[2013] UKFTT 102 (TC)
TC02520
Appeal number: TC/2011/02617
VAT– Transfer of going
concern – Restaurant premises reverting to Landlord on termination of tenancy –
purchase of assets by the Landlord – was there a transfer of a going concern –
yes – Appeal dismissed.
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
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BRENDA MASSEY
t/a
THE BASEMENT
RESTAURANT
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Appellant
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- and -
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THE
COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY’S
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Respondents
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REVENUE &
CUSTOMS
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TRIBUNAL:
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JUDGE LADY JUDITH MITTING
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Sitting in public in Birmingham on 19 March 2012 and 26 November 2012
Mr Ashwyn Kagdadia, Chartered
Accountant, for the Appellant
Mrs Sylvia Knibbs, Officer of HM
Revenue and Customs, for the Respondents
© CROWN COPYRIGHT
2013
DECISION
1.
Mrs Brenda Massey appeals against the decision of the Commissioners
dated 10 November 2010, and upheld on review dated 1 March 2011, that on or
about 14 June 2009 she had acquired The Basement Restaurant business as a
transfer of a going concern and should thus have been registered for VAT with
effect from that date.
2.
Mr Kagdadia, representing Mrs Massey, did not challenge that if the
Tribunal were to find there had been a transfer of a going concern, then she
would have been correctly registered from that date on the rolling taxable
turnover basis. His contention was that there had been no such transfer of
the business, she having merely accepted the surrender of the lease of the
business premises. This was the issue before the Tribunal.
3.
The case was originally heard on 19 March 2012 when the Commissioners
called no oral evidence and Mr Giles Massey gave evidence on behalf of his
mother, Mrs Brenda Massey, who did not attend. At the conclusion of the day’s
hearing there were so many unknown factors and contradictions in the oral and
documentary evidence that it was quite impossible to determine the facts. The
hearing was therefore adjourned to allow the Commissioners to call Mr James
Piggott, the outgoing tenant, and for Mrs Massey to give oral evidence. On
the resumed hearing, I therefore heard oral evidence from Mr Piggott, Mrs
Massey and also Mr Giles Massey who was recalled.
The Facts
4.
The facts were in part not in dispute but there were fundamental
differences on certain key issues and in respect of those issues I set out the
evidence and make reasoned findings.
5.
No 1 Spencer Street, Leamington Spa is an 1850’s style semi-detached
house in a part residential, part commercial area. Mrs Massey purchased the
property in the late 1980s. Shortly after the purchase she had the basement
converted into an apartment which she rented out and she set up a children’s
nursery on the ground floor, she herself occupying the top floor. The nursery
still continues and is still operated by Mrs Massey and she continues to live on
the top floor. Dates were rather vague but I was told that in the early
1990s, Mrs Massey applied for and obtained consent to convert and operate a licensed
restaurant from the basement. It was immediately named, and still carries the
name, The Basement Restaurant. The restaurant business traded for a number of
years as a successful family run restaurant with a strong regular clientele.
For the first few years of trading, Mr Giles Massey and his brother Simon ran
the restaurant, Simon acting as chef and Giles as front of house. Simon then
at some stage left the business to complete his university degree and Giles
took over as chef, further kitchen and waiting staff being employed on a casual
basis. Giles’ involvement in the business ended in approximately 1999 when he
went abroad. Thereafter Mrs Massey employed a succession of chefs including Mr
James Piggott.
6.
Mr Piggott began working as a chef in the restaurant in 2001 and for the
next five years worked alongside Mrs Massey. In 2006, Mr Piggott thought the
restaurant was looking rather tired and Mrs Massey was in fact talking of
closing it. He felt ready for a new challenge and after discussion and
negotiation with Mrs Massey and Mr Giles Massey, it was agreed that Mr Piggott
would take a lease of the basement from Mrs Massey and he would take over the
operation of the business. With effect from 1 June 2006, Mr Piggott operated
and ran the business as his own. Under the terms of the lease dated 15 June
2006, Mr Piggott took the premises for a term of 10 years with break clauses at
3 and 7 years. He applied to be registered for VAT, his registration being
granted with effect from 1 June 2006. On acquisition, he paid Mrs Massey
£20,000 being made up of £18,000 for goodwill and £2,000 for fixtures and
fittings.
7.
On acquisition, Mr Piggott closed the restaurant for some 8 weeks whilst
he carried out a complete refurbishment. He spent approximately £50,000. He
provided new toilets, a new bar area, a new solid oak floor and a range of new
equipment and furniture including a coffee machine and grinder, a bar fridge,
tables and chairs, fireplace, lighting, cutlery, crockery and glassware.
8.
Mr Piggott ran the restaurant successfully but after a couple of years,
realising his long term future did not lie in the restaurant business, decided
he would take up the three year break clause. How much notice he gave to Mrs
Massey was disputed. The lease provided for three months notice. Mr Piggott
thought that he gave approximately 4 months but Mr Giles Massey in his oral
evidence said that he only gave between one week and 10 days notice. Mrs
Massey could not remember but thought it would have been in the region of two
to three months. In cross examination she stated that she would be happy to
accept, and so I find, that he would have given the three months contractually
required of him.
9.
On Mr Piggott’s leaving the restaurant, the business was taken over, in
circumstances described below, by Mr Giles Massey. An area of dispute between
the parties concerned the date when Mr Piggott ceased trading and the date when
Mr Massey commenced, both being relevant to the length of the period of closure
between the two. Mr Massey had told the Commissioners in a phone call dated 15
July 210 that the business had been closed for between 4 and 6 weeks. In her
first of three witness statements, Mrs Massey put the period of closure at a
“few weeks”. Piecing together the oral and documentary evidence I conclude,
and find as a fact, that Mr Piggott ceased trading on Friday 12 June 2009 and
Mr Giles Massey commenced on 24 June. I take this from Mr Piggott’s oral
evidence and contemporaneous documents. In a letter to the Commissioners
dated 26 June 2009, Mr Piggott advised them that he had “handed over” the
business on 13 June. In his application to cancel his registration, he stated
he ceased to trade on 13 June. His accounts were made up to 12 June 2009 and
this is also the date given in his self assessment tax return. In his oral
evidence he gave his final day’s trading as Friday 12 June ending with a
leaving party that night and handing over the keys the following day, the 13th
. Mr Massey’s first card payments are recorded as 24 June so the
business had to have been operating on or before that date. All this evidence
points to a period of closure from 13 June to 23 June.
10.
During the ten day period of closure, Mr Massey worked enormously hard
drawing up menus, tasting and learning his way round the kitchen again. The
entire family helped out in cleaning up. No new major items of equipment had
to be purchased as Mr Piggott had left everything behind. Mr Piggott had
however completely exhausted the food and drink stocks and there had to be a
complete restocking. Other than this, nothing more needed to be done before Mr
Massey could open for business. From 24 June 2009, Mr Massey has continued to
act as chef and employee of his mother.
11.
The major factual area of disagreement between the parties concerned the
nature of a payment of £5,650, made by Mr Massey to Mr Piggott on his
departure. The sum was made up of £6,000 less £350 being one week’s rent as Mr
Piggott had accidentally cancelled his standing order for the rent one week
prematurely. Mr Piggott told the Tribunal that he owned all the fixtures and
fittings but was not going to need them as he was going travelling. He thought
that they would realise between £6,000 and £8,000 at auction but did not want
the hassle of going through this process. Knowing that Mr Massey was going to
be taking over as chef and that the business would be continuing to run, he
offered the entire fixtures and fittings to Mr Massey for £6,000, an offer, he
told me, Mr Massey accepted and for which Mr Massey compiled an inventory of
everything to be included and left on hand-over. The cheque was handed over on
13 June, the day after Mr Piggott’s cessation.
12.
On the first day of his evidence, Mr Massey had made no reference to the
payment and indeed the fact of it was not known to the Tribunal. When he was
recalled however, he accepted the payment had been made but disputed its
nature. It was, he told the Tribunal, a payment made entirely out of generosity.
It was paid in recognition of Mr Piggott’s services to the restaurant and was
purely and simply a gesture of friendship to someone who had become disillusioned
with the business and could probably do with the money to go travelling. Mr
Massey was adamant that it did not represent a payment for fixtures and
fittings. He did accept that Mr Piggott had requested the payment but he had,
he said, no recollection of the conversation so could not remember whether Mr
Piggott had told him why he wanted the money or indeed whether he, Mr Massey,
had asked him why. Equally he could not remember what his reaction had been to
the request and he had no recollection of having drawn up an inventory. He
accepted in cross examination that when he took over from Mr Piggott, he did
not need to purchase any equipment and that he merely took over the use of all
the fixtures and fittings left behind by Mr Piggott.
13.
Mrs Brenda Massey had not been a party to the discussions over the
payment and the first she knew of it, she told the Tribunal, was when Giles
came to her and told her Mr Piggott wanted £6,000. She could not recollect
whether she had asked Giles why Mr Piggott had wanted it. She had been very
much against making him any payment. However various friends advised her that
she should make the payment, and accepting their advice, she agreed to it as
recognition for the fact that he had spent a lot of his own money on the
premises in the past. She described the payment as a gesture of friendship and
goodwill. She stated categorically that it did not represent a purchase of
fixtures, fittings nor indeed anything else.
14.
The payment was made out of the business current account held in the
joint names of Mr & Mrs Massey. This had been the business account for a
great number of years and indeed was the account into which Mr Piggott’s rental
money was paid. I accept the payment originated from Simon and a bank transfer
of £6,000 from Mr S Massey is shown on the relevant statement coming in the day
before the cheque payment went out to Mr Piggott.
15.
I accept Mr Piggott’s explanation of this payment and find as a fact
that it was a payment made by the Masseys to Mr Piggott for the fixtures and
fittings which he left behind. I make this finding for a number of reasons.
First Mr Piggott had a clear recollection of the circumstances in which the
payment came to be made. He remembered the conversation with Mr Massey and
that Mr Massey had drawn up an inventory. I do not find it credible that Mr
Massey could not have any recollection of the conversation. £6,000 was a large
sum of money which he and his mother could ill afford, as witness the fact it
had to be borrowed from Simon. Secondly it makes obvious and abundant sense
that Mr Piggott would want some recompense for his fixtures and fittings. He
had acquired them on the transfer of the business to him or by subsequent
purchase. They quite clearly were all owned by him and he was hardly going to walk
away from assets which held to him a substantial value. Thirdly it was common
ground that Mr Piggott had requested the payment and the amount. It is hardly
a likely scenario that the recipient requests and names the amount of a payment
later to be described as a gesture of friendship and goodwill. In this context
it should also be noted that Mr Massey, particularly, had described how let
down he and his mother felt at Mr Piggott’s decision to leave. They both felt
that he had left them in the lurch and they were disappointed in him. Again
this is not consistent with the payment representing a gesture of goodwill.
16.
Mrs Massey in her evidence, both documentary and oral, stated that she
had always wanted nothing more than to receive the rental payments. She had at
no time wanted to take back the running of the business or to operate the
restaurant herself. However when Mr Piggott surrendered the lease, she still
needed the income to continue to meet the mortgage repayments. Very much against
her will she therefore saw no alternative but for herself and Giles to operate
the restaurant. She was asked in her evidence in chief whether she had tried
to re-let the premises at the time to which she replied that other than “asking
around” she had not. She was reconciled, she said, to operating the business
on a temporary basis because a restaurant can die very quickly on a closure,
however short. It had to be kept running. It was therefore decided that she
and Giles would operate it in the short term and on a temporary basis pending
eventually trying to find a new tenant.
17.
When Mr Massey gave evidence on the first day, he maintained that he had
retained none of Mr Piggott’s staff but employed friends from when he had
operated the business prior to Mr Piggott taking it over. However when
recalled, Mr Massey accepted that as many of Mr Piggott’s staff as wanted to
stay had stayed and he had merely replaced one or two that had not. He
described his style of cooking as rather more traditional than Mr Piggott’s had
been. He changed suppliers and he also operated totally different opening times.
Mr Piggott had opened lunchtimes on Saturdays and Sundays and seven days a week
in the evenings. Mr Massey did not open lunchtimes at all and only opened
Monday and Tuesday evenings when there was a pre-booked party.
Legislation
18.
The relevant legislation can be found in Section 49(1) Value Added Tax
Act 1994 and Schedule 1, paragraph 1 (2) of the same Act.
“49(1)
Where a business carried out by a taxable person is transferred to another
person as a going concern then –
(a) for
the purpose of determining whether the transferee is liable to be registered
under this Act he shall be treated as having carried on the business before as
well as after the transfer and supplies b the transferor shall be treated
accordingly.
Schedule
1, para 1(2) of the VAT Act 1994 states:
(1) Where
a business carried on by a taxable person is transferred to another person and
the transferee is not registered under this Act at the time of the transfer…
the transferee becomes liable to be registered under this Schedule at that time
if:-
(a) The
value of his taxable supplies in the period of one year then ending at the time
of the transfer has exceeded (relevant VAT threshold).
Case Law
19.
I was referred by the parties to the following cases
Sawadee Restaurant v
HMRC 15933
Nicholas Spence v
HMRC 20563
Andrew Harber v HMRC
12979
Mr & Mrs D Harper
v HMRC 20176
The Appellant’s Submissions
20.
It was Mr Kagdadia’s contention that Mrs Massey at no time purchased a
business or any assets with which to run a business. All she did was to accept
a surrender of the lease and reacquire her own premises. It had never been her
intention to start a business and she only did so having been left in the lurch
by Mr Piggott.
21.
Further, the business that Mrs Massey, employing her son Giles as chef,
did run was a wholly different business from that run by Mr Piggott. The style
of cooking was different; hours of opening were different; staff were different
and suppliers were different.
22.
Thirdly, there was a significant break in trading between Mr Piggott’s
cessation and Mrs Massey’s commencement.
23.
Mr Kagdadia referred to HMRC’s Public Notice 700/9, asserting that the main
conditions for the transfer of a going concern had not been met, the relevant
conditions being that the assets should have been sold as part of the transfer
and that those assets were to be used by the purchaser with the intention of
carrying on the same kind of business as the seller.
24.
Relying on the cases of Nicholas Spence and Sawadee, Mr
Kagdadia submitted that none of the criteria for the transfer of a going
concern had been met. He stressed that there was no sale of goodwill and that
there was no transfer of either wet or dry stock.
The Respondents’ submissions
25.
Mrs Knibbs contended that everything pointed to there having been a
transfer of a going concern. Stressing that it was the substance of the
transaction which had to be studied, the effect of what happened was to put Mrs
Massey in possession of a business which could be operated as such. She
maintained that the period of closure was insignificant.
The approach to be taken by the Tribunal
26.
The test repeatedly applied by the tribunals in cases such as this is
that laid down by Widgery J (as he then was ) in Kenmir v Frizell at
page 164:
“In deciding whether a
transaction amounted to the transfer of a business regard must be had to its
substance rather than its form, and the consideration must be given to the
whole of the circumstances, weighing the factors which point in one direction
against those which point in another. In the end the vital consideration is
whether the effect of the transaction was to put the transferee in possession
of a going concern the activities of which he could carry on without
interruption. Many factors may be relevant to this decision though few will be
conclusive in themselves. Thus, if the new employer carries on business in the
same manner as before this will point to the existence of a transfer, but the
converse is not necessarily true because a transfer may be complete even though
the transferee does not chose to avail himself of all the rights which he
acquires thereunder. Similarly, an express assignment of goodwill is strong
evidence of a transfer of the business but the absence of such an assignment is
not conclusive if the transferee has effectively deprived himself o the power
to compete. The absence of an assignment of premises, stock-in-trade or
outstanding contracts will likewise not be conclusive. If the particular
circumstances of the transferee nevertheless enable him to carry on
substantially the same business as before.”
Conclusions
27.
I have already found as a fact that the payment of £6,000 (minus one
week’s rent) was not a gratuitous gesture of friendship and goodwill but was a
payment for the fixtures and fittings. By this transaction, Mrs Massey
purchased the assets which Mr Piggott had used in his operation of the business
and which were to be used by her son Giles when he opened. There are two
further relevant findings of fact which should be made. On the first day of Mr
Massey’s evidence, he maintained first that Mr Piggott had run the business
down to such an extent that it had become what he termed “a drinking
establishment” rather than a restaurant. Secondly, he asserted that Mr
Piggott had left behind him no assets other than a few broken tables and chairs
which he could not get through the door. Both of these assertions were
contradicted by Mrs Massey, whose evidence I accept. She spoke of Mr Piggott
catering for a younger clientele but she stated that it was still very much a
restaurant. She also stated that Mr Piggott had taken nothing away with him.
He certainly left no consumable stock but everything else remained and was in
useable condition. From these findings it is clear that Mr Piggott left behind
him an established restaurant with an established clientele.
28.
Looking at the “whole of the circumstances”, it can be seen that there
were in effect two transactions and the Tribunal has to consider them in
combination. First, Mr Piggott surrendered his lease to Mrs Massey, the effect
of this being that she immediately acquired the business premises to use as she
wished. Secondly, by payment out of the jointly held business account, she and
Giles acquired all of the fixtures and fittings which Mr Piggott had used. The
combination of the two was to quite clearly put Mrs Massey in the position
where she could carry on precisely the same business as had Mr Piggott. All
she and Giles, her employed chef, had to do was to restock the consumables. I
fully accept Mrs Massey’s evidence that in the long term she did not want or
intend to run the restaurant but as she expressly stated in her oral evidence,
she realised that on a temporary basis she and Giles were going to have to run
it until they could find another tenant to take it on.
29.
The length of time for which she intended to run it is immaterial. What
matters is that she had acquired a business which she could run for as long as
she wished. She had the premises and she had the equipment.
30.
I accept there was no formal transfer of the goodwill. There clearly
was goodwill in the address of the premises, the name of the restaurant and the
length of time for which it had been trading successfully. Rather than being
formally transferred to Mrs Massey, this goodwill in effect, reverted to her on
the termination of Mr Piggott’s tenancy. I do not think this materially alters
the overall position.
31.
As far as employees were concerned, they had all been employed, as is
common in a small restaurant business on a casual shift basis. There would
therefore have been no formal transfer of employees but insofar as they wished
to carry on working for Mr & Mrs Massey, they could. They were not
dismissed.
32.
I find the period of closure of 10 days to be irrelevant. A 10 day
closure for cleaning, redecorating, restocking and devising fresh menus is not
material in the life of a long running restaurant. It was certainly not long
enough to cause any significant disruption to the trading pattern. Equally, I
find that Giles’ decision to vary opening hours and to offer a different style
of cuisine is immaterial. They were matters of preference, of choice. The
fact that the business carried on by the transferee is not identical to that
previously carried on does not matter.
33.
My conclusion is that in the circumstances outlined in this Decision,
Mrs Massey acquired a business which she was able to carry on in substantially
the same way as it had been carried on previously by Mr Piggott. I therefore
uphold the Commissioners’ decision that there had been a transfer of a going
concern and I further uphold their decision that the correct date of
registration should have been 14 June 2009. The Appeal is dismissed.
34. This
document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party
dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal
against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal)
(Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal
not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties
are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal
(Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
LADY
JC MITTING
TRIBUNAL JUDGE
RELEASE DATE: 5 February 2013