BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?

No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £5, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!



BAILII [Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]

Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> Her Majesty's Advocate v. McGovern [2007] ScotHC HCJAC_21 (16 March 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2007/HCJAC_21.html
Cite as: 2007 SCCR 173, [2007] ScotHC HCJAC_21, [2007] HCJAC 21, 2007 SLT 331, 2007 GWD 10-180

[New search] [Help]


 

 

APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY

 

 

 

Lord Nimmo Smith

Lord Philip

Lord MacLean

[2007] HCJAC 21

XC755/06

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

delivered by LORD NIMMO SMITH

 

in

 

CROWN APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE

 

By

 

HER MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE

 

Appellant:

 

Against

 

JAMES McGOVERN

 

Respondent:

 

 

 

Act: Bain, AD; Crown Agent

Alt: Ogg, QC, Hamilton; Liam O'Donnell, Glasgow

 

16 March 2007

 

Introduction

[1] This is a Crown Appeal against the sentences passed on the respondent at the High Court in Paisley on 5 October 2006. The respondent pled guilty to a charge of breach of the peace involving the repeated discharge of a handgun or similar instrument, and two charges of contraventions of the Firearms Act 1968 ("the Firearms Act"). The sentencing judge admonished the respondent on one of the firearms charges, and sentenced him to concurrent extended sentences on the breach of the peace charge and the other firearms charge, the sentences each comprising a custodial term of three years and an extension period of two years. The Lord Advocate has now appealed against these sentences in terms of section 108 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ("the 1995 Act"), alleging that the sentences were unduly lenient and that the sentencing judge erred in law in his approach to the relevant statutory provisions.

 

The charges

[2] The respondent originally faced six charges in an indictment. The Crown accepted his pleas of not guilty to charges 2, 5 and 6. The charges to which he pled guilty were in the following terms:

"(1) On 18 June 2005 at Earl Street, Glasgow, you did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner, shout and swear, repeatedly discharge a handgun or similar instrument at the window of the house occupied by Sandra Dunlop at 116 Earl Street, Glasgow, place the lieges in a state of fear and alarm and commit a breach of the peace;

...

(3) Between 10 March 2006 and 16 May 2006, both dates inclusive, at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street and at the cycle path near to Balmoral Street, both Glasgow, you did have in your possession a firearm to which section 1 of the Act aftermentioned applies, namely a handgun without holding a firearm certificate in force at the time and you did commit this offence in an aggravated form within the meaning of section 4(4) of said Act, said firearm having been converted from an imitation firearm which though had the appearance of being a firearm had been so constructed as to be incapable of discharging any missile through its barrel: CONTRARY to the Firearms Act 1968, Section 1(1)(a) and 4(4) as amended by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988;

(4) Between 10 March 2006 and 16 May 2006, both dates inclusive, at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street and at the cycle path near to Balmoral Street, both Glasgow, you did have in your possession without the authority of the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers, a prohibited weapon, namely a handgun being a firearm with a barrel less than 30 centimetres in length and which had a length of less than 60 centimetres overall; CONTRARY to the Firearms Act 1968, Section 5(1)(aba) as amended by the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997;

....".

 

The judge's sentencing powers

[3] The offence of breach of the peace in charge 1 was an offence at common law in respect of which the maximum sentence that the High Court may impose in solemn proceedings is life imprisonment, and there is no minimum sentence.

[4] The offence in charge 3 was a contravention of the following provisions. Section 1 of the Firearms Act (as amended) provides, so far as material:

"(1) ... [I]t is an offence for a person -

(a) to have in his possession, or to purchase or to acquire, a firearm to which this section applies without holding a firearms certificate in force at the time or otherwise than as authorised by such a certificate; ..."

By subsection (3) the section applies to every firearm, with certain exceptions which do not arise in the present case. Section 4 provides by subsection (3) that it is an offence for a person other than a registered firearms dealer to convert into a firearm anything which, though having the appearance of being a firearm, is so constructed as to be incapable of discharging any missile through its barrel. Subsection (4) provides inter alia:

"A person who commits an offence under section 1 of this Act by having in his possession or purchasing or acquiring .... a firearm which has been converted as mentioned in subsection (3) above (whether by a registered firearms dealer or not), without holding a firearm certificate authorising him to have it in his possession, or to purchase or acquire it, shall be treated for the purposes of provisions of this Act relating to the punishment of offences as committing that offence in an aggravated form."

By Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Firearms Act (as amended), the maximum sentence for this offence, the offence having been committed in an aggravated form within the meaning of section 4(4), and the respondent having been prosecuted on indictment, was imprisonment for seven years, or a fine, or both. There was no statutory minimum sentence.

[5] The offence in charge 4 was a contravention of the following provisions of the Firearms Act (as amended):

"(1) A person commits an offence if, without the authority of the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers (by virtue of provision made under section 63 of the Scotland Act 1998), he has in his possession, or purchases of acquires, or manufactures, sells or transfers - ...

(aba) any firearm which either has a barrel less than 30 centimetres in length or is less than 60 centimetres in length overall, other than an air weapon, a muzzle-loading gun or a firearm designed as signalling apparatus;

..."

The maximum sentence for this offence, in terms of Part 1 of Schedule 6 to the Firearms Act, as substituted by section 288 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, in a prosecution on indictment, was imprisonment for 10 years, or a fine, or both. By section 287 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a new section 51A was added to the 1968 Act. This provided a minimum sentence for certain offences under section 5. So far as relevant, it provides:

"(1) This section applies where -
(a) an individual is convicted of -

(i) an offence under section 5(1) ... (aba) ... of this Act..., and

(b) the offence was committed after the commencement of this

section and at a time when he was aged 16 or over.

(2) The Court shall impose an appropriate custodial sentence ... for a term of at least the required minimum term (with or without a fine) unless the Court is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justifies not doing so.

...

(5) In this section 'the required minimum term' means - ...

(b) in relation to Scotland -

(i) in the case of an offender who was aged 21 or over when he committed the offence, five years ....".

Section 51A has been effective since 22 January 2004.

[6] Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 obliges the Court, when passing sentence on an accused who has pled guilty, to take into account the stage in the proceedings at which the offender indicated his intention to plead guilty and the circumstances in which that indication was given. The Court is also obliged to state whether, having taken account of these matters, the sentence imposed is different from what would otherwise have been imposed, and if not, why not. In modern practice, following Du Plooy v HM Advocate 2005 JC 1, a discount of up to about one third is allowed for a plea of guilty. Section 205B of the 1995 Act provides for the imposition of a minimum sentence for a third conviction of Class A drug trafficking offences, unless the Court is of the opinion that there are specific circumstances which relate to any of the offences or to the offender and would make the minimum sentence unjust. In the absence of such specific circumstances, section 196(2) nevertheless empowers the Court to pass a sentence of less than the statutory minimum to take account of a plea of guilty, but the maximum discount which is permitted under that subsection is a period equal to 20% of the minimum sentence. There is no comparable provision permitting a discount below the statutory minimum sentence provided by section 51A of the Firearms Act. It was not therefore in dispute before us that the effect of that section is to over-ride the provisions of section 196 of the 1995 Act, so that the Court is obliged to pass a sentence of not less than the statutory minimum unless it is of the opinion that there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or to the offender which justify its not doing so.

 

The English cases
[7
] Counsel were agreed that there was no Scottish case in which the effect of section 51A of the Firearms Act had been considered. Reference was instead made to a series of decisions in the Court of Appeal in England. Of these, the most important were R. v Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern [2004] EWCA Crim 3291, [2005] 2 Cr. App. R.(S.) 44, in which the members of the court were Rose, L.J. (Vice President, Court of Appeal Criminal Division), Douglas Brown, J. and Mackay J., and R. v Rehman and Wood [2005] ECWA Crim 2056, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.) 77, in which the members of the court were Lord Woolf, C.J., Goldring J. and Walker J. The Firearms Act is a United Kingdom statute, and we would regard these authorities on the effect of Section 51A as highly persuasive. It is clearly desirable that the Firearms Act should receive similar effect throughout the United Kingdom and that this should be reflected in uniformity of sentencing practice, other things being equal.

[8] In R. v Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern the Court held that where section 51A required a minimum sentence to be imposed, the Court might not impose a sentence less than the required minimum to reflect the fact that the offender had pled guilty. At paragraph 23 the Court said:

"[Section 51A] is plain and unambiguous on the face of it, and it applies whenever an individual is convicted. The contention that Parliament cannot have intended to prevent the reduction of a sentence following a guilty plea is not, in our view, correct."

At paragraph 26, the Court said: "The rigour of section 51A is mitigated by the possibility of exceptional circumstances being found." At paragraph 30 they said:

"In our view, once a judge has properly identified exceptional circumstances, the sentence is at large. The minimum sentence provided in the section is a factor which the judge can take into account, as he will also take into account the guideline case of Avis [1998] 2 Cr App R (S) 178 and all available mitigation. This will not only involve the exceptional circumstances themselves, but also good character and a timely plea of guilty. This will only arise where there are real exceptional circumstances. These cases will be rare."

[9] In R. v Rehman and Wood the Court said at paragraph 4:

"The weapons, with which we are concerned, are ones in relation to which Parliament by section 51A has signalled it was important that there should be imposed deterrent sentences. By 'deterrent sentences' we mean sentences that pay less attention to the personal circumstances of the offender and focus primarily upon the need for the courts to convey a message that an offender can expect to be dealt with more severely so as to deter others than he would be were it only his personal wrongdoing which the Court had to consider."

At paragraph 11 the Court said:

"[I]t is not appropriate to look at each circumstance separately and to conclude that it does not amount to an exceptional circumstance. A holistic approach is needed. There will be cases where there is one single striking feature, which relates either to the offence or the offender, which causes that case to fall within the requirement of exceptional circumstances. There can be other cases where no single factor by itself will amount to exceptional circumstances, but the collective impact of all the relevant circumstances truly makes the case exceptional."

At paragraph 12 the Court said:

"So far as we can determine the rationale of Parliament, the policy was to treat the offence as requiring a minimum term unless there were exceptional circumstances, not necessarily because the offender would be a danger in the future, but to send out the deterrent message to which we have already referred. The mere possession of firearms can create dangers to the public. The possession of a firearm may result in that firearm going into circulation. It can then come into possession of someone other than the particular offender for example by theft in whose hands the firearm would be a danger the public. Parliament has therefore said that usually the consequence of merely being in possession of a firearm will in itself be a sufficiently serious offence to require the imposition of a term of imprisonment of five years, irrespective of the circumstances of the offence or the offender, unless they pass the exceptional threshold to which the section relates."

[10] The application of this approach in practice may be illustrated by a brief account of the relevant circumstances in the cases to which we were referred. In R. v Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern the appellant Jordan pled guilty to possessing a loaded Second World War revolver in working order. He had had it for about six months, having been given it by a cousin. He was of previous good character. The appellant Alleyne pled guilty to possessing a gun and ammunition. He had been working for a drug dealer who had buried the gun in some woodland. He recovered the gun about a week before his arrest with the intention of preventing its use against himself. The appellant Redfern pled guilty to possessing a pistol which he had bought about three years earlier. There was no ammunition for it. It had been modified so as to permit the discharge of a missile capable of causing death. He believed that the gun was a replica when he bought it. No exceptional circumstances were found in the first two cases, but Redfern's belief that the gun was a replica was treated as an exceptional circumstance. In R. v McEneaney [2005] ECWA Crim 431, [2005] Cr. App. R.(S.) 86, the appellant pled guilty to one charge of possessing a firearm without a firearms certificate and three charges of possessing a prohibited weapon. The most serious charge related to a semi-automatic handgun which had been constructed as a blank firing weapon but had been converted to fire ammunition and had actually been fired. His explanation for possessing this firearm was that he had found it whilst out walking one day, and he had thereafter kept it. There was no evidence that it was he who had converted the weapon or who had fired it. A psychiatric report disclosed that he suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and long-standing personality difficulties. It was held that the appellant's psychiatric history and the circumstances of the offences did not amount to exceptional circumstances in combination. In R. v Blackall [2005] ECWA Crim 1128, [2006] 1 Cr. App. R.(S.) 22, the appellant pled guilty to possessing a revolver and ammunition. He had kept the revolver in his house since being rendered paraplegic some years earlier in a shooting incident, in order to protect himself from future attacks. It was held that there were no exceptional circumstances relating to the offence, but that the fact that the appellant was a paraplegic with many consequential physical disabilities, making it much more difficult for him to cope with a sentence of imprisonment, amounted to exceptional circumstances which justified a reduction of the sentence below the required minimum. In R. v Mehmet [2005] ECWA Crim 2074 the appellant pled guilty to possession of a self-contained, gas-cartridge revolver in working order and capable of discharging pellets. No ammunition was found. The appellant come into possession of it some years previously, at a time when possession of it was lawful. He intended, if it was used, that it was to be for sporting purposes. In January 2004 the weapon became unlawful, but at that time he was suffering from depression and knew nothing of the change of legislation. The Court held that, while no one of those circumstances was capable by itself of constituting an exceptional circumstance, the combination of all the factors in the case enabled them to say that this was one of those rare cases where the Court was justified in finding the exceptional circumstances contended for by the appellant. They regarded the particular factors they identified as presenting "an unusual and cumulative picture". In Evans v The Queen [2005] ECWA Crim 1811, the appellant pled guilty to several offences, including one of possession of a semi-automatic firearm, a self-loading pistol which was in working order and had been used by him. The Court considered a psychological report which stated that the appellant had a severe level of obsessive compulsive disorder and clinically significant levels of anxiety and depression. The Court said, at paragraph 16:

"In our judgment, the appellant's psychological condition does not constitute exceptional circumstances within the meaning of [section 51A]. The appellant knew what he was doing and knew that what he was doing was wrong. He retained the prohibited weapon with that knowledge. The intervention of a specialist firearms team was required to find the weapon in his house. In the context of a statute intended to protect the public from the possible consequences of unlawful possession of firearms, evidence, in an intelligent man, well aware of the public issues involved, of feelings of compulsion to obtain and store guns, does not amount to exceptional circumstances."

Finally, in R.v Rehman & Wood, the appellant pled guilty to possession of a replica blank-firing handgun which, although a replica, could easily be altered to as to be capable of firing live ammunition. He was a collector of models and purchased the replica firearm with the intention of displaying it. He said that he did not know that the gun could be converted. He had a positively good character. His background, his ignorance of the unlawfulness of the weapon, his plea of guilty at the first opportunity, his previous good character, his co-operation throughout the search and arrest procedure and his employment with a public authority of which he was a valued employee, collectively made it possible to come to the conclusion that exceptional circumstances existed. The appellant Wood pled guilty to several contraventions of the Firearms Act, including one count of possession of a prohibited weapon, which was a single-barrelled shotgun with a barrel less than 30 centimetres long. He was a collector of weapons. He was of extremely good character, as described in the report. He had inherited the weapon from his grandfather. The Court said, at paragraph 32:

"[H]e of all people should have understood that this was not the sort of weapon which should have been in his possession. He did not take the action which he should have done to check whether it was lawful to possess it. The fact that he had committed the other offences demonstrates that he did not attach sufficient significance to the very strict statutory provisions which applied to the possession of firearms. The other offences are not ones to which section 51A applied. But they showed on his part a carelessness with regard to the possession of firearms which prevents us treating the circumstances as exceptional."

[11] The principles which may be derived from these cases appear to us to be as follows. In enacting section 51A of the Firearms Act, Parliament intended, that, for the protection of the public against the dangers arising from the unlawful possession of firearms, considerations of retribution and deterrence should be given greater emphasis, and the personal circumstances of the offender less emphasis, than would normally be the case in sentencing. While there may be cases in which exceptional circumstances are found to exist, the emphasis is on the word "exceptional", and such cases will be rare. In deciding whether or not exceptional circumstances exist, it is necessary to consider as a whole all relevant circumstances relating both to the offence and to the offender. Some circumstances may amount to aggravation and some to mitigation, and some may be relatively neutral, which is why it is to the circumstances taken as a whole that regard must be had. We do not accept the submission of senior counsel for the respondent that it is only those circumstances that are claimed to be exceptional that fall to be taken into account.

 

The material before the sentencing judge
[12
] The sentencing judge had before him, and took into account, information derived from a number of sources, which for convenience we place under separate headings.

 

The history of the case

[13] The respondent originally appeared on a summary complaint on 25 October 2005 on two charges which became charges 1 and 2 in the subsequent indictment. He appeared from custody on petition on 17 May 2006 in respect of inter alia the firearms offences which became charges 3 and 4 in the subsequent indictment. He was refused bail. He was fully committed on 25 May 2006. He pled guilty to charges 1, 3 and 4 in the indictment at a continued preliminary hearing on 8 September 2006.

 

Previous offending

[14] The respondent had numerous previous convictions, extending back to 1975. The notice of previous convictions shows that he was convicted on 46 separate occasions, three of them on indictment, for a variety of offences, including offences of violence and dishonesty. He had previously been convicted of charges of assault on his partner, the complainer in charge 1 of the present indictment.

The circumstances of the offences

[15] The sentencing judge was provided with a Crown narrative, in agreed terms, as follows:

"INTRODUCTION
The accused and the Crown witness Sandra Dunlop have been in a long-term relationship for approximately 28 years. They have 2 children as a result of this relationship, Angela McGovern (23) and Lewis McGovern (15).

 

CHARGE 1

About approximately 11pm on 18 June 2005, Sandra Dunlop and her son Lewis McGovern were within the flat at Flat 2/1, 116 Earl Street, Scotstoun, Glasgow. At this time Sandra Dunlop answered the close security entry buzzer and found it to be the accused seeking access. Due to Sandra Dunlop and the accused being estranged partners, and a recent argument, Sandra Dunlop did not allow the accused access to her home and refused to activate the door entry system giving the accused access to the common close.

The accused then started to shout and swear at Sandra Dunlop. She informed the accused that she was going to phone the police, and moved towards her phone. Within her hallway she heard a loud 'bang' and saw a flash.

Sandra Dunlop then phoned the police, dialling 999.

At this time the parties' 15-year-old son Lewis made his way over to the livingroom window giving a view over Earl Street. He saw the accused make his way over to a nearby skip where he appeared to retrieve an item. The accused then moved to the centre of the roadway directly outside the flat, and looked up towards the window of the premises.

Fearing that the accused was about to throw an item at the window, Lewis McGovern stepped back, losing the accused from his view. However, Lewis McGovern heard a loud bang, but did not see what the accused had retrieved from the skip or what had caused the noise.

At the same time, neighbours of Sandra Dunlop were within their flat, having settled their children down for the evening. They heard the sound of the argument between the accused and Sandra Dunlop, and heard a loud bang. They looked out of their living room window and saw the accused standing in the roadway outside.

The accused was seen to be holding an item, which looked like a small pistol type handgun approximately 8" in length. The accused appeared to be pulling on the top of the pistol in what could be described as a cocking motion, and pointed it in the general direction of Sandra Dunlop's window before firing it.

The accused repeated this action before placing the pistol in the holdall he was carrying and making off along Earl Street. The police were again called.

At approximately midnight on the same day Angela McGovern, the daughter of the accused, was in her next-door neighbour's house, when her partner informed her that he had allowed the accused into their home at 56 Larchfield Avenue, Scotstoun.

Angela McGovern returned home, and entered her living room where she found her father. She spoke to him briefly, and then embraced him prior to his leaving. At this she felt a hard object within the accused's waistband. She asked her father what the object was and he replied 'That's my gun in there be careful.'

Angela McGovern did not see the gun referred to, but instructed the accused to leave, as she was nervous.

Meanwhile police officers received a message via personal radio within regards to an ongoing firearm incident at 116 Earl Street, Glasgow. A full firearms procedure was adopted resulting in the attendance of armed response unit and dog units. The locus was secured and searched with a negative result.

At approximately 2055 hours, on 21 June 2005, police officers met the accused by arrangement, and the accused agreed to attend a City Centre Police Office on a voluntary basis. He was later interviewed there and stated with regard to his attendance at Earl Street: 'I was asking her to give me some money [be]cause my money goes through my daughter's bank account. She refused to even give me ah couple of pound, that's all I was wanting'.

When asked: 'That's the information we've got, you were shouting and swearing and then, they're speaking about this flash, this bang and there is witnesses saying they saw you in the street, with what appears to be a handgun?'

The accused said: 'It's an imitation starting, well it's a starting pistol, nothing comes out of it, it's just a noise.'

The accused was cautioned ad charged and made no reply.

The pistol was not recovered.

 

CHARGES 3 & 4

Around 10 March 2006 Sandra Dunlop states that she was within her home address, along with the now accused, within the main bedroom. Sandra Dunlop saw the accused remove a blue polythene bag from under the bed, which contained a handgun.

The accused then removed the handgun from the bag.

At 2.55pm on 16 May 2006 police officers went to Sandra Dunlop's address, as a result of a matter no longer before the court. They detained the accused and conveyed him to Glasgow City Centre Police Office.

At approximately 6pm he was taken to an interview room, to be interviewed. While in the room and before the interview began, the accused asked to be informed why he was being detained although this had already been explained. He was informed again of the reason for his detention.

The accused, at this time, stated: 'Look, I want to help. I have been wantin' tae hand this in for weeks. Gie us a bit of paper'. He was given a sheet of paper in order that he could draw the police witnesses a sketch of the area in which the gun could be found. The accused thereafter stated, 'You'll get the gun. A blue bag like you get in the Paki shop. It's at the fence across from ma hoose'.

As a result of the information given by the accused, police officers went to the area described by the accused, and recovered a silver-coloured, black handled handgun.

On examination by Ballistics Officers, the weapon was found to be a blank firing self loading (sometimes called semi automatic) pistol. The weapon was German in origin, and was originally designed to fire 9mm blank rounds.

The weapon on closer examination was found to have been converted to be capable of firing modified blank firing cartridges loaded with a steel ball bearing. The pistol was modified, by cutting off the standard barrel just forward of the gas vent. The remaining portion of the barrel had been opened up possibly by drilling through into the forward end of the chamber block.

Within the lab, test shots were fired successfully using a 9mm centre fire blank cartridge and a modified blank cartridge. The blank round performed as normal although the pistol did not self-load due to the modifications made.

A modified round with the ball bearing was fired and found to have a lethal potential."

 

Social Enquiry Report

[16] Before passing sentence, the sentencing judge obtained a Social Enquiry Report. This disclosed that the respondent was aged 49 and lived with his partner, Sandra Dunlop, aged 43. They had two children, a daughter, aged 25, who lived nearby with her two children, and a son aged 16 who lived with his parents. The respondent informed the social worker that the relationship with his partner had at times been volatile. He acknowledged that his temper, alcohol and drug misuse were the main cause of difficulties. Notwithstanding this, the respondent's partner confirmed that she would be willing to consider his returning to live with her, but only on the understanding that he sought treatment in relation to his substance misuse and behaviour. This was borne out by a letter signed by the respondent's partner which was put before the sentencing judge, in which she expressed herself in somewhat more optimistic terms than she did to the social worker. The respondent told the social worker that he had suffered two heart attacks and had angina. He had developed deep vein thrombosis as a result of intravenous drug abuse. He had been a heroin addict for about 25 years. He had been on a methadone programme and had experienced periods of being free from drugs, followed by relapses. He said his alcohol misuse had become a problem for him more recently, with negative effects on his behaviour and ability to manage his anger.

[17] Under the heading "Attitude to Offence" the social worker reported that, in respect of charge 1, the respondent said that he had been separated from his partner for several weeks as a result of relationship difficulties. He went to her house in order to access money for heroin, but he was refused entry and his belongings were thrown from the window. He claimed that he was sober, but he was desperate for money to buy drugs. He accepted that the weapon referred to in charge 1 belonged to him and was in a bag of his belongings. He removed the gun and caused a breach of the peace, but claimed that he was shocked at the presence of the gun and that it was discharged accidentally. He expressed considerable remorse at having caused fear and alarm to his partner and son. In the next paragraph under this heading, which may be taken to relate to the offences in charges 3 and 4, the writer states:

"Mr McGovern reports that he had purchased the gun with the intention of converting it from an imitation firearm to one capable of firing live bullets for the purpose of a newspaper article, which he proposed to compile with a journalist friend. Mr McGovern reported that he recognises the seriousness of the illegal possession of such a weapon, however presented, in the opinion of the writer, as somewhat blasé in discussion of the potential consequences of owning or using a gun, for instance Mr McGovern stated that he believed that while terrified, his family 'knew I would never shoot anyone'."

[18] The social worker undertook an assessment using the Level of Services Inventory - Revised (LSI-R), described as a validated assessment instrument, which provides a structured examination of the risk of re-offending and itemises areas of criminogenic need, which may need to be addressed through a programme of intervention. Using this instrument the respondent was assessed as requiring a high level of service. It was stated that he might benefit from structured intervention in the areas of alcohol/drug misuse, anger management, use of violence and criminal activity. Senior counsel for the respondent submitted that it was wrong to regard the Social Enquiry Report as providing an assessment of the respondent as being at high risk of re-offending. On the contrary, we regard this as an assessment that he was at high risk of re-offending.

 

The News of the World

[19] The sentencing judge was provided with information about co-operation between the respondent and a journalist working for the News of the World. The information was contained in a copy of report from that paper dated 29 October 2000 and a statement by the journalist, David Leslie. The journalist stated that he was introduced to the respondent in early 2000. The respondent agreed to act as a "snout" for the journalist, passing on any newsworthy items that he felt would be of interest. The respondent provided the journalist with information and practical assistance, involving the purchase of a replica handgun and its modification to fire live bullets, which led to the story published on 29 October 2000. The respondent attempted to provide further assistance to the journalist in later years in connection with the availability of illegal firearms. It would appear that the respondent was remunerated for his efforts. No specific mention is made in the journalist's statement about contact between him and the respondent in connection with the firearm mentioned in charges 3 and 4.

 

The plea- in-mitigation

[20] As appears from the sentencing judge's report to this Court, and from a transcript of the plea-in-mitigation by counsel who then appeared for the respondent, the respondent was said to be genuinely contrite about his actions which were the subject of charge 1. His partner and family were prepared at the time of sentence to have him back at the family home, indeed they appeared anxious that this should happen. So far as charges 3 and 4 were concerned, counsel submitted that there were special circumstances which justified a departure from the minimum sentence which would otherwise be required in respect of charge 4. As reported by the sentencing judge:

"In particular, it was said that there would have been no prosecution but for the fact that [the respondent] voluntarily advised the police of where the gun could be found. He also gave a full explanation as to how he had come into possession of the gun. It should be emphasised that the gun described in charges 3 and 4 was a totally different gun from that described in charge 1. I was also given some documentary evidence to the effect that the appellant had been assisting a journalist from the News of the World newspaper in setting up a story which described how guns could be obtained in the West of Scotland and handed to the police, thus allowing the newspaper to claim credit for an act of public service. The appellant had acquired the gun for this purpose and also to allow the journalist to do further articles on the ease with which firearms could be obtained in Glasgow."

 

The sentence

[21] There was some minor confusion on the part of the sentencing judge, which is also reflected in the Minute of Proceedings, in relation to the numbering of the charges in respect of which sentence was being passed, but before us counsel were agreed that this was as follows. In respect of charge 1 he imposed an extended sentence of five years, of which the custodial term was three years and the extension period was two years. In respect of charge 3, he admonished the respondent. In respect of charge 4 he imposed an extended sentence of five years of which the custodial term was three years and the extension period was two years. He made the sentences on charges 1 and 4 concurrent with each other. The sentence was back-dated to 17 May 2006.

[22] In sentencing the respondent, the sentencing judge said:

"Now the first thing I want to make clear is that these two charges [sic] will be dealt with entirely separately. Both of them I regard as serious and they are made worse by the fact that you have an appalling criminal record. I am particularly concerned that two assaults in the past have been committed against your partner. The Court has very little time for people who behave in this way and, in addition, in terms of the present first charge it is clear that you intended to intimidate her in a way that I find truly appalling.

I have also at the same time, of course, to consider the second charge, I beg your pardon, the third and the fourth charges which are of course entirely separate. The reason behind your acquiring these items seems quite extraordinary but [counsel] has persuaded me, particularly on the basis that you voluntarily went to the police to advise them of the position, that there are exceptional circumstances that justify the Court considering another sentence than the minimum of five years' imprisonment which would otherwise be imposed. It does, however, remain a serious matter. I also accept that from the outset you have been prepared to plead guilty and I think that, I am prepared to give some effect to the suggestion that you were not in a position to put in section 76 letter.

As far as the charge of breach of the peace is concerned, because I say I regard that as very serious, I am satisfied that with your record and previous history of assaulting your partner that had you gone to trial you would have faced a lengthy prison sentence of perhaps five years. I am prepared to accept, however, all the mitigating factors that have been adduced in your favour. I have taken into account the letter written by your wife and your early plea of guilty and have decided that the sentence to be imposed is one of three years imprisonment on charge 1. In respect of the second charge, I beg your pardon, the second two charges, charges 3 and 4, I am prepared to depart from the minimum sentence, as I have indicated, and I shall impose a sentence of three years imprisonment on charge [4]. You will be admonished on charge [3].

...

Now in addition, in respect of each of these two charges [charges 1 and 4] there will be an extended sentence of post-custodial supervision for two years. ... I have imposed sentences of three years' imprisonment on each of charges 1 and [4]. I had given thought to making these consecutive, in other words you would have served six years' imprisonment but in the hope that you will take advantage of your partner's generosity in having you back and that you will have learnt your lesson in respect of these matters I am prepared, in the circumstances, to make the two sentences concurrent."

[23] The sentencing judge does not appear to have been addressed on, or to have considered, the competency of imposing extended sentences on charges 1 and 4. Section 210A of the 1995 would only make such a sentence competent in the case of a prisoner convicted of certain specified sexual offences or a long-term prisoner convicted of offences inferring personal violence.

[24] In his report to this Court, the sentencing judge substantially repeats the considerations which he expressly took into account in passing sentence. He states:

"The exceptional circumstances in charge [4] were that the [respondent] himself had brought the existence of the gun to the attention of the police, and this was the entire basis of the charge. This was not in any way disputed by the prosecution. There was no suggestion that it had been used for any criminal purpose. In addition the respondent had pled guilty at a continued preliminary hearing. Accordingly, I felt entitled to [conclude] that special circumstances existed for not imposing the minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment. ... In addition, as the minimum sentence was now not applicable, I considered it further appropriate to give the [respondent] the benefit of a discount for his plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing, and reduced the sentence to one of three years' imprisonment. I also considered in this respect, and in making the sentences concurrent, that an excessive sentence might deter others wishing to hand in guns in the future."

 

The appeal to this court

Submissions for the Crown

[25] On behalf of the Lord Advocate, the Advocate Depute submitted that the sentencing judge erred in law in holding that exceptional circumstances existed. The two factors taken into account by him in reaching that decision were the manner in which the existence of the firearm came to the attention of the police and the respondent's plea of guilty. The sentencing judge placed undue weight on the means by which the firearm had been recovered. He erred in holding that but for the respondent's admissions there would have been no prosecution. Neither he nor the respondent could exclude the possibility that the firearm would be discovered and linked to the respondent by some other means. The respondent revealed the whereabouts of the firearm to police officers on 16 May 2006 while in custody on another matter. He appeared on petition on 17 May 2006, and was remanded in custody. He was served with an indictment on 31 July 2006 for a preliminary hearing on 31 August 2006. At that hearing the case was continued on defence motion to allow a firearms expert instructed on behalf of the respondent to provide his report. An offer to plead guilty to charges 1, 3 and 4 was first received on 4 September 2006. In these circumstances the plea of guilty was of little utilitarian value. The timing of the plea was in no way exceptional, and the plea was all but inevitable standing the evidence against the respondent. His action in bringing the existence of the firearm to the attention of the police might be indicative of a certain degree of remorse, and was mitigatory, but these factors could not, either individually or taken together, amount to exceptional circumstances.

[26] The Advocate Depute further submitted that the sentencing judge erred in law in calculating the discount appropriate in respect of the plea of guilty. He considered the plea of guilty to be one of the factors leading him to hold that exceptional circumstances existed, and accordingly imposed a sentence of less than five years' imprisonment. But having done that, he then proceeded to apply a second discount in respect of the plea of guilty alone and allowed a further discount of 25%. The only power to mitigate the penalty imposed in respect of a contravention of section 5(1)(aba) was that contained in section 51A(2). It was open to the sentencing judge to regard the plea of guilty as a factor to be taken into account in assessing whether such exceptional circumstances as were specified in section 51A(2) existed. But this specific provision overrode the general power contained in section 196(2) of the 1995 Act to reduce a period of imprisonment, and overrode the provisions of that section as regards account to be taken of a plea of guilty. Were it not so, the provisions of section 51A as to both minimum terms and exceptional circumstances would be of no effect.

[27] There was no question of the respondent having acquired the weapon in ignorance of its true characteristics. He knew of the danger posed by the firearm. He knew it was an illegal weapon. He knew well that he should not have it in his possession. The sentencing judge erred in not taking into account the risk of the respondent using the firearm. He had committed another offence (the offence in charge 1) involving use of a handgun or similar instrument. Although this was not itself a prohibited weapon, that offence demonstrated irresponsibility on his part and highlighted the risk that he might use an illegal firearm in such circumstances. The sentencing judge erred in failing to take account of the wider risk posed to the public by the respondent's actions. Whether or not he considered there was a danger of the respondent using the firearm, there was a clear risk that it might fall into the wrong hands.

[28] Finally, the Advocate Depute submitted that the sentencing judge erred in ordering that the sentences imposed on charges 1 and 4 be served concurrently. The offences were separate matters. Notwithstanding the wishes of the complainer in charge 1, the sentencing judge considered that only a substantial custodial sentence was appropriate on that charge. The imposition of a sentence on charge 4 which did not result in the respondent spending any additional period in custody did not adequately reflect the serious nature of either charge, nor did it reflect the need for retribution and the need to deter both the respondent and others from possession of prohibited firearms.

 

Submissions for the respondent

[29] Senior counsel for the respondent submitted that the sentencing judge was correct to hold that there were exceptional circumstances. In all the English cases referred to, the police had found the firearms. In the present case, the respondent had volunteered information to the police which led to the recovery of the firearm and to its being taken out of circulation. This, and his plea of guilty, could properly be regarded as constituting exceptional circumstances. The respondent's previous bad character should not be taken into account. He would never have been charged in terms of charges 3 and 4 if he had not given information to the police. He was contrite. The firearm had not been used in connection with any crime. The removal of the gun from circulation was consistent with public policy.

[30] Counsel further submitted that the sentencing judge had exercised a proper discretion in making the sentences on charges 1 and 4 concurrent. It was appropriate to look at the indictment as a whole, not just charge by charge, in order to achieve an appropriate overall result.

 

Discussion

[31] We start with charges 3 and 4, which relate to the same firearm, and in particular charge 4, which is the more serious of them. The question for consideration is whether the sentencing judge misdirected himself in holding that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment of less than the statutory minimum provided by section 51A of the Firearms Act. We have set out above the principles which we derive from the English cases, and which we propose to follow and apply in the present case. A number of matters appear to us to be of considerable significance. The respondent had what the sentencing judge correctly described as an appalling criminal record, including convictions for assault, two of them against his partner. In the course of committing the breach of the peace which was the subject of charge 1, he repeatedly discharged a handgun or similar instrument at the window of his partner's house. While this was not in itself an illegal firearm, his use of it demonstrated the respondent's willingness to use such a weapon in the commission of a crime. A member of the public might well have taken it for a real firearm. It was not subsequently recovered. When the respondent came into possession of the firearm referred to in charges 3 and 4, he was well aware that it was an illegal weapon. He hid it at a place away from his house. He did not put it beyond his own use, and it could also have fallen into the hands of someone else. The sentencing judge appears, quite rightly, to have placed little, if any weight on the respondent's co-operation with the journalist from the News of the World. The journalist's statement does not refer to the respondent's possession of this particular firearm in 2006, so it may be inferred that the respondent had not drawn it to the attention of the journalist. In any event, the only proper way of taking an illegal firearm out of circulation is to inform the police and not a newspaper. Against these considerations may be set the fact that it was the respondent who provided information to the police which led them to recover the firearm, and his subsequent plea of guilty.

[32] Bearing in mind the policy of Parliament in enacting section 51A of the Firearms Act, and looking at all relevant circumstances relating to both the respondent and the offence, we are clearly of the view that the sentencing judge fell into error in concluding that there existed exceptional circumstances within the meaning of section 51A which justified the imposition of a term of imprisonment of less than the statutory minimum. While there were some mitigating features, they were, in our judgment considerably outweighed by the aggravating features, such that, taken as a whole, the circumstances could not properly be regarded as exceptional. For this reason alone the sentence on charge 4 must be regarded as unduly lenient.

[33] There is, however, an additional reason for regarding this sentence as unduly lenient. No issue was taken by either counsel with the sentencing judge's selection of a starting point of five years' imprisonment on charge 1 (though the amount of the discount to reflect a plea of guilty and the competency of the imposition of an extended sentence may both be open to question). Charges 1 and 4 related to entirely separate matters. No doubt, as senior counsel for the respondent submitted, it lay within the power of the sentencing judge to make the sentences concurrent, but that is not the point. The result, as the Advocate Depute pointed out, was that, having decided on the sentence in respect of charge 1, the sentencing judge effectively imposed no additional sentence in respect of charge 4. In addition, he only admonished the respondent in respect of charge 3, an offence which carried a maximum sentence of seven years' imprisonment. These are additional reasons for regarding the disposal in the present case as unduly lenient.

 

Decision

[34] For these reasons we shall quash the sentences imposed by the sentencing judge. Before deciding what sentences we should impose in their place, we shall put the case out for further hearing.


BAILII:
Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2007/HCJAC_21.html