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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) >> His Majesty's Revenue & Customs v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and SA (TC) (Tax credits and family credit - other, Tribunal procedure and practice - tribunal jurisdiction, Universal Credit) [2022] UKUT 350 (AAC) (20 December 2022) URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKUT/AAC/2022/350.html Cite as: [2023] WLR 2707, [2022] UKUT 350 (AAC), [2023] WLR(D) 224, [2023] 1 WLR 2707 |
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His Majesty's Revenue & Customs v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and SA (TC) [2022] UKUT 350 (AAC) ; [2023] AACR 4 (20 December 2022)
1. regulation 8(2) of the Universal Credit (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2014 (UC TP Regs) provided that where regulation 8 applied, the tax credit award was to cease by operation of law. Whether regulation 8 applied at the material time involved answering two questions of fact, which had to be determined on relevant evidence: (i) whether a claim for universal credit had been made; (ii) whether the Secretary of State was in fact satisfied that the claimant met the basic conditions specified in section 4(1)(a) to (d) of the Welfare Reform Act 2012. The language used in regulation 8(1) of the 2014 Regulations was not concerned with any wider issue of whether the claim had been properly made or the Secretary of State had been properly satisfied that the specified basic conditions had been met. Had that been the intention such language could have been used. Perhaps more importantly, there was no sound basis for reading in language such as "properly satisfied" by necessary implication when to do so would involve HMRC trespassing on the decision-making functions for universal credit (paragraphs 31, 32).
2. whatever the reach of regulation 8 of the 2014 Regulations, the appeal before the F-tT had been an appeal against HMRC's decision under section 18 of the 2002 Act and not an appeal against the Secretary of State's decision that the claimant was not entitled to universal credit. It followed that the F-tT had erred in law in considering that it had been required to determine, as a matter of substance, whether the Secretary of State had been properly satisfied at the time of issue of the stop notice that the claimant met the basic conditions specified in section 4(1)(a) to (d) of the 2012 Act. The relevant issue for the F-tT had been limited to whether the Secretary of State had in fact been satisfied that the conditions specified in section 4(1)(a) to (d) of the 2012 Act were met. That factual question had been answered affirmatively by the stop notice which was received by HMRC from the Secretary of State. Once those two questions of fact had been determined, the only remaining question for the F-tT arising under regulations 8 and 12A of the 2014 Regulations had been the correct date of termination of the tax credits award under regulation 8(2) (paragraphs 28, 29, 31, 33).
A HTML version of this file is not available click here or view below the pdf version : [2022] UKUT 350 (AAC) ; [2023] AACR 4