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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Cainhoe Wood Leisure Ltd (t/a Beadlow Manor) v Higgins [1991] UKEAT 318_90_0612 (6 December 1991) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1991/318_90_0612.html Cite as: [1991] UKEAT 318_90_0612, [1991] UKEAT 318_90_612 |
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE KNOX
MR T S BATHO
MRS M L BOYLE
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellants No appearance by or
on behalf of the Appellants
MR JUSTICE KNOX: This is an Appeal by way of Preliminary Hearing in a matter which before the Industrial Tribunal was decided at Bedford on 10 April 1990, the decision being sent to the parties on 30 April, when the Tribunal decided unanimously that there had been a breach of the Wages Act 1986 and ordered the Respondents to pay to the applicant a sum of £1,036.
The Respondent before the Industrial Tribunal is the Appellant in this Tribunal. It is a limited company called Cainhoe Wood Leisure Ltd. It failed to appear before the Industrial Tribunal. It also failed to appear before us. What the Industrial Tribunal said about that failure was this:
"By reason of the respondents' failure to appear before us today, we caused enquiries to be made by telephone and waited before commencing the hearing. The respondents did not appear and gave no explanation for their absence."
and the Industrial Tribunal went on to hear and accept the evidence of the applicant before them, a Mr Alfred Anthony Higgins, and made the award that I have mentioned.
The Notice of Appeal that is before this Tribunal consists of a letter and an annexe to it both dated 7 June 1990. The letter reads:
"With reference to the above case we wish to appeal against the decision taken by the Industrial Tribunal in Bedford on the grounds that I was unable to attend the hearing as I have informed the tribunal that I will be in court that day, therefore the hearing took place without any representation. Therefore only one side heard, and also the amounts being claimed are incorrect, copies of relevant data enclosed supporting this statement.
Furthermore that we have a counter claim against Mr Higgins for shortages of stocks plus cash money taken of which we have proof to that matter."
That somewhat illiterate communication comes to us as the basis for the Appeal. It clearly is without any sort of foundation. The proper procedure where one party is absent from the Tribunal and wishes to have the matter reconsidered in its presence is to ask for a review. There is provision for this in the Industrial Tribunal's (Rules of Procedure) Regulations under Rule 10:
"A tribunal is given power to review and to revoke or vary by certificate under the chairman's hand any decision on the grounds that (inter alia) a party did not receive notice of the proceedings leading to the decision; or the decision was made in the absence of a party or person entitled to be heard."
That is what should have happened if the Appellant before us, the limited company, wished to have the matter looked at afresh. This Tribunal only has jurisdiction under Section 136 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 to determine issues of law that arise from decisions of the Industrial Tribunal. There is no discernible question of law involved at all here. The issues that are raised by the document that we treat as a Notice of Appeal, are entirely factual and we are quite unable to discern any question of law. That means that this Tribunal has no jurisdiction. There is in fact a remedy or was available to the Appellant, and in those circumstances this Appeal will be dismissed.
Just as the Industrial Tribunal was careful to say that its decision did not decide the questions that may perhaps be still in issue between the parties with regard to stock discrepancies, so our decision has no effect on that at all. All we do is dismiss the Appeal as misconceived.