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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Guthrie v Yare Haulage Ltd [1997] UKEAT 51_97_2504 (25 April 1997) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1997/51_97_2504.html Cite as: [1997] UKEAT 51_97_2504 |
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At the Tribunal | |
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE LINDSAY
MS S R CORBY
MR R H PHIPPS
APPELLANT | |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
For the Appellant | NO APPEARANCE OR REPRESENTATION BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT |
MR JUSTICE LINDSAY: We have before us by way of a Preliminary Hearing the appeal of Mr M W D Guthrie against Yare Haulage Ltd. Mr Guthrie had a claim for constructive/unfair dismissal in his IT1. The Industrial Tribunal on 21 November 1996 held as a unanimous decision that the Applicant was not dismissed by the Respondent employer and the Applicant's claim for unfair dismissal was therefore dismissed.
Mr Guthrie had been the company's transport manager. From April 1996 to June 1996 he was away from work on grounds which were supported by a medical certificate. He then met officers of the company and there was a negotiation. At that time there was a real risk, as it seemed to people at the time, that the company might have to close down by reason of its unprofitability. In those negotiations in June 1996 it emerged that Mr Guthrie had a choice; should he take a sum which the company was offering him to leave its employment or should he refuse that sum, stay on in employment and perhaps, should the company then cease to operate, find himself out of a job and in receipt only of what would be a smaller sum by way of statutory redundancy? The Industrial Tribunal held in paragraph 5 of their Extended Reasons:
"... He chose after due consideration, and if we may say so, very wisely, to take the £8,400.00 and leave his employment with the company. We are satisfied that that was an agreement entered into at arms length between adults. It is stretching credulity to characterise such an agreement as a dismissal."
The Industrial Tribunal added in paragraph 8:
"For the avoidance of doubt where there is conflict, and it is minimal in this case, we prefer the evidence of Mr Harrowing [the Company Secretary] and in particular we accept the accounts of the meetings as being accurate."
Mr Guthrie appeals by way of a letter treated as a Notice of Appeal. We should say that the position is that he is not here today either in person or represented. A message earlier came through to the EAT that his car had broken down. We were invited to put the matter in as last in our list, which we are now doing, but the message also said that if he had not arrived by the time we came to deal with the matter, he, Mr Guthrie, was happy that the matter should be dealt with on the papers, and that is why we are proceeding as we do, in his absence.
In his letter, which is treated generously as a Notice of Appeal, Mr Guthrie says:
"I was unable to conduct my case properly because the co-directors of Yare Haulage did not appear at the court when I was under the impression that they would be there."
Note: Firstly, it is not said that the company misled Mr Guthrie into thinking that the co-directors would either attend the hearing or give evidence at the hearing. Secondly, there is no suggestion in the papers that the Industrial Tribunal had made, or had even been asked to make, an Order under Rule 42(A) for the attendance of any director as a witness.
The letter received on 11 February 1997, which we are treating as a Notice of Appeal, discloses, as it seems to us, no error of law and we have not been able to find an error otherwise of our own motion. This is not a case to go to a full hearing. We accordingly dismiss it.