DECISION
Introduction
1.
This decision concerns penalties imposed by HMRC for late payment of
PAYE. The penalties were imposed under schedule 56 Finance Act 2009 in respect
of late payments of PAYE (and associated National Insurance Contributions) by
the Appellant for the year 2010-11. This was the first year of operation of
the new penalties.
2.
The facts are undisputed in all significant respects. The appeal was
based largely on legal argument about whether the penalty had been validly
imposed in accordance with the legislation, and whether it should be struck
down as disproportionate.
Background facts
3.
The Appellant’s business is steel fabrication. It is not a large
company, turning over £422,557 in its year ended 31 March 2010. Its turnover
increased by some 50% the following year, and it moved back into profit (having
made a loss of some £22,000 in the year to 31 March 2010).
4.
From 6 April 2010, a new penalty regime was introduced by HMRC for late
payment of monthly PAYE and NIC by employers. Previously, it was possible for
employers to delay payments to HMRC of such sums for a period without incurring
any material costs. Under schedule 56 Finance Act 2009, however, this
possibility was removed. Schedule 56 imposes penalties for late payment of PAYE.
The penalties also cover associated Class 1 National Insurance Contributions
(by virtue of Regulation 67A of the Social Security
(Contributions) Regulations 2001 (SI 2001/1004).
5.
The penalties under schedule 56 are structured on a sliding scale. The
more late payments in a tax year, the larger the percentage penalty applied to
the aggregate of the late payments. The first default in any year is
disregarded altogether. The remaining defaults trigger a penalty of 1%, 2%, 3%
or 4% depending on their number. A 4% penalty is payable if there are ten or
more defaults during the tax year.
6.
The Appellant was late in paying its monthly PAYE and NICs to HMRC for
every month in the 2010-11 tax year. The amounts, due dates, actual payment
dates and the penalty amounts charged are set out in the following table:
|
PAYE and NIC Due
|
Due Date
|
Payment Date
|
Days Late
|
Penalty @ 4%
|
|
£6,513.16
|
19.05.2010
|
17.06.2010
|
29
|
0
|
|
£5,219.85
|
19.06.2010
|
21.07.2010
|
32
|
£208.79
|
|
£5,680.32
|
19.07.2010
|
12.08.2010
|
24
|
£227.21
|
|
£7,834.62
|
19.08.2010
|
14.09.2010
|
26
|
£313.38
|
|
£6,297.32
|
19.09.2010
|
06.10.2010
|
17
|
£251.89
|
|
£5,678.23
|
19.10.2010
|
17.11.2010
|
29
|
£227.13
|
|
£7,209.00
|
19.11.2010
|
14.12.2010
|
25
|
£288.36
|
|
£5,759.58
|
19.12.2010
|
15.01.2011
|
27
|
£230.38
|
|
£6,906.69
|
19.01.2011
|
19.02.2011
|
31
|
£276.27
|
|
£5,824.97
|
19.02.2011
|
12.03.2011
|
18
|
£233.00
|
|
£6,273.95
|
19.03.2011
|
02.04.2011
|
14
|
£250.96
|
|
£7,114.79
|
19.04.2011
|
11.05.2011
|
22
|
£284.59
|
|
£76,312.48
|
|
TOTALS
|
|
£2,791.96
|
7.
HMRC assessed a penalty at the 4% rate and notified it to the Appellant
in a letter dated 15 June 2011. That letter in fact contained an error, in
that one of the amounts of late paid PAYE and NIC was overstated by
inadvertently including class 1A National Insurance contributions, which should
not have been included. HMRC have subsequently accepted that the correct
figures are as set out above.
The Appeal
The initial appeal and grounds
8.
The Appellant appealed to HMRC by letter dated 24 June 2011 from its
accountants, Harrison Priddey & Co. HMRC refused to consider the appeal as
they said it did not fall within any of the appeal provisions set out in
schedule 56. This was an unfortunate response, as the Appellant was clearly
appealing against HMRC’s decision that a penalty was payable, which falls four
square within the appeal provisions of the schedule. However, the Appellant
immediately notified its appeal to this Tribunal as well.
9.
In its initial appeal, the Appellant argued that the penalty should be
set aside on the grounds that it was disproportionate to the default involved.
Based on a rough calculation, it estimated that at an interest rate of 7%, HMRC
had lost a little over £400 as a result of its late payments.
10.
In addition to developing the proportionality argument a little more, it
added two further grounds of appeal before the hearing.
11.
First, it submitted that HMRC had wrongfully failed to consider the
exercise of their discretion under paragraph 9 of schedule 56 (headed “Special
Reduction”) before assessing the penalty, which was therefore void.
12.
Second, it submitted that HMRC should have considered the issue of
“reasonable excuse” under paragraph 16 of the schedule in conjunction with the
Appellant before assessing the penalty. Their failure to do so, it was
submitted, meant that they had not followed the correct procedure and the
penalty was accordingly void.
13.
At the hearing itself, Mr Priddey on behalf of the Appellant also argued
that HMRC had not acted fairly in imposing the penalty which it had and the
penalty should therefore be struck down under common law.
The appeal hearing
The applicable legislation
14.
As would be expected, HMRC brought copies of the relevant legislation
with them to the hearing of the appeal (which was listed as a basic case, so
proceeding straight to a hearing without any prior exchange of evidence or any
statement of case from HMRC).
15.
Unfortunately, however, it transpires that the legislation which
they brought with them was not the up to date version. The provisions of
schedule 56 were significantly amended by schedule 11 to the Finance (No 3) Act
2010 and the Finance (No 3) Act 2010, Schedule 11 (Appointed
Day) Order 2011 (SI 2011/132) with effect from 25 January 2011 (which, it will
be noticed, was part of the way through the tax year which is the subject
matter of this appeal).
16.
If the changes made by the Finance (No 3) Act
2010 had been relevant to the issues in this case, this could have been a
crucial point. In fact, the changes made do not affect the issues in this
appeal and it is therefore not necessary for us to decide the point. HMRC’s
oversight is however unfortunate, and raises the question of how a taxpayer is
supposed to remain fully informed of all current legislation when even HMRC
seem unable to do so.
17.
Therefore whilst the change to the legislation
does not affect matters in this case, we would wish to send a clear message to HMRC
and appellants that when they produce copies of legislation for hearings, they
should produce copies showing all amendments which have been made over any
relevant period.
The Appellant’s first submission – failure to exercise
paragraph 9 discretion
18.
Mr Priddey made the following points:
(1)
Paragraph 9 of schedule 56 confers a discretion on HMRC to reduce a
penalty if there are “special circumstances”.
(2)
The wording of paragraph 9 is, in all material respects, identical to
the wording contained in paragraph 11, schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 (relating
to the potential reduction, in “special circumstances”, of penalties for
careless or deliberate inaccuracies in returns).
(3)
As HMRC guidance on schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 makes clear, in cases
where a special reduction is potentially relevant, they should consider it
before reaching a decision on the penalty. He referred to Scofield v HMRC
[2011] UKFTT 199, arguing that HMRC’s failure properly to consider the question
of special reduction before assessing the penalty was a procedural flaw
which rendered the penalty void.
19.
Paragraph 9 of schedule 56 provides:
“(1) If HMRC think it right because of special
circumstances, they may reduce a penalty under any paragraph of this Schedule.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does
not include –
(a) ability to pay, or
(b) the fact that a
potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential
over-payment by another.
(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a
penalty includes a reference to –
(a) staying a penalty, and
(b) agreeing a compromise
in relation to proceedings for a penalty.”
20.
Paragraph 11 of schedule 24 Finance Act 2007 provides:
“(1) If they think it right because of special circumstances,
HMRC may reduce a penalty under paragraph 1 or 2.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) “special circumstances” does
not include –
(a) ability to pay, or
(b) the fact that a
potential loss of revenue from one taxpayer is balanced by a potential
over-payment by another.
(3) In sub-paragraph (1) the reference to reducing a
penalty includes a reference to –
(a) staying a penalty, and
(b) agreeing a compromise
in relation to proceedings for a penalty.”
21.
Mr Priddey is therefore clearly correct in his assertion that, for all
practical purposes, the two provisions are identical.
22.
The guidance that Mr Priddey referred to is contained in HMRC’s
Compliance Handbook Manual, paragraph CH82490, and includes the following
passage:
“Where a person requests a special reduction you should
establish the facts and consider all of the relevant factors before reaching a
decision.”
23.
First, we note that HMRC’s manuals may give an indication of their view
of the law, but they are not always correct, indeed on a number of occasions
they have been found to be wrong. We do not consider the manuals to give an
authoritative guide to the meaning of legislation.
24.
We also note that the above passage begins with the words “Where a
person requests a special reduction...” ie. it does not assume that HMRC are
under any obligation to consider the question of a special reduction unless and
until the taxpayer requests one.
25.
Mr Priddey also pointed us to the notice issued by HMRC on 7 April 2010,
in which they summarised the new PAYE penalty regime for taxpayers. He pointed
out that it made no mention of the possibility of a reduction in a penalty on
account of “special circumstances”. It contains no clue for taxpayers as to
the existence of such a possibility. He said this omission strengthened the
duty on HMRC to exercise that discretion of its own volition.
26.
Mr Priddey did not direct us to anything else in the wording of
paragraph 9 or the context of schedule 56 generally which could be interpreted
as laying down a requirement that HMRC must consider the question of “special
circumstances” as an essential preliminary step before assessing a penalty.
27.
So far as Mr Priddy’s argument based on Scofield is concerned, we
read that case as authority for the proposition that where HMRC are exercising
a statutory discretion, they must consider all the issues that the statute
requires them to consider before they can validly exercise that discretion.
The crucial passage (at [144]) reads:
“The statute requires that the issue of reasonable excuse is
considered before the determination is issued and not afterwards.”
28.
There is a key difference between the Scofield case and this
appeal.
29.
The Scofield case was concerned with a provision which conferred
on HMRC a discretion to withdraw “gross payment” status under the construction
industry scheme. HMRC had purported to withdraw that status from Mr Scofield
on the basis that, if he were applying for gross payment status at the time,
his application would be refused because he had made a late payment of tax; as
a result, he would fail the “compliance test” set out in paragraph 4, schedule
11 Finance Act 2004; and because his application would be refused if he were a
new applicant, they were required to withdraw his gross payment status. What Scofield
said was that as the compliance test itself allowed for a default to be ignored
if there was a reasonable excuse for it, HMRC could not properly have applied
the compliance test without enquiring into the question of reasonable excuse
for that default. By simply issuing an automatically computer-generated notice
cancelling his gross payment status, they had clearly not considered whether
there might be a reasonable excuse for the default and had therefore not
exercised their discretion as the statute required.
30.
The situation under paragraph 9 of schedule 56 is not the same. In Scofield
it was clear that the compliance test could not be properly carried out without
investigating whether there was any reasonable excuse for the default. The
compliance test was a fundamental statutory requirement. HMRC could not do
what they had purported to do (withdraw gross payment status) without forming a
proper view on the compliance test. In the present case, paragraph 9 allows a
penalty to be reduced “if HMRC think it right because of special
circumstances”. There is nothing in the existence of this “power to reduce”
which is, in the same way, fundamental to the arisal of the penalty in the
first place. Indeed, the use of the phrase “they may reduce a penalty” implies
that a perfectly valid penalty may exist before the question of reducing it, by
reason of “special circumstances”, arises. For these reasons, we reject Mr
Priddey’s submissions.
31.
Mr Priddey submitted no further arguments in support of this particular
limb of the appeal, though it is fair to say that some of the arguments he
raised on the second limb of the appeal could apply also to this limb.
32.
We consider those arguments no further here, as they are fully explored
below and our comments on them would apply equally if they were advanced in
relation to this limb.
The Appellant’s second submission – failure to consider
reasonable excuse before imposing penalty
33.
Mr Priddey referred again to Scofield. He argued that, as in
that case, schedule 56 required HMRC to consider the question of potential
reasonable excuse (which would necessarily involve raising the issue with the
Appellant) before assessing the penalty.
34.
His essential point was that paragraph 16 of schedule 56 stated that
liability to a penalty did not “arise” if a reasonable excuse was established.
He referred to the definition of “arise” in the Oxford English Dictionary:
“To spring up, come above ground, into the world, into
existence”
35.
Paragraph 16 of schedule 56, as originally enacted, provided as follows:
“(1) Liability to a penalty under any paragraph of this
Schedule does not arise in relation to a failure to make a payment if P
satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that
there is a reasonable excuse for the failure.
(2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) –
(a) an insufficiency of
funds is not a reasonable excuse unless attributable to events outside P’s
control,
(b) where P relies on any
other person to do anything, that is not a reasonable excuse unless P took
reasonable care to avoid the failure, and
(c) where P had a
reasonable excuse for the failure but the excuse has ceased, P is to be treated
as having continued to have the excuse if the failure is remedied without
unreasonable delay after the excuse ceased.”
36.
As amended with effect from 25 January 2011, sub-paragraph (1) was
amended to read as follows:
“(1) If P satisfies HMRC or (on appeal) the First-tier
Tribunal or Upper Tribunal that there is a reasonable excuse for a failure to
make a payment –
(a) liability to a penalty
under any paragraph of this Schedule does not arise in relation to that
failure; and
(b) the failure does not
count as a default for the purposes of paragraphs 6, 8B, 8C, 8G and 8H.”
37.
He submitted that, given the dictionary meaning of “arise”, the effect
of paragraph 16 was that it was an essential precondition to the imposition of
a penalty that there was no reasonable excuse. Until reasonable excuse had
been considered and discounted, no penalty could “arise”. In procedural terms,
he said, that meant that HMRC must confer first with the taxpayer to consider
the question of reasonable excuse before they could impose a penalty. Any
penalty imposed without doing so must be invalid, he submitted, on the basis of
the reasoning in Scofield.
38.
Mr Priddey noted that the language used in different parts of schedule
56 in relation to the imposition of penalties differed slightly and he sought
to make sense of the differences in order to see if they supported his view of
the significance of the wording in paragraph 16. In particular:
(1)
Paragraph 1 says that a penalty is “payable” in the various
circumstances, but that where the taxpayer’s failure falls under more than one
provision, he is “liable to a penalty” under each provision.
(2)
The various paragraphs which set out the calculations for the penalty
amounts (including paragraph 6, the relevant paragraph in this appeal) all
refer to the taxpayer being “liable to a penalty”.
(3)
Paragraph 11(1) sets out the mechanism for assessment of the penalty.
It starts with the words “Where P is liable for a penalty under any paragraph
of this Schedule HMRC must – (a) assess the penalty.....”
(4)
Paragraph 13 provides for a right of appeal “against a decision of HMRC
that a penalty is payable” or as to “the amount of a penalty payable”
(5)
As already mentioned above, paragraph 16 refers to “liability to a
penalty” not “arising” where there is a reasonable excuse for the relevant
failure.
39.
He thought that the slightly different language used must refer to
slightly different underlying concepts. He sought to make sense of this by
suggesting that “liability to a penalty” (in paragraph 16) was something
which, conceptually, preceded being “liable for a penalty” (as in
paragraph 11). Being “liable to” something, he argued, connoted an element of
jeopardy or potential liability (as in “liable to a risk of a penalty”),
whereas being “liable for” something connoted an actual existing liability (as
in “liable for a debt”). If this was right, then “liability to” a penalty
being imposed would necessarily precede “liability for” that penalty once it
had been imposed. Accordingly, he argued, you could not reach the “liable for
a penalty” stage of paragraph 11 (justifying the assessment of a penalty) until
you had been through the “liability to a penalty arising” stage of paragraph
16. The logical sequence, which was consistent with the wording of each of the
relevant provisions was as follows:
(1)
A late payment having occurred, the taxpayer became “liable to” a
penalty under paragraphs 1 and 6.
(2)
That penalty however cannot “arise” (or mature into an actual penalty)
under paragraph 16 until the question of reasonable excuse had been dealt with.
(3)
Once any reasonable excuse argument has been discounted under paragraph
16, the penalty can “arise” and therefore the previous “liability to” a penalty
matures into the taxpayer becoming “liable for” a penalty for the purposes of
paragraph 11, so that an assessment may (indeed must) then be raised.
(4)
Once the assessment has been raised, the Appellant may appeal under
paragraph 13 against either the decision that a penalty is “payable” or against
the amount of that penalty.
It followed, he said, that any attempt to raise an assessment
under paragraph 11 was premature if HMRC had not previously considered the
position in relation to reasonable excuse under paragraph 16. This supported
his interpretation of paragraph 16 viewed in isolation at [37], he submitted.
40.
With respect to the detailed and subtle submissions made by Mr Priddey,
we cannot agree with them. We consider the schedule has to be interpreted as a
whole in line with its purpose. Unlike the construction industry scheme
provisions considered in Scofield, we do not consider there is anything
in the drafting or general scheme of schedule 56 which requires the question of
reasonable excuse to be considered before any penalty can be assessed. Indeed,
paragraph 16 specifically contemplates the First-tier Tribunal or Upper
Tribunal adjudicating on whether a reasonable excuse exists, and there is no
mechanism set out in the schedule for how either of them might do so without a
penalty having been assessed and appealed; it proceeds, it seems to us, on the
tacit assumption that this Tribunal will be considering the issue of reasonable
excuse in the context of an appeal against a penalty. That seems to us to be a
perfectly sensible approach. If a Tribunal finds that a reasonable excuse
existed, then it will be discovered, as a result of such finding, that the
penalty (or the relevant part of it) never arose. That will result in an
appropriate adjustment to the penalty under paragraph 15. We see no warrant,
in the wording of the schedule, to import a whole extra stage of requiring HMRC
to consider the question of reasonable excuse as a preliminary matter before
assessing a penalty. With respect therefore, we consider that Mr Priddey’s
argument simply places too much weight on the use of the words “to” and “arise”
in paragraph 16, and it cannot be sustained.
41.
We acknowledge however that Mr Priddey’s argument is not entirely without
foundation. We do not agree with it, but if it were in fact correct it would
have major implications for the way HMRC go about assessing penalties under
schedule 56. We imagine that even if the Appellant does not wish to appeal on
the point (and Mr Priddey indicated that this was unlikely, as he was not
expecting to be paid by his client even for his appearance before this
Tribunal), HMRC may wish the matter to be considered at a higher level in order
to put the point beyond doubt, now that it has come up. With this in mind, we
are prepared to confirm at this stage that we would give permission to appeal
against our finding on this point if the Appellant were to apply for it. HMRC
may wish to reach some arrangement with the Appellant as to costs to enable
such an appeal to be made and determined.
The Appellant’s third submission – proportionality
42.
Mr Priddey submitted that we had power to strike down the penalty as
disproportionate on the basis of the reasoning set out in Enersys Holdings
UK Limited v HMRC [2010] UKFTT 20. He asked that we do so.
43.
He sought to persuade us that whilst the circumstances of the
Appellant’s cash flow were not sufficient to amount, on their own, to a
reasonable excuse, they could be borne in mind when considering the question of
proportionality. He pointed out the financial problems the Appellant had
experienced (reflected in its accounts for 2010). By reference to bank
statements, he sought to persuade us that its cash flow was tight and it
managed it as best it could, bearing in mind its reliance for a large part of
its turnover on one key customer. He did not seek (rightly in our view) to
argue that this could form the basis of a reasonable excuse for the defaults
themselves, but he submitted it was relevant when considering proportionality.
44.
He compared the Appellant with a notional taxpayer in a similar position
who “played the system”. He argued that by doing so, it could manipulate
matters by withholding its first payment in the year, then allocating
subsequent payments to current months (rather than running permanently one
month in arrears, as the Appellant had done). With further manipulation of
this nature, Mr Priddey calculated that the notional taxpayer could escape with
penalties of just £72 rather than the £2,791.96 suffered by the Appellant. He
argued that this discrepancy of itself meant that the Appellant’s penalty was
disproportionate, as it penalised the Appellant forty times more than his other
notional taxpayer with exactly the same payment profile.
45.
We do not necessarily accept that the system could be manipulated as Mr
Priddey contends, but in any event when we consider the penalty actually
imposed in this case, we do not consider it to be “plainly unfair” in terms of
the Enersys case.
46.
Mr Priddey also asked us to find that the penalty imposed on this
Appellant was disproportionate bearing in mind that many of his other 700 to
800 clients who had paid PAYE late had not received penalties. We do not
consider that a general unsubstantiated assertion that HMRC are not imposing
penalties even-handedly can found a proportionality argument. In any event,
proportionality is concerned with the proportion between the default and the
penalty, not with that between the taxpayer’s penalty and any other person’s
penalty.
The Appellant’s fourth argument – breach of common law duty of
fairness
47.
Mr Priddey referred to the First-tier Tribunal’s decision in HMD
Response International v HMRC [2011] UKFTT 472, in particular the statement
at [18] that:
“...the appellant is entitled to rely upon the common law
duty of a public body to act fairly not just in its decision-making process but
also in administering its statutory powers.”
48.
Mr Priddey argued that good practice and fair conduct required either
the early issue of penalty notices or, if that was not practicable, the early
issue of reminders or warnings that penalties may be accruing. He pointed out
that the system of schedule 56 allowed for penalties to be issued “in-year”,
but HMRC had simply decided not to do so, setting their computer to issue
penalties automatically in one go at the end of the tax year. As such, he
argued, they had set up a system which was incompatible with the principle set
out in the HMD case and therefore any penalty notice issued in pursuance
of that system was invalid.
49.
We see many differences between the facts of this case and those of the HMD
case. In that case, the Appellant genuinely and honestly believed that it had
complied with its obligations. In fact, the Tribunal found out that HMRC had not
shown that there had been any default, and therefore the comments made by the
Tribunal about fairness are not relevant to its decision. In addition, of
course, decisions of other panels of the First-tier Tribunal are not binding on
us.
50.
We express no view on the comments from HMD which Mr Priddey was
seeking to rely on, but we observe that even if they were correct, we see
nothing in the present case which would justify setting aside the penalty on
the basis of them. The Appellant was very well aware of its obligations and of
the fact that it was defaulting. What it really complains of is that it did
not realise the full implications of its actions, in terms of the new penalties
they would attract. Effectively Mr Priddey was arguing that the Appellant
should be excused from the penalty by reason of its ignorance of the law. It
is a long established principle of English law that this argument is doomed to
fail. In any event, we are satisfied that HMRC did send a letter to the
Appellant on 28 May 2010 after its first default, warning of the possibility of
penalties if there was any further default.
The process followed by HMRC
51.
Whilst it is not strictly necessary in the light of the conclusions we
have reached on the Appellant’s arguments, we feel it appropriate to summarise
the evidence we heard about the process followed by HMRC in imposing these
penalties.
52.
Oral evidence was given by Ms Louise Tarpy, who works in HMRC’s Debt
Management unit (the section of HMRC which administers these penalties). We accept
her account.
53.
Ms Tarpy explained that at the end of the tax year, information about
PAYE defaulters is extracted from HMRC’s system and a spreadsheet is produced
of what she described as “the worst defaulters”.
54.
The individual records of the various employers on that list are then
considered, especially with regard to their payment history, record of
responses to chasing calls from Debt Management, and any “time to pay”
arrangements. They seek to differentiate between employers who appear to be
genuinely trying to pay, and those who do not.
55.
In this case, there had been at least 18 unsuccessful attempts during
the year to speak to the Director at the Appellant to chase up late payments.
On occasion, the response was rude, or there was a straight refusal to pay. On
many other occasions, calls were simply not returned. It may well be that by a
more constructive engagement with HMRC during the year, the Appellant could
have avoided the imposition of penalties at the end of the year. That is the
crucial point that comes out of Ms Tarpy’s evidence, rather than any suggestion
that HMRC have simply issued computerised penalty demands to all defaulters
without any care or consideration.
Additional legal point
56.
In reviewing the papers in detail following the hearing, we have noted
that the last of the defaults involved occurred when the Appellant failed to
pay the NIC that was due no later than 19 April 2011 (slightly strangely, the
April payment consisted entirely of NIC, with no PAYE involved at all). This default
therefore occurred in the tax year 2011-12, not in the tax year 2010-11.
57.
Paragraph 6 of schedule 56 sets out how the amount of the penalty is to
be calculated. That paragraph was amended with effect from 25 January 2011.
Both versions of paragraph 6 provide for the penalty to be calculated by
reference to the defaults occurring during a tax year (both as to the number of
defaults and as to their amount). It is clear that, in both versions of
paragraph 6, a default occurs when the taxpayer fails to pay its PAYE in full
by the due date. The due date for payment of PAYE and NIC is 14 days after the
end of the tax month to which it applies (see Regulation 69 of the Income Tax
(Pay as you Earn) Regulations 2003). No default arises until the 15th
day after the end of the tax month (or the 20th, where electronic
payment is used).
58.
The penalty notice issued by HMRC following their assessment of the
penalty related to the tax year 2010-11. It specifically said so (as it was
required to do by paragraph 11(1)(c) of schedule 56). It includes a penalty
amount in respect of a default which occurred on 20 April 2011, in the
following tax year. This is incorrect.
59.
The first default in any tax year is disregarded for all purposes
(paragraph 6(3), both versions). If the default which occurred on 20 April
2011 is also ignored (as it falls into a different tax year), there were ten
defaults by the Appellant during the tax year 2010-11. That means that the
applicable penalty rate remains at 4%.
60.
However, no penalty can be levied in respect of the late payment of the
NIC due by 19 April 2011. This is for two reasons. First, the penalty notice
is specifically stated to apply to the period of the tax year 2010-11. Second,
the late payment of the NIC due by 19 April 2011 represents the first default
in the 2011-12 tax year and, as such, falls to be disregarded for all purposes
in any event.
Decision
61.
We find that the Appellant did default in making the payments of PAYE
and NIC set out in the table at [6] above.
62.
We hold that the penalty should be calculated at a rate of 4% by
reference to the amounts of those defaults but excluding the default which
occurred when the Appellant failed to pay its NIC due on 19 April 2011 (see [59]).
63.
We find that the penalty is not rendered invalid by HMRC’s failure to
consider whether to make a special reduction under paragraph 9 of schedule 56
before they assessed and notified it (see [30]).
64.
We find that the penalty is not rendered invalid by HMRC’s failure to
consider the question of “reasonable excuse” under paragraph 16 of schedule 56
before they assessed and notified it (see [40]).
65.
We consider that the penalty is not disproportionate (see [44] and [45]).
66.
Even if the principle enunciated in HMD is applicable (about
which we express no view) we find that the penalty in this case would not
offend against it (see [49]).
67.
It follows that the appeal is allowed, to the extent necessary to reduce
the penalty from £2,791.96 to £2,507.37. Subject to that reduction, the
penalty is confirmed.
68.
This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the
decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for
permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure
(First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be
received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to
that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from
the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this
decision notice.
KEVIN POOLE
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 6 DECEMBER 2011
