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United Kingdom Information Tribunal including the National Security Appeals Panel


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Information Tribunal including the National Security Appeals Panel >> McTeggart v Information Commissioner and Department for Culture, Arts and Leisure [2007] UKIT EA_2006_0084 (4 June 2007)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKIT/2007/EA_2006_0084.html
Cite as: [2007] UKIT EA_2006_0084, [2007] UKIT EA_2006_84

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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA)
Heard in Belfast                                                                  Decision Promulgated
On 30 April and 1 May 2007                                               4th June 2007
BEFORE
Information Tribunal Chairman
John Angel
And
Lay Members
David Wilkinson and Henry Fitzhugh
Between
BRIAN MCTEGGART
Appellant
And
THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER
Respondent
And
THE DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE, ARTS AND LEISURE
Additional Party
Representation:
For the Appellant:           In person
For the Respondent: Mr. Timothy Pitt-Payne
For the Additional Party: Mr. Adrian Colmer
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
Decision
The Tribunal has decided to substitute the following decision notice in place of the
decision notice dated 5 October 2006 and partially allows the Appeal.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (SECTION 50 and 58(1))
SUBSTITUTED DECISION NOTICE
Dated 5 June 2007
Name of Public authority: The Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure
Address of Public authority: The Inerpoint Building, York Street, Belfast BT15 1AQ
Name of Complainant: Mr Brain McTeggart
The Decision Notice of the Information Commissioner dated 5 October 2006 shall be
substituted as follows:
Nature of Complaint
The complainant requested an unredacted or full copy of the report into the investigation of
his complaints against the chief executive of Waterways Ireland. He has since received
parts of the report.
Action Required
The following parts of the report, not already disclosed to Mr McTeggart before the
hearing, be disclosed to him within 21 days of the date of this Decision, namely Appendix
2 (with minor redactions), Appendices 12 and 13 (which were disclosed during the course
of the hearing) and the text of paragraphs 49, 50 (redacted) and 51 of the report.
Chairman
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
Reasons for Decision
The request for information
1.      On 14 February 2005 Mr Brian McTeggart (Mr McTeggart) wrote to the Department
of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) requesting a full copy of the report (the
Request) relating to the investigation of his allegations regarding Mr John Martin
(Mr Martin) the Chief Executive (CEO) of Waterways Ireland (the Report). The
allegations related to:
1.1    Bullying and harassment of Mr McTeggart and other staff associated with him by
the CEO;
1.2    Victimisation and continuation of bullying and harassment of Mr McTeggart as a
result of highlighting the matters in 1.1;
1.3    A culture of patronage, bullying and secrecy emanating from the CEO; and
1.4    Questionable recruitment and promotion practices in relation to certain posts.
2.      The Report contains the conclusions and recommendations of the investigators and
a summary of the evidence and findings in relation to the evidence, some 60 pages.
It also contains 17 annexes which include some witness statements.
3.      DCAL confirmed to Mr McTeggart on 15 March 2005 that it held the Report. It
subsequently provided him with those parts of the Report which contained his
personal data as DCAL regarded the Request also as a data subject access
request under s.7 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), but it refused to provide
the remainder of the Report on the basis that it was exempt under ss 27(2)
(international relations), 36 (prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs), 41
(information provided in confidence) and 40(2) (personal information) FOIA (the
Refusal Notice).
4.      On 5 April 2005 Mr McTeggart sought an internal review of the decision. On 20 May
2005 DCAL informed him that it had upheld the Refusal Notice.
5.      At the commencement of the hearing it emerged that Mr McTeggart thought that
the Report also included notes of the interviews with the 24 people who were
interviewed by the investigators. This is quite understandable as he does not have
the benefit of seeing the whole Report because it has been kept confidential
pending the determination of the Tribunal. As a result the Tribunal found it
necessary to review the scope of the Request. We decided that the request was for
the Report only and not other documents which might have been used as
background reference material for the Report, but which were not contained in the
Report as such. Mr McTeggart accepted this ruling and the case continued on that
basis. It was explained to him that if he wished to see this other information that it
would need to be the subject of a new FOI request.
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
The Decision Notice
6.      Mr McTeggart complained to the Information Commissioner (IC) on 27 June 2005
who investigated the complaint. The IC issued a decision notice dated 5 October
2005 (the Decision Notice) which categorised the information withheld as follows:
6.1    Statements and opinions expressed by individuals in relation to Mr McTeggart’s
allegations;
6.2    Biographical and other identifying information relating to officials in Waterways
Ireland; and
6.3    Findings and conclusions of the investigators in relation to the general allegations
concerning the culture, recruitment and promotion practices in Waterways Ireland.
7.      The IC was satisfied that the information in categories 6.1 and 6.2 was exempt
under ss 36(2), 40(2) and 41. However it considered that the information under
category 6.3 should be disclosed to Mr McTeggart. DCAL disclosed this information
during the course of the IC’s investigation. The IC considered that only s.36 was
relevant to information in category 6.3. S.36 is a qualified exemption. As a
certificate was provided under s.36(7) the IC found the exemption was engaged
and went on to find that the public interest in maintaining the exemption did not
outweigh the public interest in disclosure but that as DCAL had provided a redacted
version of the Report containing the information in 6.3 above and those parts of the
Report containing his personal data, no further steps needed to be taken.
8.      The IC considered that s.27 was not engaged in relation to the Report.
The appeal
9. Mr McTeggart appealed against the IC’s findings in relation to the information in
categories 6.1 and 6.2. As a result it has only been necessary for the Tribunal to
consider the application of the ss40(2) and 41 exemptions, particularly as DCAL
had accepted before the hearing that ss27 and 36 were not engaged in relation to
these categories of information.
Agreed facts
10. Waterways Ireland is one of six North-South Implementation Bodies established by
international agreement between the British and Irish Governments (the Good
Friday Agreement) in 1999. These Bodies operate, in accordance with interim
procedures, under the jurisdiction of the North-South Ministerial Council, providing
for relevant Ministers, North and South, to operate jointly. They are not subject to
FOIA, nor are they subject to freedom of information legislation in the Republic of
Ireland (ROI). DCAL is the sponsor body in Northern Ireland responsible for
Waterways Ireland and is covered by FOIA. The Department of Community, Rural
and Gaeltacht Affairs (DCRGA) is the sponsor body responsible for Waterways
Ireland in ROI and is covered by FOI legislation in that country.
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
11.    Mr McTeggart had been a Northern Ireland civil servant for 23 years when he
joined Waterways Ireland on secondment on 24 February 2000. His role was to
establish the new headquarters for the body in Enniskillen and to help set up the
body across the island. From 2000 to March 2002 he undertook the role of Director
of Corporate Services and from April 2000 to August 2002 he was acting Director of
Corporate Services. Following an open competition in the summer of 2002 on 6
September 2002 he was offered the permanent post of Director of Corporate
Services in Waterways Ireland reporting to the CEO and based at Enniskillen.
12.    Mr McTeggart wrote a lengthy and detailed letter on 20 January 2003 to Mr Nigel
Carson (Mr Carson), who at the time was Director of Sports, Recreation and
Museums Division, later the Culture and Recreation Division at DCAL, setting out a
series of complaints and issues relating to the CEO and other members of the
senior management team. These allegations were wide ranging covering not only
bullying and harassment but also making allegations about appointments to
Waterways Ireland and voicing concerns about the way the organisation was being
managed by the CEO and others. He was also concerned about the starting salary
being offered for his new post. His letter also indicated that other staff would
corroborate the allegations and concerns.
13.    Because of the seriousness of these allegations DCAL and DCRGA jointly set up
an investigation into the complaints. During the investigation its scope was
narrowed down to deal with Mr McTeggart’s allegations of harassment and bullying
by Mr Martin and the recruitment and promotion practices at Waterways Ireland. It
would appear that Mr McTeggart was not aware of the limitations of the
investigation until much later when he was given the opportunity to briefly review
the findings. The investigation culminated in the Report. Mr McTeggart and Mr
Martin were both invited to inspect a version of the Report without appendices, but
otherwise unredacted, in order to correct any factual errors. On 19 November 2004
Mr McTeggart was allowed approximately one and a half hours with his solicitor on
short notice to undertake this exercise, although Mr McTeggart was not well at the
time. He was not allowed to take away a copy of the Report and was required to
sign an undertaking that he would surrender any notes made from or pertaining to
the Report.
14.    The Report has never been published. However there had been publicity around
the investigation and the Report in the press and Parliament. Also DCAL and
DCRGA issued a joint press statement on 4 April 2005 in which they provided their
version of a summary of the findings reached by the investigators and stated that
the conclusions and recommendations in the report had been accepted by the
Departments.
Evidence in dispute
15. There are two matters in dispute. Firstly, whether Mr McTeggart was given any
assurances that he would be provided with a copy of the Report and that it would
be published. Secondly, whether the witnesses who gave statements to the
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
investigators either in written form or by way of interview where notes were taken or
both, did so in confidence.
16.    On the first point, Mr McTeggart’s own understanding, based on the nature of the
investigation and the implications of its findings for his own position in Waterways
Ireland, was that the Report would be given to him and published. In particular, he
claims that at a meeting at DCAL on 27 October 2004 he was informed by Mr
Carson that both he and Mr Martin were going to be “given” the report that was
going to be “issued”. However, he then received a telephone call on 12 November
when Mr Carson informed him of the procedures that were eventually followed, as
set out in paragraph 13 above. In oral evidence, Mr Carson confirmed that
originally he had envisaged Mr McTeggart and Mr Martin being allowed to take
home a copy of the report so that they could study it. Ultimately, however, DCAL
decided, to impose a more restrictive and controlled form of access to the Report in
order to minimise the risk of further media coverage. Nonetheless, the original
purpose of the exercise remained the narrow one of giving the two key parties an
opportunity to check the Report for factual accuracy. Mr Carson insisted in
evidence that the Department never gave Mr McTeggart an undertaking that he
would be given his own copy of the Report for his own purposes or that the Report
would be published. He further gave evidence that the understanding between
DCAL and DCRGA throughout was that the Report would be delivered exclusively
to the two commissioning officials of the respective Departments, namely himself
and Mr Hamill.
17.    On the second point on 26 May 2004 all witnesses to the investigation into Mr
McTeggart’s allegations were sent a letter by the investigators setting out the
process for the investigation. It explained that the investigation would be conducted
within the framework of DCAL booklet Procedures for Dealing with Equal
Opportunities and Harassment Complaints.
In that booklet at paragraph 4.5.2 it
explains that “Staff involved in the investigation should appreciate that the
investigation is conducted on a confidential basis and therefore must not discuss
the matter with any other person.” Also in the letter, which is contained in one of the
redacted annexes to the Report, but was disclosed during the course of the
hearing, it emphasises that “the confidential nature of the interview and of the
investigation in general.” We also note that the terms of reference of the
investigation, which were known to Mr McTeggart, stated that “The investigation will
be conducted on a confidential basis and those interviewed must be informed that
they are not to discuss the matter with any other person.”
18.    Richard Buchanan (Mr Buchanan), one of the investigators, gave evidence that the
interviews were carried out at the Killyhevlin Hotel, away from the offices of
Waterways Ireland, in order to ensure confidentiality. At the interviews he again
emphasised the confidential nature of the interview and of the investigation in
general and that was recorded in the notes taken at the time. The investigators
explained though, that there was always a possibility of disclosure to Mr Martin if
legal proceedings ensued. We note also that the witness statements included in the
redacted part of the annexes to the Report are stated to be ‘in confidence’.
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
19.    In addition we take into account that although Mr McTeggart was able to see the
Report without annexes for correction purpose he was not allowed to take away a
copy of the report or any notes that he made at the time.
20.    Mr McTeggart makes the point that although the process of the investigation may
have been undertaken on a confidential basis this did not apply to the Report. We
can understand how Mr McTeggart might have been confused on this point. As his
allegations had triggered the investigation he may have been under the natural
expectation that any report would be disclosed to him. It was somewhat unusual
that he was allowed to review the body of the Report but not take away a copy.
Notes of the investigations of two witnesses were provided in evidence by Mr
McTeggart which contained no reference to confidentiality and one of the witnesses
provided a signed witness statement to the effect that he was given no assurance
of confidentiality by the investigators during his interview that his evidence would
not be disclosed. In response Mr Buchanan said in evidence that he may not have
made the confidential nature of the investigation clear during some of the early
interviews, but that did not apply to the majority of witnesses. The Tribunal notes
that the witness statements which are the subject of the Request and have been
withheld are all clearly provided in confidence.
21.    We also note from Mr McTeggart’s evidence that it was, at least partially, at his
wish and behest that witnesses were offered confidentiality in the first place; he
wanted witnesses to feel free, come forward and give frank evidence without risk of
recognition or retribution.
22.    The Tribunal has considered all the evidence on both of these issues and finds that:
22.1  While we can understand Mr McTeggart’s perception that he would be given his
own copy of the Report, we note that the terms of reference, on which he was
consulted and to which he agreed, clearly state that “on receipt of the
investigating officers’ report the sponsor departments will agree how to proceed”.
In short the departments explicitly reserved to themselves decisions on how they
were going to handle the Report until they had received it and had had an
opportunity to consider its content. Our finding is that this is what they did and
that there was no decision to publish the Report.
22.2  The evidence from witnesses was obtained in confidence, particularly in relation
to the disputed information. This was in some part so as to protect them from Mr
Martin and Waterways Ireland. In order to do this confidentiality would need to
extend to the contents of the Report so far as it would identify any witnesses other
than Mr Martin and Mr McTeggart,.
The issues for the Tribunal to determine
23. The parties accept that there are two categories of information which have been
redacted from the version of the Report now provided to Mr McTeggart. These are
set out in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.2 above, namely statements and opinions
expressed by individuals in relation to Mr McTeggart’s allegations and biographical
and other identifying information relating to officials in Waterways Ireland.
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
24.    The Tribunal needs to determine:
24.1  whether the exemptions claimed by DCAL and upheld by the IC, namely that the
Request contains personal information (s.40(2)) and that the information was
provided in confidence (s.41), are engaged;
24.2  if they are engaged, then in relation to
(a)    the s.40(2) exemption whether the disclosure of personal information of
third parties would be fair and lawful processing;
(b)    the s.41 exemption whether the information is confidential information in
the terms of the section and if so whether there is a public interest defence
where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public interest in the
maintenance of the duty of confidentiality.
25.    Although other exemptions were claimed in the Refusal Notice and were dealt with
in the Decision Notice it is agreed by the parties that these are no longer relevant to
this appeal and that only the matters in paragraph 24 need be considered by the
Tribunal.
26.    The redacted parts of the Report have been disclosed to the Tribunal in confidence
in order that we can determine the above matters. As a result it has been
necessary to produce a confidential annex to this decision which is only disclosed
to DCAL and the IC.
The law
27.    Section 41(1) provides:
Information is exempt information if –
(a)    it was obtained by the public authority from any other person (including
another public authority) and
(b)    the disclosure of the information to the public (otherwise than under this
Act) by the public authority holding it would constitute a breach of
confidence actionable by that or any other person.
28.    The leading case in this Tribunal on the application of this exemption is Derry City
Council v Information Commissioner
(EA/2006/0014). In relation to the meaning of
confidential information Derry at paragraph 30 sets out the test as follows:
28.1  whether the information has the necessary quality of confidence about it in that it
is not common knowledge and not in the public domain;
28.2  whether the information was communicated in circumstances imparting an
obligation of confidence;
28.3  whether, subject to any defence, disclosure would be a breach of that confidence;
and
28.4  whether there is a defence to any action for breach of confidence, based upon the
public interest in disclosure of the information, and if this part of the test is
satisfied then
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
28.5 would the public authority nevertheless have a defence to a claim for breach of
confidence based on the public interest in disclosure of the information.
29.    In relation to the question of whether there is a public interest defence, the Tribunal
considers that the IC’s decision to adopt the approach set out in the Derry case at
paragraph 35 is the correct approach. In order for there to be a public interest
defence, the public interest in disclosure must outweigh the public interest in the
maintenance of the duty of confidentiality. The Tribunal accepts that IC’s view that:
(i) there is no requirement to show exceptional circumstances in order for this
defence to be made out; and (ii) the defence is not confined to specific and defined
categories of case.
30.    S.40(2) provides that
Any information to which a request for information relates is also exempt information
if –
(a)  it constitutes personal data which do not fall within subsection (1)
[applicant’s personal data], and
(b) either the first or second condition below is satisfied.
(3) The first condition is –
(a) in a case where the information falls within paragraphs (a) to (e) of the
definition of “data” in section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, that the
disclosure of the information to a member of the public otherwise under
this Act would contravene-
(i) any of the data protection principles,
31.    The relevant data protection principle under Part I of Schedule 1 DPA is:
Personal data shall be processed fairly and lawfully and, in particular, shall
not be processed unless-
(a) at least one of the conditions in Schedule 2 is met
32.    Part II of Schedule 1 to the Act contains further material as to the interpretation of
the data protection principles. Paragraph 2 of Part II relates to the circumstances in
which data are treated as being processed fairly for the purposes of the first data
protection principle. So far as relevant to this appeal, it reads:
(1) Subject to paragraph 3, for the purposes of the first principle personal
data are not to be treated as processed fairly unless-
(a) in the case of data obtained from the data subject, the data
controller ensures so far as practicable that the data subject
has, is provided with, or has made readily available to him, the
information specified in sub-paragraph (3).
(3) The information referred to in sub-paragraph (1) is as follows, namely-
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
(a)      the identity of the data controller,
(b)      if he has nominated a representative for the purposes of this
Act, the identity of that representative,
(c)       the purpose or purposes for which the data are intended to be
processed, and
(d)      any further information which is necessary, having regard to the
specific circumstances in which the data are or are to be
processed, to enable processing in respect of the data subject
to be fair.
33.    Additionally in order to satisfy the first data protection principle, it is necessary for
processing to satisfy one of the conditions in Schedule 2 to the DPA. The condition
that is potentially relevant in these appeals is in paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 2:
The processing is necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued
by the data controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are
disclosed, except where the processing is unwarranted in any particular case
by reason of prejudice to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of
the data subject.
34.    In the Tribunal’s decision in The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons v The
Information Commissioner and Norman Baker
EA/2006/15 and16, the Tribunal
found that the application of paragraph 6(1) involves a balance between competing
interests broadly comparable, but not identical, to the balance that applies under
the public interest test for qualified exemptions under FOIA. Paragraph 6 requires a
consideration of the balance between: (i) the legitimate interests of those to whom
the data would be disclosed which in this context is a member of the public (section
40 (3)(a)); and (ii) prejudice to the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the
data subjects. However because the processing must be ‘necessary’ for the
legitimate interests of members of the public to apply The Tribunal find that only
where (i) outweighs (ii) should the personal data be disclosed.
35.    The first DPP also requires that personal data shall be processed ‘lawfully’. Where
processing of personal data is in breach of a duty of confidentiality this would be
unlawful and therefore in breach of the principle.
The Tribunal’s powers
36.    The Tribunal’s general powers in relation to appeals are set out in section 58 of the
Act. They are in wide terms. Section 58 provides as follows.
(1) If on an appeal under section 57 the Tribunal considers-
(a) that the notice against which the appeal is brought is not in
accordance with the law, or
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
(b) to the extent that the notice involved an exercise of discretion by the
Commissioner, that he ought to have exercised his discretion
differently,
the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could
have been served by the Commissioner; and in any other case the
Tribunal shall dismiss the appeal.
(2) On such an appeal, the Tribunal may review any finding of fact on
which the notice in question was based.
37.    The question whether the exemptions in ss 40(2) and 41 apply is a question of law
or (alternatively) of mixed fact and law. The Tribunal may consider the merits of the
Commissioner’s decision that this exemption does not apply, and may substitute its
own view if it considers that the Commissioner’s decision was erroneous. The
Tribunal is not required to adopt the more limited approach that would be followed
by the Administrative Court in carrying out a judicial review of a decision by a public
authority. Also the Tribunal has power, in the case of an appeal by an applicant for
information, to allow and substitute such notice as could have been served by the
Commissioner - Guardian Newspapers and Heather Brooke v The Information
Commissioner
EA/2006/0011 and 0013 at paragraphs 16 – 23.
Whether the exemptions are engaged?
38.    The Tribunal finds that the IC was correct in finding that both exemptions were
engaged in relation to the information in categories 6.1 and 6.2.
39.    In relation to category 6.1 information having taken into account all the evidence
and applied it to the relevant legal provisions we find that most of the information
was provided in confidence and that the s.41 exemption is engaged.
40.    In relation to category 6.2 information having taken into account all the evidence
and applied it to the legal provisions we find that most of the information is personal
data and that its disclosure could contravene the first DPP, namely (fair and lawful
processing) and that the s.40(2) exemption is engaged. We have considered the
requirements in paragraph 2 of Part II to Schedule 1 DPA and find that these have
been met and to this extent the processing is fair.
41.    Although these are both absolute exemptions under FOIA as set out in paragraphs
27 to 35 above there are further tests we need to consider under the DPA (the
legitimate interest balance) and under the common law (the public interest balance)
in order to decide whether any information should be disclosed.
42.    We should mention that because of our finding in paragraph 39 this means that it
would be unlawful (as an actionable breach of confidence) to disclose the
information and therefore it could be argued there is no need to go on to consider
the legitimate interest balance. However because it is still necessary to consider the
public interest balance to determine whether or not it is unlawful we have
proceeded to consider both tests in relation to the Report.
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
The Report
43.    We have considered the unredacted version of the Report in confidence. We have
applied the two tests where relevant to the redacted information. In applying the
tests we have taken account of the following factors.
Legitimate interests of Mr McTeggart and the public:
44.    In relation to the test set out in paragraph 34 above we have taken into account the
following legitimate interests in favour of disclosure to McTeggart and the public at
large:
44.1  Interest and concern of the public regarding the standards of personnel
management and fair and transparent appointment practices exercised by a CEO
within a public body;
44.2  Interest in seeing how accountability was secured in a North-South body without a
supervisory board and over a period when the NSMC was not operational. In
other words did DCAL in the admittedly difficult and sensitive political
circumstances discharge effectively its role in securing a robust and fair
investigation?
44.3  Interest and concern of the public regarding the efficient working of a North-South
body established under the Good Friday Agreement;
44.4  Interest in being able to know the detailed facts and reasons behind the findings
in the Report;
44.5  Mr McTeggart has already seen the body of the Report, albeit briefly, and it would
be unfair to not let him have a copy of the Report.
Legitimate interests of Mr Martin and witnesses to the investigation
45.    We have taken into account the following legitimate interests of the data subjects
involved:
45.1  Any witness whose identity is disclosed may be subject to some form of
discrimination or retribution;
45.2  Staff may be reluctant to take part in such investigations in the future if their
identity would be disclosed;
45.3  Given the nature of press interest, Mr Martin’s actions could be subjected to unfair
analysis and attention;
45.4  Other managers of Waterways Ireland whose names are known could suffer
some form of “guilt by association” in the eyes of the public
45.5  Disclosure of biographical and other identifying information of officials of
Waterways Ireland would be unfair because these individuals are not the focus of
McTeggart’s complaints and its disclosure might lead to speculation about the
validity of their appointments.
Public interest considerations in favour of disclosure
46.    In relation to the test set out in paragraph 29 above we have taken into account the
following public interest factors in favour of disclosure:
46.1  Interest and concern of the public regarding the standards of management and
practices within a public body;
46.2  Interest and concern of the public regarding the efficient working of a North-South
Body established under the Good Friday Agreement;
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Appeal Number: EA/2006/0084
46.3  Given that it is public knowledge that an investigation has taken place, non-
publication of results or merely the press release that has already taken place will
erode public confidence in this and future investigations;
46.4  Potential witnesses may in future not choose to be part of a seemingly ineffective
process, nor wish to take any risk for no result;
46.5  Publication of results, however uncomfortable, should lead to management
improvements, which is to the public benefit.
Public interest considerations against disclosure:
47. We have taken into account the following public interest factors against disclosure:
47.1   Evidence given in confidence must be respected as such. It is not in the public
interest to break such confidences. In this case we find that if such assurances of
confidentiality had not been given then it would have been difficult to undertake
the investigation and we have therefore given considerable weight to this
particular public interest;
47.2  Regardless of any finding on the nature of any undertakings as to confidentiality
given to witnesses, disclosure of testimony, even anonymously, may be a
deterrent to witnesses taking part in investigations.
The Tribunal’s findings
48. The Tribunal has considered each redaction in the Report and as a result has
decided to allow the appeal in part and issue a substituted decision notice as set
out in the Decision above.
Date 4th June 2006
Chairman
John Angel
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