[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Dickenson v. Security of State for Trade & Industry [2000] UKEAT 229_00_1406 (14 June 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2000/229_00_1406.html Cite as: [2000] UKEAT 229__1406, [2000] UKEAT 229_00_1406

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

APPEARANCES

 

For the Appellant	Appellant neither Present nor Represented


 


JUDGE WILCOX

1. This is an appeal against the decision of the Employment Tribunal held at London (North) on 2 November 1999, the point is in short point. What the Tribunal there had to consider was whether or not the Applicant was in fact by a virtue of the section 230 of the Act an employee is an individual who has entered into or works under or where the employment, has ceased work a contract of employment. Such a contract of employment maybe, either oral, or in writing. Essentially it is a question of fact create Tribunal to decide on all the evidence.
2. What this Tribunal is concerned about today is whether firstly the Tribunal directed itself properly in law. Secondly, if it did was there a sufficiency of facts for it that would support its decision. Thirdly, were there on the face of it there has shown to be a perversity.
3. The Applicant together with her son and husband formed a limited company Marini Ltd in 1985. It was a company which was a retail company selling menswear. The Applicant was Director of the company throughout, held 51% of the shares in the company. His son was the Managing Director. The Applicants duties were consistent with employment to complete all the accounts, the PAYE, Vat returns and undertake the tasks of administration of the business it was a great deal of documentation related to the import of goods requiring forms and returns to complete ……….
4. There was no written contract of employment. There was significantly no written memorandum as set out in Section 318 of the company's act of 1985 giving the task and conditions of any such employment contract. She received a basic salary, she worked 40 hours a week 5 days a week, she was entitled to 6 weeks paid holiday and she worked such hours as the business required. She was entitled to dividends; these were taken twice and paid as the business warranted it. The holding of her shares in as a majority was because, it was explained to the Tribunal she was considered a member of the family to have a steady influence not merely a matter ……….. to control the company.
5. There is of course authority to take into account that even if she did have controlling shares and by no means is a decisive or particularly significant ingredient of the Tribunal's role in adjudicating as to whether she is or isn't an employee. It is a matter that they can consider together with all the other factors in the case. I refer that relation to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Bottrill [1999] IRLR 326. Since this a matter of fact and since it appears to us that the Tribunal properly directed itself as to law, and there is to an extent no perversity of finding, we are driven to the conclusion that we cannot interfere with the Tribunal's decision below. We dismiss this appeal. There is no arguable fact or arguable matters of law or perversity of fact evident. For those reasons therefore we dismiss the appeal.