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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Morgan-Owen v London Guildhall University & Ors [1994] UKEAT 850_94_1412 (14 December 1994) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/850_94_1412.html Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 850_94_1412 |
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MR J C RAMSAY
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant (NO APPEARANCE BY OR
ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT)
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is the Preliminary Hearing of an Appeal by Mr Richard Morgan-Owen who was a senior lecturer in law at the London Guildhall University.
His appeal is in proceedings brought against London Guildhall University and other Respondents for what is described in the Originating Application as dismissal and "gross systematic and sustained victimization".
The Industrial Tribunal made an Order on a pre-hearing review, which is the subject of this Appeal. That hearing took place at London (south) on the 13th June 1994. As appears from the decision entered on the register, copies of which were sent to the parties on the 30th June 1994, the Tribunal unanimously decided that there was no reasonable prospect of
Mr Morgan-Owen's application succeeding against any of the named Respondents.
He was required to make a deposit of £150 if he wished to pursue the application against any one or more of the named Respondents. The Tribunal stated in a further paragraph:
"1. In the absence of a reasonable prospect of success the Applicant being able to establish a constructive dismissal, no other issue arises for consideration in respect of the claim against the first Respondent. The remaining Respondents are not the Applicant's employers and no claim for unfair dismissal can lie against them."
Mr Morgan-Owen appealed against that Decision by letter dated 7th August 1994. He was notified on the 25th November 1994 that his Appeal would be in the list for a Preliminary Hearing at this Tribunal, not before 11.30 a.m. to day. He was told the estimated duration of the hearing would be one hour and he was required to notify the Registrar of any matters which might effect the length of the hearing.
On the 29th November, Mr Morgan-Owen wrote to the Tribunal saying:
"As requested on several occasions, I want my application and appeal on my Originating Summons adjourned sine die so as to enable me to pursue claims for, inter alia, libel, personal injury (and repeated for removal of doubt).
Please confirm adjournment sine die immediately.
See reverse of my present letter".
He was informed by a letter of the 2nd December 1994 that his letter had been shown to the Registrar who had directed that he must make his application for an adjournment to the full Tribunal on Wednesday 14th December 1994. The letter stated:
"The case remains in the list for hearing as per our previous notification."
During the course of this morning's business, the Tribunal ran behind time because, as often happens, one of the cases over-ran the estimated time. Although Mr Morgan-Owen's case was listed "not before 11.30", it was hoped to reach it soon after, but that was not possible. The position at 1 o clock, when the Tribunal adjourned, was that his case had not been reached.
What then happened, according to information provided to us by staff of the Tribunal, was that Mr Morgan left the building at about 1.15, saying that he had a pressing engagement and something more important to go to, and that he would not be coming back. He made no application to the Tribunal, either at 1 o clock or on the resumption of business at 2 o clock, for an adjournment.
When his case was reached at 3.15. inquiries were made as to whether he had returned to the building. But he had not. We have therefore proceeded to deal with the case in his absence. We note that he was well aware from the letter of the 2nd December that, if he wished to have an adjournment of today's hearing, he had to make that application to the Full Tribunal. We emphasise that he has made no such application today.
We could, in the circumstances, dismiss the appeal, simply on the basis that he had failed to attend and had failed to make an adjournment application. We feel, however, we should say a little more because we have read the papers and we have formed the view that his appeal raises no arguable point of law.
The case is set out in the numerous originating applications presented against the thirteen Respondents. What he says is that he was a senior lecturer in law, employed at the London Guildhall University from the 1st September 1969 until the
28th February 1994. He alleges actual/constructive unfair/unjustified dismissal and interference with his future employment prospects. He excludes from that what he describes as ancillary matters which impinge on the present application. Those are identified as issues of false imprisonment, harassment, intimidation, libel etc., all of which will be pursued in the High Court. He complains of victimization generally.
We then come to the facts on which he bases his serious allegations. He says on the 12th February 1993, without prior warning, the second respondent Professor Floud, by letter suspended him from all duties from 1700 hours on that date, and excluded him from all buildings at London Guildhall University, except Moorgate. He could only enter for limited purposes with the permission of either the 6th respondent or the 7th respondent.
He said that initially the second respondent, Professor Floud vaguely referred to concern about his health [that the Applicant's health] in a letter from the third respondent when he mentioned aspects of behaviour. He goes on to set out, in greater detail, particulars of his complaints against the University and against the individual respondents. It is not necessary to repeat those for the purposes of deciding this Appeal.
The Respondents answer in the Notice of Appearance was similar in each case. They denied that Mr Morgan-Owen was dismissed. They set out various grounds in which the claim is disputed. As regards the second to thirteenth respondents, a case quite simply is that none of them, individually or collectively, was Mr Morgan-Owen's employer for the purposes of the 1978 Act and therefore he can have no claim against them.
As regards to the claim against the University, the details were then set out in which a lengthy account is given of the perceived health problems of Mr Morgan-Owen. It is not necessary to repeat those. It is sufficient to say that the case of the Respondent University is that, on the 14th October 1993, a letter was written to Mr Morgan-Owen on behalf of the University offering him voluntary premature retirement from the 1st March 1994. On the 24th October 1993, Mr Morgan-Owen replied that he would accept voluntary premature retirement on a "without prejudice" basis.
The terms of that are set out in a letter of the 2nd November to Mr Morgan-Owen. It is the University's case that Mr Morgan-Owen cannot bring a case for Unfair Dismissal because he was not dismissed. He left his employment of his own volition by acceptance of the terms set out in a letter of the 2nd November 1993 with effect from 1st March 1994.
They contend that the case brought by him is frivolous and/or vexatious. it was for that reason that an Application was made by the solicitors acting for the University for a pre-hearing review. The pre-hearing review was held and the decision, which is under appeal, was reached.
We have looked at the documents in the Employment Appeal Tribunal bundle and we have looked at the letter of the 7th August 1994 which purports to set out grounds of law on which Mr Morgan-Owen wishes to appeal. We are unable to see from any of the papers, let alone his letter of appeal, any legal ground on which he can appeal the Decision.
It is to be remembered that the Decision which he seeks to appeal is simply an order that he makes a deposit of £150 if he wishes to pursue the Application. The Tribunal have not actually adjudicated on the merits of the Appeal. They have formed the view, on the material available to them, that there was not a reasonable prospect of it succeeding and for that reason he had to make a deposit if he wanted to go on.
We cannot see any error of law in that decision. If Mr Morgan-Owen wants the matter further investigated by the Tribunal on the merits, he must make that deposit. The Tribunal made no error of law in requiring him to deposit £150. In those circumstances, we dismiss his appeal against the Decision.
