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	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Aniagwu v London Borough Of Hackney & Anor [1998] UKEAT 116_98_1102 (11 February 1998) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1998/116_98_1102.html Cite as: [1998] UKEAT 116_98_1102

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APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	MR CHIMA UMEZURUIKE (of Counsel) Messrs Andrews Solicitors 92a Rye Lane London SE15 4RZ


 


MR JUSTICE MORISON (PRESIDENT): The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether Mr Aniagwu has an arguable point of law in an appeal which he wishes to raise against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at Stratford on 12th November 1997. By that decision a Chairman sitting alone concluded that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's application and accordingly it should be dismissed. That was an application which had been presented by the complainant against the London Borough of Hackney and a named individual. It was a complaint brought both under the Race Relations Act 1976 and under the Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act 1992.

The Industrial Tribunal looked at the evidence presented to it. It would appear from the facts found by the Industrial Tribunal that a decision was taken in relation to the complainant by his employers which he believed was discriminatory against him, and that that decision occurred on 6th December 1996. He then exercised the rights given to him by his employers to complaint about that decision. The internal appeal was heard and a decision was arrived at by the panel on 20th March and communicated to the applicant on 26th March. Subsequently, the decision was re-written in certain formal respects as at 30th April. As we understand it, the applicant had a further right of appeal which he was exercising. He presented his complaint to the Industrial Tribunal on 26th June 1997.

The appellant wishes to argue firstly, that the finding in paragraph 6 of the tribunal's decision, that time started to run on 20th March 1997, the date of the panel's decision, was wrong in law. The result of that decision was not communicated to the appellant until 26th March on their findings. It is said to be arguable that time cannot start to run at least until the person concerned is aware of a decision of that sort. Secondly, it would be argued that the complainant was acting reasonably by pursuing his remedies within the London Borough of Hackney as he was entitled to do under his contract of employment, and that accordingly, it was perverse of the Industrial Tribunal in the circumstances to have concluded that it was not just and equitable to extend time. There may be a question as to whether the Industrial Tribunal has properly taken into account the relevant factors when considering whether to exercise its discretion, and the case of Mills v Marshall, which has just been handed down; and an earlier decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in the British Coal case may need careful consideration. It seems to us that those points are arguable.

In relation to the language of the 1992 Act which adopts the reasonably practicable provisions to be found in the unfair dismissal legislation, very sensibly Counsel has taken the view that his position is much less strong in relation to that. We agree with him. We consider that the tribunal's decision on that matter was unarguably correct.

Accordingly, the appeal will be confined to the race discrimination aspect of the applicant's complaint. On those matters the appeal will be allowed to go forward. We express no views one way or the other as to the likely outcome.