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Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Scottish High Court of Justiciary Decisons >> LINBROOKE SERVICES LTD AGAINST HIS MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE [2023] ScotHC HCJAC_31 (17 August 2023)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotHC/2023/2023_HCJAC_31.html
Cite as: 2023 SCCR 271, [2023] HCJAC 31, 2023 SLT 1006, 2023 GWD 32-269, [2023] ScotHC HCJAC_31

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APPEAL COURT, HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY
[2023] HCJAC 31
HCA/2023/000256/XC
Lord Matthews
Lady Wise
OPINION OF THE COURT
delivered by LADY WISE
in
Appeal against Sentence
by
LINBROOKE SERVICES LIMITED
Appellant
against
HIS MAJESTY'S ADVOCATE
Respondent
Appellant: Duguid KC; Rradar
Respondent: A Gray, advocate depute; Crown Agent
17 August 2023
Introduction
[1]
On 30 March 2023 at Dumbarton Sheriff Court the appellant company was found
guilty after trial of the following charges:
"(001) between 24 May 2018 and 05 June 2018, both dates inclusive, at Bearsden
Railway Station, Station Road, Bearsden, East Dumbartonshire you...being an
employer within the meaning of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 and the
after mentioned regulations, did fail to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of
the risks to the health and safety of your employees to which they were exposed
2
whilst they were at work, and any other person not in your employment arising out
of or in connection with the conduct by you of your undertaking, for the purpose of
identifying the measures you needed to comply with the requirements and
prohibitions imposed upon you by or under the relevant statutory provisions in that
you fail to make a suitable and sufficient assessment of the risks to the health and
safety of your employees engaged in installation of longline public address system
equipment and, in particular, did fail;
(a)
to adequately identify the risks involved with pulling cables through a
conduit at height, having been informed of difficulties encountered by a
sub-contractor in a prior attempt to pull said cables;
and
(b)
to adequately identify the risks involved with the use of improvised
cable dispensing methods;
and, as a consequence thereof, on 5 June 2018, Matthew Mason, then employed by
you and engaged in the task of the installation of longline public address system
equipment, fell from a step ladder there on to a metal conduit and was fatally
injured;
CONTRARY to the management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999
Regulation 3(1) and the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 Sections 15 & 33(1)(c);
(002) on 5 June 2018 at Bearsden Railway Station...you...being an employer within
the meaning of the after mentioned regulations, did fail to ensure that work at height
was properly planned; appropriately supervised and carried out in a manner which
was so far as was reasonably practicable safe in that you did allow your employees
to work from a step ladder to pull cables through a conduit there when you had
insufficient measures in place to prevent a fall from height or ensure that the
surrounding area was free of material which could cause injury in the event of such a
fall, and in consequence thereof your employees were exposed to risks to their health
and safety, and Matthew Mason, then employed by you and engaged in the task of
the installation of longline public address system equipment, fell from a step ladder
there on to a metal conduit and was fatally injured;
CONTRARY to the Work at Height Regulations 2005, Regulation 4 and the Health
and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, Section 33(1)(c);
and
(003) on 5 June 2018 at Bearsden Railway Station...you...being an employer within
the meaning of the after mentioned regulations, did not provide sufficient work
equipment to prevent in so far as was reasonably practicable a fall occurring, in that
you did fail to provide suitable work equipment to your employees, engaged in the
task of the installation of longline public address system equipment there, who were
3
required to pull cables through a conduit at height from a set of step ladders which
were inappropriate for the purpose for which they were to be used due to the risk of
your employees losing their balance when applying force to pull said cables through
the conduit, and, in consequence thereof, your employees were exposed to risks to
their health and safety, and Matthew Mason, then employed by you and engaged in
said task, fell from a step ladder there on to a metal conduit and was fatally injured;
CONTRARY to the Work at Height Regulations 2005, Regulation 6(4)(b) and the
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974, Section 33(1)(c)."
[2]
At an adjourned diet on 15 May 2023 the sheriff imposed a financial penalty
of £750,000 which he divided in to two parts; compensation to the deceased Mr Mason's
parents in the sum of £200,000 and a fine of £550,000 to be paid by the company.
The evidence
[3]
The sheriff narrates in his report that the contentious area at trial was the opinion
evidence given by three expert witnesses. The facts were relatively straightforward.
Matthew Mason was 20 years old in 2018. He was a time served electrician. The appellants
had taken on a substantial contract which largely involved the installation of public address
systems in railway stations. Necessarily that involved running cable through metal
conduits, often at a height of 3 metres or thereby. The work at Bearsden Railway Station had
been sub-contracted to a separate company, but 11 days prior to 5 June 2018 that company
had told the appellants that they had been unable to complete the task. They had fixed the
conduit to the wall but said that they had been unable to pull the cable through it.
Mr Mason apparently heard this recounted and volunteered to do the job, which offer was
taken up by the appellant.
[4]
Although the appellant had prepared substantial documents, including those
addressing the issue of safe working practices, in advance of the contract commencing, the
employees who were tasked with actually doing the work on site were expected to follow
4
instructions contained in a document given to them shortly before work commenced. This
document was known as a "task briefing sheet". The six employees of the appellant,
including Mr Mason, who were to work at Bearsden on 5 June had seen such a document.
For reasons not established in evidence but against the background of the work having been
taken back by the appellant from the sub-contractor a matter of days beforehand, that task
briefing sheet was entirely silent about the required work at height, pulling cables through
conduits. Any associated risks appeared not to have been assessed.
[5]
The accident was captured on CCTV and subsequently viewed by the jury.
Mr Mason was a well built, strong young man who was seen to take part in the first element
of the job, entailing pulling out the appropriate length of cable from a drum. The cable
could only be pulled freely if the drum was lifted off the ground. Mr Mason was then seen
to put an extra length of conduit through the drum as if it were an axle for a wheel and to lift
the drum off the ground. Once the requisite length of cable was unwound by one of the
others, he was seen to put the drum on its end and to put a length of conduit through the
hole in the middle of the drum such that a length of it was protruding upwards beyond the
drum. None of this would have complied with approved cable dispensing methods, but no
system was in place to prevent improvised methods being adopted, which there ought to
have been, given the risk obviously created thereby.
[6]
There had been a site visit on 4 June 2018 when it was ascertained that the
step ladder which had been provided, notwithstanding health and safety executive
guidelines warning against the use of step ladders for various tasks to be carried out at
height, was too short. What was requested, and supplied, was not a different type of
platform, with greater security, but a taller ladder. Again, no risk assessment was carried
out.
5
[7]
Work then was carried out off camera, before Mr Mason was seen on the CCTV to
climb the step ladder, start pulling the cable and descend when a problem appeared to be
encountered. He then disappeared from view and returned, moving the ladder closer to the
drum and protruding conduit than it was before, and climbing even higher up the step
ladder. He was seen to resume pulling, but there then appeared to be a sudden loss of
resistance, and Mr Mason fell backwards off the ladder and onto the conduit, resulting in his
death. The cable had been pulled through the conduit after being attached to a "Fish",
effectively a long piece of wire or fibreglass which had been pushed through the conduit
from the other end and attached to the cable by insulating tape. The "Fish" had not been
attached correctly and it became detached from the cable, causing the loss of resistance.
The sheriff's approach to sentence
[8]
The sheriff produced a sentencing statement and in his helpful report explains
further the approach he took. He states that he both followed the sentencing process
guideline issued by the Scottish Sentencing Council and used the English Sentencing
Council's Definitive Guideline on sentencing in health and safety matters issued in 2015 as a
useful cross-check, as the offences were regulated by UK statute. He began by assessing the
levels of culpability and harm. On the basis of the evidence he had heard he concluded that
the level of culpability attributed to Linbrooke could be categorised as Medium. He
accepted that there was no deliberate breach on the part of the company and no flagrant
disregard for the law. He acknowledged that the use of step ladders even in inappropriate
circumstances appeared not to have been restricted to Linbrooke but to have been common
throughout the industry. The company had not been put on notice as to the risk by any
previous expression of concern about this method of working. The sheriff accepted also that
6
before the general contract had commenced, Linbrooke had taken steps to identify potential
hazards including those arising from working at height and to some extent had given
guidance as to systems that could be used to avoid a reduced risk. However the sheriff
regarded it as critical that by the stage of issuing final instructions in the form of the task
briefing sheet they had clearly failed to alert the employees who would actually carry out
the work to the risks involved and the need to ensure the correct equipment would be used
and be used in the correct manner.
[9]
So far as harm was concerned, the sheriff took into account both the seriousness of
the harm risked by the employer's failure and the likelihood of that harm arising. He
considered that the seriousness of the harm risked (falling from the top of a tall ladder)
should be categorised as level A while the likelihood fell into the category of medium. That
resulted in placing the offences as harm category 2 with reference to the English guideline.
He was prepared to proceed on the basis that the number of employees exposed to risk of
harm was a low one. However, the offences had resulted in the most significant cause of
actual harm. While Mr Mason might have made unwise decisions, that was not something
taken into account in the sentencing process. It had been the company's legal duty to take
care to ensure that safe systems of work were not merely nominally in place but were being
followed on a day to day basis.
[10]
The sheriff then considered the size and financial strength of the appellant
company's business, as required by the English guidelines. He concluded that Linbrooke's
annual turnover exceeded £50 million over the 3 year period ending March 2019, 2020,
and 2021, although he now accepts that the figure was marginally below £50 million
However, he had also been provided with draft accounts for the year ending 31 March 2022
which remained in draft form only because the outcome of these proceedings required to be
7
incorporated into them. The draft showed a projected annual turnover of £60.6 million for
the year ending March 2022. Positive remarks from the directors in their strategic report
were noted. Taking account of the draft produced an average annual turnover over the four
year period in excess of £52 million. The sheriff categorised Linbrooke as a large company,
albeit at the lower end of that category. He considered that the guidelines pointed him
towards a range of fines between £300,000 and £1.5 million with a suggested starting point
of £600,000. He indicated that his starting point would be at the upper end of the range and
fixed that at £1 million. There were no aggravating factors to increase the fine from that
starting point but there were a number of mitigating factors. These included the absence of
any previous convictions and an exemplary health and safety record by the company until
Mr Mason's death; the company's philosophy and aim of assisting former armed forces
personnel to return to civilian life and acquire a trade, which had met with considerable
success; the genuine and ongoing distress at all levels of the company in relation to
Mr Mason's death; the steps taken immediately by the company to avoid any repetition of
the accident; and the full cooperation with the investigating agencies. In light of those
mitigating factors and the whole circumstances the sheriff reduced the penalty to £750,000.
It was largely because of submissions made by both Crown and defence that the financial
penalty imposed was likely to complicate the pursuit of civil claims arising from the
accident that the sheriff decided to divide the sum into the two parts mentioned above.
Submissions for the appellant
[11]
On behalf of the appellant, senior counsel made clear at the outset that, should the
appeal succeed to any extent, the company would not wish any reduction to be made to the
compensation order of £200,000 to be paid to the parents of the deceased. While it was a
8
matter for the court, the company was keen that the payment to the family would not be
eroded. There were three main issues raised in argument. First, it was contended that the
deceased's contribution to the accident ought in the particular circumstances of this case to
be taken into account. Secondly, the assessment of the appellant company as a large one for
the purposes of the English guideline was challenged. Thirdly, the sheriff had wrongly
increased his final harm assessment by twice taking into account that death resulted in this
case, rather than at a single stage of the exercise.
[12]
On the first matter of the deceased's contribution, it was submitted that Mr Mason
had attached the "Fish" wire to the cable in a wholly inappropriate manner, presumably
because it was quicker. If he had attached the wire to the cable correctly the amount of
weight that could have been sustained would have been 80kg but because of the way he
performed the task it could sustain only 15kg. The process he used for unreeling a stretch of
cable was unauthorised and a device had been available that he could have used. It was the
deceased's use of a piece of conduit by holding it up almost "like a weight lifter", that
rendered the whole process within range of the lethal obstacle that Mr Mason himself had
placed inside the barrier area at the foot of the ladder. While it was acknowledged that it
would be rare for the individual's fault to be taken into account in a case of this sort, in the
particular circumstances of this case Linbrooke could not reasonably have foreseen that
Mr Mason would behave in the way he did. Accordingly, the court should, unusually, take
this matter into account. In doing so, the court should view the available footage and
various animations prepared for the company and played to the jury.
[13]
In relation to the size of the company and its relationship with the fine imposed,
counsel submitted that, even if Linbrooke could, strictly speaking, be categorised as a large
company, it was a comparatively small competitor in a field where the other players were
9
many times larger. The sheriff had accordingly reached a conclusion about the company's
financial circumstances and ability to pay a fine in a way that was disproportionate. Three
recent decisions to support this point were referred to. First, was a decision published by
COPFS on 9 May 2023 in relation to the Fife based company Mowi Scotland Limited.
Following a plea of guilty to health and safety breaches at Inverness Sheriff Court on that
date arising from a fatal accident at a fish farm, the company had been fined £800,000. The
salmon farming company involved was a very large one. Secondly, in the case of HMA v R J
McLeod a sheriff at Glasgow had fined that company £800,000 on 14 April 2023 after the
company had failed suitably to assess the risks of unauthorised persons gaining access to a
construction site. This had resulted in children making their way through insecure fencing
into the construction site, one of whom died from drowning in flowing water at the foot of a
manhole. The company had pled guilty to failing to take measures to control the risk of
children gaining access to the site. The company involved in that case had a turnover of
about four or five times that of the appellant company. Finally, reference was made to a
news report involving the energy firm BP which was fined £650,000 after a worker died
when he plunged from an offshore platform into the sea. On 19 July 2023 a sheriff in
Aberdeen had imposed the fine stating that, while it had been an isolated incident of the
company failing to have suitable control measures in place for open gratings on a north sea
platform, given that a man had died the fine on a profitable company such as BP required to
have "some economic impact".
[14]
Senior counsel submitted that these decisions supported a contention that, while
each case required to be carefully considered on its own facts, the sheriff had erred in
considering it proportionate to impose a fine of £750,000 on a much smaller company than
those involved in those decisions. The appellant was a railway engineering company
10
formed by two individuals with admirable intentions. It was not in the same category as the
companies referred to and was only very technically in the "large" category referred to in
the English guideline. There was said to be a relationship between the chronology of the
case, which had involved the postponement of a number of trial diets and the financial
circumstances of the company. Had the case been brought to trial on the original intended
dates, the company's draft accounts for 2022 would neither have been relevant nor
applicable. The average turnover for the previous three years would have resulted in the
appellants being categorised as a medium company, albeit at the higher end of that category.
[15]
The third and final contention was that the sheriff double counted Mr Mason's death.
The sheriff's approach and his application of the English sentencing guideline was not open
to criticism in relation to his assessment of culpability as medium and the risk of harm as
level A with a medium likelihood of harm, resulting in a harm assessment of category 2.
However in selecting the figure of £1 million as a starting point, before reductions for
mitigation, the sheriff stated that he sought to distinguish between cases in which a fatality
had occurred and non-fatal cases. In his sentencing statement he recorded that it was
because such a difference should be drawn that his starting point was towards the upper
end of the range. He had moved up from the starting point in the range by 66% purely
because a fatality had resulted. However the distinction between fatal and non-fatal cases
had already been factored into the calculation at the stage of judging the seriousness of the
harm risked and the assessment at level A under reference to the English sentencing
guideline. The sheriff had accordingly fallen into error by revisiting the issue to increase the
starting point by the amount he did. This was particularly the case given that the appellant
company was very much on the margin between "large" and "medium" for the purposes of
the guideline. By ignoring the contribution of the employee, treating the appellant company
11
as if it was of a much greater size and failing to recognise that the death had already been
taken into account, the sheriff had imposed a level of fine far beyond what was
proportionate.
[16]
The appellant company continued to acknowledge that the incident had resulted in
the terrible death of a very young man. It had built "Mason's wall" in his memory and had
made substantial contractual death in service payments. It was noteworthy that the
company continued to enjoy good relations with the deceased's family.
Decision
[17]
The court has given careful consideration to the submissions made and has viewed
the CCTV and animated footage of the incident and the working practices under scrutiny.
We have concluded that this is not the type of exceptional case in which the employee's
actions should have a bearing on the level of financial penalty. While Mr Mason was a time
served electrician he was only 20 years old. He was working with colleagues. He appears to
have adopted an improvised method of reeling the stretch of cable with which he was
working. However, the accident happened because he fell from a ladder. The appellant
company was found guilty of charges that reflected their failure to assess the dangers of
employees carrying out such work at height and using improvised methods. The second
and third charges narrate the failures of supervision, of taking steps to prevent a fall from
height and of providing suitable and safe work equipment. It cannot be said that the
accident was not reasonably foreseeable in light of those failures; on the contrary
Mr Mason's accident was a consequence of them. Accordingly, we reject the first of the
arguments presented on behalf of the appellant.
12
[18]
As to the second of the three arguments, we consider that the sheriff was correct to
categorise the company as a large one for the purpose of gaining assistance from the English
Guideline to check the broad range of fines that might be appropriate. The circumstances in
which there were delays to the trial did not justify the exclusion of the most up to date
material available in assessing the company's turnover. Two of the trial postponements
were granted on joint motion of the Crown and defence. In any event, the difference
between the turnover of the company in the years prior to 2022 and the draft accounts for
that year was not so significant as to alter the broad range of fines that might have been
appropriate in this case. The English Guidelines are not to be applied mechanistically
(Scottish Power Generation Limited v HM Advocate 2017 JC 85, at paragraphs 35-37) and
categorising the company as a large one was only one part in an exercise that has several
steps, including standing back and considering the whole circumstances. In any event, as
the sheriff explains in his report, the relevant accounts of the company for the three year
period ending 31 March 2021 suggest an average annual turnover of £49.9 million. While
that figure is just under the £50 million figure that would, if the English Guideline is used,
take the company into the large category, the draft accounts to 31 March 2022 illustrate that
turnover had risen to £60.6 million. We bear in mind that the purpose of taking account of a
company's financial position is to ensure that the level of fine meets, in a fair and
proportionate way, the objectives of punishment, deterrence and the removal of gain
derived thought the commission of the offence. As the English Guideline puts it, the fine
must be:
"sufficiently substantial to have a real economic impact which will bring home to
both management and shareholders the need to comply with health and safety
legislation."
13
In the present case, the size and financial circumstances of the company were such as to
merit a very significant fine to meet the sentencing purposes and the sheriff did not err in
looking at the range of figures he did.
[19]
That said, we consider that there is merit in the third argument advanced by senior
counsel on behalf of the company. The tragic consequences of the company's health and
safety legislation breaches were taken into account by the sheriff, quite properly, at the stage
of assessing the seriousness and likelihood of harm. The established fact that the offences
were a significant cause of actual harm were factored in at an early stage of the process of
assessment. Thereafter, having categorised the company as a large one in light of its
turnover to identify the range of possible fines and the starting point within that of £600,000,
the sheriff sentencing statement records that:
"Given that the range encompasses a wide spectrum and that a difference must be
drawn between non-fatal and fatal cases, my starting point is towards the upper end
of the range"
as the explanation for the starting point of £1 million (reduced from a possible £1.2 million
give that the company was only just in the large company category). We have concluded
that the selection of a figure so much higher than the starting point for a large company
would justify does appear to include an element of double counting of the fact that death
occurred. In any event, it has resulted in a final outcome that appears disproportionate in all
the circumstances.
[20]
While each case must inevitably turn on its own facts, we note that in the R J Macleod
case, Sheriff Jackson KC was careful not to take the tragedy of a child's death into account
twice, albeit in the context of considering whether there were aggravating factors. In many
of the cases in this area, including some of those to which we were referred, a company
accepts responsibility for a death and pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity. While that
14
did not occur in the present case, that is reflected in the absence of a discount once the
penalty has been fixed. In the present case, there were a number of mitigating factors, all of
which were correctly taken into account by the sheriff. But for the reasons given, the starting
point was too high and we have decided that we ought to remedy that by quashing the
sentence and substituting a lower figure.
[21]
With the exception of this single error, the sheriff's approach to assessing the
appropriate financial penalty was sound. Using the principles summarised in Scottish Sea
Farms Ltd v HM Advocate 2012 SLT 299 at paragraph 18 and using the relevant English
guidelines as a cross check, we consider that the total financial penalty would have
been £800,000, had it not been for the mitigating factors. Taking those into account, we
reduce the total to £600,000. We acknowledge the company's wish that the family receive
the compensation ordered. Accordingly, we will not interfere with the Compensation Order
of £200,000 but we will quash the fine of £550,000 and in its place impose a fine of £400,000.
The appeal is allowed to that extent.


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