United Kingdom Immigration and Asylum (AIT/IAC) Unreported Judgments

Upper Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: AA/07461/2013

 

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

 

Heard at Field House	Date Sent
On 10 March 2014 and 24 April 2014	On 21 May 2014
	…………………………………

 

Before

 

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KING

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RINTOUL

 

Between

 

M a

(anonymity order made)

Appellant

 

 

and

 

 

 

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

 

Representation:

 

For the Appellant: Miss L Appiah, Counsel, instructed by Stepstones Visas, Legal Representatives

For the Respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

 

 

DETERMINATION AND REASONS

1.             The appellant appeals with permission against the determination of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sangha in a determination promulgated on 2 October 2013 in which he dismissed her appeal against the decision of the respondent made on 25 July 2013 to refuse to grant her asylum and to remove her from the United Kingdom.

2.             On 23 October 2013, the appellant was granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against Judge Sangha’s decision. Her appeal then came before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Coates, sitting at Bennett House, Stoke-on-Trent on 18 December 2013. For the reasons given in his decision of 8 January 2014 (a copy of which is attached to this determination) Judge Coates found that the decision of Judge Sangha did involve the making of an error of law such that it was to be set aside. He directed that the decision be remade and that it should be listed before him. The matter came before us as a result of a transfer order made by Principal Resident Judge Southern on 11 February 2014. It is accepted by both parties that none of the findings of fact made by Judge Sangha are to stand.

The Appellant’s Case

3.             In summary, the appellant’s case is that she (and her father) are undocumented Bidoons from Kuwait. Her husband is also an undocumented Bidoon and as a result their children are in the same position. Although she has some documents relating to her status in Kuwait, she does not have the necessary “security card” without which she is an undocumented Bidoon and thus, following NM (documented/undocumented Bidoon: risk) Kuwait CG [2013] UKUT 356 (IAC). She is at risk of persecution on return.

4.             In addition, the appellant faced problems in Kuwait due to her involvement in the distribution of leaflets calling for Bidoon rights which had been printed by her husband and his friends. At the end of April 2012 she was arrested from home and taken to a state security office and interrogated about the leaflets. She was held for about a month and as a result of the beatings during interrogation, she confessed that she had helped her husband in delivering the leaflets but only once. She was released on condition that she must report to the Authorities within one month of her release giving information about her husband’s whereabouts, and the identities of his friends to whom she had delivered leaflets. She was forced to sign a paper confirming the conditions and was released through the intervention of a Kuwaiti citizen guarantor known to her father.

5.             After her release, arrangements were made for the appellant to travel to the United Kingdom with the assistance of an agent. The appellant claimed asylum at the airport on arrival.

The Respondent’s Case

6.             The respondent’s case is set out in the refusal letter dated 25 July 2013. In summary, she accepted that the appellant’s account of how her family came to be Bidoons was consistent with the objective evidence [17], but considered that her claim to be an undocumented Bidoon was contradicted by the fact that she had produced a copy of her birth certificate; by the fact that she, her husband and the children had all attended school in Kuwait; and, that although, with some difficulty, she and her children would be able to access medical treatment.

7.             The respondent did not accept the appellant had been politically active in Kuwait given inconsistencies in her account as to how her husband got the money to obtain a laptop and printer, her account of what she did with the leaflets and how she transported them. The respondent did not accept either the appellant’s account of her arrest and detention given the inconsistencies in her account.

8.             The respondent considered that the appellant is a documented Bidoon and accordingly, on the basis of BA and Others (Bidoon – statelessness – risk of persecution) Kuwait CG [2004] UKIAT 00256 considered that she would experience significantly less problems than undocumented Bidoons, and that while she might face discrimination, that was not sufficient to amount to persecution. The respondent considered that removing the appellant to Kuwait would not be in breach of the Refugee Convention or contrary to the United Kingdom’s obligations pursuant to Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Hearing on 10 March 2014

9.             We heard evidence from the appellant. It did not prove possible to complete cross-examination, and the matter was adjourned part heard until 24 April 2014 when cross-examination continued. We then heard submissions from both representatives.

10.         We had before us the following documents:-

(a)          respondent’s bundle (“RB”);

(b)          the appellant’s bundle (“AB”);

(c)           appellant’s additional bundle containing witness statement from the appellant, letters of support from Harrow Kuwaiti Community Association with witness statements, NM (documents/undocumented Bidoon: risk) Kuwait CG [2013] UKUT 356 (IAC) and documents relating to the appellant’s father’s service in the army;

(d)         additional translation of appellant’s father’s army driving licence;

(e)          skeleton argument from Miss Appiah.

11.         The appellant gave evidence in Arabic with the assistance of a court interpreter. She adopted her witness statement of 5 March 2014 which states [4] that she had had read back to her and agreed with the contents of her previous statements of 16 July 2012, 14 March 2013 and 31 August 2013.

12.         The appellant said that the documents relating to her father’s service in the army had been faxed to her by a friend in Kuwait who had visited her family. She said she had last had contact with her parents some one or two weeks earlier.

13.         In cross-examination the appellant said that she had had a few contacts with her family in Kuwait and that she had only been able to get back in contact with them through a friend recently and after some questioning we were able to elicit that the appellant had got back in contact with her friend in March 2013. She said that she had spoken to her friend who had tried to find the family and had been able to track them down. She said that the friend had found the family in February 2013 and had told her at that point. It was put to her that this was inconsistent with her statement [witness statement of 3 March 2013] that her family had been missing since January 2013.

14.         The appellant was asked if she could explain why her father’s driving licence states (in translation) that it was issued in 1979 but was valid from 1985. She said that she had no idea and could not explain this.

15.         Asked about the letter from Harrow Kuwaiti Community Association and how she knew the two witnesses, the appellant said that she had met a person who had asked her about her problems. She was asked how she knew the two people who had given statements, saying she had been asked a few questions about where she came from and her problems. She confirmed that she had spoken to only one person. Asked then how there were two people who had verified her identity, she said that she knew one person, Tariq, who had been a friend of her father’s in Kuwait for a long time and she had met him once since she had come here. She said that she had met Ali Sankh here and that he knew about her because he had known of her family. She had no idea when her father had last seen Tariq. She could not recall when she had last seen him in Kuwait. She said that Ali had provided the witness statement on the basis of what she had told him.

16.         The appellant said that between her release and leaving Kuwait she had not been in contact with her husband (and had been misunderstood in the screening interview at 6.2). She said she had not seen her husband since she had been arrested and that he had not been present at the time of her arrest. She said she had not asked her family if they had heard of him.

17.         Asked how, if she had had no contact with her husband, she knew he was hiding in various locations, the appellant said it was obvious that he had been in hiding as he had not been arrested. She said she did not say in the screening interview that her husband was living at the same address as her and it was put to her that although she had corrected some parts of what had been said in the screening interview, she said that part had not been the subject of any revision. She denied, when it was put to her, that she had any idea where he is.

18.         The appellant said that she had received education up to the age of 17 although it had been difficult and had been interrupted.

19.         The appellant confirmed that she and her father were members of the Bidoon community in Kuwait (witness statement of 31/8/13). She was asked what attempts had been made to get a security card and said that they had tried to obtain it by organising demonstrators agitating for the rights of Bidoons and by protest.

20.         The appellant had denied that she was a documented Bidoon, stating that her children’s education had been paid for (see Q108, Asylum Interview).

21.         The appellant said that in order to get medical treatment she had made up a number to give to the doctor which turned out not to work. She attended the doctors with a face veil which meant that he could not identify her from the false identity she used (see Q110/111).

22.         The applicant was asked if she had ever approached the Bidoon committee to inquire about getting registration. She said she had not and that she was completely oblivious of this committee and did not know what Ms Isherwood was talking about. Asked then what she meant by she and her father being heavily involved with the Bidoon committee ( witness statement 31 August 2013, at [15]), she said that they had been involved with them, had asked them to get a green card to get registered but that that had not happened. She said that her earlier answer about being completely oblivious about the committee was a misunderstanding but she could not recall when she had dealings with the committee.

23.         Asked to explain what she meant by saying that she and her father were involved members of the committee, the appellant said that they had explained to people what Bidoon means, their rights and tried to get their rights but without success. She confirmed that she had approached people to explain the difficulties the Bidoon face. She was asked why she had not mentioned before that she had approached people to explain the difficulties of Bidoon people, she said that she had mentioned this and had been involved in the distribution of leaflets about it which is why she had been imprisoned. She said that she had distributed leaflets to people, to all the Bidoon community. After what she had said in her witness statement (paragraph 21) she said that she had not handed them out individually but was in contact with a man to whom she had given them, but she said they had a printer at home; she produced the leaflets, gave them to Ahmed Yasser who distributed them and she said that the committee consists of coordinators and people who go out to mosques, distribute leaflets, all activities to help Bidoon get their rights. She said her role was printing out leaflets and giving them to Ahmed to distribute them. Asked about why she had not mentioned herself printing out some leaflets she said that she and her husband had done it together, and that she and her husband specialised in this task of printing them out because they read and write and so were tasked with that activity.

24.         Asked why she and her husband had been given the task of printing out leaflets, the appellant said that they could read and write and are literate. She was then asked about using a computer. She said it was just a typewriter, then after further questioning what she did was basically photocopying; that they got the letters already written and made photocopies of them. She said that they used a photocopier which they had bought with money collected by the group and which they placed in their bedroom where no one could see it. She said that she did not have a laptop (a laptop was shown to her in court) and that it was not a computer. She said that her understanding of the device was that it was only a photocopier and she did not know the name of it.

25.         Asked if she had had her witnesses’ statements read back to her in the appropriate language, she said that she had only had interpreters at court. When asked to comment on the fact that her initial statement (AB, Q8) had been signed by an interpreter, she said she could not recall what had happened and had not paid attention to what had happened.

26.         In re-examination the appellant confirmed that she had signed a statement dated 16 July 2012 but could not recall if it was read to her. Asked about the most recent statement she said she has a problem with concentration, referring to a report from her doctor in the United Kingdom.

27.         We then heard submissions. Ms Isherwood submitted that the appellant was not a credible witness, asking us to note that it was only now that the appellant said that she and her husband distributed leaflets and that whilst she had earlier clearly said they had had a laptop and printer, she now said they had a photocopier which was a significant difference. She submitted that the explanation regarding a lack of interpretation in her witness statements was contradicted by the fact they were signed by an interpreter and that the contradiction goes to the core of the appellant’s claim as there were political activities.

28.         Ms Isherwood submitted also that the appellant had been inconsistent in her evidence about the distribution of leaflets and had given vague and incredible evidence as to the activities of the committee of which she had formed a part. She submitted that weight could not be placed on the documents produced in relation to the appellant’s father nor the medical document. She submitted the account of being able to use a friend’s ID by wearing a veil was inconsistent with the account of having visited the doctor on several occasions.

29.         Ms Isherwood submitted that it was clear the appellant was in fact a Bidoon who had been given a security card. She submitted that no weight could be attached to letters from the Bidoon community in Harrow given the lack of evidence in respect of the authors; there was no evidence of their status and the appellant who confirmed that she had only spoken to one of the people.

30.         Miss Appiah relied on her skeleton argument submitting that the appellant had given consistent evidence throughout her witness statements, interviews and hearing and oral evidence. She submitted that it was plausible that she had difficulties with memory and that it was possible that the appellant did not know the name of the equipment, whether it was a laptop, a computer, or a photocopier, which had been used. The evidence had been consistent that the equipment had been used to produce leaflets in her home. She submitted that there was confusion as to what was meant by the “Bidoon committee”. It was clear that that phrase was used in the country guidance case, NM, to refer to a Government committee; the appellant was clearly referring to a committee formed by the Bidoon themselves.

31.         Miss Appiah submitted that it was entirely plausible that the appellant’s father had, given the history of the Bidoon, worked in the army and that it was possible that the uncle had been in a better position than other members of the family, given the inconsistent way in which people from the same family were treated, as shown by the background evidence. She submitted that there were no real inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence with regards to her husband when she had last seen him and had had contact with him. She submitted it was possible for the appellant to be credible on core aspects of her evidence, yet to be lacking credibility in respect of others, yet still making out the core of her claim. She said that she had nothing to submit with respect to Article 8.

The Background Evidence

32.         The starting point for our consideration of this appeal is the country guidance set out in BA and others (Bedoon–statelessness–risk of persecution) Kuwait CG [2004] UKIAT 00256 which sets out the history of the bidoons and the difficulties they encountered. This is of course subject to the important qualification in NM where it is noted that there are three distinct categories of people in Kuwait:

(1)          citizens with civil ID cards who were entitled to all the benefits that flow from that;

(2)          Bidoon who can hold security cards, also known as “green cards”, people who registered with the Bidoon committee between 1996 and 2000;

(3)          unregistered Bidoons, that is those who are not able to renew their security cards or people who have never obtained security cards.

The rights of each of these groups are different. Many in the second category have to pay for tuition for their children, do not receive free healthcare and are without the legal protection for their right to work. They face increased difficulty in receiving passports.

33.         The third category, cannot obtain passports, are not provided with educational funding and are denied access to Government clinics and hospitals altogether.

34.         As was accepted in the refusal letter the appellant’s account of the circumstances in which her father found himself a “Bidoon” are consistent with the background evidence. We note that in the past a substantial part of the Kuwaiti Army was made up of Bidoon and we note that the situation for the Bidoon began to become more difficult in the mid-1980s and increased significantly after the first Gulf war.

35.         There is little in the appellant’s account or the documents she has produced (with the exception of the medical records and the education records) which is inconsistent with her being an unregistered Bidoon. That said, the documents are also consistent with her being a registered Bidoon.

36.         In assessing the appellant’s evidence we bear in mind the fact that the appellant was referred by her GP for specialist help with her psychological difficulties. She had, according to the letter of 26 March 2013 presented with symptoms of obsessive compulsive disorder and trichollomania which results in stress and anxiety due to the frequent compulsions and obsessions. It is noted that her depression anxiety is currently in the severe range and that she had attended five high intensity psychological therapy sessions. This is not, however any comment on her ability to recall nor does the letter indicate any memory problems. The brief medical report from Kuwait (RB, page L2) again refers to her suffering from OCD and the appellant’s physical activity being impaired. There is no mention of any effect on her memory.

37.         These reports make no comments on the appellant’s ability to recall or on her cognitive abilities. It is not possible, in the absence of expert evidence, to infer from the diagnoses made that the appellant’s memory is affected. The reports therefore do not confirm that assertion from the appellant.

38.         The appellant’s case is that she and her father were politically active within the “Bidoon committee.” We accept Miss Appiah’s submission that this evidence could not relate to the committee referred to in NM or the Human Rights Watch Report which is clearly a Government body and must be, if we accept the appellant’s testimony, a reference to some other committee set up by Bidoons themselves.

39.         At paragraph 15 of her witness statement of 31 August 13 the appellant says:

“I confirm both my father and I were involved members of the Bidoon committee in Kuwait but neither of us was ever issued with a security card. I have not heard of a security card before and I do not know anyone that has ever been issued with one.”

40.         Her involvement with this committee is not mentioned in her initial statement dated 16 July 2012 (RB, Appendix Q). There is no direct mention of this activity in the appellant’s interview although she was asked why she did not attend demonstrations or gatherings (Q207) that is not the same as being involved with the committee.

41.         That there is a distinction to be drawn between the “Bidoon committee” run by the Government and a committee set up by Bidoons themselves, this is not an adequate explanation of the appellant stating quite clearly that she is oblivious of any such committee yet she had mentioned this in her witness statement. Further, when asked about the activities she was unable to explain what she did or what her father did. We find that her evidence was vague and that evidence which she did volunteer, that she produced leaflets and talked to people about the rights of Bidoons, is in contrast to her evidence elsewhere as to the limits on her activities, such as attending gatherings, out of fear.

42.         The appellant’s claim that she had to leave Kuwait due to adverse interest from the state, arises from the involvement of her and her husband in the production of leaflets promoting Bidoon rights which came to the attention of the Authorities. In her initial statement (RB, Q5) she states:

24. Around March 2011 my husband and his friends together purchased laptop and printer which was kept at our home and it was agreed that he would print leaflets and they would distribute them. These leaflets were calling for Bidoon rights. It was at the same time that the Bidoon uprsing was taking place in Kuwait. My husband started to print leaflets that called for Bidoon rights.

25. My husband asked me to deliver these leaflets in separate boxes to his friends who would distribute these leaflets amongst people to encourage people to rise up against the regime’s treatment of Bidoons. Each box contained about 250 leaflets.

26. The reason that my husband was asked to print these leaflets was that because he knows how to use a computer and also as we live above my parents’ house our place is less suspicious to the Authorities.

27. At the end of April 2012 three men who were wearing plain clothes came into my flat … [T]hey found some boxes of leaflets which were hidden in our bedroom. The printer and the laptop were also in our bedroom and they found this.

43.         In her interview the appellant was asked about the type of printer. She said “small one. Square type. It was put next to laptop, size of a microwave.” (Q196). The appellant was also asked (Q202) where we used to distribute the leaflets, she said “I distribute in nearby areas to our friends and neighbours who are Bidoons in area.” She later said (Q209) “I did not distribute the leaflets myself I give them to a man and he would distribute them. My job is to take them out of home and give them to man to distribute.” This is however after she had been asked why she would take the risk of doing this (Q208). When questioned about this discrepancy she said that (Q210) that she would give them to one person to distribute, then to another.

44.         In her response to the adverse inferences drawn from this, the appellant states in her witness statement that it was for her to distribute the leaflets in bulk [20] and that she had not distributed them to people [21].

45.         The evidence as to how the leaflets were produced is wholly inconsistent. The appellant, when questioned, first said that she and her husband were tasked with this because they could read and write. She has also said that it was because her husband could use a computer, yet it emerged in oral evidence before us that all they did was photocopy leaflets. This is in direct contrast to her witness statement as set out above. She now denies that they had a computer or a laptop.

46.         We do not accept that this was due to any confusion or lack of memory problems and we do not accept her explanation for the inconsistency in her account of how she distributed the leaflets. What is noticeable about the appellant’s evidence, and indeed quite remarkable, is that she simply changes her evidence when confronted with a difficulty or inconsistency. This is a thread which runs throughout her testimony and serves significantly to undermine her personal credibility. The strong impression we have formed is that the appellant will simply say anything that suits her purpose.

47.         A further example of this is the appellant initially stating, when questioned, that her statements had not been translated to her. When confronted with the signature of the interpreter she changed her evidence to saying that she could not explain and could not recall. This is in significant contrast to her most recent witness statement of March 2014 in which she expressly states that all her witness statements have been read back to her.

48.         The evidence of the appellant’s ability to access medical care for herself is difficult to assess, given that the documents supplied (RB, H to M) are not properly translated nor, for that matter, are translations provided for all of these documents (with the exception of the drug prescription sheet). This document is of limited value given that it is in the name of Tahani Mubarak, whose identity the appellant says she used to obtain medication. We have of course only the appellant’s word for that. To accept it, we would have to discount what is said on the face of the document. While the ID cards of the friends are provided, we are nonetheless dependent on the appellant’s testimony

49.         The same observations apply in respect of the medical records in the name of Fahdah Fahad Munawer. (I1 to I6). These documents relate to the period 18 May 2011 and 19 May 11. The document at I7 is described as an appointment ticket with an ID card said to have been given to her by a receptionist to permit her to see a doctor but the chemist declined to issue the documents as she did not have an ID card. This is of course consistent with the evidence referred to in NM at [43]-[44] that whilst medical insurance is available to documented Bidoon, albeit upon payment of a premium, this does not include access to medication.

50.         Similar observations apply to the documents produced in respect of the children. Again a doctor appears to have seen them but the phrase, no medication Bidoon, is stamped on them. The documents at J1, K, L and M are not translated. These appear to have been amended in manuscript to say a Civil ID was not available or in the case of K, “rejected stateless.” This is written in English on K3 and K4, but why that language should have been used on a document for use in Kuwait is unclear.

51.         While there is no translation of K1 the civil ID number given in the form is different from that at J, T00761203004 as opposed to T00761203005 but it is not possible to discern the name of the patient in J; the name given for the patient in the forms at K is in Arabic. We note also that the document at K5 bears the civil ID number ending 003. There is no civil ID number o n the report which appears at Appendix L or at Appendix M. Given the absence of proper translations difficult to attach any weight to these documents.

52.         In her initial statement (Appendix Q) the appellant states at paragraph 18 that she was able to see a doctor on 10 June 2012 when he prescribed medication but she was refused at the chemist because she has no ID card.

53.         In her interview the appellant was asked at length about her medical treatment, explaining that she had used the ID cards of two friends to obtain medication.

54.         In turning to the other documents adduced in support of the appellant’s claim, we have concerns regarding the reliability of the driving licence produced in respect of the appellant’s father, given that it states its date of issue is several years before the date from which it is valid. While it may be that “date of issue” refers back to when the licence was first issued, there is no evidence to support that submission, only conjecture, and we are not persuaded that it is reliable. The licence is, in any event, of little evidential value in assessing whether the appellant is an undocumented Bidoon; while it is capable of showing her father was in the army, that is not substantially challenged nor is that fact indicative that she is a undocumented Bidoon.

55.         The appellant has produced (AB, 43 to 44) what purports to be a notice requring the appellant to attend before an investigation officer on 22 January 2013. That notice has a section which set out the purpose of attendance and reads “to hear your statement as a witness/an accused/an accused case number”. This indicates that it is a standard notice which can be adapted to show the reason the individual is required to attend. That has not been done here; there is no indication from this document that the appellant has been accused of any particular crime and given that the section headed “witness” has not been struck out. This document is consistent with her being asked to attend as a witness.

56.         We considered that it is difficult to attach much weight to the letter from the appellant’s uncle who, on his evidence, migrated to Australia in 1997. His statement discloses the difficulties that the Bidoon face but says nothing specific about the appellant; in any event there is no indication he was in Kuwait during the period the appellant says she was arrested and detained. While he does refer to having obtained a passport, as Miss Appiah submitted, given the arbitrary way in which citizenship has been given or withheld and the manner in which some people have been able to get security cards or not, this is of little evidential weight in assessing whether or not the applicant was a documented Bidoon.

57.         We attach little weight to the letter from the Harrow Kuwaiti Community Association while the author confirms the appellant was able to confirm familiarity with where she had lived, it does not necessarily follow from this that she is Bidoon nor is it stated that she is an undocumented Bidoon nor that she has no security card. The “witness statements” attached to it do not merit that title; they are pre-printed forms and provide no details about either witness or how they knew that the appellant is an undocumented Bidoon. We have only the appellant’s evidence as to how those who completed the forms knew this to be the case. Whilst we do not discount the possibility of her knowing somebody in the United Kingdom had been known to her family in Kuwait, that has not been confirmed by the individual in question.

58.         Taking all these factors into account and viewing them as a whole, we find that the appellant’s credibility is wholly undermined. For these reasons, and bearing in mind also the decision in Tanveer Ahmed, we attach no weight to the documentary evidence that she has adduced. Whilst we accept that the appellant is from Kuwait; that she is a Bidoon; that she is married; and that she has two children, none of which is in dispute, we are not satisfied that she has been involved in any political activity on behalf of the Bidoon people nor that her husband has been involved in such activity. We do not accept that either of them were involved in the production and distribution of leaflets. We do not accept that the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and accordingly we do not accept her assertion that neither she nor her husband were issued with security cards. Moreover, we consider that the fact that she was able, apparently, to obtain medical treatment and that her children were able to obtain medical treatment but were refused medication is consistent with that.

59.         In the light of these findings of fact we are not satisfied that the appellant is at risk on return to Kuwait of ill-treatment of sufficient severity to engage either the Refugee Convention or Articles 2 or 3 of the Human Rights Convention.

60.         Whilst Miss Appiah did not formally concede the appeal in respect of Article 8, we are not satisfied on the basis of the evidence before us that the appellant fulfils the requirements of paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules. Further, we are not satisfied that she has established a family life here and her private life is of minimal content given the short time she has spent in this country which she entered unlawfully. Given the limited content of her private life we are not satisfied that her removal to Kuwait, the country where she has lived for the greater part of her life and where she has family, including parents, a husband and children, that the interference caused by her removal is sufficient to engage Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention.

61.         For these reasons, we remake the appeal by dismissing it on all grounds.

Summary of Conclusions

(1) The determination of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error of law. It is set aside.

(2)          We remake the decision by refusing the appeal on all grounds.

(3)          We maintain the anonymity direction made by the First-tier Tribunal

 

Direction Regarding Anonymity – Rule 45(4)(i) of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Procedure) Rules 2005

 

Unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify her or any member of her family. This direction applies both to the appellant and to the respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

 

 

Signed Date

 

 

Upper Tribunal Judge Rintoul