BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Tasker v British Gas Plc [1996] UKEAT 738_96_0212 (2 December 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/738_96_0212.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 738_96_212, [1996] UKEAT 738_96_0212 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MISS A MACKIE OBE
MR G H WRIGHT MBE
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING - EX PARTE
For the Appellant | MR G E TASKER (Representative) |
JUDGE LEVY QC: Mr G M Tasker was employed by British Gas on a contract of employment which forbade him to use company vehicles or company uniform for social purposes.
On 29th August 1995 Mr Tasker had been drinking after work in two public houses. When doing so he was wearing a British Gas uniform and he drove to and from the pubs in a British Gas van. When stopped by the police that evening he was found to have been approximately over twice the legal limit. He was subsequently prosecuted for driving with excess alcohol. He appeared before the local magistrates court, and was disqualified for driving for a period of 12 months and was additionally fined £500. He was disciplined by British Gas and dismissed.
He made an application to an Industrial Tribunal claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed. His application was heard by an Industrial Tribunal at Bedford on 20th March 1996. The unanimous decision of the tribunal was that his dismissal was not unfair, his application was dismissed. Extended reasons were given and there was an appeal for a review of those extended reasons which was thereafter dismissed.
In seeking to appeal from the decision this morning, Mr Tasker's father has courteously, vigorously and persistently submitted to us that there are reasons of law which should entitle his son's appeal to go forward. We have to reject them.
There are three grounds of appeal put forward. The first is that because the other employees had not been sacked for gross misconduct for drink/driving in similar circumstances, the appellant here should not have been so dismissed. Secondly Mr Tasker suggested that the reasons of the Industrial Tribunal were insufficiently set out, to the extent that other cases had been taken into account. Thirdly, it was submitted that some particulars which had been sought on behalf of his son had not been properly answered by the respondents.
As to the first, we refer to paragraph 3(viii) of the summary reasons and to the judgment of this court in Procter v British Gypsum Limited [1992] IRLR 7 from the decision given by Wood J and his colleagues. It reads:
"Whatever the relevant factors, the overriding principles must be that each case must be considered on its own facts and with freedom to consider mitigating aspects. The dangers of a tariff and of untrue comparability are only too obvious. Not every case of leniency should be considered to be deviation from declared policy."
It seems to us that the tribunal below considered whether the disciplinary procedures of British Gas were correctly and properly applied, and came to the conclusion that they were. The fact that others had been dealt with leniently did not mean, as night follows day, that this employee had to be so dealt with. It was within the bounds of a reasonable employer to treat the appellant as this employer did.
As to the second ground, it seems to us that everything was properly done and properly considered by the Industrial Tribunal which needed to be considered, and both the extended reasons on the decision and the review sufficiently fully set out why the tribunal came to its decision in a way which so that on a fair reading the facts found and the law applicable could be understood. It is not for the Industrial Tribunal to "cross every T and dot every i" in its judgments. The reasons given here are sufficiently detailed.
The third point raised by Mr Tasker was considered by the Industrial Tribunal. It held that there had been sufficient discovery of the manner other employees had been disciplined for the case of the appellant to be properly considered. This was a decision it was entitled, in its discretion, to reach on the facts.
In these circumstances it seems to all of us that there is no point of law to go forward and we must dismiss this appeal at this stage. Finally we would pay tribute to the Industrial Tribunal for the manner in which the reasons for both their decisions were expressed. It made the task of Mr Tasker in attempting to upset the decisions that much more difficult, though as we think he realised as he developed his courteous submissions.