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The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions |
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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Decisions >> Gayle v. The Queen (Jamaica) [1996] UKPC 18 (12th June, 1996) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1996/18.html Cite as: [1996] UKPC 18 |
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Privy Council Appeal No. 40 of 1995
Michael Gayle Appellant
v.
The Queen Respondent
FROM
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF JAMAICA
---------------
JUDGMENT OF THE LORDS OF THE
JUDICIAL
COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL,
Delivered the 12th June 1996
------------------
Present
at the hearing:-
Lord Keith of Kinkel
Lord Griffiths
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle
Lord Steyn
Sir Iain Glidewell
·[Delivered
by Lord Griffiths]
-------------------------
On 22nd May 1990 the appellant was convicted of
the murder of Mary Smith on the night of 3rd and 4th April 1988. The Court of Appeal of Jamaica dismissed the
appellant's application for leave to appeal, and he now appeals with special
leave against that decision of the Court of Appeal.
The facts.
The deceased, Mary Smith, was a widow aged
seventy eight who lived on her own in a two bedroom apartment on the ground
floor of a house in the village of Hatfield. Audrey Smith, a cousin of the deceased, had for the last five years
visited the deceased twice a day, once in the morning to tidy the house and to
help prepare breakfast, and once in the afternoon. On the afternoon of 3rd April she left the deceased's house at
about 4.30 p.m. at which time the deceased was fit and well and alone in the
apartment. When Audrey Smith returned
to the house at about 6.00 a.m. the following morning she found the body of the
deceased in a water tank outside the house, and the door of the house ajar.
1. The deceased's bedroom had been ransacked and a
lock broken on a locker, but there was no evidence that any property had been
stolen. There were signs of a struggle,
and traces of blood were found in the bedroom and outside the house, which
together with impressions in the earth between the front door and the water
tank indicated that the deceased's body had been dragged by that route to the
water tank. The post mortem report
revealed that the deceased had suffered a number of abrasions about the head
and face and had been killed by strangulation before her body entered the water
tank.
2. The police found fingerprints on two of the
glass louvres of the bathroom window at the rear of the premises. There were fragments of glass on the window
sill inside the bathroom. The window was
some eight feet above the ground and marks were found on the window sill that
corresponded to a ladder leaning against an adjacent tree. Audrey Smith said that she had washed and
polished the window about fourteen days before the murder. A clear impression of the appellant's right
thumbprint was identified on one of the glass louvres. Audrey Smith also gave evidence that
although she knew the appellant she had never seen him visit the house. There were no other signs of a forced entry
to the deceased's apartment.
3. From this evidence the prosecution invited the
jury to conclude that whoever murdered the deceased had broken into her
apartment through the bathroom window at the rear of the house and left their
fingerprints on the glass louvres in so doing. And, as the evidence showed it was the appellant's thumbprint on the
bathroom window, they could safely conclude that he was the murderer.
4. The appellant made a statement from the dock in
which he said he had been stabbed in the chest on 3rd April and had come out of
hospital on 4th April. No other
evidence was called on behalf of the defence, and no explanation offered for
the presence of his thumbprint on the window.
5. The jury, from their finding of a verdict of
guilty, must have been satisfied by the forensic evidence that the appellant's
thumbprint was correctly identified on the window and Mr. Blake has not sought
to challenge that finding. Nevertheless
he has submitted that, despite the fact that the appellant's counsel did not
make a submission that there was no case to answer at the end of the
prosecution case, the judge should have stopped the case and discharged the
appellant on the ground that no reasonable jury could convict on the
prosecution evidence. This submission
did not form one of the grounds of the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, but it is
apparent from the
following passage in the judgment of the Court
of Appeal that it would not have succeeded if it had been made:-
"There is no evidence in the case to
indicate that the applicant had legitimate cause to visit the home of 78 year
old Mrs. Smith. There is nothing to
suggest that he visited her home at any period in the past and the evidence
that the blades were dusted and polished some two weeks before must give rise
to the inference that the fingerprint found thereon was placed there after they
were cleaned. The condition of the home
on the morning of the 4th April 1988 indicated that an unwarranted invasion of
the premises had occurred in the interval between the departure of Audrey Smith
on the 3rd and her return on the 4th. This evidence coupled with the isolation and identification of the
fingerprint as that of the applicant was presumptive evidence of the
applicant's involvement in the crime. His denial is challenged by this evidence. The fingerprint is evidence on which the jury could act in coming
to a verdict adverse to the applicant."
6. Their Lordships find no error in this reasoning
of the Court of Appeal, and are satisfied that the judge was right to allow the
case to go to the jury.
7. Furthermore, it is not the function of the
Judicial Committee to act as a second Court of Criminal Appeal. Matters such as the weight properly to be
given to evidence, and inferences that may or may not legitimately be drawn
from evidence and whether a presumptive or final burden of proof has been
discharged, are to be determined by the Court of Appeal in the local
jurisdiction, and save in exceptional circumstances the Judicial Committee will
not enter upon a rehearing of such issues (see Muhammad Nawaz v. The
King-Emperor (1941) 68 I.A. page 126, Badry v. D.P.P. [1983] 2 AC 297 at pages 302, 303 and Buxoo v. The Queen [1988] 1 W.L.R. 820 at page
822). Although leave to appeal was
given in the present case, appellants should not be encouraged to think that it
is likely to be repeated in similar circumstances in future cases.
8. Finally complaint was made of a passage in the
summing up in which the judge said:-
"Now, Detective Inspector McGhie told you
that when he examined the window sill inside he saw fragments of broken glass,
small bits of broken glass. He said he
formed the view that the blades had been removed from the louvre frame and
replaced and these fragments went there on the window sill at that time."
9. In fact Inspector McGhie did not give that as
his opinion. He was clearly about to do
so, but the judge stopped him from giving it. However the whole basis of the prosecution case was that the appellant
had broken in through the bathroom window and the factual evidence was there to
support it. This one slip in an
otherwise full and fair summing up cannot possibly have affected the outcome of
the trial.
10. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly
advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed.
© CROWN
COPYRIGHT as at the date of judgment.