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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Castle Inns Ltd v Kerchey [1993] UKEAT 664_92_0102 (1 February 1993) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1993/664_92_0102.html Cite as: [1993] UKEAT 664_92_0102, [1993] UKEAT 664_92_102 |
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I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MISS J W COLLERTON
MRS T MARSLAND
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellants MR S A KHAN
Director
2 Oakfield Road
Newport
Gwent
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): Mr Khan who is, we think, a Director, shareholder, in Castle Inns Limited, appeals by a Notice of Appeal dated 3rd July 1992 and that Notice of Appeal in the form of a letter, which might have been rejected because it does not, in any way, follow the prescribed form for a Notice of Appeal but nevertheless, it says:
"I wish to appeal the review decision as advised. The grounds are:
1)That relevant factors have been ignored.
2)Irrelevant factors have been taken into account.
3)The interest of justice requires a proper review.
4)The learned Tribunal did not give me an opportunity to hear my case for review."
The proceedings have a long history. The Originating Application is dated 10th May 1991. In it, the Applicant, who is variously called Miss Kerchey, or under her married name, Mrs Green, alleged unfair dismissal by the Respondents. One of the issues was whether she had continuity of employment because the present Company is not the same company as that which employed her originally.
There was a Notice of Appearance of the 14th June 1991. There were a number of issues that were raised in the proceedings. The first issue, as we have already indicated, was the question of continuity of employment, for the purposes of jurisdiction. Although we do not have it before us there is clear reference in the last paragraph, paragraph 11, of what has been called "the main decision", namely, a hearing of the 6th February 1992, the Reasons being promulgated on the 11th February 1992, reference to a earlier hearing of the 18th November 1991. At that hearing, as referred to in paragraph 1 of the main hearing, there had been a ruling that Mrs Green had continuity of employment throughout in the same business without a break. The main hearing was on 6th February 1992. At which hearing it was decided that Mrs Green had been unfairly dismissed. She was entitled to a basic award of £186. A compensatory award of £2,582.70. The respondent Company was ordered to pay £235 on account of costs, and that is explained in paragraph 11 to which we have already referred as being the costs of the earlier hearing, because it was thought that there had been unreasonable conduct on the part of the Respondents, and indeed the word "frivolous" was also used.
An application was made by the Applicant's Solicitors for a review. The application was made on the basis that the Respondent to the proceedings should be Mr Khan in person and not the Company. On this occasion Mr Khan appeared and the Tribunal decided in his favour and decided that the earlier decisions should stand. It is against that decision, in which he was successful, that Mr Khan appeals. That would not seem particularly understandable, but there was a letter of the 4th May 1992 in which Mr Khan had sought a review of the main decision of the 6th February 1992. Mr Khan, on behalf of the Respondents, appealed against the main hearing by a Notice of Appeal of the 20th June 1992. That was out of time and the extension of time was refused by an Order of the learned Registrar of this Court on the 6th August 1992. By that time the present Notice of Appeal had of course been served.
The position, therefore, seems to be this, that we seek to examine the review decision of the 5th May, promulgated on the 26th May, to see whether there is any discernible error of law in the decision of the Tribunal. This is a preliminary hearing and it is only if we can discern an error of law that this matter would go to a full hearing. We can discern no such error of law, but as we have already said, it was decision in favour of the Respondents, indeed Mr Khan was not made personally liable, therefore, it is a little difficult to see quite what his interest is in upsetting that decision.
We can find no reason to send the matter forward and the decision on his Notice of Appeal against that review decision must, inevitably, be dismissed.
That leaves us with his letter of the 4th May seeking a review against the first main decision. That was out of time but it has not apparently been dealt with. Whether Mr Khan goes back to the Tribunal and asks for an answer is a matter entirely for him but in any event the application was well out of time and so far as the main decision is concerned his Notice of Appeal against that is also out of time. Looking at that main decision we feel it is right to accept what was an implied invitation of Mr Khan to examine it and without having heard full argument it seems to us that there is no very obvious error of law in the decision of the 6th February. The points which Mr Khan takes, concern the length of employment and continuity, in so far as it is suggested that the Applicant was under-aged and therefore any contract of employment in licensed premises was illegal, that point does not seem, on the documents, to have been taken at any stage, certainly not in the Notice of Appearance. So far as continuity and length of employment is concerned those points were decided against him in the decision of the 18th November 1991, which he did not attend, and it seems to us quite hopeless to appeal on those points. It follows therefore that this appeal must be dismissed.
