

UNIVERSITY OF LONDON  
INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED  
LEGAL STUD

12 MAR 1960

25 RUSSELL SQUARE  
LONDON, W.C.1

13,1959

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

O N A P P E A L

55591 FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA IN ADMIRALTY

TUESDAY the 1st day of OCTOBER, A.D. 1957

PRESENT:

THE HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF CANADA  
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE TASCHEREAU  
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT  
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE FAUTEUX  
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ABBOTT, P.C.

B E T W E E N :

MAXINE FOOTWEAR COMPANY LTD.,  
et al. ... (Plaintiffs) Appellants

— and —

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT MERCHANT MARINE  
LTD. ... (Defendant) Respondent

J U D G M E N T

WALTONS & CO.,  
101, Leadenhall Street,  
LONDON, E.C.3.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

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ON APPEAL  
FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA IN ADMIRALTY

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TUESDAY THE 1st DAY OF OCTOBER, A.D. 1957

PRESENT:

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In the  
Supreme  
Court of  
Canada.

JUDGMENT  
1st October  
1957.

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B E T W E E N:

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et al, ... (Plaintiffs) Appellants

— and —

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT MERCHANT  
MARINE LTD., ... (Defendant) Respondent

J U D G M E N T

20 The appeal of the above named Appellants from the  
Judgment of the Exchequer Court of Canada pronounced in the  
above cause on the 14th day of February in the year of our  
Lord One thousand nine hundred and fifty-six affirming the  
judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Arthur I. Smith,  
District Judge in Admiralty for the Quebec Admiralty  
District, rendered in the said cause on the 3rd day of June  
in the year of our Lord One thousand nine hundred and  
fifty-two having come on to be heard before this Court on  
the 15th and 16th days of May in the year of our Lord One  
thousand nine hundred and fifty-seven in the presence of  
Counsel as well for the Appellants as the Respondent,  
30 whereupon and upon hearing what was alleged by Counsel  
aforesaid, this Court was pleased to direct that the said  
appeal should stand over for judgment and the same coming on  
this day for judgment;

THIS COURT DID ORDER AND ADJUDGE that the said judgment  
of the Exchequer Court of Canada should be and the same was  
affirmed and that the said appeal should be and the same was  
dismissed with costs to be paid by the said Appellants to  
the said Respondent.

(Sgd.) "PAUL LEDUC"  
REGISTRAR.



board at that time, although he submitted that, even if the evidence were clear on the point, then, unless the fact that there was a fire was evident, the respondent was free of liability on other grounds.

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The appellant's goods were placed in number 3 hold. Mr. Justice Smith stated that the loading of number 3 hold was commenced on Tuesday, February 3, and completed on the evening of Friday, February 6. Mr. Justice Cameron finds that the loading of number 3 hold commenced on Tuesday "and the loading of the vessel was completed at about 8.00 p.m. on the evening of Friday, the 6th". It should be here explained that this action was commenced on May 11, 1943. Examinations for discovery were held in 1946. The trial commenced May 3, 1947, before Mr. Justice Cannon, who was then Local Judge in Admiralty, but, after argument, he became ill and died and by consent the evidence already taken was used before Mr. Justice Smith. Accordingly, the latter heard only the evidence of Isaac Joseph Tait to have the transcript of his previous evidence amended and some further testimony by that witness and, of course, none was heard by Mr. Justice Cameron. By consent the minutes of an investigation held by a legal advisor of the Canadian National Railways, shortly after the fire, became part of the evidence of the respondent. At that investigation the Captain of the "MAURIENNE", Y. Salaun, was asked the following questions, to which he made the answers indicated:-

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"Q.- You say you finished the loading of the cargo on Thursday in No.3? A.- At 8.00 Thursday night they had finished No.3.

Q.- And everything was battened down? A.- Yes.

Q.- It was all covered? A.- Yes.

Q.- What did you have in the tween deck? A.- I got shocks in the tween deck.

Q.- You had charge of the stowage of the vessel?  
A.- The First Mate.

Q.- On Thursday what loading did you still have to do? No.3 was finished; were any of the others finished? What about No.1? A.- It was finished a long time before. They went back to No.4 and No.2 the next day.

Q.- Then Thursday night No.1 and No.3 were completely loaded? A.- Yes."

In the Supreme Court of Canada. Francis Sim, the Stowage Clerk, was also examined. Under his direction the work of stowing the cargo in number 3 hold was started on Tuesday, February 3, at 10.00 a.m. and finished 8.15 p.m. Friday, February 6. The stowage plan identified by Sim shows that the cargo for Kingston in number 3 hold was put in the top, consisting of 78 sundries, 1020 bags of salt and 250 shooks, with the bottom part containing 1406 bundles of shooks and 3100 bags of flour. The statements of this witness are not in conformity with that of the Captain but he would know more about the stowage. Mr. McKenzie points particularly to that part of his evidence at page 53 of the record when he stated that he was there when the work was completed and that he made sure that number 3 was closed. "Sundries" would presumably include the appellant's goods. 10

Upon this record it should be held that the appellant's goods were not stowed until after the commencement of the fire, but even on that basis the appellant is not entitled to succeed. It is agreed that The Water Carriage of Goods Act, c. 49 of the Statutes of 1936, applies. By s.3 there is not to be implied in any contract for the carriage of goods by water any absolute undertaking by the carrier of the goods to provide a seaworthy ship. By paras.1 and 2 of Article III of the Rules:- 20

"1. The carrier shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to, 30  
(a) make the ship seaworthy;  
(b) properly man, equip, and supply the ship;  
(c) make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. 40

2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried."

By para. 1 of Article IV:-

"1. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused

by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III.

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10 Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this section."

Para.2 of Article IV provides in part:-

"2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or resulting from,

- 20 (a) act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of the ship;
- (b) fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier;"

30 In view of s. 3 of the Act, para. 1 of Article III of the Rules must be construed that if before and at the beginning of the voyage the ship is unfit for the cargo before the commencement of the loading of the goods, for the loss of which a claim is made, the carrier may absolve itself by showing that it exercised due diligence in that regard. In my view, that onus has been met by the respondent. It appears that the scuppers connected with the galley, the toilet and the shower had become clogged with ice and at someone's direction (not Mr. Campbell, the one who was in charge at Halifax) a local firm was engaged to thaw out the scuppers. The ship was cork insulated and that fact was not made known to the contractors. Each of the scuppers emptied on the starboard side of the ship and, after going straight in for six inches, turned at right angles. The contractor's employee applied the flame from an acetylene torch for about five minutes to each of the scuppers and I think there is no question that the fire originated by the flame from the torch igniting the cork insulation. The fire was not discovered for some time. There is also no doubt that whoever hired the contractors was negligent in not telling them of the cork insulation; that the contractor's employee was negligent in the manner in which he applied the flame, but Mr. Campbell, although

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inspecting the ship every day, had nothing to do with these acts of negligence nor was he derelict in his duty. Scuppers blocked by ice are common in the harbour of Halifax in the winter time. I agree with Mr. Justice Cameron that "neither the fact that the pipes were frozen nor that an acetylene torch was to be used to clear them was communicated to anyone who represented the carrier."

Moreover, within the meaning of para.2 (a) of Article IV, the negligence or default was that of the servants of the respondent in the management of the ship. The earlier cases are referred to in the judgments of this Court in *Kalamazoo Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Co.* (1950) S.C.R. 356, and it is settled that the distinction to be drawn is one between want of care of cargo and want of care of vessel indirectly affecting the cargo. Here the frozen scuppers had nothing to do with the cargo, except incidentally and indirectly. For the reasons stated by Cameron J. the present case is distinguishable from *Spencer Kellogg & Sons Inc. v. Great Lakes Transit Corporation* (1940) 32 Federal Supplement, 520; and, in addition, decisions in the United States under the Harter Act must be read with care, in view of the absolute obligation under that Act to provide a seaworthy ship.

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The appeal should be dismissed with costs.

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

MAXINE FOOTWEAR COMPANY et al

v.

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Coram: The Chief Justice and Taschereau,  
Cartwright, Fauteux and Abbott JJ.

CARTWRIGHT J.

10 The relevant facts are set out in the reasons of the  
Chief Justice and in those of the learned judges in the  
courts below. I agree with the conclusion of the Chief  
Justice that the proper inference to be drawn from the  
evidence is that the appellant's goods were not stowed  
until after the commencement of the fire.

A brief summary of the facts will be sufficient to  
indicate the question of law calling for decision.

20 At 3 p.m. on Friday, February 6, 1942, the  
"Maurienne" was loading general cargo at Halifax. Three  
of her scupper pipes were frozen but Cameron J. has  
found that this circumstance did not render the ship  
unseaworthy, that at the time mentioned she was in  
fact seaworthy, and that the holds and other parts of  
the ship in which goods were carried were fit and safe  
for their reception and carriage. These findings are  
supported by the evidence and should not be disturbed.  
Between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m. the cork insulation of the  
ship was ignited. As to the cause of this Cameron J.  
says:-

30 Before me, counsel for the respondent  
specifically admitted that the fire "was due to the  
fault of an employee who had been there to thaw out  
the ice which was blocking the openings of a  
discharge line or pipe". It might be stated here  
that there is no evidence that Hemeon - the welder  
from Purdy Brothers who actually operated the  
acetylene torch - was told anything about the  
cork insulation. His work was under the direct  
supervision of the Fourth Officer who - as well as  
the other ship's officers - had knowledge of the  
cork insulation near which the thawing-out  
40 operation was conducted. I think that in view of



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the special risk involved, it was negligence on the part of the Fourth Officer not to adequately supervise the operation and also in his failure to make an inspection to ascertain whether the cork insulation had, in fact, been ignited. Both the Fourth Officer and Hemeon were employees of the carrier and it was the negligence of one of these - or of both - that caused the fire. The Captain and Chief Engineer also had knowledge of the operation being carried out and of the proximity of the cork insulation thereto; it may also have been their duty to see that the operation was carried out in safety, but again, both are employees of the carrier.

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For the purposes of this case it is sufficient to state that the evidence fully warrants the presumption that the fire was caused by the negligence of the employees of the carrier.

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These findings also are supported by the evidence.

The fire started not later than 4 p.m. Following its commencement the appellant's goods were stowed and at about 8.15 p.m. all hatches were closed and battened down. The fire was not discovered until about 11 p.m. Efforts to control it were unsuccessful and on the following morning the ship was scuttled as the only means of extinguishing the fire.

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Cameron J. found (i) that the thawing out of the scupper pipes with an acetylene torch was an act of the servants of the carrier, the respondent, in the management of the ship, (ii) that the fire was not caused by the actual fault or privity of the respondent, (iii) that the loss of the appellant's goods was "the direct result of the fire only", and, (iv) that consequently the respondent was relieved from liability by Article IV r.2 clauses (a) and (b) of the Water Carriage of Goods Act.

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In my opinion, assuming the correctness of findings (i) and (ii), findings (iii) and (iv) do not necessarily follow.

Under Article III, r.1 clauses (a) and (c)

the respondent was bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and to make the parts of the ship in which goods were carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. No doubt up to 3 p.m. on Friday the requisite due diligence had been exercised but the duties of the carrier under the clauses mentioned are continuing and persist until the beginning of the voyage. It is clear that from some time not earlier than 3 p.m. and not later than 4 p.m. when the cork insulation had commenced to smoulder, the ship had ceased to be seaworthy and the holds had ceased to be fit and safe for the reception and carriage of goods. It is equally clear, on the findings of fact summarized above, that the respondent stowed the appellant's goods on an unseaworthy ship when the exercise of due diligence would have resulted in the discovery of the fact that the ship was on fire.

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The carrier is responsible in law for the failure of his employees to exercise the due diligence required by Article III, r.1. In my opinion the effect of the authorities is correctly stated in the following passage in Carver's Carriage of Goods by Sea, 9th Edition, p.182:-

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"Due diligence" seems to be equivalent to reasonable diligence, having regard to the circumstances known, or fairly to be expected, and to the nature of the voyage, and the cargo to be carried. It will suffice to satisfy the condition if such diligence has been exercised down to the sailing from the loading port. But the fitness of the ship at that time must be considered with reference to the cargo, and to the intended course of the voyage; and the burden is upon the shipowner to establish that there has been diligence to make her fit.

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It is not enough to satisfy the condition that the shipowner has been personally diligent, as by employing competent men to do the work. The condition requires that diligence to make her fit shall, in fact, have been exercised, by the shipowner himself, or by those whom he employs for the purpose. The shipowner "is responsible for any shortcomings of his agents or subordinates in making the steamer seaworthy at commencement of the voyage for the transportation of the particular cargo."

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"The obligation to make a ship seaworthy is personal to the owners, whether or not they entrust the performance of that obligation to experts, servants or agents." If such experts, servants or agents fail to exercise due diligence to make her seaworthy the owners are liable under Art.III, r.1 of the Rules.

It is argued for the respondent, however, that, even if it is accepted that the general rule is that the carrier is responsible for loss caused by the failure of its employees to exercise the due diligence required by Article III r.1. clauses (a) and (c), still, in the case at bar, the respondent escapes liability on two grounds. First it is said that the failure was an act, neglect or default of the servants of the carrier in the management of the ship and that the carrier escapes liability under Art.IV, r.2(a). Secondly, it is said that the result of that failure was a fire caused without the actual fault or privity of the carrier and that the carrier escapes liability under Art.IV, r.2(b). 10 20

I incline to the view that the duties imposed on the carrier under Art.III r.1, clauses (a) and (c) are paramount and that the carrier is liable for a loss caused by failure to exercise the due diligence required by that rule even although that failure or its result could also be regarded as falling within the wording of clauses (a) and (b) of Art.IV, r.2, but I do not find it necessary to reach a final conclusion on this question. While it may well be said that the negligent acts done in the course of thawing out the scupper pipes were acts of the servants of the carrier in the management of the ship and that the resulting fire was not caused by "the actual fault or privity of the carrier", and while the fire was the agency which brought about the scuttling of the ship and loss of the cargo, in my opinion, the direct cause of the loss of the appellant's goods was the action of the carrier's employees in bringing those goods to, and loading them on a burning and unseaworthy ship the holds of which were not fit and safe for their reception and carriage. Had the due diligence required by Art.III, r.1. been 30 40

exercised this undeworthiness would have been prevented, or, if not prevented, would have been discovered and the appellant's loss would have been avoided. The effective cause of the loss was the failure to exercise the due diligence required by Art.III, r.1.

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For these reasons I have reached the conclusion that the appeal succeeds. In view of my concurrence in the finding that the appellant's goods were not stowed until after the commencement of the fire I say nothing as to the position of the owners of that part of the cargo which was stowed before its commencement.

In its statement of defence the respondent asks a declaration that in the event of the action succeeding, it is entitled to limit its liability, but in my view the question of its right to do so should be left to be determined in other proceedings in which all parties interested would be represented.

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I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgments below and direct that judgment be entered for the appellant for \$2801.33 with costs throughout.