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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Gigi's Restaurant Ltd v Jurio [1995] UKEAT 123_95_0704 (7 April 1995)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/123_95_0704.html
Cite as: [1995] UKEAT 123_95_0704, [1995] UKEAT 123_95_704

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    BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 123_95_0704

    Appeal No. EAT/123/95

    EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

    58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

    At the Tribunal

    On 7 April 1995

    Before

    THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY

    MRS TERESA MARSLAND

    MR T C THOMAS CBE


    GIGI'S RESTAURANT LTD          APPELLANTS

    MR A M SOLA JURIO          RESPONDENT


    Transcript of Proceedings

    JUDGMENT

    PRELIMINARY HEARING

    Revised


     

    APPEARANCES

    For the Appellants Mr C P SMITH

    Messrs Stones Porter

    Solicitor

    26 Farringdon Street

    London EC4 4AQ


     

    MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY: This is an appeal from the decision of an Industrial Tribunal in Manchester on 28 November 1994. The Tribunal found that the Applicant before them, a Mr Jurio, had been unfairly dismissed as a chef from the Respondent, Gigi's Restaurant Ltd. Following on from that finding they went on to deal with compensation, as they were bound to do, and the point that arises is that they made an assessment that it would take the Applicant six months to find alternative employment.

    The Appellant, the Restaurant, now seeks to appeal on the ground that there was an error of law or perversity in the finding relating to the six months. What Mr Smith has urged on us is that the Tribunal went wrong because there was no evidence before them to support the finding of six months.

    We note that there was in the findings a finding that the Applicant had failed to mitigate his loss. That arose out of the fact that he had not sought alternative employment because he wanted reinstatement. So, to that extent, the finding was in favour of the Appellant and they did not, therefore, award the full amount that was being claimed and, as we say, they settled for six months.

    Part of the findings to which our attention is drawn is paragraph 7, the Tribunal says this:

    "We consider that to have been unreasonable and on the basis of our knowledge as an Industrial Tribunal, we consider that if he had sought other work it is likely that he would have found employment after six months. He would by now be in paid employment."

    The position was, so far as we can see, that neither side made any real point of placing evidence before the Tribunal as to the state of the job market or any expert evidence from those involved at Job Centres or otherwise, as to how long it would have taken the Applicant to find his job. The Tribunal, well-versed in these matters, and constituted quite deliberately as they are, so that they have some working knowledge of these affairs, drew on their own knowledge and commonsense and reached their decision. We take the view that that was something they were entitled to do. If parties go before them and whilst probably giving some general evidence, for example, the Applicant clearly told them where he lived and what areas he would be prepared or able to work in, that type of evidence, but do not choose to call expert evidence, there is nothing a Tribunal can do except the best they can, drawing on their own general knowledge of the subject. That we regard as entirely legitimate and part of their function. We were referred by Mr Smith to several cases which make the point that if there is a finding of fact unsupported by any evidence, that is an error of law. We accept that principle but do not feel that that applies to this type of situation.

    Taking the matter on a little bit further, what then happened was that the Respondents sought a review and they sought to place before the Chairman some evidence touching the six months' issue, namely, newspaper advertisements. The lady Chairman received that evidence, clearly considered it and gave her reasons for declining the review. What she said in paragraph 4 of her reasons was that she had examined the job advertisements from the newspapers, she made some intelligent objective comments about them explaining why she felt that, if anything, they supported the six months that the Tribunal had already decided. That paragraph is a perfectly rational analysis of the evidence sought to be placed before a Tribunal at a further hearing and her mode of dealing with it, we find, not open to criticism, so we cannot see any point of law that arises from that, even assuming that that is attacked as well as the basic decision and we certainly cannot say that the finding there or in the original decision is perverse.

    We remind ourselves that there could only be any prospect of success on an appeal at a full hearing if there was identified a point of law or clear perversity. We can see absolutely no prospect of either and this appeal must be dismissed.


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/123_95_0704.html