BAILII is celebrating 24 years of free online access to the law! Would you consider making a contribution?
No donation is too small. If every visitor before 31 December gives just £1, it will have a significant impact on BAILII's ability to continue providing free access to the law.
Thank you very much for your support!
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback] | ||
United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal |
||
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Cretney v. Larmond & Anor [2003] UKEAT 0318_03_2107 (21 July 2003) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2003/0318_03_2107.html Cite as: [2003] UKEAT 318_3_2107, [2003] UKEAT 0318_03_2107 |
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
At the Tribunal | |
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MISS A GALLICO
MR B R GIBBS
APPELLANT | |
SOUTH THAMES COLLEGE |
RESPONDENT |
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
For the Appellant | MR MARK SUTTON (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Pattinson & Brewer Solicitors 71 Kingsway London WC2B 6ST |
For the Respondent | MR SINCLAIR CRAMSIE (of Counsel) Instructed by: Messrs Davenport Lyons Solicitors 1 Old Burlington Street London W1S 3NL |
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
18 "The scheme of the Act is that a rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination arises once a gender based comparison shows that a woman, doing like work or work rated as equivalent or work of equal value to that of a man, is being paid or treated less favourably than the man. The variation between her contract and the man's contract is presumed to be due to the difference of sex. The burden passes to the employer to show that the explanation for the variation is not tainted with sex. In order to discharge this burden the employer must satisfy the Tribunal on several matters. First, that the proffered explanation, or reason, is genuine, and not a sham or pretence. Second, that the less favourable treatment is due to this reason. The factor relied on must be the cause of the disparity. In this regard, and in this sense, the factor must be a 'material' factor, that is, significant and relevant factor. Third, that the reason is not 'the difference of sex'. This phrase is apt to embrace any form of sex discrimination, whether direct or indirect. Fourth, that the factor relied upon is, or, in a case within s.1(2)(c), may be a 'material' difference, that is, a significant and relevant difference, between the woman's case and the man's case."