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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Chambers v GEC Marconi Ltd [1996] UKEAT 951_95_2211 (22 November 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1996/951_95_2211.html Cite as: [1996] UKEAT 951_95_2211

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
For the Respondents	MR J BOWERS (of Counsel) Messrs Woodford & Ackroyd Solicitors The Director-General's House Rockstone Place Southampton SO15 2EP


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the decision of the Registrar, who dismissed Mr Chamber's appeal on the grounds that it was lodged out of time: that is that it was lodged here more than 42 days after the decision appealed from.

Mr Chambers was dismissed by Ferranti International PLC when it went into administrative receivership. Parts of the Ferranti business were subsequently purchased by GEC Marconi Ltd. Mr Chambers initially made a complaint of unfair dismissal against Ferranti. On 22nd June 1994 his non-legally qualified representative sought leave to add GEC Marconi to that complaint. On 24th June 1994 that application was refused on the ground that it was not appropriate to join GEC Marconi in the present application. On 6th July 1994 Mr Chamber's representative asked the Industrial Tribunal to review that decision. On 26th July 1994 that application for a review was refused. On 14th August the substantive hearing of the complaint against Ferranti was due to commence. On 22nd and 23rd August 1994 a new IT1 was issued against GEC Marconi amongst others.

Time was then taken whilst the cases were transferred from different regions to Reading, and on 10th February 1995 the Industrial Tribunal ruled that the new Industrial Tribunal proceedings naming GEC Marconi as second respondents had been presented out of time, and time was not extended in his case. That decision was fully reasoned, in extended reasons given for it on 7th April 1995.

Mr Chamber's representative, Mr Farrell, requested a review of that decision, and after a certain amount of administrative blunder, by 10th July 1995 that application for a review was refused.

The Notice of Appeal in this case was lodged on 9th August 1995 against the original decision in 1994 to refuse Mr Chambers leave to amend his then IT1 against Ferranti to add GEC Marconi as a second respondent.

It will be noted that the period between 7th April 1995, when the extended reasons were communicated to the parties, and 9th August 1995 when the Notice of Appeal was lodged, is a period of 124 days.

If a Notice of Appeal had been lodged very promptly after 7th April 1995, I consider that Mr Chambers would have had some prospect of successfully arguing that the delay between the decision appealed against, given in 1994 and then, was or might have been attributable to the way the proceedings had been conducted before, and to remarks made by the Industrial Tribunal Chairman during that period. Specifically it is Mr Chamber's contention that a tribunal Chairman indicated as part of his grounds for refusing leave to allow GEC Marconi to be added as a respondent, that it would be open to Mr Chambers to bring fresh proceedings against them. That was a course of action which was followed in this case, with the result that I have indicated.

But it seems to me that once Mr Chambers and his advisers had become aware that the route of issuing a new IT1 was not open to them on time limit grounds, it became his duty, in my view, to proceed with all due despatch along the other route, namely an appeal against the 1994 decision not to allow the complaint to be amended to add GEC Marconi.

The principles upon which applications for appeals to be lodged here out of time are to be dealt with in accordance our Practice Direction issued on 29th March 1996, and to be taken from the case of United Arab Emirates v Abdelghafar [1995] ICR 65. Those principles have been summarised in that case and there is no dispute between the parties as to them.

A time limit of 42 days is generous. It is not a target to be aimed at, but will normally be strictly observed. Extensions will be granted only in rare and exceptional circumstances. Lack of prejudice to the respondents does not constitute an exceptional circumstance justifying an extension of time. All advisers, by advisers I include lay advisers, are expected to know the law and procedure. An application for assistance to an outside funding body of whatever kind is not sufficient to justify an extension; and discretion will only be exercised in favour of an extension if the appellant provides a full and complete explanation of the reason for non-compliance. In normal circumstances, the merits of the appeal itself is not a factor to be taken into account.

In my judgment, the problem here for Mr Chambers is that he cannot, in my view, put forward a convincing or acceptable explanation for the period of delay of 124 days which I have identified. It seems to me that in the light of the history, immediately after the decision had been given on 7th April 1995 a Notice of Appeal should have been lodged against the 1994 decision. I have of course some sympathy with Mr Chambers himself. He was at all material times during that period in the hands of his advisers, both Mr Farrell, a non-lawyer, and a firm of solicitors who were looking over Mr Farrell's shoulder. It seems to me that as a result of the appeal not being lodged timeously after 7th April 1995, I should not exercise my discretion in favour of extending time.