORD JOHNSTON

in

APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION AND SENTENCE

by

ROSE BROADLEY

Appellant;

against

HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

Respondent:

_______

 

 

Appellant: Ritchie, Q.C., Miss Mitchell; Jim Friel & Co., Glasgow

Respondent: G. Mitchell, A.D.; Crown Agent

13 July 2005

[1]      On 29 March 2004 the appellant was convicted at Glasgow High Court of three charges, including one of murder, which after deletions reads as follows:

"(6)(b) on 25 May 2002 at [locus] you did by means unknown to the prosecutor cause [Joanna Colbeck] to fall from a window there to the ground below and you did murder her and you ROSE BROADLEY did previously evince malice and ill will towards her".

The Crown accepted a plea of not guilty to this charge from the appellant's co-accused, her partner Robert Butchart. The verdict, in respect of the murder charge, was by a majority.

[2]     
The appellant appealed to this court in respect of the conviction for murder and also, initially, in respect of sentence in respect of other charges but the latter was withdrawn at the close of the hearing before us.

[3]     
It was agreed between parties that the narrative provided by the trial judge in his report accurately recorded the evidence. He states as follows:

" ... The deceased Joanna Colbeck was 28 years of age when she died. She had become a prostitute and worked for the appellant. She also abused heroin. At the time of her death she owed money to the appellant. She had told her mother, who gave evidence, that she owed money and that she was frightened. She said that the people to whom she owed money were going to kill her if she did not pay the money back and that they lived at the flats, referring to the flats at Norfolk Court where she met her death.

Joseph McCrimmon, who together with his girlfriend Michelle Cattrell visited the flat from time to time, described a number of occasions in which he had seen the deceased being assaulted by the appellant. He described a particular occasion when the appellant flew at the deceased and started punching and kicking her. This had occurred in the flat occupied by the appellant. The deceased had been taken into the kitchen and he could hear screaming and shouting coming from the kitchen. It was obvious that the deceased was getting a doing. There was another occasion when he said that he could hear sounds of a disturbance going on inside the flat and later saw the deceased sitting on the floor, crying, with a cut to her face. The appellant was calling her 'a cow'. There was another occasion when he described the appellant as 'going absolutely mental' and she had grabbed the deceased by the hair and said 'You fucking cow, I'm going to kill you'. She was shouting something about stabbing the deceased and dragged her into a bedroom. On another occasion he had seen the appellant punching and kicking the deceased.

Michelle Cattrell described the appellant punching the deceased and hitting her with a stick. She described an incident in which the deceased had said that she was going throw herself out of the window to which the appellant said 'Are you going to throw yourself oot the windae? Well, I'll help you!'. She thought that this had been said against the background of an allegation of some sexual activity between the deceased and Robert Butchart.
In the period before her death the deceased was living with Norman Morton, who gave evidence. He said that the deceased was in debt to the appellant, she was frightened and was avoiding meeting the appellant. Mr Morton lived in Sandyfield Road, on the South side of the Clyde. Mr Morton was in the habit of going to meet the deceased on his bicycle. He would meet her at the video shop in the Saltmarket. The direct route back to the house would take them past Greggs the Bakers and the Quicksave shop. There was a likelihood of meeting the appellant in that area and sometimes, in order to avoid that, they took an alternative route home from the Saltmarket. On the day before her death the deceased telephoned Mr Morton at 3.40 p.m. He went to meet her in the Saltmarket and on the way back he asked her if she wanted to go round the other way in case they bumped into the appellant. The deceased said 'Just go straight on' and they took the direct route. As they passed Greggs the Bakers they saw the appellant in the shop and the deceased ran round the corner and disappeared into a close. The appellant came round the corner and asked Mr Morton where the deceased was. She was in a bad mood and she found the deceased in a close. Mr Morton could hear the deceased shouting 'Stop it!' and saying that her mother would repay the money. A policeman came along the road and the appellant told Mr Morton not to say anything or he would get it as well. Mr Morton went to Robert Butchart who was outside the shop and said to him 'She's got that lassie petrified, are you going to get her away from her?' The appellant and the deceased then came along together and the two of them and Robert Butchart got into a car which was driven away by Robert Butchart.

At Norfolk Court, which is a multi-storey block, the arrival of the car was caught on CCTV. The footage showed the appellant and the deceased getting out of the car and going into the building at 1605. The appellant had a hold of the left arm of the deceased. While Robert Butchart went to park the car the appellant and the deceased went up in the lift to the 20th floor on which level was the flat occupied by the appellant and Robert Butchart. The CCTV camera in the lift was time-lapsed but showed some movement which looked as if the appellant was assaulting the deceased. There were also two girls in the lift, Holly Smith and Justine Tinney, both of whom gave evidence. In the lift the appellant said to the deceased 'You wait till you get up the stairs, I have got a surprise for you. Your name is written all over it'. The appellant then punched the deceased whom the witnesses described as looking scared.

At 1608 Robert Butchart entered the lift and went up to the 20th floor. At 1754 the appellant and Mr Butchart left the building and returned at 1823. During this period the deceased must have been in the flat with Anthony Broadley, the appellant's son who was then aged 15 years.

In the afternoon of the following day, 25 May, two Crown witnesses, Tasdaq Shah and Ahsan Ulhaque were in the car park of the mosque not far from Norfolk Court. They saw the deceased hanging from the window or window ledge with both hands. They saw her letting herself go backwards and fall to the ground. They saw no-one else at the window and they heard no scream. The absence of any sounds was supported by the witness Barry Kean who lived in a flat lower down than the appellant's flat. He was aware of something passing the window but heard no sounds. The CCTV footage showed the deceased hitting the ground at 1409.

The police attended and began to make enquiries in the building. Constable Paul Thompson went to the door of the flat occupied by the appellant on two occasions. The appellant and the others in the house, Robert Butchart and the appellant's son Anthony, did not answer the door. Inspector James Steele said that later he spoke to the appellant who seemed perfectly normal. She told him that she had not heard or seen anything. At 15.23 the appellant, Robert Butchart and Anthony Broadley came down the back stairs of the building and left the building, apparently in an effort to avoid the police or being caught by the CCTV camera in the lift.

In the early hours of the morning of Sunday 26 May 2002 the appellant, Robert Butchart and Anthony Broadley arrived at the house of Norman Morton. The appellant told Mr Morton that Joanna had jumped out of the window and was dead. They stayed with Mr Morton for the next two or three nights. In the course of that period an incident occurred in which the appellant was alleging that Mr Morton had allowed the deceased to wear some clothing belonging to the appellant, and which had been in the flat. She was aggressive about the matter and at one stage was prodding Mr Morton with her finger. In the course of this she said to him 'Don't you start me, otherwise you'll be the next to go out the window'. When she said this she was angry. When he was asked if he took that threat seriously, Mr Morton said 'So-so'.

In addition, Mr Morton said that the appellant had asked him to lie for her. In anticipation of his giving a statement to the police about the alleged abduction, the appellant said to him that he should say nothing about the car and should say that the deceased had simply walked across the road with the appellant and Robert Butchart.

Two other Crown witnesses, Mathew Miller and Yvonne McCracken, described a visit from the appellant some time later when she said that she had been 'taken in' for throwing somebody out of the window. She was saying something along the lines of 'Can you fly' or 'Can we fly'. Yvonne McCracken's impression was that the appellant said this in a peeved way having been accused of putting Joanna out of the window.

Fingerprint evidence showed the presence of the fingerprints of the deceased on the window frame and sill. No fingerprints of the appellant were recovered.

The appellant did not give evidence but the defence relied on what she had said in a statement to the police. She said that she was in the flat at the time when the deceased went out of the window but that at that time she herself and Robert Butchart where in bed and they were told by her son Anthony that the deceased had gone out of the window.

Anthony Broadley gave evidence in the defence case and said that the deceased had voluntarily stayed in the flat on the night of 24 to 25 May. He had been in the flat and that he had been the last to go to bed the night before. He played on the computer until the early hours of the morning and woke up the following afternoon. He went to the kitchen and on his way he noticed that the door of the bedroom in which the deceased had spent the night was open. In the kitchen he noted that the window was spun round which struck him as odd. He went to turn it over and as he was doing so he looked down and saw something covered by a white sheet on the grounds below and an ambulance and crew in attendance. He realised that the deceased was not in the flat and concluded that she had gone out of the window. He went and woke his mother and Robert and told them what he had seen. He was unable to say whose idea it was for the appellant, Robert Butchart and himself to leave the building by the back stair. They went to Ibrox where his mother got drunk and they then contacted a solicitor. They then went to the police office and gave statements.

The defence led the evidence of a finger print expert, a Mr Bayle. He confirmed the presence of the fingerprints of the deceased. In addition he noted the absence of any fingerprints of the appellant which he suggested was odd if she was forcing somebody out of the window. With respect to the fingerprints of the deceased he said that these were of normal pressure, where not smudged and were pointing towards 5 o'clock on the clock. Further, it was only the right hand prints that were recovered and that suggested to him that the left hand was being used outside the window and that therefore the deceased had climbed out of the window with her left leg leading."

[4]     
The appellant lodged three grounds of appeal against conviction of which counsel argued the following two:

"1. That the learned trial judge erred in law when he repelled the submission of no case to answer in respect of the charge of murder. Specifically there was insufficient evidence to allow the jury to convict the appellant, there being no evidence that the deceased Joanne Colbeck had in fact been murdered. The only evidence as to how the appellant [sic] had exited the building and fallen to her death, indicated that she had committed suicide.

2. There was no evidential basis upon which a reasonable jury properly directed could have convicted the appellant of murder. There was a body of unchallenged evidence which contradicted the Crown contention the deceased had been murdered."

The trial judge also records the adminicles of evidence upon which the Crown relied, fifteen in all:

"1. The evidence of the mother of the deceased that the deceased owed

money to certain persons who lived at the flat at Norfolk Court and who had threatened to kill her if she did not pay.

2. The threat to kill, spoken to by Joseph McCrimmon.

3. The threat to help out of the window, spoken to by Michelle Cattrell.

4. The evidence of the assaults leading up to 24 May, spoken to by

Joseph McCrimmond and Michelle Cattrell.

5. The evidence of abduction on 24 May.

6. The evidence as to what the appellant said to the deceased in the lift.

7. The absence of a suicide note.

8. The absence of any indication that the deceased was suicidal,

according to the mother of the deceased and Mr Morton.

9. The presence of the appellant in the flat at the time of the deceased's

fall.

10. The failure of the appellant to answer the door to Constable Thomson.

11. The response to the inquiry made by Inspector Steele.

12. The departure by the back stair to avoid the police and the CCTV

camera in the lift.

13. The attempt to get Mr Morton to lie to the police about the abduction.

14. The remarks made to Miss McCraken and Mr Miller about flying.

15. The remarks made to Mr Morton which contained an admission that

the appellant had caused the deceased to fall from the window."

[5]     
In his charge to the jury the trial judge recorded that the Crown placed great reliance on a remark made to Norman Morton, by the appellant (No. 15 supra) some time after the event, which was in the following terms: "Don't you start me, otherwise you'll be the next to go out the window".

[6]     
Before us, counsel, in relation to the first ground of appeal, submitted that however that remark should be interpreted, it had to be looked at in the context that the Crown had not established by other evidence that a murder had taken place at all. The cause of death was falling from the window, but he submitted there was no substantial evidence to establish how or why the deceased fell from the window. No witness deponed to seeing the deceased going through the window or how she did it. There were however two eye witnesses in the street below who observed her hanging from the window sill by her fingers or hands. The window of the room in question opened through 180° in a lateral or horizontal movement. The only fingerprints to be found on the window after the event were those of the deceased. In the competition between murder or suicide, he submitted, the proper view of the evidence was to prefer the notion of suicide, particularly having regard to the lack of apparent distress at the time she was hanging from the window nor any attempt to try and get back into the room. He referred us to the defence evidence from Mr Boyle, who is an expert on fingerprints, who supported the view that she had pushed the window open herself, having regard to the position of the fingerprints on the right hand side of the window. In any event counsel submitted that the remark upon which the Crown relied was anything but an admission and was at best equivocal as between a threat and a recognition that she had committed the crime. While the Crown had embarked upon a circumstantial case it did not adduce sufficient evidence to justify a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant caused, by one way or another, the deceased to go out through the window.

[7]     
The advocate depute accepted that the case for the Crown was circumstantial but he submitted it was powerful. It was legitimate to infer that a murder had been committed against firstly the background of the relationship between the parties and, in particular, the fact that the deceased owed the appellant money, worked for her as a prostitute, and had been threatened in the past by the appellant, not least with a view to killing her. In addition he pointed to the circumstances of the actual events on the day involving the abduction and the violence done. He maintained that the proper way to interpret the remark in question, which was a matter in any event for the jury, was an unequivocal admission such as was to be found in H.M.A. v. Greenshields 1989 S.C.C.R. 637. He did not accept that he had to exclude suicide, although he recognised that there was an alternative body of evidence in that respect. He submitted that taken overall the fourteen adminicles listed together with the remark made by the appellant (No. 15) was sufficient to provide a circumstantial case corroborating what he said was the admission contained in that remark. He also referred to H.M.A. v. McVey 1992 S.C.C.R. 272. In the final analysis the position of the advocate depute was that, in the absence of any evidence of physical violence causing the deceased to leave the window, she must have been ordered to do so by the appellant with criminal intent, thus constituting murder when death resulted.

[8]     
Whatever may be the legal status of that last submission, what is clear in our opinion is that there is absolutely no evidence to support the proposition in fact and it therefore amounts purely to a speculation. That is almost enough to close the matter since the Crown has not established the means, be they verbal or physical, whereby the appellant caused the deceased to go through the window if she did that at all. There is no basis in evidence for any involvement between the appellant and the deceased's death. We are impressed by the fact that only the deceased's fingerprints were found on the window which would suggest that it had not been cleaned after the event. We also consider that it is a legitimate inference to assume that, given the dependence of the deceased on the appellant, presumably for drugs and a livelihood and, in any event, owing her money it is more likely than not that she would wish the deceased to remain alive rather than want to kill her. If the remarks relied upon by the Crown by the appellant are to be treated at least as an equivocal admission, that cannot be any more than the start of the Crown case against a background that murder or indeed a crime has not been established by any other evidence. In most, if not all, cases where confessions or admissions by an accused have been held to be virtually sufficient and requiring very little corroboration, the Crown have already established that the relevant crime has been committed, the issue being by whom. They do not achieve that position in this case, as we have discussed, since there is no direct evidence or even inferential evidence to support the view that the deceased was the victim of a murderous attack by one means or another when she came through the window. If one stands back and looks at the evidence as a whole as listed in the Crown's fifteen adminicles, it seems to us that, on balance, the more legitimate inference to draw is that the deceased committed suicide.

[9]     
For the reasons we have given, we are therefore satisfied that there was not sufficient evidence to put to the jury to entitle them to convict the appellant of murder. Recognising as we do that interpretation of statements or remarks by an accused person is a matter primarily for the jury, there are simply not enough surrounding circumstances in the present case against that background to form the base for sufficient evidence in law for the jury to consider even whether a murder was committed.

[10]     
In these circumstances it is not necessary for us to consider the second ground of appeal and we offer no view upon it.

[11]     
In these circumstances, and for these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the conviction for murder will be quashed.

[12]     
As we have indicated the appeal against sentence in relation to the other charges was not insisted in.


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