BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
 |
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | |
United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
||
|
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Taylor & Ors v Secretary Of State For Employment [1991] UKEAT 165_91_1110 (11 October 1991) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1991/165_91_1110.html Cite as: [1991] UKEAT 165_91_1110 |
||
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
At the Tribunal
Before
SIR DAVID CROOM-JOHNSON DSC VRD PC
MR J P M BELL CBE
MR J D DALY
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellants Mr A J Lawrie
(Colleague)
SIR DAVID CROOM-JOHNSON: We have come to what I will describe as a "temporary" conclusion upon this matter. It is an appeal argued by Mr Lawrie on behalf of three Applicants Mr Taylor, Mr Adams and Mrs Courtney who were requiring a declaration from The Secretary of State for Employment, that he was liable to pay a total sum of about £3,000 to the three Applicants under the terms of Section 122 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978. The £3,000 is money owed to the three Applicants apparently by their former employer Earl Engineering Limited. Whether they can turn round to the Secretary of State and say that he is obliged to pay the money instead, out of what used to be called the Redundancy Fund, depends upon whether Earl Engineering Limited are insolvent within the meaning of Section 127 of the same act which defines "Insolvency" for the purposes of Section 122.
When the applications came on originally there was a preliminary point taken that there was the question of insolvency had to be decided in order to see whether there was any liability by the Secretary of State. On 3 October 1990, the Industrial Tribunal adjourned the hearing because matters had indicated that there might be evidence which meant that Earl Engineering Limited were insolvent. After that adjournment the applications were restored and were heard by the Industrial Tribunal on 7 February 1991 and the Industrial Tribunal on that occasion, came to the conclusion that the requirements of Section 127(1)(c) did not apply, that Earl Engineering were not insolvent within the meaning of that section and that accordingly the Secretary of State for Employment was under no obligation to pay the money to the Applicants. It was against that decision that the three Applicants appealed to this Tribunal.
The facts have been fully set out in the decision of the Industrial Tribunal given on 7 February 1991. Mr Lawrie, on behalf of the Applicants, had taken really two points. The first is that the Industrial Tribunal misdirected itself upon the position of the Sheriff when he executed on a writ of fi. fa. for a Judgement of about £77,000 obtained by Barclays Bank against Earl Engineering Limited. Secondly, he also has taken the point that the Industrial Tribunal did not properly interpret or construe the meaning of Section 127(1)(c). He has advanced arguments which we have listened to with interest and respect. What we have not had, on a point of what is really a point of law, is any argument on the proper interpretation of that section on behalf of the Secretary of State. He has not attended in any way at this Hearing and we have had no argument at all. This Tribunal without saying anything more upon its views on the matter, thinks that this is a case where the interpretation of Section 127 does require argument on behalf of the Secretary of State.
We are giving no indications of our views or what may be the ultimate outcome of the hearing but the only way in which we can require the Secretary of State to come and justify his decision that the employers, Earl Engineering Limited, were not insolvent, is by arguing before the Tribunal in reply to what it is that Mr Lawrie has advanced for the Applicants. This means that as a matter of procedure, not because of any decision on the merits of Mr Lawrie's arguments, that what we should do now is to direct there should be a full hearing of the Applicants' case and so that the Secretary of State may have the opportunity of coming here and saying why the decision of the Industrial Tribunal is right. Mr Lawrie says it is wrong. We are coming to no conclusion about it one way or the other and for that reason, and that reason only, we are going to direct there should be a full hearing of the Applicants' cases. Is that clear Mr Lawrie? Thank you very much.
