[2012] UKFTT 97 (TC)
TC01793
Appeal
number: TC/2011/04790
INCOME TAX – Surcharge
on late payment of income tax (Taxes Management Act 1970 s.59C) – Appeal allowed
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX
MR ANTHONY METCALFE Appellant
-
and -
THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
REVENUE
AND CUSTOMS Respondents
TRIBUNAL:
Dr Christopher Staker (Tribunal Judge)
The
Tribunal determined the appeal on 20 January 2012 without a hearing under the
provisions of Rule 26 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax
Chamber) Rules 2009 (default paper cases) having first read the Notice of
Appeal dated 4 June 2011, and HMRC’s Statement of Case dated 22 September 2011,
and other papers in the case.
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2012
DECISION
1. This is an appeal against a default surcharge imposed
pursuant to s.59C of the Taxes Management Act 1970 (the “TMA”) in respect of
the late payment of tax for the 2002/03 tax year.
2. There is something of a history to the case, but it is
unnecessary to delve into that history in detail. The appellant brought an
appeal before this Tribunal in respect of the tax due for the 2002/03 tax year,
which was dismissed by the Tribunal. The hearing before the Tribunal in
relation to that matter was held on 28 September 2010, and the release date of
the determination was 15 October 2010. If the determination was notified to
the Appellant by post, it is to be assumed that he would have received it after
15 October 2010. The Appellant says that in fact he received it on 22 October
2010.
3. The position taken in an HMRC letter to the Appellant
dated 12 April 2011 is that the Appellant was required to make payment within
30 days of the Tribunal’s “determination”, which is stated by HMRC to have been
on 28 September 2010, such that the payment was due on 28 October 2010, and
such that the Appellant became liable to a default surcharge under TMA s.59C 28
days after that due date, namely on 25 November 2010.
4. Section 59C of the TMA provides in relevant part as follows:
(2) Where any of the tax remains unpaid on the day
following the expiry of 28 days from the due date, the taxpayer shall be liable
to a surcharge equal to 5 per cent of the unpaid tax.
...
(12) In this section—
“the due date”, in relation to any tax, means the date on
which the tax becomes due and payable;
“the period of default”, in relation to any tax which
remained unpaid after the due date, means the period beginning with that date
and ending with the day before that on which the tax was paid.
5. According to HMRC, the Appellant requested a time to pay
arrangement on 22 December 2010, which HMRC granted, and the Appellant made
payment in accordance with that agreement on 21 March 2011.
6. The Appellant’s position is as follows. He only received
the Tribunal’s determination on 22 October 2010. If payment was due 28 days
after the date of the Tribunal’s determination, time should run from 22 October
2010. The Appellant says that this would mean that he would not become liable
to a default surcharge until 25 December 2010, which was after the date that he
had entered into a time to pay agreement with HMRC.
7. The HMRC statement of case does set out the statutory
provisions relating to the date on which payment of tax becomes due in cases
where it is required to be paid following a Tribunal appeal. Even assuming
that it is the case that the tax must be paid within 30 days of the Tribunal’s
determination, HMRC does not explain on what basis it contends that time begins
to run in this case from 28 September 2010, which was the date of the hearing
before the Tribunal. There does not appear to be any suggestion that the
Tribunal gave its decision orally on the date of the hearing. Presumably the
first that the Appellant would have known about it was when he received the
written determination. The release date of the determination is 15 October
2010, and the Appellant says he received it on 22 October 2010. The parties do
not address arguments as to whether, as a matter of law, time runs from the
release date or the date of receipt of the decision by the Appellant, or, for
instance, a date of deemed receipt of the decision by the Appellant, or
even the date of expiry of the period in which to seek permission to appeal, in
the event that there is no application for permission to appeal.
8. The only response by HMRC to the Appellant’s argument is
to say in the HMRC statement of case that even if the Appellant did not receive
formal notification of the Tribunal decision until 22 October 2010, receipt of
notification on that date “would still have allowed him ample time to make
payment ... before the surcharge trigger date of 25 November”. However, HMRC
does not address the central question, which is whether 25 November 2010 is in
fact the surcharge trigger date.
9. The Tribunal has considered whether it should invite
further submissions from the parties on this issue. The Tribunal has decided
against this course. The default surcharge is in the sum of only £474.02. The
Appellant has made his position quite plain. The HMRC statement of case has
not directly addressed the Appellant’s argument. The core of the HMRC case is
that time began to run from 28 September 2010, which appears to be plainly
wrong. That was the date of the hearing, not the date of the Tribunal’s
determination. In any event, HMRC gives no explanation why HMRC considers that
to be the correct date from which time starts to run. The Tribunal considers
that in all the circumstances it would be disproportionate to invite further
argument on such matters, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2
of the Tribunal’s Rules. The appropriate course is to allow the appeal.
Conclusion
10. Appeal
allowed.
11. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons
for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to
apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal
Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application
must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is
sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a
Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and
forms part of this decision notice.
DR CHRISTOPHER STAKER
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 31/01/2012